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Constitutional Right to Private Correspondence Discussed

90UN0546A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by S. Sokolov: "Read—No 'Mines'?"]

[Text] The USSR Constitution guarantees that the privacy of correspondence is protected by the law but, alas, this guarantee is not always observed...

What is accomplished by opening and inspecting mail?
Ye. Maksimova, Balashikha

It is not nice to tell tales, to eavesdrop, or to read other people's mail. In childhood these are unwritten laws which every boy tries to follow at home so as not to lose the respect of his friends. And the "secret agent" of the neighborhood is enough to drive out the desire to play such games. But with age, apparently, people get used to everything, and now it takes a whole article in the state constitution to discourage people who are nosy and like to listen in and read other people's mail: "The personal life of citizens and the privacy of correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraph communications are protected by the law" (article 56).

Why is it that in the Constitution which tries so hard to be concise there are these clarifications—the privacy of correspondence... conversations... communications...? Is a statement guaranteeing the inviolability of private life really not enough?

The reason why the basic document of our state is so scrupulous became clear to me within the walls of the Central State Archive of the October Revolution. Stored here is substantial evidence of state interference in private life—a collection of opened and inspected mail from tsarist times, that is, a collection of "others'" letters read secretly. It is easy to find the Latin word "perlustration" in Ozhegov's Dictionary of the Russian Language: "Perlustration—inspecting mail for purposes of surveillance and censorship." This is why, considering the historical experience of the country's past, our current constitution gives its citizens a guarantee against a repetition of this misfortune—perlustration. Details about how and by whom this was done in prerevolutionary times were given to me by the head custodian of the perlustration collection, Zinaida Ivanovna Peregodova:

"One should clarify that perlustration appeared for the first time in Russia under Katherine II and she adopted it from the rulers of Western Europe. The importance of perlustration increased sharply under Nicholas I when it came to be used as a means of fighting against the 'enemy within.' And with the creation of the country's police department in 1880 seven perlustration points were established: in Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Tiflis, and Warsaw. These points were created at the post offices under the division for censorship of foreign newspapers and magazines."

"Zinaida Ivanovna, at that time how many readers of other people's mail did the police need?"

"Not many. In all of Russia from 40 to 50 people were employed in direct perlustration. And 30 postal workers helped them to pick out the 'interesting' letters. Incidentally, they were mainly educated people."

"I found out from your article that throughout the country in a year approximately 380,000 letters were inspected, from which an average of 10,000 excerpts were taken. What principle was followed in selecting these letters from the general flow?"

"The censors sent two lists around to all the divisions. On the list for the special section of the police department they gave the addresses and names of people engaged in revolutionary activity. According to information for 1904 the list included thousands of addresses. It included the addresses of Lenin, Plekhanov, many activists in the social democratic movement, and social revolutionaries..."

"The second list was compiled personally by the minister of internal affairs. From this list they inspected the letters of social and political activists, newspaper editors, professors, teachers, members of the state council and the state duma and also letters of members of the tsar's family. Only correspondence of the minister of internal affairs himself and the tsar were not subject to perlustration."

"Although it seems to me that the cynicism of the censors even reached them, and they were not supervised. In any case, when reading the memoirs of such an eminent state figure as the former chairman of the Council of Ministers S.Yu. Vitte, who actually did a lot of reasonable things for the country, in his discussion of perlustration I did not find a moral assessment of this phenomenon. The only thing for which he reproached, for example, the minister of internal affairs, P.A. Stolypin, was for the fact that Stolypin frequently used inspected letters of people with whom he was acquainted not for state purposes but for personal ones."

"Yes, the highest state bureaucrats when they learned about perlustration preferred to act according to their own principles. They were not tempted to reveal the strictest state secret. In the materials of the extraordinary investigatory commission of the temporary government there are data to the effect that in 1910 the commander of an individual gendarme corps, P. Kurlov, asked the senior censor to make sure that in the future the letters that came to him not have clear indications of having been opened. A similar request was made by... a proponent of perlustration S. Beletskiy, the director of the police department."

"Incidentally, there are many cases like these. The work of the perlustration points was carefully observed and conducted scrupulously. The senior censor had his own special pseudonym. And the letters sent to him from the police department and the 'black offices' were addressed to 'His Excellency S.V. Sokolov'..."

"You know, Zinaida Ivanovna, as fate would have it I have exactly the same initials and last name—S.V. Sokolov. Therefore I am now doubly interested in finding out my highly placed namesake and his coworkers 100 years ago were threatened with criminal liability if their 'black office' readings were revealed."

"According to the punishment code, an employee could be fired for unsealing letters 'even out of mere curiosity.' And if the content of the letter were told to another person the employee was jailed for from 4 to 8 months."

"From another article of the code we see that if the postal bureaucrat for any reason agrees with someone to give him letters addressed to someone else without the permission of the latter, he is threatened with jail or exile."

"Zinaida Ivanovna, scrupulously studying the past and practically every day holding in your hands files with various names—'Surveillance of correspondence of private individuals,' 'Confiscated telegrams and letters,' 'Elaboration of secret information,' and so forth, have you ever wondered if such files are being kept now as well, in modern 'black offices'?"

"As a historian I am accustomed to believing only the facts—and I do not know of any such facts..."

"There are no facts but the very word 'perlustration' has not been completely forgotten. In the 1987 edition of the Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary it is explained as follows: '...secret disclosure by state or other organs of correspondence sent through the mail.'"

"The privacy of correspondence is guaranteed to us by the constitution, what other guarantees do you need?"—this is the answer I received from almost all the officials of the USSR Ministry of Communications I questioned about perlustration. Guaranteed automatically, all the way? Why is it that many of us cannot shake a feeling of distrust? Why is it that almost every fifth letter that arrives at the editorial offices is marked with lines at the place where the envelope is glued—a naive way of protecting one's text from outside eyes. Why do hundreds of our readers prefer to send their complaints about outrages both in the local areas and in the center by some other means than using the postal services? Because the years of outright trampling on the rights of the individual have taught us intuitively not to trust and to be overly cautious. We have learned from the recollections of Stalin's former secretary that even in the twenties Iosif Vassaronovich calmly listened in on the telephone conversations of all members of the Politburo. Incidentally, it is not really necessary to speak about that time. What about 30, 20, or 10 years ago? Did it happen or not? Yes or no?

For an answer I went to people on whom the attention of internal security organs was fixed at the time. (Concerning the work of the latter the chairman of the USSR KGB B.A. Kryuchkov said recently: "...there were mistakes and shortcomings and, unfortunately, excesses...").

And so a couple of interviews.

Sergey Admovich Kovalev, a biophysicist. In the seventies he spent 7 years in jail under article 70 for editing a samizdat magazine *KHRONIKA TEKUSHCHIKH SOBYTIY* and for reproducing the novel "GULAG Archipelago":

"I cannot responsibly say that this system is in effect now. But in the past there were many cases of perlustration. An acquaintance of mine, the mathematician Boris Isakovich Tsukarman, did an entire investigation of this subject during the seventies. For example, he sent to London exactly 26 seditious letters (so that article 70 would not be applicable) and then found out that the person in England to whom he was sending them had not received a single letter."

"The only thing that bothers me today is that sometimes I receive letters in unsealed envelopes. True, in these cases there is a postmark on them indicating that the letter was received like this."

Lev Mikhaylovich Timofeyev, literary scholar, was convicted for publishing in the West several articles about socialism:

"I am convinced that in this past this was a natural practice for state security. Now I do not know. Although in the two and a half years since I got out of the camp I have not received a single letter that was not torn. And all the letters inviting me somewhere regularly arrive after the event has already taken place."

Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, historian, USSR People's Deputy:

"There is no doubt about the fact that perlustration was practiced in past years. At the beginning of the seventies my brother Zhores Medvedev published a whole book about this entitled 'The Privacy of Correspondence is Protected Under the Law.' In my library I also have recollections from a former censorship worker who left for Israel. They are called 'I Read Your Letters.'"

"Previously my correspondence was inspected but now it is not. I know this for sure because I checked it (using a fairly simple method)."

At the end of November 1989 Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov answered a question about perlustration in *KOMSOMOLKA*:

"I do not know whether perlustration is practiced today. But I know for sure that during the seventies and at the beginning of the eighties my mail was read. I recall a case in which letters were switched in their envelopes. And I received a completely different letter."

This is not proof. This is only testimony. But there is also documentary proof of direct violation of article 56 of the constitution. Some of it was never concealed and now law enforcement organs discuss other proof with no particular secrecy (with the exception of the times, probably). All

one need do, for instance, is read article 40 of the USSR communications regulations to be convinced of the regular encroachment on the privacy of telegraph communications: "Telegrams... directed against the security and state interests of the USSR... are not to be received." Naturally, a vigilant telegraph operator has frequently found sedition in everything, especially in telegrams addressed to party congresses and the Politburo. Then in June of this year the Ministry of Communications changed this unconstitutional article. From now on only telegrams with uncensored words are accepted.

The existence of perustration was officially reported in 1979 to the Leningrader V. Kreynovich by the acting senior assistant procurator of Leningrad, S. Gusev. The fact is that 10 years ago Kreynovich was called in to the rayon KGB division and shown copies of his personal letters to the United States and then was forced to write a confession. But during that year V. Kreynovich mustered the courage to go to the city procurator's office and request that the copies of his letters and his confession be returned to him. To his surprise, he received this answer (which was subsequently printed in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI): "It has been established that the investigation of the aforementioned international postal dispatches was conducted by customs authorities in keeping with article 87 of the World Postal Convention, which gives the postal administration the right to conduct a customs inspection of written material that is sent out. The xerox copies of your letters and your confession to sending them abroad, which the customs authorities sent to the KGB administration, were destroyed upon expiration of the period of storage."

In other words the acting senior assistant procurator confirmed that the copies of citizen Kreynovich's letters were actually kept by the KGB and clarified that they had been opened, read, and xeroxed in customs. Although perustration is legal only if there is known to be a criminal case pending against the writer of the letter and it has the procurator's sanction.

Is perustration practiced in our day or not? If so, unfortunately, we shall not soon learn about it. And if not, thank God, this means that encouraging changes actually are taking place today. The problem is something else: State security organs must public and legislatively confirm that they honor article 56 of the Constitution, that is, they must make it clear in which cases (and such cases are necessary in any investigatory practice) the KGB conducts perustration of letters. Incidentally, the same thing applies to special division of the army. They must legally be the same as ordinary investigatory organs whose rights and responsibilities are clearly defined in the criminal procedure code. Otherwise we shall never get rid of the specter of the "black offices."

Rector of Deputies' Academy Interviewed

90UN0578A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 30 Dec 89 p 6

[Interview with Aleksandr Midler, rector of the deputies' academy, by Konstantin Ryasentsev: "The Deputies' Academy"]

[Text] [Ryasentsev] Why was this new educational establishment called an academy? Did you assume that all of your students will have a higher education? If this is not so, then what is your opinion regarding the widely held idea that academy education is for the elite?

[Midler] The academy for the deputies' corps is an educational and scientific-research center for teaching the deputies, candidates for deputies at all levels, and assistant candidates for deputies. This name should ensure a high level of fundamental knowledge. Supposedly, after graduating from the academy, these students will prove to be well-educated and capable of conceptual thinking and possess in the highest degree the qualifications of a parliamentarian.

In my opinion, academy education is for the elite just in the sense that only the people of great internal maturity, whatever their position in society, will be able realize their education by solving the problems facing our country. In this respect the doors of the academy are open for anyone willing to test himself. For instance, we received an applicant from a 50-year-old driver with a huge, well-digested life experience and we invited him to become a student.

When we created our academy we based the initial idea on that of Plato. Plato did not necessarily deal with only well-educated people; he aimed at students striving to reach the peaks of wisdom. People who seek internal maturity, wisdom, and skilled ways to solve the most complex modern problems have not always been the most highly educated in their countries.

[Ryasentsev] Don't you think that many of the deputies do not have sufficient college education?

[Midler] Yes, I do think so. However, our country is full of talented people and in spite of everything it remains the country of Kulibins and Polzunovs [18th century Russian self-taught mechanics and inventors]. When we select future students for our academy we interview and test them to find exactly that type of person. We are going to use the most modern methods in their instruction.

[Ryasentsev] Such a statement imposes quite a responsibility. With respect to modern methods of instruction, they are obvious: The Sorbonne method, the American system of tutors, Japanese immersion methods... What are the main principles of instruction at the academy?

[Midler] Here is the first one: In a sense the students will both study and teach. At the end of the course every student should be able to change places with any professor. The second principle lies in focusing the students from the very beginning on the final practical result—to create a concept for the development of our country or of its separate regions. We have passed already the stage of appeals to be constructive and some fragmentary attempts to repair leaks; we have put all of this behind us. We are, I think, at the stage of creating complete concepts, i.e. logical, comprehensive formulae of development. Our graduate should know the ways and concrete

terms for the realization of his concept, as well as his own role in it. We cannot let things happen as they do with some doctors: They treat the liver and at the same time destroy the spleen. This is not good for us.

The creator of a concept must ensure that everybody suffering from political, legal, social, cultural, or economic conflicts turns to us for help. And then a general discussion of the student's concept will become its most serious test and in this we rely much on the mass media. Using their enormous possibilities we will ask the people to help us and themselves in the solution of the most crucial problems currently in the country and in various regions. The academy is an education and scientific-research center in the sense that it stimulates the people's creative activity.

Let us not indulge in wishful thinking: No one has a solution for our problems now. The most that we can do is to phrase some questions in front of the entire people, but to do it in a precise enough way so that each of them has the thread balled up inside and by pulling it we could untangle the whole skein. And our academy has been called upon to pose the questions to the country.

[Ryasentsev] How will these concepts be worked out?

[Midler] They will be created after the students study three large blocks of information that we offer them. The first one includes social, political, economic, and legal knowledge as, for instance, theory and practice of political leadership and parliamentary work, optimization of economic and commercial processes, management, and legal training. The second, culture-philosophical block includes a course in the history of civilization and modern parliamentary systems. Here I would like to mention specifically some courses that are not taught practically anywhere in our country: Russology, Sovietology, and Kremlinology. We would also offer to our students studies in social psychology, various styles of negotiation, art of persuasion, and culturology. People's deputies should know how to govern modern socio-cultural processes instead of just going with the flow. And, finally, the main, basic course of our instruction—conflictology. Every discipline will start with the explanation of how that particular subject may help to resolve various conflicts; for instance, the most crucial problem—settlement of conflicts between nationalities.

We will be able to make our instruction highly condensed by making it well equipped from the technical point of view. The NII Informelektro [Scientific Research Institute of Information and of Technical and Economic Research in Electrical Engineering] and the All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information (VINITI) will provide us with audio-visual equipment, computers, and a data base. The third block of instruction in the academy will be made up of "total immersion" method business games. Our readers should not feel any concern just because those games would last up to 14 hours a day. Our experts in yoga and auto-suggestion will help our students to stay in shape. We hope these games will help the students to develop an integral concept as well as the ways to realize it.

[Ryasentsev] What is the status of the academy? It is very important not to let it be manipulated economically by anyone. In that respect, how are you going to deal with financial problems?

[Midler] The academy was created by the USSR people's deputies and the Association of Parliamentary Democracy, through the initiative of its president V.N. Yaroshenko. It was designed as a public, self-supporting organization. Its financial autonomy means its independence and it will be financed through the money given by the founders, sponsors and students, and also from its economic and scientific-research work.

[Ryasentsev] How do you, as the academy's rector, define a Soviet parliamentarian? Did you form that image from the television broadcasts? Or did you do it by analyzing the work and experience of parliaments of the leading capitalist countries?

[Midler] For me the ideal of a deputy of the Supreme Soviet is a wizard. My ideal is based not so much on what I know or have seen (which is the experience of both Soviet and foreign parliaments) but on my feeling about what is most important for a parliamentarian. It is a living sensation of all three stages of existence: past, present, and future. In my view, the trouble with many of our deputies is their work with only past and present. We have an acute shortage of people with the vitamin of future in their blood and that is a special gift. Another big rarity is the ability to see our country the way it looks from outside.

For now we have to admit that Soviet parliamentarians very often are ill-prepared for their work and many speeches at the Congress serve as evidence to that even though it is obvious that the deputies are filled with good intentions. But as it is well known even the guillotine was invented by a deputy and a kind person whose name was Guillotin.

The leading scientists of the country are among our professors and we hope that with their help and through the efforts of our students we will build a center for creative activity and all-country intellect which will find the ways out from the socio-cultural, political, economic, and legal cul-de-sacs of today. So, our main purpose is to stimulate the collective wisdom through scientific methods.

The telephone number of the academy is 165-89-98.

Voters Polled On Deputies' Work

90UN0567A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
22 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by T. Boykova and A. Kostyukov: "Public Opinion Reflects"]

[Text] Sociologists have made it possible for the deputies to see their own work through the eyes of their constituency. It is obvious that sample polling does not become the voice of the people but it does provide some significant information. At least, the polling reports prepared by the sociological

group of the Congress disappear in a minute. That shows the deputies' interest in the opinions of their compatriots.

On 15-17 December the Sociology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences conducted the second round of public opinion polling in 11 cities: Alma-Ata, Vilnius, Irkutsk, Kiev, Leningrad, Moscow, Tallinn, Tashkent, Tomsk, Tyumen, and Cheboksary; and eight villages.

The sociologists note a considerable interest in the work of the Second Congress. Those who are not following it at all make up less than 10 percent of those polled; those who watch it from time to time account for about a third of the total number. The majority of the people gave a positive answer to the question of whether the work of the Congress was democratic enough. People from rural Estonia, Tomsk, Tallinn and Vilnius were least pleased with the level of its democracy (from 41 to 29 percent negative answers).

What is the voters' opinion on the measures to strengthen the economy that were suggested by the government and its opponents? In that respect the voters are no more unanimous than the deputies. The government's stage-by-stage reform was backed more than anywhere else in Tyumen, Cheboksary and Moscow (43.8 to 35 percent of all polled), in villages of Chuvashia and of the Irkutsk Oblast (42 to 38 percent). Those who support the immediate transfer of the economy to market relations make up: 90 percent of everyone polled in rural Estonia, 47 percent in the Leningrad Oblast, 60 percent in Tallinn, 54.5 percent in Tomsk, 46.2 percent in Irkutsk, and only 14.2 percent in Tashkent, and 16 percent in rural Chuvashia.

The idea of strengthening the centralized element, that is to build up the administrative methods in economy, was least popular both in urban and rural areas. It found support only among 2 to 9 percent of those polled, with the exception of Tashkent where this figure jumped to 40.5 percent.

A discussion arose at the Congress about the introduction of ration cards for basic consumer goods in popular demand. What do our compatriots think about this? The most decisive support for the ration cards idea was displayed in Estonia, both in Tallinn and in villages; it was approved by the villagers of Tyumenskaya Oblast, by the people of Leningrad, Cheboksary, and Alma-Ata: 52 to 42.5 percent. Those who live in rural areas, especially in the Alma-Ata, Irkutsk, Tomsk and Leningrad oblasts, are least inclined to live with rationing: 19 to 30 percent.

Well, what do those polled think about the work of the Congress in general? Did it meet their expectations and realize their hopes? About a third of the people answered that it did not quite do that and about the same number gave a negative answer. This evaluation, unfortunately, is not very high but we must remember that when the poll was taken the Congress had not yet exhausted all its possibilities for conquering public opinion.

On 15 December the sociological service of the Congress conducted a questionnaire survey of the deputies. They wanted to analyze, in particular, the psychological atmosphere at the Congress, the connection between the deputies' emotional state and the burden of the political responsibility they are carrying now; they were interested in some other aspects too. The final results of the survey were received on 21 December and we want to offer them to our readers here. At the same time the journalists of our newspaper decided to withhold any generalizations or comments and to let our readers do it for themselves.

So, the sociologists' survey showed, as they think, the following:

The people's deputies feel that the level of their general satisfaction with the work of the Second Congress is considerably lower than at the time of the First Congress. At the beginning of the First Congress 20 percent of its participants were very definite about all their hopes and expectations being realized there; this time only 15 percent of the statements were similar. The number of those who felt disappointment was respectively 14 and 26 percent.

More than half of the deputies (54 percent) now show a critical attitude towards the results of their work. When asked to identify the main problems making their work harder, they named a host of problems and all of which needed to be given first priority at the same time: It is impossible for them to render realistic help to their voters on a whole range of crucial problems; the deputies' requests were not complied with in a satisfactory way; finally, they were short of time, etc.

The situation in the country grew considerably more complex in the period between the two congresses and that was mentioned by 56 percent of the deputies. Because they all felt a more acute sense of political responsibility for everything happening. And it is very difficult to carry such a burden, in its entirety, from a psychological point of view. As a result, according to the data of a sociological survey among the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet (23 November 1989), only 37 percent would like to remain in the parliament for another term.

On the road toward the realization of perestroika the deputies named as one of the main obstacles the intensification of contradictions that exist between the development of democratization, expansion of glasnost, and the ever-worsening condition of the economy. For instance, when asked to evaluate the situation in the country during the period between the two congresses, 65 percent of the deputies spoke of a lower standard of living and a worse economic situation; only 3 percent were of the opposite opinion. But the estimate of glasnost was quite contrary to this: 64 percent spoke of improvements in this respect and only 9 percent disagreed.

We would like to mention here one serious element that transpired in the course of the survey: There is an ongoing separation of positions and the level of consolidation is approaching the "critical mass" of 50 percent. It became quite obvious from the estimates of the report of the USSR Council of Ministers: On the day of the survey 49 percent of the deputies approved it in general and 46.5 percent did not agree with some of its statements.

A similar situation is evident with respect to the legislative activity. For instance, the majority of deputies disapproved laws and acts passed by the Supreme Soviet that regulate economic relations: on property, on land, on leasing, on a unified tax system, etc. Every third deputy disagreed with certain decisions of the Supreme Soviet on those laws.

As concerns the work of the Supreme Soviet in general, the majority—58 percent—of deputies expressed satisfaction with it. However, 37 percent viewed it critically.

And finally we would like to mention the psychological atmosphere at the Congress which is rather complex. For instance, 45 percent of the participants claimed tension as one of the elements of self-evaluation. According to the results of the survey, it also became evident that the conflicts are not caused by the relationship between the audience and the presidium but by the low level of political discussions (stated by 73 percent), by the lack of agreement between positions of various deputies' groups (59 percent), etc.

On the basis of all the results the sociologists concluded that the people's deputies now have entered the stage where the collective self-consciousness is formed and norms of political behavior are being formed. All of this makes us expect an increase in general positive results in their work.

All in all there were 1173 people's deputies polled.

Russian Deputies Club Declaration

90UN0634A Moscow NASH SOVREMENNİK in
Russian No 12, 22 Nov 89 pp 3-6

[Declaration of the "Rossiya" Club of Russian USSR people's deputies; place and date not given]

[Text] We USSR people's deputies, representing a number of regions of the Russian Federation, are, having discussed at a working meeting in the City of Tyumen 20-21 October the general political situation in the country and the position of Russia and, as a whole, the Russian nation in the USSR, uniting in the Russian Deputies Club and declare the following.

First, the Congress of USSR People's Deputies has shown graphically that the Russian delegation was one of the most fragmented and least prepared for constructive legislative work at the Congress. The present leadership of Russia in the persons of Comrades Vorotnikov and Vlasov was unwilling to assume the role of organizing authority in the activity of the Russian deputies and did not attempt even to speak about the republic's problems at the Congress. Inasmuch as the republic leadership does not intend as yet to hold any preparatory meeting of the Russian delegation, the situation could be repeated at the Second Congress also. Second, the current underestimation of the political interests of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and of Russians living in other republics is fraught under current conditions with dangerous consequences for the whole country. This is connected both with the relative importance of Russia in the system of the USSR and also with the very high percentage of Russians in the industry of all republics. The strikes in the Kuzbass, Estonia, and Moldavia should be inducing reflection by the hotheads from the ranks of separatists and the party officials who have of late lost their internationalism and state wisdom and who are indulging the former. It is the duty of people's deputies under these conditions to uphold the rights of their people by parliamentary methods. Otherwise the people will themselves enter the fray, using all accessible means, and the responsibility for this will historically be borne by us. Third, a preliminary discussion prior to the Congress of the position of the RSFSR and the Russian nation is also necessary as a consequence of the fact that as of 1922 Russians, as a nation, and the RSFSR, as a republic, have been deprived of full political representation. A non-Russian structure of administration of the country has in fact taken shape. There were in the People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs all departments except a Russian one. There is hardly anyone today who would venture to seriously maintain that such party leaders as Stalin, Trotsky, Zinovyev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Rykov, who played the leading role in the twenties, in the period when the foundation of the entire state system of the USSR was laid, adequately represented the national interests of the Russian people. Currently, the situation is such that more than 20 million Russians outside of the RSFSR are extremely concerned about their situation and, as the

events in Estonia and Moldavia have shown, have been forced to defend their rights with the aid of strikes since they lack proper representation and legislative protection. The position of Russia itself, with a truncated political and state structure, is on the decline also. And, finally, the latest factor. The meetings of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies which have been held in Moscow have shown that the deputies, while representing chiefly Russian regions, have not been remembering Russia and Russians but have been concentrating attention on general political matters. While not denying in the least the significance of such matters and sharing certain propositions of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies, we believe that under the conditions of the formulation of new principles of interethnic and interpublic relations the specific problems of the RSFSR and the Russian nation as a whole are of no less significance and require special study.

All that has been said above, we believe, is sufficient reason to organize a Russian Deputies Club.

Evaluating the general political situation in the country, the deputies expressed profound concern at the state of affairs in the political and socioeconomic spheres and also in the sphere of interethnic relations. The endless talk about perestroika- revolution by the enemies of perestroika, the partocracy, and left extremists is increasingly wearying and exasperating the people. The three revolutions which have occurred in Russia in the 20th century are no reason to wish for one more and linking with it all hopes for a better future. No one is in a position to provide assurances that the ideals of this new revolution would not be distorted in the same way as in the previous ones and that it superintendents would not find themselves among the first casualties. Only on the path of unification of all healthy forces, and not confrontation, may a way out of the crisis be found.

We are profoundly convinced that all nations have equal rights and are of equal worth. While sincerely welcoming the processes of extension of the national self-awareness of all peoples of the USSR, we at the same time note that if the Russian people remain in the present calamitous situation, the plans for the development of the other peoples of the USSR cannot be realized successfully. Denial of the obvious geopolitical and historical realities in an evaluation of the role of the Russian Federation and of the Russian nation as a whole in the burgeoning state and stability of our state could be of benefit only to political adventurers and the outright enemies of all the peoples of the USSR and could produce nothing more than an intensification of the crisis.

Currently, however, Russians see a dispiriting picture. The pumping of resources from Russia into a number of republics continues via the central budget and the unbalanced system of prices. Russians have found themselves to be unwanted "immigrants" not only in Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia but also in Georgia, which they once saved from annihilation. They will have to submit

to language laws and compulsorily learn a second language and, perhaps, a third, forgetting their native language "through lack of need". At a time when calls for the separation of this republic or the other are being heard, Russians are seeing representatives of these same republics at all their markets and among the people of the cooperative system. But no one asks how many Russians there are trading in the markets of other union republics.

In the four years of perestroika not one political and state structure of Russia other than the Academy of Arts has been restored, the historical names have not been given back to a single Russian city other than Rybinsk, not one new Russian newspaper has appeared and Russian radio and television remain silent. A number of figures of the Inter-Regional Group of Deputies is proposing in all seriousness the withdrawal of Russia from the RSFSR, having narrowed its territory down to the borders of the Moscow Principality. The process of the transfer, sanctioned by no democratic decisions, of primordial Russian land to the inhabitants of Central Asia continues.

All this is taking place against the background of an orgy of attacks on the Russian language and Russian history. The Russian people's contribution to the development of many nations and nationalities of our country is glossed over in total silence here. The Russian family is breaking down, but there is absolutely no discussion of the problem of the appearance therein of a third and fourth child, without which the nation is doomed to extinction.

The long practice of the indigenization of personnel, which has not extended to Russians, has in fact led to discrimination against them at the time of enrollment for higher educational institutions, graduate training, and doctoral studies. Today the educational level of Russians is one of the lowest in the state.

The closing of oblast publishing houses has made the position of Russian talent in the provinces hopeless. Can we compare the opportunities for creative growth and development for the Estonian in Tallinn, for example, where there are numerous publishers, a film studio, and an academy of sciences, and for the Russian in a city of the same economic potential as Tallinn? What is there in Perm, Omsk, Kostroma, Tyumen?

A situation has in fact taken shape where the areas west of Moscow are a facade to where foreign tourists and artists are taken, but eastern, remote Russia is the backwoods. Yet thousands of tons of gold and mountains of raw material resources fateful for the country have been recovered in these "backwoods". The labor intensity of the population and its productivity in these areas are not in the least less than in other regions of the country.

Instead of a serious analysis of the activity of the People's Commissariat for Nationality Affairs headed by Stalin, attempts are being made at the further comminution of the country along national lines and political,

economic, and national separatization, which is in howling contradiction to world experience. The mechanistic principle of determination of the nation and the bureaucratic adaptation of actual reality to this principle are leading the country toward medieval isolation within the borders of midget pseudo-states. All this is totally contrary to the long-term political and economic interests of the peoples of our country and is leading to the mining of the country with new Karabakhs! Particular significance under these conditions is attached to the quality of the republic deputy corps to be formed by the citizens of Russia in the coming elections.

We express serious disquiet in connection with the current attempts to discredit the Army and the decline in the level of the state patriotism of our youth. Euphoria at the expanding foreign policy contacts should not screen the obvious fact that the circle of American military bases around our country has not diminished, that disarmament is as yet a unilateral process and that South Korea has subscribed to the COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Mutual Economic Controls] technology blockade. The linguistic violence planned in a number of republics could cause most dangerous phenomena in the Army, mutual alienation, a misunderstanding of orders, and separatism in thoughts and feelings.

The young people of all republics should be raised on the idea of the greatness of the common Soviet fatherland, the indestructibility of its borders and the monolithic integrity of the country. The state as an idea, the state as consciousness, the state as a military structure—it is on this that the youth needs to be raised! The new political thinking and our country's recognition of the priority of values common to all mankind do not countermand the stern necessity for an efficient Army. Our historical experience in this sphere is too bitter for us to give ourselves over to unwarranted pacifism!

We pose the question of the fate of Russian gold, of a halt to its unjustified export abroad, and categorically object to the calls which are being heard for more extensive use to be made of the country's gold reserves. Transnational economists, both foreign and national, are propounding the idea that gold is losing its significance, but do not for some reason or other explain the reasons for the continuing stockpiling of gold in the banks of New York, London, and Geneva!

Guided by all that we have set forth above and having united in the Russian Deputies Club, we suggest that all USSR people's deputies from the Russian Federation support the following proposals:

1. Allocation of the USSR budget strictly in accordance with the contribution of each republic and a halt to nonrepayable subsidies.
2. Revision of the normative base for the purpose of optimization of the structure of centrally determined prices of manufacturing sector products and resources.

3. Creation on the basis of proportional deductions from the budgets of all republics of an all-union assistance fund in case of natural disasters and catastrophes.

4. Proposing to the second congress the formation of a demographic committee, the holding of special hearings therein, the elaboration of a long-term program and the adoption thereof at the spring session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The use only of democratic principles in the implementation of migration policy and the formation of a special migration subcommittee in the demographic committee.

5. The pursuit of an active official policy in the sphere of the education and training of personnel of the highest qualifications aimed at the proportional representation of all nations and nationalities in the education and skills structure of the country's population.

6. Formation in the RSFSR of an academy of sciences.

7. Formation in the RSFSR of a state committee for television and radio broadcasting and the opening of oblast publishing houses.

8. Real access to the national cultural heritage, regardless of current ideological evaluations thereof. Reprints in a sufficient quantity of national literary, philosophical, economic, historical, and religious classics.

9. Restoration of historical names and enactment of a name-protection law.

10. Use for the patriotic education of the youth of progressive national and historical symbols.

11. A request to the supreme soviets and governments of all union republics for stricter guarantees of the actual equality of all nations and nationalities, regardless of their place of residence. Renunciation of the principle of the division of the nations into "indigenous" and "non-indigenous" as being unconstitutional. Raising the question of the creation of bicameral parliaments in republics with a heterogeneous national composition.

M.M. Astakhova, Belorechensk; G.V. Bykov, Leningrad; N.G. Bykovskikh, Staryy Oskol; S.V. Vasilyev, Tyumen; L.F. Voloshkina, Armavir; K.G. Geyasin, Nevinnomyssk; A.N. Glazunov, Lipetsk; V.I. Glazunov, Kleshchevka Village, Saratovskiy Rayon; A.I. Demidov, Leningrad; G.I. Demidov, Penza; N.P. Denisov, Arzamasskiy Rayon, Gorkiy Oblast; S.N. Kandaurov, Kursk; V.Ye. Karepin, Ulan-Ude; A.D. Kupin, Maykop; V.I. Kostenko, Shchekino, Belgorod Oblast; A.O. Karaulov, Goryachiy Klyuch; V.D. Kotik, Khabarovsk Oblast; N.A. Kirilenko, Kondopoga; A.N. Marmilov, Maritime Kray; V.N. Matyukha, Nefeteyugansk; N.P. Nechetnaya, Klinup; V.P. Pantykin, Vladimir Oblast; G.I. Ryazanova, Perm; N.V. Savchenko, Novorossiysk; V.V. Sobolev, Krasnoyarsk; S.V. Strelyavin, Kyzyl; A.V. Saprykin, Lipetsk; A.V. Shuldeniva, Tyumen.

From the editors: The meeting of USSR people's deputies in Tyumen, whose appeal is adduced above, took

place 20-21 October. Just 3 days later, on 24 October—in development of the process of consolidation of the patriotic forces—the constituent assembly of the "Rossiya" Club of Russian USSR people's deputies and the electorate took place. The founding members were the Russian United Workers Front, the RSFSR Writers Union, the All-Russia Cultural Foundation, the journal NASH SOVREMENNİK, the newspapers SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, the Committee for Saving the Volga, the "Sovetskaya Rossiya" Publishers and the "Yedinstvo" movement. The council of the "Rossiya" Club includes the eminent Soviet writers V. Astafyev, V. Belov, and Yu. Bondarev and S. Kunyayev, chief editor of NASH SOVREMENNİK. The workers' leader Veniamin Yarov, people's deputy of the USSR, was elected chairman. Among the co-chairmen was the commentator A. Salutskiy.

The club's rules record: "The club contributes to the work of the Russian USSR people's deputies by way of the creation of permanent specialist groups; members of the club organize and conduct deputies' meetings with the electorate and the work force; the club organizes public discussion of bills in preparation and submitted for examination by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Congress. The club publishes and disseminates news material."

Club telephone numbers: 298-81-96, 921-43-07.

Prokofyev Moscow Gorkom Plenum Report

90UN0575B Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 9 Dec 89 pp 1-2

[Yu.A. Prokofyev report: "Political Theses of the Moscow Gorkom for the Elections to the Republic and Local Soviets"]

[Text] Comrades!

The election campaign has started and will for a long time to come determine the political atmosphere in the country and in the city.

The elections of next spring will in fact complete the formation of the new political structure of our state and the handover of decisive power functions to the soviets and really advance the reform of the political system.

A political struggle, whose arbiter will be the people, and only the people, lies ahead. As the people decide, so will it be.

Communists are joining this struggle with a recognition of their tremendous responsibility to their party comrades and to Muscovites.

The alignment of political forces is complex. We shall not dramatize the situation but nor can we act the part of detached observer merely recording the facts.

The times demand a realistic, clear, and definite political position by the gorkom [city party committee] on the fundamental current issues, which will determine the program of our practical actions in respect to the elections and for the long term.

Addressing the electorate, we must declare our firm support for the policy of the democratic renewal of the Soviet state and the implementation of economic and political reforms.

There can be no "backsliding". Either progress or profound "failure" are all that is possible.

Either by the highway of social progress or on the periphery of civilization.

We have no intention of indulging in wishful thinking, idealizing all the processes occurring in society and closing our eyes to our common difficulties and our own mistakes.

Even now it is clear that in embarking on perestroika the country's political leadership obviously conceived of it as a serious, but, for all that, cosmetic renovation.

Of course, in April 1985 we did not have today's four-year experience of perestroika, and for this reason much time was spent on individual measures of a tactical nature, and society was wittingly or unwittingly oriented toward the rapid achievement of success.

When, however, the resolve to implement really radical measures was mustered, time was already short.

Economic reform began without due preparation. A number of hasty and at times erroneous decisions led to distortions in the development of leasing, the cooperative movement, and self-management on the job which we so much need.

An inefficient investment policy and the failure of such a socially significant action as the anti-alcohol campaign complicated the country's financial situation. Once again emergency measures to stabilize the economy had to be introduced on the run.

The problem of how under the conditions of the sharply expanding economic independence of the enterprises and research organizations and the development of the cooperatives to balance their interests with public interests and curb inflation and the unwarranted growth of incomes has yet to be solved either theoretically or practically. The present state of Moscow's economy is confirmation of these conclusions.

Contract discipline is weakening before our very eyes. In the 10 months the city's enterprises fell short to the extent of R123.4 million in the supply of products, and one out of every eight enterprises failed to meet contract pledges. Tardy supplies to the city's enterprises from outside may also be measured in multimillion-ruble amounts. And this process is expanding and engendering the disorganization of the economy.

The principle of the growth of profits and income at any price is increasingly becoming the fashion. Both the interests of consumers and the long-term interests of the work force itself are being sacrificed to it.

We cannot fail to be disturbed by the fact that the retooling of production has begun to slow. The introduction of comprehensive transfer machinery has declined by more than one-third in Moscow in the current year. The rate of replacement of the product of the mechanical engineering complex has declined by a factor of two. We are proving incapable of solving many social problems owing to the intensifying technology lag.

The market is in a state of imbalance. Muscovites' income growth is more than doubly outpacing the increase in consumer goods production; hence the galloping increase in savings bank receipts, the empty store counters, the lines, the shortages, and the profiteering. The difficulties of neighboring oblasts are making Muscovites' life even more difficult.

Of course, solving these problems will not be easy. Therefore in joining the struggle for the right to be represented in the organs of Soviet power we must set ourselves the task of preventing an intensification of the contradictions between the social aims of perestroika and man's actual general condition.

However, negotiating the transitional period rapidly is not possible. Speaking in 1921 at the Seventh Moscow Provincial Party Conference, V.I. Lenin observed in the report "The New Economic Policy": "There have come to be more contradictions. And, understandably, there will be no springing out of these contradictions all at once while we are undergoing an abrupt break."

It has to be acknowledged that the party has not achieved a timely understanding of these complex processes on the part of the working masses at large. Perestroika has been inadequately developed in the ideological sphere. M.S. Gorbachev's article "Socialist Ideas and Revolutionary Perestroika" (PRAVDA, 26 November 1989), which was necessary to the party and society, was manifestly late. And we must today, unfortunately, affirm that the party's ideological and political positions have weakened.

There has been a narrowing of the influence of the communist philosophy and socialist ideals. The "vacuum" which has formed is being filled by bourgeois-democratic, liberal, social-democratic, Eurocommunist, anarcho-syndicalist, neo-Stalinist, and even monarchical representatives, and more, by national socialist views and currents. They are persistently seeking their social base and endeavoring to broaden it in every possible way, taking advantage of our ideological sluggishness.

Objective and subjective conditions for a manifestation of powerful outbursts of mass emotions and small-group actions frequently expressed in such extreme manifestations as the strike movement and social extremism have taken shape.

A new phenomenon of social life—populism, to which the lack of democratic traditions and the low level of political culture of considerable numbers of the population are contributing—has been manifested here.

Populism is based on the masses' aspiration to social and national justice, a natural thirst for normal public order, and on faith in a decisive and uncompromising personality who will lead all the opponents of perestroika to "clear waters" and solve urgent problems at a stroke.

The strength of populism lies in merciless criticism of the fact that we are concealing and glossing over the mistakes of perestroika itself. It is not we who are speaking about this, it is others winning authority here. True, they do all the talking and demand of others the actual work.

The ideas of populism are tempting to politicians. But we do not have the moral right to make facile promises and play on the heightened feelings of the electorate, which is now ready, as the people say, to believe in both God and the devil. We emphatically reject the methods of those who at one time promised the people piles of gold but led the country into crisis. We are not utopians but pragmatists in politics with a difficult, but realistic action program based on sober calculation.

We can no longer today play political hide and seek; we need to state plainly what we are "for" and what we are "against". It was not fortuitous that such sections appeared in the draft "Political Theses," with which you have had time to familiarize yourselves.

Why theses and not an election program or platform or appeal?

In our view, political theses reflect to the greatest extent the specifics of the impending elections, which will be conducted at three levels—Russian, city, and rayon. And, consequently, the questions which the deputies will have to tackle will be various.

The communists who are nominated as candidates for deputy have to have an opportunity to supplement the theses with their own program. Only thus will it be possible to take account of the particular features of each electoral okrug and look for the specificity and efficacy of the election programs of our comrades.

We emphatically support the transfer of the plenitude of power in the solution of all vital questions to the city and rayon soviets. Ultimately only they will determine the prospects of the development of the city's economy and social sphere. Having proposed our frontiers in the "Progress-95" program, which was drawn up on the initiative of the gorkom and which has essentially become the economic part of our election policy, we deliberately left out of the draft theses a list of figures and avoided unnecessary details.

No less important a question is the perception of the material.

The document should be concise, but packed with ideas. It was to this that the bureau and the commissions of the gorkom aspired in work on the theses. They underwent a "test of strength," so to speak, during the recent conferences of secretaries of primary party organizations representing three-fourths of all Moscow's communists. The logic and form of this document and our positions were specified in earnest in the course thereof.

It is now up to the plenum. We need once again to carefully weigh and discuss everything and adopt the theses in order to make them public without delay.

The gorkom bureau deems it necessary to call the plenum's attention to a number of fundamental propositions of the theses.

I will begin with the main section, perhaps—on the party.

In the course of discussion of the theses there arose repeatedly the question: Why deal in this election document with party problems? There were doubts, nonetheless, and it was decided that this was necessary.

Muscovites are rightly saying that in declaring the democratization of society the party should itself set an example. Only a renewed party operating in accordance with democratic rules has the right to the consolidation of the progressive forces and the right to the leading role in perestroika.

For this reason our declaration concerning measures pertaining to the democratization of the party and actual steps in this direction will be of the greatest importance for the election struggle. The vast majority of secretaries of primary party organizations demanded the inclusion of this section.

The proposals formulated in the draft theses are based on the ideas and thoughts that were expressed by the communists and nonparty people in the course of the citywide party discussion. As you know, there were doubts as to its expediency and a skeptical attitude toward the debate at the initial stage. But as it developed, it pulled into its orbit increasingly new participants. The main list of questions on which the argument will be conducted emerged.

These amounted primarily to the question of the place and role of the CPSU itself in the political system of our society.

The political theses which we are discussing today reflect our position on Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. It demands particular attention inasmuch as even in the party milieu the attitude toward this question is ambivalent.

The actual mood in society and among considerable numbers of communists, in Moscow at least, objectively dictates the need for a revision of the declaratory nature of this article. But we support definition in the constitution of the place and role of the party in the political

system of the Soviet society and its unconditional right to pursue its policy via the party organizations, party publications and the media and via communists elected to the organs of people's power and working in the system of state institutions.

At the same time it has to be seen that in inspiring the immediate removal of Article 6 from the Constitution extremist forces are essentially striving for a single goal—removal of the CPSU from the political scene and its conversion into an ordinary debating club. Unfortunately, certain party members are taking part in this campaign also.

The aspiration to downplay the party's significance under the conditions of perestroika runs counter to the resolution of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies "Guidelines of the USSR's Domestic and Foreign Policy," which clearly records: "We understand the total importance of the consolidating role of the CPSU as the governing party and as the political vanguard of society."

Summarizing what has been said, it may be emphasized that we are for a change in this article of the USSR Constitution and for a wording thereof which reflects the realities of our life in their dynamics.

A serious question of the debate is the procedure of the formation of the leading party authorities and the election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Proposals concerning the election of delegates to the congress directly in the primary party organizations by party okrug are being expressed. This approach is supported by many people, including the city's large party organizations. However, we need to consider the territorial-production principle of composition and understand clearly who the delegates elected in this way would represent at the congress.

In other words, the election procedure must not conflict with the current CPSU statutes. In a society engaged in building a law-based state the party cannot set an example of legal nihilism.

At the same time we cannot fail to consider that the idea of direct elections to the congress is popular with the communists. For this reason it is being discussed in the gorkom and was at the center of the attention also of the conference of secretaries of the city's primary party organizations. Specific proposals are emerging. It might be possible, say, to nominate candidates for congress delegate by secret ballot in the primary party organizations and then conduct by secret ballot from this number of candidates elections by party okrug, adopting the final decision at city or, perhaps, rayon party conferences.

The right of each communist to participate in the shaping of the composition of the delegates to the party congress would in this way really be assured.

Other approaches are possible also. They should all be examined closely.

One thing is certain—the process of democratization in the party must develop. We already have many examples of the extensive discussion of candidates and choice-based elections of the secretaries of raykoms. But at the gorkom level this practice is only just emerging. There has been criticism also of the procedure of the recent election of the Moscow Gorkom first secretary. The gorkom bureau agrees with it and is submitting for your perusal a proposal concerning the procedure of the election of the gorkom secretary.

It is proposed at today's plenum nominating candidates and conducting the preliminary discussion of them and then affording the candidates an opportunity to set forth their programs, views, and positions in the media. In about 10 days the gorkom plenum could meet once again and make the final decision on the election of the gorkom secretary.

The requirements of the democratization of intra-party life dictate the need for a change in the procedure of the party registration of Moscow Gorkom secretaries, who are registered in the party organizations of the city's labor outfits. I myself am registered with the party organization of the Electrical Plant imeni Kuybyshev.

We believe that there should also be more openness and democracy in the activity of the party Central Committee and its Politburo. We consider necessary regular reports by members of the CPSU Central Committee to the primary party organizations, and by Politburo members at Central Committee plenums.

And our party's Central Committee plenums themselves should at this difficult time, a time of change, be held more often and discuss fundamental problems of cardinal significance for the country's future, such as questions of property and land and a press law, and unfailingly formulate a particular party position.

Comrades!

The draft political theses formulate approaches to the solution of the city's main political, economic, and ideological problems.

The most important thing today is striving together with all the capital's progressive forces for the election to the soviets of deputies who are prepared to take hold of power and use it effectively, honestly, and responsibly for the good of all Muscovites.

We are prepared to support each candidate for deputy who agrees with the fundamental aims of perestroika, recognizes the country's socialist choice, and is opposed to the destabilization of society.

The gorkom's basic policy line is consistent implementation of social and political dialogue. We declare our desire to integrate various social, age, and professional interests of the population and defend them via our representatives in the soviets of all levels.

The policy of dialogue is not simply an election tactic dictated merely by the current moment. The free and open comparison of opinions and a focus on cooperation—this is the normal condition of a party developing pluralism and democracy in society. It is also, of course, a search for prudent compromise.

We sustained considerable losses during the past elections because of our underestimation of interaction and an alliance of all movements and forces devoted to perestroika. Instead of the adoption of joint decisions and a rapprochement of positions, we exchanged rebukes and tried to show one another who understood and would implement perestroika better.

The consolidation of all healthy forces and good will are needed.

It has to be emphasized once again that it is not important by whom one is nominated, just that, nominated, but what his intentions are. [sentence as published]

We are for close interaction and cooperation with the city's main public organizations—the unions, the Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League], and veterans and women's associations.

We actively support the voter clubs. These are today a new form of the participation of the population and the working people in the election campaign. Communists, nonparty people, representatives of official structures and the new public formations are tackling questions and reaching agreement together, as equal voters, in the majority of them. Fifteen representatives of these clubs are members of rayon and city electoral commissions.

We support constructive political dialogue with all public formations operating within the framework of the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws. But we are emphatically opposed to manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism and political recklessness and the forces which are consciously struggling against socialism. Political compromise does not mean ideological compromise.

We are soberly evaluating the program aims of the amateur public formations and their actual political actions.

We support, for example, the United Workers Front in its endeavor to strengthen the party's positions and defend the interests of the working people. At the same time we also see a certain dogmatism in a number of theoretical tendencies and an absence as yet of constructive programs taking account of current realities. Also disturbing is the extreme intolerance of other views and positions which is displayed from time to time even by representatives and leaders of the front.

Cooperation with groups of a social democratic persuasion is on the agenda. Generally, as far as social democracy as a social phenomenon and as an aggregate of ideas and notions is concerned, we need to make an objective investigation, from positions of principle and without prejudice.

But something else needs to be seen also. Some associations and groups attributing themselves to social democracy in practice represent, if at all, only the far right wing of this political movement. Moreover, their calls for the universal transfer of enterprises and the land to private ownership and the permissibility of and need even for unemployment and their demand for the transfer of power to a professional political elite—these are demands to which we take exception.

And it would be utterly naive to fraternize with those who reject the party as society's most important political force and who are actively struggling against it.

Today those campaigning with the "Soviets without the communists!" slogan are united by just one thing—gaining power at any price. And however preposterous this may sound, what is more, there are among them also party members, who are not giving up their party cards merely out of opportunistic considerations. There is no place in our ranks for such people.

Ringling attacks on the party and Lenin distinguish the public speeches of a leader of the Russian People's Front, V.A. Ivanov, deputy director of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology All-Union Translations Center. He has been expelled from the CPSU for failure to comply with the party statutes expressed in a rejection of Marxist-Leninist ideology and public speeches and actions incompatible with membership in the CPSU. This is a natural reaction to the departure of a member of the party from its philosophical principles and a breach of party ethics.

In developing social and political dialogue, the gorkom is fully aware of the need for consideration of the diversity of Muscovites' national interests.

Representatives of practically all the country's nationalities live in the capital. There are national groups hundreds of thousands strong. They have their own distinctive requirements and rightly wish to develop their own culture and language.

We support the humanitarian, devoted activity of the city's national cultural societies. The formation of a gorkom interethnic relations commission will contribute to the intensification of cooperation with them.

But it must not be forgotten that Moscow is not only a multinational city but it is also the capital of the Russian Federation. We believe that the Muscovites who are elected RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies should strive for the complete equality of our republic in the USSR and its mutually profitable economic relations with other regions.

Moscow has historically been a place of attraction for peoples large and small and has taken shape as the center of Russian soil.

Perestroika has awakened unprecedented interest in history. It is no accident that voices calling for the

restoration of national cultural monuments which would return to Moscow its inimitable architectural appearance are being heard increasingly clearly. In this connection we support the proposal of the city organization of the society for the protection of historical and cultural monuments concerning the rebuilding of the Kazan Cathedral in Red Square. Its construction by the people's individual construction project method would be a manifestation in practice of Muscovites' patriotic feelings.

Comrades!

The current moment has called for an intensification of party work, of its ideological component primarily.

Certain steps have already been taken on this path. The Political Education Center has been converted into the Social and Political Center. The gorkom press center is regularly in the news, and a Moscow state institute of public opinion is being created. It is important that this policy line be continued and enriched in the primary party organizations. Without their support, even the most successful undertakings will produce no result.

The gorkom began this year implementation of the "Topic of the Month" information and propaganda programs. A special bulletin is put out regularly for the party organizations. However, work in connection with this has in many outfits developed formally, in our estimation.

As you know, we supported the idea of the creation of rayon publications. There are now 26 of them. One of the virtues of the rayon press is the fact that the leaders of the local authorities may appear therein. We need to continue to conduct a candid dialogue with Muscovites. The future is only for the rayon papers that get as close as possible to local problems and organize topical information and do not descend to purely commercial interests.

I would like to draw your attention to one further proposition of the theses. In the new soviets of people's deputies our representatives will facilitate the transfer of the plenitude of rights and responsibility in the solution of local questions to the public self-management authorities and the creation of a mechanism of public supervision of Muscovites' work, social and recreational conditions, and the state of ecology.

We unreservedly support the process initiated by the creation of the Brateyevskiy Self-Management Committee. We will orient ourselves increasingly in our political work toward this civic initiative.

The self-management authorities afford the communists a real opportunity to show what they are made of at the place of residence also and to influence the course of the election campaign. The social field of residential neighborhoods must be developed by the party organizations at least no less well than in the work force.

The next most important political thesis is social justice. It is the principle of social justice will that is ultimately at the core of the entire socialist philosophy, and it is

with this slogan that the Bolsheviks came to power and won the support of the people.

The actual processes in the city today pose acutely the problem of social justice. We justifiably highlight among the present priorities accommodation.

It needs to be candidly acknowledged that, although practicable, the comprehensive program for providing each family with a self-contained apartment by the year 2000 is in jeopardy.

It is sufficient to say that fulfillment of the control figures of the 1987-1988 program constituted little more than 70 percent. The city is experiencing a most acute shortage of construction materials and equipment. In the current year alone approximately 40,000 workers have quit the construction sites, many of them joining cooperatives. The attraction to the city of specialists from other cities, who are immediately given accommodation, continues. Approximately 2,000 specialists with their families have arrived in Moscow in three years, and providing for them has consumed approximately 120,000 square meters of space.

What kind of solution is possible?

Primarily the institution of the strictest accounting and control of the allocation of accommodation and the enlistment in this of local self-management authorities and territorial party organizations.

It is essential to erect a barrier to departmental claims to accommodation from the rayon and city lists. This will force the departments to develop the direct-labor method in construction more actively. We need to broaden Muscovites' opportunities in cooperative housing construction and the purchase of apartments.

We need, finally, to seek a position where accommodation of different quality is paid for differently. Why should a person living in an old panel five-story building without a balcony and auxiliary premises and with a cramped kitchen pay for his apartment just as much as the person who is living in a modern, more comfortable home? Is this fair?

Complete openness and glasnost are necessary generally when it comes to housing matters.

The theses define our position also in such an important matter as solution of the problem of shortages on the consumer goods market. There is no other way left here than the approval of quite strict measures.

The new soviets, we believe, should seek to ensure that each enterprise and each research institution, the cooperatives, and other organizations on the territory of the city accomplish in full Moscow's social commission for the production of commodities and services in extremely short supply, for the production of inexpensive goods for children and elderly people included.

The allocation to the work force of accommodation and garden plots, the organization of out-of-town trade in industrial commodities, and the securing of food orders should be directly dependent on this.

The soviet of people's deputies, as the true master in the city, must learn to do business in the new manner—to bargain, to liven up the market and to stimulate everything that helps normalize the situation. In other words, to act according to Lenin: Whoever is today invigorating industry, agriculture, and trade, and accelerating the turnover of finances—even if in nontraditional forms—is doing more for the victory of socialism than the person guarding its principles, but doing nothing.

It is essential to protect Muscovites' interests by way of an expansion of the specific provision of the townspeople themselves thanks to out-of-town trade and acceptance of orders at the place of residence.

At the same time, blocking off Moscow to the inhabitants of other regions and selling commodities in accordance with ID would be immoral. Moscow cannot and must not counterpose itself to the country. We are for the just redistribution of commodity resources between our city and the adjacent oblasts.

Securing the rights of the individual and respect for the honor and dignity of the citizens and bringing the rule of law to bear—these also are for us a priority area of work today.

And we need here to straighten out the distortions, particularly in the interpretation of humaneness toward those who transgress. The atmosphere of democratization has in one way or another attuned society to a liberal attitude toward offenders and criminals. Our credo is that humaneness should be displayed in respect to all honest citizens and that they should be reliably protected against the encroachments of the criminal world.

It is essential for everyone finally to adopt a firm position in respect to the growing "shadow" economy and the attempts under the cover of the cooperatives to obtain superprofits by exploitation and corrupt deals. Any instance of the concentration of particularly great wealth in the hands of individuals should be inspected for the legality of the sources of the income.

We can see that it is essential to fundamentally change the cooperative policy of the organs of people's power. The soviet deputies must finally strive to ensure that all city cooperatives, without exception, assist Muscovites in the solution of their vital problems and that there not be among them dubious middleman transactions parasitizing on the shortages. We are convinced that it is not so much administrative as economic measures which could prove effective here.

Benefits and privileges are a large aspect of the problem of social justice.

We are experiencing difficult times, and these difficulties need to be shouldered by everyone, some "select" groups

not being spared here. It is essential to emphatically end the system of distribution not according to labor, which is discrediting socialism.

Order needs to be brought to bear here not only in the party and soviet authorities and ministries and departments but in the work force also.

The social protection of our needy fellow men, pensioners, and invalids is a matter of conscience and honor for Moscow's communists.

There are currently in the capital, as you know, approximately 2 million pensioners, of whom approximately 340,000 are badly off.

Only three percent of pensioners are in receipt of preferential benefits.

The government has adopted a number of measures to improve the life of these strata of the population. However, for such a city as Moscow, of which a hallmark is the high cost of living, now particularly, they are inadequate.

The problem needs to be tackled by way, say, of the creation of funds for material assistance to the needy, as Taganskiy, Krasnopresnenskiy, Perovski, Sovetskiy, Sokolnicheskiy, and Leninskiy rayons have begun to do.

This also means the payment by the enterprises of a one-time cash benefit to those retiring on pension and a monthly extra payment on top of the pension.

And, for all that, the guaranteed minimum living standard should be buttressed, in our opinion, by local budget resources.

The development of the philanthropic movement in Moscow and propaganda of the ideas of charity demand the utmost support.

We support, for example, that all departmental medical and preventive treatment establishments, without exception, be made available to Muscovites in dire need.

We need from the standpoint of the present to revise the citywide "Young Family" program. The demographic situation in Moscow in 1989 was disquieting. The birth-rate has begun to decline sharply. Attention and assistance to young and large families and the very institution of the family need to be intensified urgently.

It is time to switch from pious wishes and talk about the fate of the boys who served in Afghanistan to absolutely specific support for them in their life.

Comrades!

Many of the individual problems, even the important ones, of our huge city cannot be solved without changes in the very status of Moscow and without new approaches to its rights and possibilities.

The scale of the tasks and the singularity of Moscow not only as the capital of the state but also as the largest city with its own economy and social problems demand, in our view, a broadening of the powers of the city and rayon soviets.

A vote at the time of determination of the choice of priorities and paths of achieving the goals of Moscow's socio-economic development and the allocation of resources should be reserved for them.

This is why we consider it essential to enact as quickly as possible the USSR Law "Moscow—Capital of the USSR".

In this same category of measures is the transition of the city to new principles of management. Everything needs to be thoroughly thought out here, of course. But we are quite certain of one thing. The city authorities must have at their disposal all levers of the expenditure of resources received for Moscow's development, centralized capital investments included.

The soviets of people's deputies, and not the ministries and departments, are obliged to be the masters in the city.

I would like to emphasize once again the role of the "Progress-95" territorial-sectoral program in the solution of the problems confronting Moscow.

Individual propositions thereof may be disputed and amended in accordance with changing reality, but it cannot be denied that, thanks to "Progress-95," Moscow already has essentially a ready draft plan for the 13th five-year period.

However banal this idea may sound here, fulfillment of the scheduled plans will depend only on our labor and strong discipline and organization and responsibility.

Our positions expressed in the political theses and our programs and plans will only be worth something if they are based on political will and a resolve to see what is planned through to completion.

We call on the party committees, the organs of soviet power, the public movements, and the work force to emphatically get down to business. Enough of intimidating and weakening one another with talk about the crisis of society. Crisis always means a turning point. Our society also is at a turning point—from the serious illness of stagnation to renewed socialism.

In adopting the political theses for the elections to the republic and local soviets we aspire to the cohesion of the party ranks.

There are more than 1 million communists in the capital. We are counting on their political maturity and their capacity for uniting at this difficult time for the party and the country.

The party must straighten its shoulders and move resolutely forward.

The document to be adopted today must form the basis of the activity of all the city's party organizations.

A most important assignment of the party and ideological activists, members of the gorkom primarily, is to begin to propagandize the main political import of the theses and their basic propositions and to join actively in the election campaign.

We hope Muscovites will support our position.

Reform Winning Battle in Leningrad Oblast

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in Russian 12 Dec 89 pp 2, 3

[Article by K. Rendel: "There Is a Boss in the City"]

[Text] In the past two years LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA has written several times about Sosnovyy Bor in critical tones. Because of the reality there: The youngest city of Leningrad Oblast unexpectedly became an arena for open confrontation between conservative and reformist forces which reflected on a miniature scale the struggle that was shaking up our society. But without "prompting" from the side, and without the urging of the citizenry, communists and non-communists accomplished that to which all of us aspired: They made a beginning to the process of real economic and political changes. This is what my story is about today.

Two persons were conversing in the electric train that was going from Sosnovyy Bor to Leningrad.

"Don't argue!" one insisted. "I say to you once more that: Our ispolkom [executive committee] "has turned green."

"It turned green'..." ironic notes could be heard in the voice of the second person. "We agreed on something, and you believed, and became happy. No, dear, we are just at the beginning of our road."

"We are really still at the beginning of the road," reasserted Valeriy Aleksandrovich Kirpichnikov, the chairman of the Sosnovyy Bor Ispolkom, to whom I conveyed the substance of the unintentionally overheard conversation. "Well, and what color are we? The Red Banner has always been the symbol of the Soviets."

Kirpichnikov became the chairman a year ago. He got the seat just after the serious dispute between the "greens" and the former city leadership about the proposed establishment of a territory for a beautiful natural park with beautiful pines and surviving dunes—the so-called White Sands. As a result, the initial project had to be changed: Its implementation threatened the destruction of hundreds of trees. And the former ispolkom chairman had to vacate his seat.

An overwhelming majority of the deputies voted for Kirpichnikov in the elections for a new chairman. They knew him well: A little more than 40 years old, he is not a newcomer to Sosnovyy Bor. After the VUZ [higher educational institution] and service in the army, he worked in the local affiliate of the State Optical Institute imeni S.I. Vavilov where he advanced honorably to chief engineer. Afterwards, he was elected deputy chairman of the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee].

It seemed strange to many at that time: Why does a "technical virtuoso" with a sound reputation in the collective leave industry? Even the salary in the ispolkom is a lot less.

"I want to see from the inside what the Soviet authority that many criticize so strongly is," Kirpichnikov told me then.

When the results of the voting were publicized, the new chairman warned the deputies:

"If things do not turn out, I will try to be the first to understand this and the first to tell you about this."

He knew what he was getting into. He knew what a purely symbolic authority the Sosnovyy Bor city soviet had, and what kind of authority the "city fathers"—prominent administrators—reserved for themselves. They have the money, they have the labor resources, and they also have the assets. Try not to go cap in hand to the director of the NITI [scientific research and technological institute] when almost all housing is commanded by the institute municipal housing administration! And the general builder in the city is not the city soviet, but NITI's capital construction administration. How does one not secure the favor of the chief of the administration, if he is the one to say whether he will "accept" any site or refuse? And when you cannot accuse him of anything here—the building chief really does not have enough people, mechanical equipment, and bricks for all sites.

I will never forget how, together with one of the former representatives, I went to the former manager of a building site, to request the continuation of the construction of a children's play center, which the whole country knows now—Andersengrad. The builders started and gave up the site. The public attempted to continue with its own resources, but materials, cranes, and excavators were needed. The chief met the mayor and journalists with foul language, promising then and there to send equipment to Andersengrad, but not to assist, but to demolish that which was already done. "I am building the LAES [Leningrad nuclear electric power station]," he averred. "And you, you mother-so- and-so, lose sleep over toys. I am not responsible for them, but if I do not complete the second unit, they will lop my head off."

After an hour the chief switched from anger to kindness. The next day people and machines were at work in Andersengrad. Having deigned to send them, he felt like

a hero to the end of his days. I do not think the mayor felt that way—because he appeared in this story as a pitiful petitioner.

He did not have either the money or the resources for Andersengrad. And nothing was added "under the scepters" of the second and, afterwards, three years later, of the third ispolkom chairman. In resolutions that the soviet adopted, as previously, one could read: "request," "submit a proposal," and "consider it necessary." However, each traveler from an industrial ministry, especially from the famous "sredmash" [medium machine building], felt himself in the role of benefactor. Even a special ritual was worked out: The ministers or their deputies were met on the outskirts of the Lomonosovskiy Rayon and the city, and with an honor escort of the GAI [state automobile inspectorate], they were driven to the NITI or to the LAES. City problems were decided in the directors' offices, and not in the ispolkom or the gorkom [city committee] of the party.

And how they were decided! Only after a conversation about "the main thing" was ended—concerning the start of the next unit or shop. And if the mood of the guest was not spoiled, it was then possible to lay out the proposal of the city soviet.

The "old city soviet" must be given credit for trying to fight against this tradition and this ritual that developed over many years. When, for the first time, the city managers did not show up among those who were meeting a deputy minister, he seemingly did not pay any attention. But when he was given an invitation to make a call on Sosnovyy Bor authorities before visiting the nuclear power station, he retorted: "But I have no questions for them."

"But they have questions for you," the Moscow bigwig was told quietly but insistently (and perhaps with some irony).

Meetings "at the outskirts" were soon ended forever, but putting an end to a system in which the authority of an industry is stronger than the authority of soviets has to this day not yet turned out successfully.

The Fight Is Continuing

"But the emphasis of this fight is shifting substantially," says V.A. Kirpichnikov. "Now, both we and the departments are fighting for... survival. The ministries today are far from what they were even a year ago. The state budget feeding trough has ended for many. The sooner the soviets and the enterprises unite for the sake of a common cause, the easier will it be to overcome the economic and also the political crisis.

The ispolkom, to its credit, foresaw these processes and began to prepare for them in good time. At the beginning of 1989, decisions were made on principal positions: First, all city administrations must be subordinate to the soviet; second, there must be an accurate outlook for the development of enterprises and, consequently, of the

entire city; third, a purely economic method of interrelationships with enterprises has to be found. The fourth position caused a lot of confusion among some comrades: It is necessary for the city soviet to begin to earn money itself, in order not to ask the departments for handouts.

All told for the year, the Sosnovyy Bor Gorispolkom took away from the departments and placed under its own control four-fifths of the housing fund, and it is working toward becoming the boss of all housing. At present, the gorispolkom does not have its own capital construction administration. But the idea of becoming an independent main consumer is ripe and has acquired so many supporters that, perhaps, even this departmental bastion will fall under the authority of the soviet.

In the middle of last year, at a session of the city soviet, approval was given for a specifically assigned program of construction in Sosnovyy Bor to the year 2000. Work on the document moved along with difficulty: The available resources did not keep up with the requirements. The ispolkom assigned deputy commissions and labor collectives to the work. And the work went well! Together, they were able to reduce industrial construction already planned in the city by R100 million [rubles]. It was planned to increase the volume of housing and social construction by about the same amount.

The attack on the departments proceeded simultaneously in two directions—economic and ecological. In the city, where there are a lot of enterprises today that use nuclear energy, it is hardly worth propagating such “zones of risk” any further. The voice of the public that is protesting against the construction of new enterprises with harmful products was supported by the soviet.

It is quite fitting to enter 4 September 1989 in the chronicle of Sosnovyy Bor. On that day in the Kremlin, under the chairmanship of I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the nation's Council of Ministers considered the question of the future of the youngest city of Leningrad Oblast for three hours. The Sosnovyy Bor chairman also took part in the meeting. Up until that time, representatives of local soviets were not invited to the Kremlin frequently. Perhaps this is no longer an exception to the general rule, but a new approach instead of yesterday's approach of—“We see everything from up here, so act accordingly!”

The government, after hearing the opinions of residents of Sosnovyy Bor and their city soviet, banned new industrial construction in the city. It was proposed to the departments that they look into construction that was already started and to report on it to the Council of Ministers. Support was given to the idea of reorienting part of the production to the output of consumer goods and other city needs. A whole series of other decisions was adopted which had been impossible to “push through” in previous years.

Thus, ecology had a perceptible effect on the future economy of the city and on its social program. And that which was secreted from citizens under lock and key during the fight for White Sands is published today in the local newspaper and enables readers to form their own opinions. Incidentally, ecological glasnost made it possible to disprove rumors about an increased radiation background in Sosnovyy Bor that persistently made the rounds and not only in the city. It turned out that the background was normal, and that mushrooms and berries could be picked in a 30-kilometer zone around the LAES. And so that those who lacked faith had an opportunity at any moment to know what the radiation situation was, an electronic indicator board was set up on the facade of the post office. The automatic information indicator will not deceive, and it will say honestly whether danger threatens the city.

Where Will the Money Come From?

The Sosnovyy Bor city soviet needs money, and quite a lot, to implement what was conceived. Where will it come from? Once more go with cap in hand to the departments?

“But not with cap in hand!” says Kirpichnikov. “We can and should take the money of economic organizations and enterprises on the basis of principle. The system of drawing up the city budget requires urgent improvement. I hope that the new law on self-government envisions such a system of economic cooperation of the soviets and enterprises. It should be this way: The better the enterprises work, the more resources fall to the budget of the soviet. With this approach, any construction or development of an enterprise must be economically justified, and it must include interested residents of the territory in it.

But there should also be appropriate levers in the territorial organs of control. It is inappropriate for us to beg. If an enterprise asks a beginner from another city to come to work—put out the pay because he will use the stores, transport, and dining halls.

“The pay for recruits is already replenishing the city treasury. And the soviet is looking ahead. The conversion and economic accountability that are taking place in the country are leading to a reduction in the number of jobs. The ispolkom thinks that if a plant or an institute plans to discharge a person because he is not needed, let them in this case transmit a specific sum to the city soviet. Because concern for each of those cut is shifted to the shoulders of the soviet; since, they say, Soviet authority proclaimed the right to work, let it also implement this. But this should not be done at the expense of the city budget. This is inappropriate? Then before a discharge, think about it. Is it not possible to utilize the person being discharged in another sector.

All of the processes in a city should be controlled by its “parliament”—the soviet—and by the “government”—the ispolkom. This is the position of V.A. Kirpichnikov

and those who think like him. And they have a lot of ideas about how to arrange life in the city.

For example, create the shareholder association "Construction Production" on the basis of the Sosnovyy Bor group of enterprises in Leningrad Oblast. The task—to arrange the output of building materials.

The city might need a brick factory, but without money no one will sit at the Kuhlman drafting unit in order to produce a draft. There is another out! The drafters are also shareholders, and the ispolkom proposes to them:

"Prepare a draft for a plant, and the cost of your work will be a share in the overall business."

The plant will require non-standard equipment. There is a machine building enterprise in Sosnovyy Bor. This means that its contribution also will be evaluated and will be registered as a share in the overall business.

The stock association has already earned the first dozen thousands of rubles by filling an order from the hothouse sovkhoz [state farm] to erect a cottage for its workers.

The initiative of the residents of Sosnovyy Bor and the Leningrad Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] was supported by the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Economic Reform.

We Are Thinking With Our Own Heads

In order to join regional economic accountability more quickly, it was decided to take advantage of the main wealth of Sosnovyy Bor—its intellectual potential. It was not very long ago that every enterprise was partitioned off from its neighbors by high departmental fences. What kinds of scientific-technical problems are these neighbors wracking their brains over as if they did not affect anyone. But enthusiasts were found who decided to surmount the departmental barriers in the interests of the city and to unite the forces of the scientists, designers, and project engineers. That is the way the GNTS—the city scientific-technical council—was born. It is headed by Vladimir Yevgenyevich Sabinin, a senior research associate of the GOI [Order of Lenin State Optical Institute imeni S.I. Vavilov] and a candidate of chemical sciences.

This unusual "office" is guided by the principle: "Money should not leave the city." Why do we invariably turn for help to some industrial NII [scientific research institute] that is miles away from Sosnovyy Bor, when the same task can be performed by "our own" NII or by one of its employees? Perhaps the GNTS will also conduct a preliminary expert analysis of managerial decisions on the scale of Sosnovyy Bor and will help in the implementation of conversion.

The GNTS will become a brain center created by the ispolkom of the city commercial center "Kaskad." This is a state-public organization whose main objective has become the development of the city's sphere of services and the production of consumer goods. The income of

"Kaskad" will bring profit to the ispolkom and will be deposited in a special account in the bank. "Kaskad" has already started to establish economically accountable subdivisions in various directions. The USSR Council of Ministers helped a lot here, by sending regulations on small state enterprises to ispolkoms and, with this, reinforcing ideas engendered in the city. But there were a lot of skeptics and even opponents to the creation of "Kaskad."

Foreign economic ties became an absolutely new direction in the activity of the soviet and its commercial center and enterprises of Sosnovyy Bor. The times are receding into the past when foreigners were not permitted within cannon shot of the young city, except for visits by official organizations which were permitted by a special decision of the Council of Ministers. Negotiations are going on here now about the creation of joint enterprises with U.S., French, Italian, and Hungarian firms. One of the American companies is even ready to open a building materials store and to trade in rubles.

But Sosnovyy Bor residents are attracted most of all by the idea of utilizing their own scientific and technical potential. Quite specific steps have been taken. It is proposed to create an association of city satellites of nuclear electric power stations on the Baltic Sea: To unite forces to increase the reliability of operation of AES's [nuclear electric power station] and to monitor the ecological condition of the region. An invitation to discuss this proposal was sent to the municipal authorities of the Baltic countries through the consuls of these states who arrived in Sosnovyy Bor. The first application for participation in the future session came from the Finnish city of Lovisa, where a nuclear electric power station is in operation. The residents of Sosnovyy Bor believe that they will be joined by the Poles, the Germans, and the Danes.

Before each agricultural campaign, neighboring sovkhozes sent messengers to Sosnovyy Bor: We are waiting! They were waiting for cheap labor in order to remove rocks from the fields, to prepare sowing material, to pull out weeds and prepare silage, to cut grass and to transport potatoes and cabbage to storehouses. And for insurance, they concluded contracts with the Belorussians and even with Astrakhans for the delivery of potatoes and vegetables. The sovkhozes Koporye and Kronstadtskiy (right next to Sosnovyy Bor) were never confident that what they grew could be sold in the city because contracts were concluded with competitors from remote krays.

But authoritative delegations from Sosnovyy Bor and the Lomonosovskiy Rayon met not long ago and held talks on business:

Let us develop a relationship on a new foundation. The city and its enterprises will really undertake farm mechanization and the introduction of new technology in the fields, and they will help put an end to losses that occur during transportation. And the villagers will start to send

all of their products to us. You have the products, and we have a developed industrial base. With help of this base, it is possible to build a processing industry. Because it is absurd when milk is transported from "Koporye" to a plant in Lomonosov, and after processing it is delivered to Sosnovyy Bor residents, or even to Koporye itself! The ministry, to which a majority of the Sosnovyy Bor enterprises belong—Minatomenergoprom [Ministry of Atomic Power Industry]—is now also producing milk plant-modules. If such a plant is set up in Sosnovyy Bor, the need for long distance transport will fall off, the city will be supplied with milk, and, indeed, the neighboring villages and hamlets will no longer be offended.

The ministry gave a "well done" to the delivery of a plant- module. Now work is being done on other ideas and possibilities- -the establishment of a sausage shop, the production of non- alcoholic beverages, and a shop for processing vegetables.

"We are pleased with this partnership," said V.M. Nelyubov, the first secretary of the Lomonosovskiy Raykom [rayon party committee], "the volume of production and the processing of products is adequate for the population of the villages as well. The estimates are convincing that the benefits are unquestionable."

And I.G. Kurbatov, the director of the sovkhos Sosnovoborskiy, immediately noted that the collective is ready to grow for their kinsmen an entire assortment of greens for the table, having leased areas from neighboring villagers.

A second program will be added to this one—the acquisition of potatoes, vegetables, fruit, and berries in the yards of Sosnovyy Bor residents. Now, every second family in the city has a garden or kitchen garden. Last year, so many strawberries were harvested that berries could be bought in the stores very easily at state prices and without standing in lines. In recent years, quite a few small country houses and settlements have sprouted up among the vegetable patches and gardens, and there will be even more of them. In addition, about 200 hectares have been allocated for gardeners. A comprehensive program has been developed and is being implemented in order to speed up the erection of buildings. It includes the apportionment of bank loans, the supply of building and planting materials, transport, the provision of rental equipment, and assistance to project engineers.

The fate of cities is not being decided now behind closed doors or in the quiet of offices which a simple mortal has difficulty getting into. And while it was only a year to a year and a half ago that people who were capable of untying difficult knots had to be "dragged" to the soviet, today these people go by themselves and are eager to join in on a problem. Many decisions are being made together, and, together, a road is being laid to what is new. The flow of ideas and proposals became especially intense in the days of the preelection campaign. The programs of the candidates for deputy and the mandates of the voters are a truly inexhaustible spring of ideas. But

in order for them to take on flesh and blood, there is an equal need for a passionate desire to put them into practice. And also a collective desire!

Has everything been done in Sosnovyy Bor? Of course not. There are enough problems and conflicts here. That is the way it should be—animated people are making perestroyka. But one thing is obvious: Perestroyka has really come to the young city, and now its movement backward cannot be allowed.

Leningrad Party 'Protest Meeting'

90UN0656C Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 7 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by V. Koshvanets, A. Ozhegov, and Ya. Strugach: "What Will the Response Be?"]

[Text] We will stipulate immediately. Only time and, more accurately, specific actions by Leningrad residents, will provide a final answer to the question raised in the headline of this report. But the question was not asked accidentally. Recently, in many oral and written statements to the editorial office and to party and soviet organs, Leningrad residents have been making statements more often about the fact that they are tired of the talkathon that has befallen society and of the endless verbal battles that have not made store counters any richer, nor the life of city folk any more tranquil and secure.

Neither did a multi-thousand meeting of Leningrad communists held on 22 November at the V.I. Lenin SKK [sports and concert complex] escape this kind of censure. "This talkathon just has to come to an end," writes, for example, bookkeeper N. Klyagin to the newspaper. "All kinds of 'informals' jabbered then, and now party members also have taken to twaddle. But who will work?..."

We will not start to applaud such opinions: We will not be able to move forward if we do not plead, explain positions to one another, and define clear reference points for the future development of perestroyka. Words have been and remain effective weapons in the struggle for renewal. It is another matter how they are perceived in the hearts and minds of people, whether they will serve the unification and consolidation of our forces, resolve the social, economic, and political problems that trouble us, or lead to a new word debate or even to a confrontation that no one needs.

Thus, what were the words that were heard yesterday at the mass meeting of Leningrad residents in the SKK imeni V.I. Lenin calling us to? To a meeting which was organized by a number of public formations of the city and which was called a "Protest Meeting" on leaflets that appealed to people to attend.

It is obvious that after familiarizing ourselves with these leaflets we expected to see the direct opposite of that which we observed on 22 November. And we did not see it. A good half of the slogans and posters which the

crowd brought with them were very reminiscent of or duplicated those that were here, in front of the SKK, two weeks ago. "There is no private property!" "From dialogue—to unity," "For political stability and democratization!" "We support the platform of the Leningrad communists," and "No to fronts—yes to parties!"

True, there were also posters which we had not encountered previously: "72 years of party dictates," "Editorial staff of LENPRAVDA—retire!", and "Boris, you are wrong..." But in the final analysis that is why there are meetings, so that people can come to them with different slogans.

But when one speaker after another started to come to the microphone, from time to time we got the impression that we were present at a continuation of that meeting two weeks ago. It is enough to say that out of 22 speakers only several persons did not belong to the party.

Well, then, is this a new meeting of Leningrad communists? Then why the designation here of "protest meeting." But the main thing is—what is the protest against?

The meeting had not yet started when one of its organizers, N.M. Arzhannikov, turned to those who had assembled with an appeal to observe law and order and to be restrained. For example, with respect to those who appeared on the square "with different kinds of slogans."

"Let those who were sent here work off their pay," a former militia captain concluded in his short speech. Unfortunately, it was not possible to specify precisely which posters he thought were not included in the planned program.

In any case, among the slogans there were quite a few that directly supported and approved the platform of the Leningrad party organization which was adopted at a joint plenum of the obkom [oblast party committee] and the gorkom [city party committee] of the CPSU, or individual clauses of this political document: "We are for socialism without private property!"; "For direct elections of delegates to the congress;" "For perestroika in the party!"

And not only slogans: Almost everyone who took the floor at the meeting deliberately or unwittingly related his speech to the ideas of the platform, which clearly expressed aspirations to cooperate with progressive public movements in the implementation of economic and political reforms and with the formation of organs of Soviet authority.

At the same time, a number of speakers subjected the platform to a torrent of attacks. Most of the time the criticism boiled down to the critical question: Did the Leningrad Obkom do everything to revitalize the city and to make the economy of the region dynamic before demanding an answer from the CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo, on whose initiative perestroika was in fact started? This was discussed from the rostrum at the beginning of the meeting by P.S. Filippov,

one of the leaders of the Leningrad People's Front who called on those assembled to think about this and express their opinion. And those who wanted to did not wait long.

"Are there really no members of the Central Committee of the party among the party leaders of the city," said S.M. Podobed, chief engineer of the holiday hotel "Zarya," and a former candidate for USSR People's Deputy, speaking from the rostrum. Then, perhaps, we should at the beginning ask them for a report of activities.

In the opinion of Captain Second Rank V.V. Sergeyev, the apparatchiks in the armed forces, in this case the political organs of military units, as well as the partocracy, hamper the development of political processes in society. In general, the long familiar confrontation of the apparatus versus the people, and the apparatus versus the party organization, could be heard fairly often on the square.

Lawyer Yu.M. Luchinskiy identified among administrators of various ranks one, as he saw it, dominating feature of activity—"the fight for a seat," even comparing it with the child's game of commanders. We will not try to judge how appropriate such a comparison is. But his warning about some kind of a conspiracy that is threatening the general secretary of the party Central Committee frankly seems to us to be really a fabrication in the manner of staff games.

Other speakers, thank god, did not prophesy in the speeches about "conspirators"; however, they willingly shared their suspicions, for instance, of peculiarities like this: A number of the provisions of the platform (particularly concerning Article 6 of the Constitution) appeared in it only because those same infamous apparatchiks made concessions to democratic forces with the hope, owing to this, of gaining deputy seats.

There were plenty of various kinds of criticism. To begin democratization, first of all, with oneself and with the party organizations of the city—this is the demand of the times, the speakers emphasized. In this connection, G.A. Bogomolov proposed convening a special conference of Leningrad communists of the worker association "Lenpoligrafmash" [Leningrad polygraph machinery]. There were other proposals also.

Of course, a rally is a rally and it is difficult to expect an elaboration of clear positions from it, no matter how it is organized. Nonetheless, in the current critical political situation all of us need at least small steps forward. Well, were they taken yesterday, and were at least some kind of new ways out of the crisis proposed? Approving exclamations of thousands of people resounded more than once over the square. Afterwards, listening to a tape recording, we noted that outbursts of emotion greeted such demands as "examine and adopt constitutional principles on the Laws on Property, Land, and Leasing... about freedom of speech and the press," which were in

the resolution, and which were read out by Yu.N. Nestorov, a member of the coordinating council of the LNF [Leningrad People's Front]. That is, demands for that which has already published in the newspaper for national consideration.

The words of another speaker—S.Yu. Andreyev—that economic reform was obviously being sabotaged, were received with approval. It was precisely this thesis that was formulated with alarm more than once in different words by many Leningrad administrators at various kinds of meetings and in the mass media. There also has been no disagreement, and there is no disagreement, with the main idea of Docent A.V. Boltyanskiy who spoke at the rally about the fact that deserving Leningrad residents have to be elected to the soviets and that authority must belong to the people.

In fact, by separating ideas from emotion and arguments from slogans you discover how insignificantly our political views differ. Of course, we will still argue a lot and heatedly with respect to democracy, and private property, and cooperatives, and a multi-party system; however, each such argument, even one that is transformed into a rally, is like a race in a circle in which the participants never get ahead of each other. The reason for this again is in a superficial understanding of the subjects which are under discussion, and in some kind of childish fear of "capitalistic" terms, on the one hand, and in a naive hope of overcoming bureaucratism with appeals to pluralism, on the other hand.

So that to say that yesterday's rally became a step toward something would be too optimistic. However, there is one circumstance that compels us to assess it as an event of no small importance in the life of Leningrad, ranking with later events in the activity of Leningrad party organizations right up to the meeting of 22 November. We have in mind the resolution adopted yesterday—a document, in our view, that is cleansed of superfluous emotions and that is sufficiently weighed and well thought out. It says, in particular: "Taking into account the just criticism directed at the CPSU Central Committee for sluggishness and inconsistency in conducting reforms, we believe that no less responsibility for the catastrophic situation in Leningrad is borne by the Leningrad Obkom and the gorkom of the CPSU. Today, each party and public organization must become an initiator of democratic changes, not waiting for instructions from above... The line of separation does not pass now between those who are numbered among supporters or opponents of socialism, nor between the intelligentsia and workers, nor between representatives of various nationalities, but between adherents to the administrative-command system on the one hand and the supporters of democracy and the sovereignty of the soviets and a market economy on the other hand.

And although similar assessments were heard not long ago at the plenum of the Leningrad Obkom and gorkom

of the party, they logically supplement all those documents whose implementation is now one of the main tasks of the Leningrad communists.

And yet another thought automatically comes to mind, when you recall what was seen and heard at yesterday's rally. Incidentally, the thought was expressed in the speeches of many of the speakers: We will not move perestroika forward, we will not bring order to internal party affairs, and we will not resolve any other problems until we learn at least to listen to one another in an unbiased way, and to seek the truth in conflicts and in the comparison of different points of view, and not reasons for confrontation. We frequently are not able to do this. This, in particular, was shown by the reaction to the speech of B.V. Gidasov, USSR People's Deputy. Even when he talked about a fact which was received with applause earlier, for example, about the need to elect people to local soviets who are honest and industrious—the response was dissatisfied buzzing and shouts.

Yes, all of us, including communists, are different people, and we can have very different views about the very same facts and phenomena. But is not perestroika a search? A joint search for the resolution of problems that trouble us, and ways to get out of blind alleys.

And until we understand this, it is hardly likely that our words will result in a cause that unites everyone.

Belorussian Resolution on Elections

90UN0629A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 5 Dec 89 p 1

[Resolution adopted by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet in Minsk on 4 December: "On Setting the Elections of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR and of People's Deputies of the Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR, 21st Convocation"]

[Text] In accordance with Article 79 of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Articles 14 and 15 of the Belorussian SSR Law on "Elections of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR," and Article 14 of the Belorussian SSR Law on "Elections of People's Deputies of the Local Soviets of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR," the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic resolves:

1. To set elections of people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR and people's deputies of the local soviets of people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR, 21st convocation, for Sunday, 4 March 1990.
2. To establish the electoral norm of one electoral district per 23,100 voters for the elections of people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR.

3. To extend the term of office of deputies of local soviets of people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR, 20th convocation, until the election of people's deputies of the local soviets of people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR of the new convocation.

Prior to the formation of presidiums of the local soviets of people's deputies, their functions will be carried out by the executive committees of the corresponding soviets of people's deputies.

N. Dementey, chairman of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

L. Syroyegina, secretary of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

4 December 1989, Minsk.

Belorussia Forms Election Commission

90UN0629B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 5 Dec 89 p 1

[Resolution adopted by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet in Minsk on 4 December: "On the Formation of a Central Commission on Elections of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR"]

[Text] Having examined the proposals of the executive committees of oblast and the City of Minsk soviets of people's deputies, and republic-level organs of social organizations, on the basis of Article 20 of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Law on "The Elections of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR," the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR resolves:

To form the Central Commission on Elections of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR, comprised of the following:

Commission chairman: Mikhail Ivanovich Lagir, chairman of the Belorussian SSR People's Control Committee;

Deputy chairman: Semen Stepanovich Mokhovikov, first deputy director of the department for party organization and cadre of the Central Committee of the Belorussian Communist Party;

Deputy chairman: Nikolay Ivanovich Rosh, secretary of the Belorussian Republic Council of Trade Unions;

Commission secretary: Ivan Vasilyevich Likhach, director of the department on the functioning of the soviets of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet;

Members of the commission:

—Galina Ivanovna Volotkevich, worker at the Orsha Flax Combine;

—Anatoliy Tikhonovich Glaz, first secretary of Belynichskiy Raykom [rayon party committee] of the Belorussian Communist Party;

—Stepan Grigoryevich Drobyazko, law faculty professor at the Belorussian State University imeni V.I. Lenin;

—Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Zhuk, deputy chief editor of the magazine POLYMYA, member of the presidium of the board of the Belorussian SSR Writers' Union;

—Grigoriy Vladimirovich Kozhuro, chief veterinarian at the Sovkhoz [state farm] imeni Gastello, Molodechnenskiy Rayon;

—Anna Iosifovna Lapa, teacher at the Strubnitskaya Incomplete Secondary School, Mostovskiy Rayon;

—Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Osipenko, secretary of the Central Committee of the Belorussian SSR LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth League];

—Yekaterina Vladimirovna Petrovskaya, director of the stock-raising farm of October Kolkhoz [collective farm], Lyakhovichskiy Rayon;

—Yevgeniy Stepanovich Porfenyuk, rural dean of Brest Orthodox District, Father Superior of Brest Cathedral;

—Anatoliy Anatolyevich Rodnikov, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District;

—Konstantin Semenovich Romanchenko, deputy chairman of the City of Minsk Council of War and Labor Veterans;

—Valeriy Guryevich Tikhinya, Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice;

—Leonid Afanasyevich Tozik, brigade leader of the comprehensive production brigade of the "Minsk-promstroy" Construction and Assembly Association;

—Valentin Vladimirovich Fedotov, apparatchik at the organic synthesis plant of the "Khimvolokno" Mogilevskiy Industrial Association imeni V.I. Lenin;

—Nadezhda Mikhaylovna Shershneva, brigade leader of assembly workers at the Gomel Plastics Industrial Association.

N. Dementey, chairman of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

L. Syroyegina, secretary of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

4 December 1989, Minsk.

Belorussian Official on Upcoming Election

90UN0629C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in
Russian 5 Dec 89 p 1

[Speech by People's Deputy V.A. Mikulich, deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet: "On Elections of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR and Deputies of Local Soviets of People's Deputies"; place and date not given]

[Text] Dear Comrade Deputies!

Our session takes place on the eve of the Second USSR Congress of People's Deputies and during the period of widely developing effort in preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress. Tied in with the party's political platforms and its practical activity the Soviet people see successes in the further development of perestroika towards creating a new quality of socialism—a highly economically effective, human, and democratic socialism.

Fundamental economic reform is being carried out in the country. Reform of the political system has entered a new stage.

As you know, the first stage of political reform comprised the formation and functional beginnings of new central organs of authority and rule.

The second stage of this reform will entail a renovation of the entire system of the organs of state authority on republic, oblast, city, rayon, and village level.

In this manner, the principle of sovereignty of the soviets will gradually attain its full embodiment at all levels of the leadership and government of society.

This will have tremendous significance with regard to ensuring success in the policy of perestroika, and in the accomplishment of economic and social tasks.

Among the laws, very important to the life of the republic, which were adopted following universal discussion at the earlier 12th session of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet were those:

—On amendments and additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Belorussian SSR;

—On the elections of Belorussian SSR people's deputies;

—On the elections of people's deputies of local soviets of people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR.

Renovation of the electoral system is in complete accord with the spirit of perestroika. It will facilitate the development and expansion of democratic processes, and will consolidate freedom in effecting the will of the people.

As you know, the Belorussian SSR Constitution and its laws on elections provide that elections of people's deputies be set for not later than three months prior to the expiration of term of office of the soviets.

The term of office of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation, ends 24 February 1990; that of the local soviets, 20th convocation—in December of this year.

It is therefore necessary to extend their term of office until such time as the new soviets are elected.

The Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet presents for your consideration the proposal: To conduct simultaneously the elections of Belorussian SSR people's deputies and the deputies of local soviets, 21st convocation, on Sunday, 4 March 1990.

In accordance with the Belorussian SSR Constitution and the Law on Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies, the Belorussian Supreme Soviet will consist of 360 deputies. 310 of these are to be elected directly in the electoral districts, and 50—by the following social organizations:

—Belorussian Republic Council of War and Labor Veterans;

—Belorussian Society of the Disabled;

—Belorussian Society of the Blind;

—Belorussian Society of the Deaf.

According to the data of executive committees of oblast and City of Minsk soviets of people's deputies, there are more than 7 million voters in the republic. On the average, 23,100 of these will comprise one electoral district.

This figure is proposed for inclusion in the Supreme Soviet resolution "On Setting the Elections of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR" as the norm with regard to the formation of electoral districts.

Based on Article 20 of the Belorussian SSR Law on "The Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies," the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet forms—not later than 90 days prior to the elections and upon proposal of oblast and City of Minsk soviets of people's deputies, taking into account the views of labor collectives and republic organs of social organizations—the Central Commission on Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies.

It should be kept in mind that the Central Commission on Elections of People's Deputies of Local Soviets is not formed for the simultaneous conduct of elections of Belorussian SSR people's deputies and people's deputies of local soviets. Authority is exercised by the Central Commission on Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies, as provided by Article 18 of the Belorussian SSR Law "On Elections of People's Deputies of the Local Soviets of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies."

The commission is comprised of a chairman, two deputies, a secretary, and 15 members—19 individuals in all.

Selection of candidates to the Central Election Commission was accomplished by the executive committees of the soviets on a competitive basis.

A proposal on the composition of the Central Election Commission, based on statements and concepts received by the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, is presented for your consideration. You have a listing which shows its composition.

The listing includes representatives of the working class, of the kolkhoz [collective farm] peasant population, of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, of party, soviet, trade-union, and Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] organs, of veteran and other social organizations, and of servicemen. Fourteen of them have higher educational background, including two in the field of jurisprudence.

It is proposed that Comrade Mikhail Ivanovich Lagir be confirmed as chairman of the commission.

We have every reason to believe that the Central Election Commission, in this composition, will be able to exercise its authority in highly qualified, competent fashion.

It is proposed that appropriate resolutions of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet be adopted regarding these matters. You have received a text of the draft resolutions.

Estonia Justice Minister on Sovereignty

90UN0583A Tallinn KOMMUNIST ESTONII in Russian No 11, Nov 89 pp 18-24

[Article by A. Kiris, Estonian SSR Minister of Justice, candidate of legal sciences: "A Rough Road To Restoring Sovereignty"]

[Text] A year has passed since an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic adopted the Declaration on Sovereignty of the Estonian SSR, and introduced amendments and additions into the Fundamental Law in accordance with it.

Other events followed: On 26 November 1988 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet declared the most important innovations in the republic's acts to be invalid; in December the USSR Supreme Soviet made constitutional changes of a radical nature, based on which an entirely new organ of state authority was elected and this year began its work—the Congress of People's Deputies. A number of other political-legal events took place which were of greater or lesser significance.

The decisions of principle of 16 November last year create a kind of background for the internal political life of the republic in which the events of reforming our political system are developing. To this day there has not been a reasonable resolution to the constitutional conflict between the USSR and the Estonian SSR which

arose following adoption of the Declaration on Sovereignty and amendments to the Fundamental Law. Variations in interpreting the rightfulness and legality of the acts adopted in Estonia have not been eliminated.

The ambiguity regarding the acts of last year is caused chiefly by diverse political concepts and aims of the individuals involved. It finds expression primarily in the varied approaches to state sovereignty, and in this instance to reciprocal political-legal ties between the Soviet Union, as the integral federation entity, and the union republic, as a part of it.

Opponents of the 16 November decisions cite in their argument both the Ukaz of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and provisions of the USSR Constitution presently in effect. In the final analysis, the whole issue amounts to whether or not a union republic, within the structure of the USSR, is genuinely a sovereign state, what kind of state-judicial reciprocal relationship exists between the union and union republic, and what kind it should be. The problem is a complicated one because in the theory of state and law there do not yet exist satisfactory, unified interpretations of the sovereignty of members of a union (federated) state. More often than not attempts are made to explain or justify the legal status of one particular state or another in pragmatic terms. In order to better understand the constitutional conflict in question, it is necessary to make at least a brief excursion into the general theory of state sovereignty and federalism.

In analyzing the concept of sovereignty it should not be forgotten that this has undergone change during the process of historical development. In the past the bearer of sovereignty (sovereign) was considered to be the monarch, parliament, people, or state. Modern theory distinguishes between sovereignty of the people, expressed in the undisputed right of a nation to self-determination, and the sovereignty of a state as a determinate quality of state power. In its simplest formulation, state sovereignty consists of the supremacy, indivisibility (absoluteness), and independence of state authority. This means that a sovereign state itself determines the limits of its authority on its own territory, and its highest organs do not share this authority with anyone else in the state. Moreover, the sovereign state is independent in exercising its authority—no one from without has the right to wield it.

This is the classical model of a sovereign state. But the parameters set forth above cannot be put into absolute terms. It is important to keep in mind that, under conditions of reality, state authority is never absolutely free—neither internally nor in foreign relations. Within the state we must take into account economic capabilities, the interests of diverse social strata and classes, the correlation of political forces, etc. The state is obligated in its external dealings to observe the terms of concluded treaties and the norms of international law. In this regard, the conduct of a sovereign state is dictated—in both domestic and foreign relations—by the free will of

its own supreme authority, and not by the contradictory will of internal or external coercion.

It is evident that certain particular features are characteristic of the sovereignty of a state which has joined into some kind of association. The state which has entered into an association or union voluntarily gives up a portion of its sovereign rights to the union, and obtains some kind of significant advantage by virtue of this.

Theory distinguishes between unions of states, or confederations, and union states, or federations, by the nature of the associations themselves and by the legal status of their member states.

A confederation is established by international treaty concluded most often for military or economic aims. Members of the confederation remain subjects of international law and retain their sovereignty and citizenship.

A federation can be formed in various ways—on a primal, contractual basis (the USSR, for example), resulting from the constitutional development of a state (Brazil), owing to the fact that ties between confederation members have become closer (United States), etc. The state structure of a federation and the system according to which its organs of authority operate are usually closer to unitarianism, with its unified state authority, territory, and citizenship. The subject of international law is the union as a whole, and member states cannot leave the federation. At the same time, its participants have rather broad rights and freedom of action in the sphere of economics, politics, self-rule, and legislation.

Confederations are generally considered not very solid unions of states, which disintegrate immediately with changes in the economic, political, or military situation, i.e., when the states united no longer share common interests. Federations, which often approach a unitarian structure thanks to strong, centralized state authority, are much more stable, especially since the subjects of such an association are, as a rule, denied the right to leave the federation.

These are the overall characteristics. At the same time, the history of confederations and federations holds many examples which do not fit into any theoretical scheme. The most powerful argument against the theory that confederations lack stability is the classic Swiss Confederation, preparing to celebrate its 600th anniversary.

The USSR as a federated association of states grew out of an original union of a confederate nature entered into by the Soviet republics of that time—the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belorussia—over the period 1919-1922. In 1922 the documentary basis for a new association was constituted by the Declaration and Treaty on Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which the Trans-Caucasus Socialist Federated Soviet Republic joined. The Declaration and Treaty became part of the text of the union Fundamental Law.

On the one hand, the birth of the USSR by virtue of a treaty among states points out its confederate nature. It is natural, therefore, that member states of the union retain their sovereignty within its system. As a guarantee of this, the treaty reserved for each union republic the right to freely leave the union.

On the other hand, an extensive and detailed enumeration of the functions of central authority envisaged by the treaty during the creation of the union showed its disposition for unitarianism, which grew stronger with further development.

The Declaration and Treaty on Formation of the USSR were excluded from the USSR Constitution adopted in 1936. All mutual relations between the union and union republic are regulated today only by the USSR Constitution—it is the Constitution which must provide an answer to the question of the sovereignty of the Estonian SSR.

Let us first examine the historical and legal aspects of the problem.

Over the USSR's more than 60 years of existence 15 completely different states and state formations have joined it in one form or another. Each of these traveled its own historical journey prior to this time, bringing along its own experience and level of political development, its distinctive political and legal culture. This is why we see differences in the attitudes of the peoples of the union republics towards sovereignty and political values.

The Estonian SSR was admitted into the composition of the USSR after 20 years of enjoying the legal status of a sovereign state in the world political arena. It formed its own state regime, in principle a democratic, parliamentary order, and established its own economic system.

If, in the declaration adopted 22 July 1940 by the new State Duma of Estonia, it was indicated that the Duma requested that the ESSR be accepted into the composition of the Soviet Union as a union republic on the same principles according to which the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and other union republics belonged to the USSR, this would then mean that its sovereignty was preserved according to the very same principles which applied to these other union republics when the Treaty on Formation of the USSR was concluded. It is another matter that by that time the union republics retained not a grain of sovereignty within the framework of Stalinist autonomization and the decision of the State Duma did not reflect the free will of the Estonian people, that entry into the union came about primarily as a result of the military and political dictatorship of the Soviet leadership of that time and was a direct consequence of the implementation of secret protocols to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. We now have at our disposal weighty and irrefutable proof to this effect.

If we attempt now to resolve the problem of the future legal status of Estonia in the USSR and the restoration of

its sovereignty, it should be acknowledged that at least in a formal judicial sense, according to state legal norms, Estonia did not lose its sovereignty upon entry into the USSR. No Estonian acts on repudiation of sovereignty exist, and in fact in 1940 the USSR Constitution contained the principle of the sovereignty of union republics. Consequently, with admission of the Estonian SSR into the composition of the USSR, the Estonian SSR did not cease to be a sovereign state in the formal judicial sense.

Many diverse amendments have been introduced into the USSR Fundamental Law over the past five decades, but none of them have to this time resolved one fundamental issue—what exactly is meant by sovereignty of a union republic in the composition of the USSR?

If we seek an answer in the USSR Constitution, it turns out this constitution in a way affords the union republics a certain legal status not held by a single member of any other federation in the world. Continuing the tradition of the Treaty on Formation of the USSR, the Fundamental Law—in Article 76, Part 1—proclaims that a union republic is a sovereign Soviet socialist state. Evidence of the comparison of constitutional interpretations of sovereignty between the union republic and the union as a whole can be seen in the fact that union sovereignty is touched upon only indirectly—in Article 75, Part 2—in connection with the integrity of the territory of the USSR, and is treated in this context not so much in the sense of sovereignty, as in the meaning of competence. The sovereign status of a union republic in the USSR is confirmed in a number of other constitutional norms. Article 77, Part 1 of the Fundamental Law, for example, defines forms of participation by a union republic in deciding matters which fall under the jurisdiction of the USSR. Article 78 prohibits any change in the territory of a union republic without its consent. Article 79 ascribes the administrative division of the territory of a union republic to its competence exclusively. Article 80 endows the union republic with the right to enter into relations with foreign states, exchange with them diplomatic and consular representatives, and participate in the activity of international organizations.

When we talk about the sovereignty of a union republic, we must not fail to mention that the USSR Constitution emphasizes the principle of voluntary entry of republics into the USSR. According to Article 70, the USSR is formed as a result of the free self-determination of nations and the voluntary association of Soviet socialist republics with equal rights. As a guarantee of the voluntary aspect, Article 72, like the Treaty on Formation of the USSR, reserves for each union republic the right to freely leave the USSR.

If we look at other constitutional norms from the point of view of union republic sovereignty, we see that many of these, especially when taken together in a group, constitute a significant contradiction to the principles of sovereignty mentioned above (Article 76, Part 1). Article 73, for example, which determines the competence of the

USSR, gives clear preference to the union. All the most significant questions are placed within the jurisdiction of the USSR. "Encroaching" more than anything else upon the sovereignty of the union republics is Point 12 of Article 73, which essentially transforms the entire article into a norm with vague disposition, since the union organs themselves establish "other questions of all-union significance" which fall under the competence of the union.

The advantageous position of union sovereignty as compared with that of the republic becomes especially clear when we juxtapose their competence in the sphere of legislation. Article 74 of the Fundamental Law introduces a general norm according to which the laws of the USSR have equal force over the territory of all the union republics. And in the event a union republic law is not in conformance with all-union law, the USSR law takes precedence. The priority of union over republic legislation is also propagated in the constitution—according to Article 76, Part 3 of the USSR Fundamental Law, the union republic constitution must conform to that of the USSR. And Point 4 of Article 21 states that the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet will ensure that the constitutions and laws of the union republics conform with the constitution and laws of the USSR.

It has been noted above that the concept of sovereignty entails various meanings. But in however simplified a manner we approach it, we cannot exclude the supremacy of state authority over its territory and its independence from outside forces. We can agree with the fact that, for a union state the competence of each member of the union is limited by the number of issues which fall under the jurisdiction of the union, but even in this instance the limitations of competence are established by the sovereign itself; and when a dispute arises—by mutual agreement of the sovereigns.

Within the framework of the administrative-command system, disagreements arising between the union and a union republic were resolved by central organs, i.e., by the right of the strong and controlling party. In truth, divergences in law simply were not tolerated—they were already disallowed by the super-centralized union legislative procedure itself.

The constitutional conflict which arose when the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet adopted the famous resolutions of 16 November last year sharply revealed for the first time all the imperfections in USSR constitutional law, which in essence comprised the reason for the conflict. Awakened to an active political life thanks to perestroika, the republic began to use its sovereignty and to protect it, emphasizing its presence in the Declaration on Sovereignty and striving to create a mechanism for safeguarding it through the establishment of priority to republic (over union) legislation.

The laws passed 16 November 1988 by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet also uncovered inadequacies and contradictions in the constitutional approach to sovereignty

of a union republic and sovereignty of the USSR. At the same time they invited the attention of the highest union organs to the need to develop a mechanism to resolve constitutional conflicts. Procedures for resolving clashes of this type are currently prescribed in Part 2 of Article 64 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Regulations, according to which the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet will, upon discovery of divergence between the constitution or law of a union republic and that of the union, present the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the union republic the question of bringing it into conformance with union acts. If necessary it will adopt an appropriate ukaz.

The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet did not do this, however, with respect last year's conflict. True, in the 26 November discussion of the question of non-conformance of the 16 November laws of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet with the USSR Constitution, the Presidium—contrary to regulations—declared the norms under dispute to be invalid in Article 1 of its ukaz. Such an act, of course, has no judicial force. The act of the highest organ of authority of the Estonian SSR as a sovereign state can not be repealed by any party except itself. This is one of the manifestations of sovereignty of a state.

It is very important to remember, however, that at that same session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet the draft ukaz was augmented by Article 2 at the proposal of M.S. Gorbachev, according to which it was acknowledged that it was advisable to develop, at the next stage of reform of the political system, a state-legal mechanism for observance of the political and socioeconomic interests of the union republics, and for the expansion and protection of their sovereign rights. One such measure, for example, was the attempt to establish a constitutional oversight committee at the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies. As we know, this did not succeed. Apparently this alone will not suffice.

To protect the inalienable rights of the union republics as sovereign states and to ensure the right of their nations to self-determination, it is necessary during the coming stages of reform of the political system to fundamentally reorganize, to qualitatively renew the Soviet federation. It is a fact that the constitutional mutual relations of today between union and union republic, which took shape during the Stalin period and which to a significant degree correspond to the concepts of that day regarding the structure of political authority, have begun to hinder perestroyka in quite a noticeable fashion.

The united, free will of the members of any union is most fully expressed by an agreement which has been concluded among them as partners with equal rights. Consequently, complete sovereignty of the union republics would be guaranteed by regulation of their mutual relations through a union treaty, determining those spheres of activity in which members of the union unite their efforts, establishing general union organs for this purpose. Transferring once again the mutual relations of the union republics to

an treaty basis would also entail restoration of the Leninist principles of formation of the USSR.

We must not forget, however, that the concept of concluding a new union treaty has so far found neither understanding nor support on the part of the country's present political leadership. This was seen indirectly in an article from the sixth issue of SOVETY NAROD-NYKH DEPUTATOV [Soviets of People's Deputies], the magazine of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, whose author uses insufficient argumentation to refute the idea of concluding a union treaty, spread throughout the social thinking of the Baltic republics, alleging that the other union republics do not support this idea. At a recent CPSU Central Committee plenum dedicated to ethnic relations, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet M.S. Gorbachev also considered it proper to expand the sovereign rights of the union republics, to put real substance into their state sovereignty as a result of changes in the USSR Constitution, "real substance" being seen primarily in the transition of the union republics to economic accountability, while the central authority retains exceptionally broad powers in the most diverse spheres. Such is the political reality of today.

Of course, the renewal of our federation on a treaty basis will require a great deal of time. It will necessitate grounding of a political and ideological nature—political-economic and legal preparations will be required. At the same time, everyday life convinces us that the legal foundation of the Soviet federation is in need of swift and solid revision, primarily in the establishment of an effective mechanism for resolving contradictions which arise. A determining, strategic measure for renewal of the Soviet socialist federation which could most completely guarantee the sovereignty of the union republics prior to conclusion of a potential union treaty can be seen in the new construction in principle of mutual relations between the union and union republics. Its main features are presented in the party organization platform of our republic to the 19th CPSU All-Union Conference, in the provisions of the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party, and in the proposals of the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet directed in the spring of this year to the appropriate commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The concept of IME [Self-Managing Estonia] is based on this construction as well, and intertwined with its implementation are the hopes for the future of the inhabitants of Estonia.

The most important features of this model, of the federation qualitatively renewed to such a degree, are again presented—and here in a more precise version—in the activity program of the Estonian Communist Party presently under discussion and in the newspaper article related to it, "The Estonian Path to Independence," written by four gorkom [city party committee] and raykom [rayon party committee] first secretaries. It seems to me that the most realistic basis for complete restoration of Estonian sovereignty in the composition of the USSR has been set forth in these political documents.

Judging from everything, the road to full sovereignty will be long and rough. Not everything in this complicated process depends on just our thoughts and desires. A great deal will depend on how well we succeed in joining the interests and aspirations of all members of the federation in the search for solutions, on how well we are able to find the optimal political consensus.

In spite of the difficulties we are faced with, we are obliged to travel this road purposefully until we reach its end, using democratic forms of politics and parliamentarianism. And if today we glance back along this road to where we were just one year ago, we will understand even better how important the first step was—the step taken on 16 November of last year.

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Estonian SSR Ethnic Rights Law

90UN0599A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 17 Dec 89 p 2

[The Estonian SSR Law "On the Ethnic Rights of Citizens of the Estonian SSR"; issued in Tallinn, 15 December 1989]

[Text] The Estonian SSR acknowledges the free development of ethnic life and promotes national self-existence in all of its democratic and legal forms.

Only the right of the Estonian nation, as the native nation of Estonia, to its own ethnic territory and to self-determination can be a guarantee for the ethnic rights of all citizens of the Estonian SSR.

In implementing the ethnic rights of citizens of the Estonian SSR, the state proceeds from the need to unify the efforts of Estonians and of all ethnic groups for achieving the political, economic and cultural sovereignty of Estonia.

Article 1. The Estonian SSR, as a sovereign democratic state, guarantees its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, equal political, economic, and social rights and freedoms.

Article 2. All residents of Estonia, regardless of nationality and citizenship, are obliged to observe the Constitution of the Estonian SSR and other laws of the republic, and to treat the culture, customs and traditions of the Estonian and other nations with respect.

Article 3. Ethnic associations, formed in the Estonian SSR and registered in the established legal procedure, possess the right of legislative initiative in the person of their own republic bodies.

Article 4. Along with the development of the Estonian culture and language, the Estonian SSR shall create conditions for the free development of the culture and language of ethnic groups.

Citizens of all nationalities have the right:

- To create ethnic cultural associations;
- To receive general education in the Estonian, Russian, or other language in state educational institutions or through cultural associations;
- To receive secondary specialized and higher education and to undergo training in the Estonian, Russian or other language, provided by the state according to the needs of the Estonian SSR;
- To organize the dissemination of information and cultural life in the native language, and to perform ethnic rituals and religious rites;
- To interact with representatives of their ethnic group beyond the borders of the Estonian SSR, and to establish ties through ethnic associations with the bodies and ethnic organizations of corresponding ethnic states.

Article 5. Organizations and associations, engaged in developing ethnic culture, have the right, along with the state system, to create cultural and education institutions at the expense of their own funds, to form funds, to establish bonuses and stipends, to engage in enterprise and to release printed publications.

The state shall offer ethnic associations material assistance and support.

Higher and secondary specialized educational institutions of the Estonian SSR shall train specialists for the cultural requirements of ethnic groups, within the limits of their possibilities, on the basis of contracts concluded with state organizations, ethnic and cultural associations and other public organizations.

Article 6. Ethnic cultural and historical monuments and ethnic symbols are taken under the protection of the state.

Article 7. A citizen of the Estonian SSR has the right to the free choice of his ethnicity according to his ethnic origin. The honor and dignity of each nation is defended by the state.

It is forbidden to force anyone to reject his nationality.

Article 8. Any infringement on the ethnic feelings of another citizen is prohibited.

Any action to assert ethnic exclusivity or ethnic supremacy, or to kindle ethnic enmity are punishable in legal form.

Article 9. The normative acts required in order to put this law into effect are to be passed by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet.

*A. Ryuytel, Estonian
SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman,
A. Almann, Estonian
SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium secretary*

Estonia's Toome on Local Government Law

90UN0571A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 19 Nov 89 pp 1, 3 [MS Received 29 Dec 89]

["A Report by Deputy I. Toome, Chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The draft law presented to you by the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, "On the Government of the Estonian SSR," could give rise to certain doubts and questions.

Are radical changes in government necessary in today's tense times of transition? Does this step not cause unneeded confusion; does it not sow further feelings of defenselessness at a time when our economy is writhing in pain? Does it make sense to reorganize the government when we are on the verge of establishing a new parliament?

These are natural questions, and they have their reasons. These feelings are no doubt intensified by the half-hearted results and modest success derived from the reduction or reorganization of the governing apparatus. All this is so. However, it was the government that decided on this step. It is a question of a principal change brought on by the practical realities of life, and above all the need to create a government structure appropriate to IME [Self-Managing Estonia], and appropriate to the IME team; otherwise we will be unable to find rapid, sweeping and competent solutions to those problems and conflicts, without whose solution the IME cannot become a reality.

If the state were a ship, the people the wind, and time the sea, then the government would be the sails. In today's stormy sea of life, the sails must be replaced if we are to arrive in port on time.

We are proceeding from the fact that the present government is cumbersome and hard to manage; that there are too many links in it; and that a number of the current organs of government are not carrying out the functions directly connected with state administration.

For example, the structure of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers is multi-layered. We have the Council of Ministers, the Presidium of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, and the institution of the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers, which looks after the ministries and agencies.

This system has led to a situation in which the ministers are not in fact ministers. They are under the wardship and guidance of the deputy chairmen, and the decisions are made by the Presidium. They have neither the obligation, nor the need for initiative, nor the responsibility. Why then should a minister be answerable for a decision made by some "super-minister," i.e., the members of the Presidium? On the other hand, such a multi-layered system delays official business and drags out the resolution of problems.

This is one of the principal motives.

Secondly, assuring the economic and political sovereignty of Estonia, expanding the rights of local self-government, and assuring the economic independence of the economic organizations have made it necessary to re-evaluate the working functions of the government and its organs, and to change the structure of the government as a whole. And thirdly, it is bad enough when ministers are changed rapidly; but it is even worse when the government is not renewed in a timely manner.

IME working groups in Lokhusalu have begun work on reorganizing the government. Taking part in drawing up the draft law are our prominent scholar-specialists in government, jurists and ministers; the leaders of a number of departments; government advisers, and representatives of social movements.

In the course of their work, they have familiarized themselves with the fundamentals of government organization of a number of states, and made use of the experience of other republics. IME concepts were adopted as the basis. However, this was hardly a simple process. If we truly want radical changes, we must also touch upon the vital interests of many people. This is especially important in the process of redistribution of power. At times it was quite difficult to distinguish where state interest ended and departmental interests began; where people were defending their true convictions, and where they were simply holding onto their old habits.

Before presenting it to the Supreme Soviet, the government examined this draft law at three sessions. This was a difficult time, a time of fierce debate; however, the government reached a consensus on the draft presented today.

In the draft law itself, our desires are stated accurately and concisely. Therefore, permit me now to dwell on only the most fundamental positions.

The new government of Estonia will have no more important task, than the transition to cost-accounting [khozraschet]. The government must direct its attention to questions of state administration; to strengthening the people's welfare and the protection of its citizens; to creating conditions for the most rapid development of a socially and economically powerful and sovereign republic, and for effective management and economic cooperation with other union republics and foreign countries; to creating favorable working conditions for the administrative and government organs; to protection of the environment and careful use of natural resources; and to ensuring legality. All the principal changes in the operation of the government are directed toward rapid achievement of these goals.

I would like to stress one detail. In drawing up the draft law, our goal was not to establish an all-embracing

system of government for the entire political and economic life of Estonia; but first to work out the fundamentals of the activities of the government of the Estonian SSR formed by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Therefore the draft law in question does not touch upon questions of judicial authority, the procuracy or state control, which must fall under the purview of the Supreme Soviet. Nor does the draft speak to supervising the activities of television and radio, since here too the government believes that the work of the mass information media should properly fall under the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet or a working organ created by it.

And now, in brief, on the basic provisions of the draft law:

In accordance with the draft, the government of the Estonian SSR is the highest organ of state administration; it is subordinate to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Members of the government of the Estonian SSR shall be called ministers, and the chairman of the government—the Prime Minister.

Ministries shall become the central organs of state administration. The government shall be a collegial organ. Sessions of the government shall take place as the need dictates, and shall be considered authoritative if no less than half its members take part. No permanent deputies are stipulated for the Prime Minister. In his absence, the Prime Minister will appoint one of the ministers Acting Prime Minister. This is an important innovation, which will allow the establishment of a single-stage governmental structure. The ministers will directly supervise their ministries, and will also be completely responsible for this sphere of administration in the government. As an exception, there can be more than one minister in a single ministry. And the post of minister may be conferred on ministers who have no ministries under them.

The administration of state and economic life as a whole shall be divided among the ministries. A minister's sphere of activity shall form his sphere of administration as well.

Here I would like to clarify that a minister's sphere of administration and the sphere of administration of a ministry do not coincide. The difference lies in the fact that within a minister's sphere of administration, in addition to the ministry, a number of state services and inspectorates, which are as a rule not subordinate to the ministry, may operate as well.

State services and inspectorates are formed to solve those problems of state and economic life which do not fall under the jurisdiction of the ministries. State services are administered by general directors and directors of inspectorates, who are not members of the government. Ministries, state services and inspectorates form the institution of the governmental establishment. At the

same time, every governmental establishment is an independent subdivision, whose functions, rights and responsibilities are not duplicated in other governmental establishments. As of today, the government of the republic has compiled an initial list of state services and inspectorates (about 40 subdivisions). But it would be more proper to determine their ultimate number, and the sphere of which ministry they pertain to, after the government is reorganized and the regulations of the ministries have been examined. Therefore, the government has provided neither a detailed list, nor the structure of state services and inspectorates in the draft of the present resolution.

These are, in general terms, the basic principles of the formation of the government.

And now, in somewhat more precise terms: Whereas today the Council of Ministers consists of 40 ministers, deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers and committee chairmen, the draft proposes establishing 17 ministries and defining the maximum number of ministers as 21. At the same time it is stipulated that governmental establishments shall not directly supervise the activity of the economic organizations. Thus, enterprises and institutions, in their operational-economic activity, will not be subordinate to ministries, nor to state services or inspectorates, nor to local self-government—but only to the laws in effect in the republic. This is an important innovation, and a significant step on the way to a law-governed state.

A list of the proposed ministries is included in the present draft. A brief description of these ministries is also found in an explanatory note. Therefore, I will not relate the contents of these documents. In the course of the debate, quite a number of different alternatives were proposed, which after discussion were discarded for one reason or another. Certain suggestions deserve to be examined once again after a period of time. Therefore I would like to briefly present for your consideration the reasons why, in today's situation and at the present level of knowledge, things were decided one way and not another.

A proposal was made that the Ministry of Justice should also control the work of the executive institutions, which is now the function of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The principle is a proper one, but its realization will take time. A number of organizational questions must be resolved. We resolved that both ministries should make an announcement when the time comes for the transfer of these functions.

Many disputes and disagreements were connected with the development of the Ministry of Forestry. The government does not believe that the existence of an independent forestry ministry is justified. And the development of the forestry industry falls almost equally under the sphere of both the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. There are pluses and minuses in both variants. The forest, on the one

hand, is a source of scarce raw materials; and on the other hand, it is an object necessary for preserving the environment—and at the present time it makes more sense to leave it in the sphere of administration of the Ministry of Environmental Protection.

There was a proposal to create a single transportation ministry for the Estonian SSR, which would combine the current Goskomtrans and the Ministry of Communication. This is an altogether justifiable proposal. But here we were considering the present reality. On the one hand, we are faced with the transfer of the railroads, aviation and sea transport to republic jurisdiction; and on the other, communication is needed to an exceptional degree for its completion. Apparently it would be more proper to retain the two separate ministries at the first stage.

The future Committee for State Security and Ministry of Internal Affairs deserve special attention. The Committee for State Security, beginning a new year, retains its present status. For how long? Time will tell. No one must have special rights: that is our firm conviction and program of action.

Subordinating the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the republic is altogether real and necessary. It is planned to transform it from a so-called ministry of law and order into a true Ministry of Internal Affairs, which will ensure public safety and will be occupied with resolving questions of the internal life of the state—including, for example, coordinating the work of local self-government, civil defense, military obligation, and so on.

Disagreements and disputes also arose in connection with creating a state organ which would be occupied with questions of labor, social questions, and health care.

A proposal was made to create, instead of today's three agencies, an Estonian SSR Ministry of Health Care and Social Problems. Life has introduced its adjustments here too. The IME demands attention to problems of labor and labor resources and a new pension law, which entails a great deal of work, for social life requires broad reforms. It was decided to merge the Estonian SSR State Committee on Labor and Social Problems and the Estonian SSR Ministry of Social Security, and to create an Estonian SSR Ministry on Social Problems and Labor, and to change its functions somewhat. Thus, for example, questions of social security could be transferred from the functions of the present Ministry of Social Security, to the Ministry of Health Care and Social Security.

Distribution of general state services into the spheres of specific ministries presents difficulties. It was deemed necessary to subordinate them to a State Chancellery of the Government of the Estonian SSR. There would be, for example, a Statistical Service and a State Archive, and a Service on Religious Affairs, or the Estonian Telegraph Agency (ETA).

The State Chancellery of the Government of the USSR is a new concept. It is needed to support office-work for the government of the republic and for the Prime Minister. The State Chancellery will be formed in place of the present Administration of Affairs of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers. The task of the State Chancellery is to formulate the government's decisions (resolutions). It will also monitor the execution of the government's programs of action, and the resolution of questions concerning the government, which do not fall under the jurisdiction of a single ministry.

The State Chancellery operates under the purview of the Prime Minister, and its work is supervised by a state minister. An institute of government advisors will be created within the State Chancellery for the consultation of the Prime Minister and ministers of the Estonian SSR.

This was a brief survey of the draft which has been presented for discussion. I request that you quietly discuss the draft law, and support the government, so that beginning 1 January 1990 we might begin our work with a principally new government. This is necessary to put into action the programs of radical measures to restore our economy.

Commission Head on 9 April Tbilisi Events

90US0165A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
31 Oct 89 pp 4-5

["Slightly abridged" transcription of interview with Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, USSR people's deputy, and chairman of the "Commission of the Congress of People's Deputies for investigating the circumstances of the 9 April tragedy in Tbilisi," by Moscow correspondent Gii Merkvilishvili, broadcast on Georgian television on 25 October: "The Commission Is Ready to Present Its Conclusions"]

[Text] [Correspondent] There is an immense amount of interest in your commission's conclusions. You have recently completed your work. Can you assure us that everything has been straightened out?

[Sobchak] Yes, in general I can say that we have studied all kinds of available materials that exist regarding this case and I also think we have questioned all individuals from the state and party apparatus and military leadership who were involved in making one decision or another, and we have obtained practically all the information we needed. At the same time I cannot say that we have solved all the problems because a number of questions are left for the investigation. After all, we are a parliamentary commission. We do not warn people whom we question about their responsibility. Naturally, the value of these eye-witness testimonies is somewhat different from what it is when people are warned of their responsibility. Incidentally, we were convinced of this repeatedly when various individuals forgot very important circumstances or presented them in distorted form, and then we had to return again and it became clear that the thing looked or sounded different. This is why one of

the conclusions of our commission was that it is necessary to adopt a special law on the rights of parliamentary commissions like ours so that we can conduct open hearings and warn people of their responsibility. And perhaps the main responsibility should be that officials who give such commissions false information or fail to report something must bear responsibility for this, if only in the form of being relieved of their position. This would be quite adequate because concrete conclusions about criminal liability and administrative responsibility should be made by an investigation and other organs. Therefore, of course, I think we have solved the basic problems.

I can name questions to which we, say, did not receive a simple answer and concerning which we are thus drawing similar conclusions. For example, we discovered chloropicrin in a number of samples taken from the square. Chloropicrin is not contained in any of the official gases or toxic substances that were used by the internal forces. And therefore the question arises: Where did it come from? We are not answering this question because we did not find a clear answer. We heard many testimonies—very contradictory ones. We have both letters and testimonies saying that these are some kind of unknown preparations used by the military. But I think that the investigation now being conducted by the USSR Procuracy should give an answer to these questions as well as to several others. But we could not provide a simple answer to this question. So we wrote in the commission's conclusion that we could not rule out the possibility of the use of unidentified toxic substances and unidentified gases. That is, we do not even know what kind of gases these are, but the fact that traces of them were discovered shows that they could have been used and actually were used. By whom? We do not know. I do not even rule out a situation in which it could have occurred, as it were, that on their own initiative Afghan veterans could have used gases they had seized; after all they had returned from Afghanistan fairly recently... But this is all conjecture and not based on solid evidence and therefore in places where we have had our doubts we have not drawn any conclusions.

[Correspondent] Of course members of the commission cannot always be unanimous in their assessments of various facts. How about yours?

[Sobchak] We had differences of opinion, more significant ones at first, but then we decided to solve the problem on the basis of consensus; that is, bringing the viewpoints together and verifying these viewpoints against the actual material. Each time differences arose we turned to the documents, to the facts, listened to transcripts, and examined... I can tell you that I personally viewed several times the KGB videotape which we want to show all the people and which gives a minute-by-minute and second-by-second account of everything that took place on the square, and not for myself but in order to convince certain doubters that this is the way things actually were. For instance, there were many arguments about whether this rally was peaceful or not.

Some of the official announcements even said that some especially armed revolutionaries were operating there... On the basis of the video documents and the questioning of witnesses we came to the conclusion that the rally was not that kind and we found no indications that there were any armed revolutionaries. On the contrary, the resistance arose only after they began to clear the square, and with such strict and sometimes even cruel measures, when they began to beat up women and use gases—only then did resistance begin to occur. And the more they cleared the square, the more resistance there was. This is what we are noting. What else is there about our differences? We then put the question this way: If there are any differences on which the majority cannot agree, a person can write a separate opinion. And we ended up with the signatures of the entire commission except for two. One of them was Academician D. Likhachev—because of illness and the long trip he did not participate in the final stages of the work but I think that if he were familiar with it he would have signed it. And the other who has not signed is the deputy chairman of the All-Union Veterans' Council, General A. Golyakov. He made a number of his own remarks and we explained to him that if he had any disagreements he could inform the Supreme Soviet or the congress of them in the form of his own special opinion.

[Correspondent] I wish to ask you this question. Have you or any other members of the commission experienced any pressure on you?

[Sobchak] No, we experienced no pressure. I must first of all express my gratitude to the Georgian authorities—the representatives of the party Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers, and practically everyone else who rendered us all kinds of assistance. The two times when we were in Tbilisi and traveling and when members of the commission traveled to the military units no obstacles were placed in our path. In exactly the same way we generally had access to the Moscow offices and we were able to speak with whomever we wished. Suffice it to give the list of Politburo members we interviewed—Comrade Lukyanov, Comrade Shevardnadze, Comrade Yazov, Comrade Razumovskiy, Comrade Chebrikov, Comrade Ligachev, and many other comrades. We actually interviewed everyone who had anything to do with this case.

[Correspondent] When do you wish to report your conclusions to the session and will they be published in the press.

[Sobchak] Yes, they undoubtedly will. I was told by the leadership: Please report tomorrow. But the fact is that we have signed this conclusion and tomorrow I must fly to the United States as part of a parliamentary delegation. Therefore we have reached an agreement in principle that immediately after my return from the United States (and we are returning on the 5th), sometime around the 10th-11th I shall report these results to the session. But I should like for our conclusion to be published before my report so that the deputies will be

familiar with it and with the basic documents appended so that everyone may draw his own conclusion regarding all the basic documents that were there—the correspondence, the orders, and so forth. And we have not even ruled out the possibility that if we are given new evidence or new information we can convene again. We are a commission of the congress and this is only information for the Supreme Soviet. And if we are given some new information we are prepared to include it.

A couple of days ago we had a quite comical episode. A woman suddenly called and said that she had very significant proof and information for the commission. Well, I said: "All right, come in and we will listen to what you have to say." A very sick person came in (and we could see this at once). She even brought in a small gas canister which some unknown people had brought into her apartment in order to poison her, and so forth, and so on, and she thought that these were the gases used in Tbilisi. But she had not been there and had nothing to do with it... Well, this was a sick person. But even this episode shows how attentively we listened to everyone—through all the letters and phone calls we have received... And all the people wanted to come and say something. There were many people to whom we listened in vain, who gave us nothing. But it was very important to check on every clue.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, it seems to me personally and to many others that people are still skeptical about the notion that the real truth will be told about everything and everyone. In your opinion, how justified is this criticism?

[Sobchak] I think there is justification for this skepticism because too frequently in the past we assessed things differently, hid certain things, and failed to report certain others. But I should like to answer your question with another question: Can you name for me any other commission made up of people's deputies or deputies of the Supreme Soviet which during the process of its work would listen to the explanations of this number of members of the Politburo or even one member of the Politburo during all the time Soviet power has been in existence?

[Correspondent] I do not think so. Even the committee that handled the Gdlyan case was not like this.

[Sobchak] They did not do this. But, in my opinion, what we did is a guarantee that we will tell all that we have established.

[Correspondent] In regard to what you have established, here is a question that gets right to the heart of the matter: Who, in your opinion, is the main party guilty for what happened?

[Sobchak] You know, that question would be very easy for me to answer if I could say that Sidorov or Ivanov was to blame. But the main guilty party here is our decisionmaking system which does not take the laws into account. This is the main thing that is to blame, and not

just for the events in Tbilisi. This is to blame for the fact that our entire country is in such a crisis—both political and economic. Because we have lived and are still continuing to live not according to the laws we have created, regardless of how imperfect they may be. This is especially clear in this case. And we show this at each level of decisions that are made—as though all of them were made without taking the laws into account. Therefore I would say that the main guilty party is the typical lawlessness and the habit of breaking the laws.

[Correspondent] I understand. You have said that, of course, in the work of your commission there have been those who have agreed with a fact when the majority has decided that it is true, and there have been those who have not. How did the members of your commission who disagreed express their resistance and what alternatives did they propose?

[Sobchak] You understand that for various reasons there were disputes related to the assessment, say, of the actions of the informal groups: Should they be regarded as the actions of extremists or the actions of people who are trying to overthrow the existing government through violence and seize the main government buildings as was reported in the well-known telegram to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. There were large disputes regarding this. Who was right? Where are the correct assessments? We eliminated the disagreements and not because certain people had proceeded from their own prejudices. It was simply that some of them had not mastered the material. I can name only a couple of the commission members who had mastered the factual material (we had more than 10,000 documents and transcripts) who worked actively on the commission from the first day to the last. They include writer B. Vasilyev, academician O. Gazonko, the chairman of the Committee for State Security of Kazakhstan, V. Miroshnik, and Army General V. Govorov, the deputy minister of defense. And at first glance people might look at this and take it with a certain amount of disbelief, but I can tell you that General Govorov along with Vasilyev and Miroshnik prepared all of the military part of the events; as it were, the real course of the operations. You will see how neatly all this is presented according to the documents. And we also received an immense amount of assistance from Vladimir Leonidovich. And here there was no attempt in any way to change the minds of the military men or understate the degree of anybody's guilt. On the contrary. In all cases they achieved complete unanimity, and for me this was a pleasant surprise. You know, I must say that by the time its work was finished the commission was a unified solid collective and we even began to joke that we ought to transfer as a team to the next case that had to be investigated. In particular there was a proposal for us to handle the investigation of the Novocherkassk events of 1962. We shall see—time will tell.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, you promised that you would personally make the Georgian people aware of your commission's conclusions and all

the zigzags in your work, and that you and the members of your commission would go to Georgia. When will this happen?

[Sobchak] I would like to do that as soon as possible. Immediately after we make our commission's conclusions public I would like to go to Georgia to answer questions—this could be on television with telephone contact or we could meet somewhere in a large hall—in your large public building, perhaps, so that anyone could ask questions and we would answer them. But the only thing that could hold us up is the session and the passing of the draft laws. But I give you my firm promise that I will do this after the session. As soon as it ends a large number of members of the commission will fly to Tbilisi and we shall answer all your questions. And we are prepared to listen to any additional evidence. We are mainly interested in this so that if there are questions to which we have not gotten to the bottom or if there is evidence we have not yet considered, we must find out about this so that we can say to the Congress of People's Deputies on 10 December: Yes, we have done everything possible and examined all the materials there were to be examined.

[Correspondent] The conclusion of the commission of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet probably helped you in your work.

[Sobchak] Undoubtedly, for we did work together, even though there were rough spots. For we allowed the commission of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet to participate in our work from the very beginning. They were present at our meetings and they were able to copy and familiarize themselves with our documents. But then there arose one complication which I would like to discuss. They used our documents and published information before we did. I did not want this because it caused certain... well, you will see when we publish—certain imprecisions in our assessment of certain facts and certain materials. So we have various readings but you will see how many things coincide as well.

[Correspondent] When you were interviewed by the Vremya program, you stated that after the publication of the conclusions of your commission, the case would be taken over by the military procuracy and other procuracies. What does this mean?

[Sobchak] It is definitely not true that the case will be continued. After all, there is an investigation going on! The head military procurator of the USSR Procuracy will be conducting an investigation of the case beginning 10 April. (This does not mean the procurator under the jurisdiction of the military authorities; it is a subdivision of the USSR Procuracy which especially investigates military crimes.) And I know that they have gathered a good deal of evidence and a number of circumstances of the investigation which did not pertain to us—the guilt of specific parties; they determined who was firing there, who specifically was beating people, and so forth. This is their affair and it is not our work. And as far as I know

they intend to conclude the investigation sometime toward the end of the year, to make their materials public, and turn the guilty parties over to the court.

[Correspondent] Does this mean that there were some criminal cases there?

[Sobchak] Undoubtedly.

[Correspondent] What kind? Can you name them?

[Sobchak] Unfortunately, I cannot. Until I give my report (he laughs). I know which they are. But I would not like to say today because this has to do with specific individuals.

[Correspondent] I am not even asking direct questions because I know that you cannot answer until you submit your report, is this not true?

[Sobchak] Of course. Then, you understand, there is also what is perhaps a moral side of the matter, that we must report first to the Supreme Soviet and people's deputies and after that make it public property for everyone.

[Correspondent] We are all saying that mistakes were made in decisionmaking...

[Sobchak] Not only mistakes but serious violations.

[Correspondent] ...Violations—and also during their implementation. Which of these would you consider the most tragic?

[Sobchak] You know, I am guessing now. Because, you know, this is like a familiar anecdote: What would have happened if a machine gun had been placed on the battlefield at Borodino? In exactly the same way: If, say, Eduard Amvroseyevich Sevardnadze and Georgiy Petrovich Razumovskiy had flown directly to Georgia on the 8th as Mikhail Sergeyevich suggested, I am convinced that nothing would have happened. It would have been the same if Dzhumbar Patiashvili had had enough restraint and political wisdom. Just a little while before the beginning of the operation the minister of internal affairs Sh. Gorodze appealed to him and G. Gumbaridze telephoned him to ask him not to undertake the operation, not to be in a hurry, and to stall for time. But nonetheless all this took place. I think that if political restraint and wisdom had been applied this might not have happened. But after that. Let us say that it has all happened: The troops are on the square. If the people in charge of the operation had had the good sense to understand that they were not fighting an enemy but their own Soviet people, that there was no need to conduct this like a military operation, that there was no need to hurry and clear the square in 21 minutes, and if they had simply stopped and stood there—maybe an hour, maybe 2—and if they had addressed the people and said: "Comrades, you must disband because you are breaking the law"—this would not have happened. Further. Let us say that the troops had gone out there and had already stopped. But you know that on that day the Georgian party aktiv had decided that they all would go

to the square. And if the communists and representatives of the party aktiv had come to the square (and they did not do this) or the party leadership had intervened between the people and the troops and said: "Comrades, we beg of you to disband so that there will be no victims, so that there will be no unfortunate occurrences, so that there will be no tragedy"—I am confident that the people would have listened to them and the tragedy would not have occurred.

[Correspondent] So one might say that this tragedy had a dual cause: On the one hand it was caused by the military and on the other by our party leadership.

[Sobchak] And not only that. Unfortunately, everything figured in there: the party and soviet leadership and, for instance, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet who stood on the sidelines. It is our tragedy when the most important questions of state, political, and other aspects of life are resolved by party organs without any participation from soviet organs. All of this worked together. Unfortunately, the result of the tragedy in Tbilisi is a combined result of violations of the law, obvious criminal actions (they also took place), and ill-considered actions. For instance, much of this would not have taken place if the military servicemen had not been brought in. Because, for instance, soldiers of the internal forces had shields, and bulletproof vests, and helmets, and clubs. And the military servicemen who had come from Afghanistan, and they were paratroopers, had nothing except their notorious entrenching tools. And I assure you that if they had had shields and clubs they would probably not have used their entrenching tools.

[Correspondent] There was a rumor that the clubs were electric stun guns.

[Sobchak] That I do not know... No! No, no, no... The clubs were made of that... We, incidentally, examined these clubs not only, say, in the 8th Regiment and the 4th Regiment, but the informal group members brought us the clubs they had taken as "trophies." Particularly in the House of Artists near the theater institute they took them—and they brought them here and showed them to us. No, they were ordinary rubber items. There were no electric stun guns. Unfortunately, there have been many rumors like this. For example, we especially investigated and refuted as a myth, a legend, this story which all the newspapers carried. I recall the first thing I heard about the tragedy in Tbilisi—my wife came and said: "Have you heard what a terrible thing has happened! I just heard about it on the radio; the soldiers chased a woman three blocks and caught her after she had run away from the square." We especially investigated this heart-rending scenario. That did not happen. Because we precisely revealed and placed each victim in the place where the murder took place. And the majority of them were on the square itself, and then there were two bodies in the Kashvetskiy temple. And beyond that—as they say, in Iveriya—there were no victims.

[Correspondent] What about what the other side, the opposing side, said about the informal group members supposedly killing their own women and the soldiers saved them?

[Sobchak] You know what I can tell you: Here is where this division into opposing sides took place... From the very beginning we did not look at this as opposing sides; on the contrary, we tried to look at everything in its totality and reveal the guilty parties. And if one is to speak about the accusations of the informal group members, you know, from the very beginning I was convinced that that was nonsense, that it does not correspond to reality. Because I worked in the Caucasus after graduation from the university and I know something about the spirit of the people and their moral principles. And in general I dismiss the possibility that, say, a Georgian would put a woman in front of him and use her as protection. This can be ruled out.

[Correspondent] But they successfully developed this idea...

[Sobchak] But it was not confirmed. We found no facts that would bear witness to this. The only thing that could have led to the large number of victims among women in particular was the use of gas, to which the female organism reacts more strongly and the fact that before they began to clear the square, they, particularly Tsereteli, told people to sit down, that those who were sitting would not be beaten. This was a very significant precondition for the tragic consequences because they began to beat those who were sitting.

[Correspondent] Did they beat them with entrenching tools.

[Sobchak] No, if you recall, if you have seen the films, the first ones there were the soldiers from the internal forces; they began to use their rubber clubs, although the order categorically forbade them to use them on women and children. So there were very serious violations in this respect from the very beginning.

[Correspondent] Was General Rodionov in command of this...

[Sobchak] That also falls within the area of my report. You want to know too much.

[Correspondent] You cannot talk about that?

[Sobchak] No, I could tell you but I want to tell everything to the Supreme Soviet first, and then—to everyone else.

[Correspondent] Then let us move to a different area. Did you make use of the materials from the newspaper LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, the newspaper of the ZakVO [Transcaucasian Military District]?

[Sobchak] I especially assigned one of the commission members to study the files of all the newspapers published in Georgia during the period starting with February, and for a number of central newspapers, the ZakVO, and Georgian newspapers, beginning in November, so as to create a new picture from the press. So we have looked at all of this. We have seen all the ZakVO materials. Moreover, during the process of the commission's work in Tbilisi we held a special conversation both with the editor in chief and with the chief of the political administration of the ZakVO and we especially asked them not to publish the materials before the commission published its conclusions, since this could only evoke and deepen this antagonism between the Army and the people. We do not think this is the best method of agitation and propaganda.

[Correspondent] The confrontation is not only with the Army. There is also the ethnic question, the confrontation between Russians and Georgians, and the ZakVO spread this propaganda...

[Sobchak] You understand that unfortunately much here has proceeded according to the principle of confrontation because there were certain articles in Georgian newspapers and magazines that included caricatures and the corresponding assessments which placed the blame for everything on the union organs and the Army. I have read many of these articles. The assessments are far from restrained. And this just might be the result of the fact that confrontation and polemics in the press have begun to increase.

[Correspondent] And perhaps this is the result of the Georgian articles?

[Sobchak] No, I do not think that. I think that in all questions, especially ethnic ones, it is very dangerous to take the path where everyone tries to give an answer. You say one thing and in response I tell you something else...

[Correspondent] You know what I am inclined to think? There never has been any Russophobia in Georgia and there is none now.

[Sobchak] We are especially taking note of this. We put the question this way: There is not a single fact or crime or attack or assault motivated by ethnic feelings or political considerations, say, on the part of the Russian-speaking population or, as was reported in certain telegrams, that there is a threat of physical destruction of the leadership or representatives of state organs—there has not been a single case of this. Moreover, the published data concerning the structure of crime during this particular period show that Georgia has one of the lowest levels of crime related to precisely these issues. Therefore we wrote directly into our conclusion that there was not one case of an attack or a crime motivated by ethnic or other similar considerations. Thus I think we are giving a simple answer to your question about Russophobia and so forth. I must say that in general all these discussions—and not only in Georgia—are exaggerated by certain of

our Russian societies who, as it were, incite the corresponding attitude from this side (like Otechestvo, Patriota, Pamyat, and others). There are similar exaggerations on the part of national groupings in the union republics. But if one is to take the people, I am convinced that the more than 70 years of Soviet power have laid a solid basis for normal human relations among representatives of various nationalities. In general the Georgians might be the most tolerant of the Caucasian peoples toward other nationalities. This is manifested both in religion and in national customs. Therefore I personally do not subscribe to these accusations—of Russophobia or anything else. There have undoubtedly been such slogans, and among youth there are people who are “fired up” by slogans who could somehow manifest this attitude. But the main thing is that we encountered these cases after the events of 9 April, and this is understandable. It is very difficult to place the blame for this because after the tragedy that took place the explosion of certain interethnic relations was inevitable. And today we must think about doing everything... Of course, this wound will never be healed, it will go down forever as a shameful chapter in the history of our country as a whole and as the saddest event, one of the saddest events in the history of the Georgian people, but perhaps the main thing is that from this sad lesson in the name of those who died we shall draw one very important conclusion: For the future we shall have to create the kind of political and legal conditions whereby such a thing will never be repeated either in Georgia or in any other republic. But unfortunately this conclusion has not been reached yet. For in many places blood is still being spilled because of interethnic factors...

[Correspondent] Perhaps the commission's conclusions will contribute to the creation of this kind of mechanism.

[Sobchak] We would like that very much and are hoping for it. At one of our meetings we discussed the question of cooperatives, and Academician Tikhonov recalled Bismark's famous words that only fools learn from their own mistakes and wise people learn from the mistakes of others. And so I must say that we are our own worst example. I think that the main thing today is ultimately not material goods, although we do not have enough of them and there is a real shortage of certain goods. The main thing is a shortage of morality. And in these clashes and conflicts, clashes with authority, clashes among ethnic groups, each ethnic group loses certain moral values which have to be restored later. I am convinced that we must begin with the basic Christian commandments—loving our neighbors and being able to forgive one another. This does not contradict our communist or socialist ideals—on the contrary.

[Correspondent] Unfortunately, we have forgotten this.

[Sobchak] Unfortunately, we have. But I still hope that we shall meet again and talk about this, and I must say that during all these months the Georgian events were the main issue in my work and my life. And I think that as a result of all this work I have learned a very great deal

for the future, and the main thing is that I have come to know many excellent people both in Georgia and in Moscow and members of the commission—we have representatives from all republics and all nationalities in the country. And the work of our commission can serve as a model for how people with the most varied views and nationalities can find a common language. If we do this, let it be our small contribution to the restoration of normal relations among people.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much for the interview. We are very eagerly awaiting your report—that is, your commission's report—because there are probably many crucial questions which I have not asked...

[Sobchak] I shall not dodge a single crucial question; I shall answer them all. If there are questions I cannot answer as a professional, we have an academician in medicine, an academician in chemistry, and a toxicologist who can answer any question—even the most difficult. You can be confident of that.

[Correspondent] Thank you very much.

Georgian CP Buro on Preparations for Winter, Demography, Railroads

90US0312A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 29 Nov 89 p 1

[Gruzinform report: "From the meeting of the Central Committee Buro of the Georgian Communist Party: Down to Business—Responsibly"]

[Text] Along with other issues, the agenda for the regular session of the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro included three "central" questions. Here we detail the significance these have for the republic, for each of its inhabitants, and for all of us.

The question might arise—why is the Buro of the Georgian CP Central Committee discussing the state of preparedness of the national economy of the republic for operation during the winter period? After all, we know that the party takes up political issues. But it is a fact that the committee considers the state of affairs of the republic in this sphere to be not just an economic problem, but a political one as well. As was noted at the buro session, there is great dissatisfaction with the work of all organs connected with this important sector, with the work of departments, responsible officials, communists, all who by virtue of their official obligations and party responsibility are obligated to ensure the resolution of this extremely important matter which today requires our urgent attention.

It is precisely from this point of view that discussion of the matter took place, introduced at the buro session by the Party Control Commission of the Georgian CP Central Committee. The aims and purpose of discussion were also determined by the fact that everyone must feel party responsibility for his entrusted sphere, whether it be leading officials of the Council of Ministers and

republic ministries or leaders of local party and soviet organs, of all services and organizations entrusted with providing people a normal life style and caring for their labor and well-being.

But the situation here has become extremely adverse, a fact which has become convincingly evident these past few days as winter has shown a severe temper in this cold onslaught. The effects are seen in the numerous complaints concerning poor heating in the cities, vast obstructions in the Rikotskiy Pass, trains running late, interrupted supply of essential goods to rural areas—foodstuffs and fuel products primarily, and lines kilometers long which have become customary for acquiring fuel.

We have also come to feel the consequences of unfinished projects in the capital of our republic. I. Andriadze, chairman of the executive committee of the Tbilisi city council, reported on these in detail. A great deal has been accomplished in Tbilisi. Insuring that the city is provided with an uninterrupted water supply has acquired special significance during the preparations for winter. Today 90 percent of the city population is afforded an unrestricted water supply, when just two years ago this figure did not exceed 44 percent. Water is also provided to the boiler rooms which are universally being converted to dual electrical power supply. Major overhaul of 114 boiler shops has been accomplished; 32 kilometers of heat mains have been replaced. Yet there are enough incompleting projects, and this naturally causes Tbilisi residents quite a few problems.

Work is colored by results. From this point of view if we evaluate the explanations given at the buro session by R. Arveladze, "Gruzenenergo" chief engineer; V. Dzhindzhikhadze, trade minister; B. Saralidze, minister of motor vehicle transport and roads; O. Kereselidze, "Goskomtoplivo" first deputy chairman; M. Chumburidze, deputy chairman of the Tsekavshiri board; V. Blazhiyevskiy, Trans-Caucasus Railroad chief; and I. Kharatishvili, chairman of the republic branch of "Gruzagrostroy," the results are not great. It is precisely for this reason that the buro noted pointedly enough that "in spite of the specific measures taken by party, soviet, and economic organs in preparing for the winter season, the situation remains generally unfavorable in this sphere."

Information provided by the party control commission shows that "Goskomtoplivo" did not ensure delivery of reserve fuel; the Tbilisi city and rayon power plant is not in compliance with winter readiness requirements; a selective check of thermal power plants of the Tbilisi Main Administration for Thermal Power Facilities shows these are not completely prepared for the cold season; plans are not being carried out for the construction and reconstruction of heating facilities by "Gruzpromgrazhdanstroy" and "Gruzagrostroy;" "Minzhilkombyt" has not been providing a schedule for completion of repair work in many cities and rayons of the republic; an extremely adverse situation has arisen in the agricultural-industrial complex since deficiencies in the supply of construction materials have resulted in repair work

not being accomplished at many farms, a factor which threatens the normal wintering of cattle; a significant number of farm managers have not been taking decisive measures with regard to conservation of fuel-energy resources and the prevention of squandering...

This is why the views and conclusions reached by bureau members—to the effect that communists in the government and department heads sometimes numb themselves in statistics when the situation is in fact exceedingly alarming—are entirely justified. This applies primarily to those who are directly concerned with the supply of petroleum products in the republic. Serious claims have many times been leveled against them, but their reaction as a rule takes the form of occasional official trips to Moscow, Grozny, or Donetsk. They do not feel disposed to fight to achieve a solution to the problem, and the impression is created that responsible officials at "Goskomtoplivo" have an unscrupulous attitude towards the job they are entrusted with, that they are waiting for these problems to be resolved for them by the leadership of the Central Committee and Council of Ministers. Apparently—and this idea was echoed at the session—the government and V. Vadachkoriya personally should introduce the question of their official responsibility for consideration by the Presidium of the republic's Council of Ministers.

"Gruzenergo" directors must also feel their responsibility to the people in order to avert problems in supplying electricity. By the way, it was proposed that this matter be resolved by changing days off to Wednesday and Thursday. An appropriate resolution was even adopted and promulgated. It turns out later this was a hurried action, insofar as the matter was not studied thoroughly taking into account public opinion. We cannot work this way. We must seek other solutions in which the entire population participates. The joint experiment conducted recently by "Gosteleradio" and the "Gruzenergo" production association is a case in point.

The composure the situation was dealt with in the sphere of supplying the population with goods also deserves condemnation. Figures regarding assets and delivery statistics mean nothing to the ordinary laborer if there are no goods on the shelves. Our shortages are excessive. Recently they have come to include salt, matches, kerosene, and now vinegar. And this in a wine-producing republic?! And at the threshold of winter, the shortages are doubly fraught with serious consequences—in the socio-economic and the political sphere as well. Specific individuals are responsible for it—Comrades V. Dzhindzhikhadze, R. Kontselidze, and O. Melkadze, it was stated directly at the session.

Yes, we are becoming more and more convinced of the need to effect change, first and foremost in the party itself, in the conscience and actions of communists—particularly the leadership, in every one of us. Today the basic requirement is a personal responsibility, and proceeding from this—a demand, in strict party fashion, a

comradely, exacting demand. Discussion results were as might be expected—no one was tasked with constructing anything or effecting repair anywhere, with delivering goods or products of any kind, with "providing," "attaining," "augmenting," or "improving," etc.

Responsibility! And responsibility again! To the party, to the people! This is what the discussion comes to, and this is the necessary condition for making it through the winter with the least possible adversity and hardship.

A number of urgent tasks we face today involve demographic policy and the population migration associated with it. The Georgian CP Central Committee is devoting special attention to developing a system for regulating these processes. This time, based on the Tetrtskaroytskiy Rayon example, session participants again became convinced that this is a vital issue for many other—if not all—rayons of the republic.

From the statement of Nodar Chitanava, chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers:

"This is a most severe social and national problem. An appropriate state program is under development, but any improvement in the situation will require multiplied efforts on the part of party, soviet, and other organs, of the entire people. These matters must be systematically examined not only in the Central Committee and Council of Ministers, but in other republic organs and in the localities as well."

Precise and competent explanations of this issue were given by Tetrtskaroytskiy Raykom [rayon party committee] Second Secretary Dzhemal Tsiklauri and rayon council executive committee chairman Ivan Megulashvili. Much has been done in recent years by party and soviet organs in the rayon. Perestroyka has significantly affected the social infrastructure, whose lack of development has had a negative impact on the demographic situation. The lack of required attention over an extended period of time to questions of social development and the extensive approach to developing branches of the national economy have resulted in adverse migrational processes. Thirty Georgian villages have become almost entirely deserted. As a result, the population of the rayon decreased by more than 1,000 individuals over 1970-1979. True, 1989 census data show the figure to have risen somewhat, but the main role in this increase was played by the resettlement here of inhabitants of the Svaneti and mountainous Adzhar regions who were victims of natural calamities.

There are many reasons for the unfavorable demographic situation in the rayon. The local leadership did not have, and still has not worked out a clearly defined migration policy. Moreover, the high level of unemployment and poor organization of everyday life in the village are prompting some of the population to move from the village to the rayon center, to other cities and rayon centers of the republic, and out of the republic. In this regard, the majority of those departing, as a rule, are young men. This has an adverse effect on the age

composition of the republic. Suffice it to say that citizens 60 years of age and older comprise 16.8 percent of the rayon population—this is far greater than the accepted age indices of our population. Analytical data show that the next few years will show a significant increase in the proportion of older citizens, which will lead to a sharp drop in the level of human reproduction by the year 2000.

Nor does the level of development of the rayon's economy in any way facilitate a reduction in the processes of migration. Fundamental improvements are required in the everyday social conditions of village laborers; there is insufficient housing in the rayon. The inadequacy of the potable water supply is being felt. The network for supplying the population with natural gas is poorly developed. The population has leveled serious accusations against the sanitation services, enterprises dealing in everyday services, trade, medical, and cultural enlightenment establishments. In short, everything here is interwoven into a complex, multi-faceted bundle of problems. An integral approach is required to untangle it—thorough scientific research and urgent resolution of the most pressing problems. And there are quite a few of these, ranging from the condition of rural roads to—unfortunately—ordinary everyday burdens, far from secondary in their significance, which have become commonplace. This concept was echoed in the presentation of A. Sulaberidze, department director at the Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences Economics and Law Institute, who took part in a study of the question. There was discussion at the session of a need to make more effective use of the capabilities of ministries, enterprises, and organizations which have fruit and vegetable gardening plots in the rayon in the process of solving problems concerning the rural infrastructure, development of family and peasants' farms, and the allocation of personal plots to young families.

In concluding the discussion, Givi Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, stressed that improvement of the demographic situation of the republic comprises a most important part of the Concept of Ethnic Development of the Georgian Communist Party. Examination of this issue in the buro is therefore quite natural, but will yield nothing unless words turn into actions, so that a consistent, detailed resolution is found for specific problems in all Georgian rayons, taking ethnic interests into account. We must have a systematic hearing of information at all levels, from directors of republic, city, and rayon organs, regarding what is being done to resolve the ethnic issue. Any irresponsibility shown in this effort must be severely assessed. With regard to Tetrtskaroykiy Rayon, we cannot reconcile ourselves to the fact that in the outskirts of Tbilisi, in immediate proximity to the capital where more than 6,000 garden plots are allocated for Tbilisi laborers, Georgian villages have become deserted.

Perestroyka brings to light the true individual, the true worth of the card-carrying communist, especially when this is a party leader with so much responsibility for

perestroyka's fate. No special courage is required today in order to pointedly identify deficiencies. What is more difficult is the job of surmounting them in fact.

This view was present constantly at the buro session. It was manifest especially distinctly during discussion of the report of CPSU member V. Blazhiyevskiy, chief of the Trans-Caucasus Railroad, regarding the implementation of measures to improve railroad operations.

It is no secret to anyone that the situation of the Trans-Caucasus Main Line continues to be unfavorable—serious operational interruptions continue to be felt, the chief reason for which is poor organization in the local areas. Unfortunately, however, the railroad chief has lacked the self-criticism which was warranted. And the absence of an objective assessment of the situation on the part of the railroad leadership in a number of instances has had a negative influence on the development of operations and maintenance work, on the enhancement of movement safety, on the technical re-equipment of the branch, and on its socio-economic development. We see a lack of clearly defined coordination between management and party leadership in resolving fundamental problems in the branch; a persistent, principled approach towards surmounting stagnation phenomena is lacking. Nor is appropriate attention being devoted to supervising the execution of decisions which have been made. Mutual interaction between the Tbilisskiy and Samtredskiy departments, the major railroad yards, and the leading administration services leaves much to be desired. Little is being accomplished in the way of shifting the branch over to new management conditions. Meanwhile, instead of increasing the exactingness required of the railroad management leadership, instead of effecting a principled and competent investigation of negligence which has led to accidents and truly enhancing responsibility for movement safety, we continue to see the obsolete stereotype of an assessment "on paper" of events which have occurred.

An exacting discussion also took place regarding the inability of railroad management to realize opportunities available for developing the social sphere, especially with regard to housing construction for railroad workers.

G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, paid special attention to this. Social conditions are not comprised just of good dining facilities. They include the financial situation of railroad personnel and their provision with housing and goods. They include people's dispositions, everyday attention to people and their needs, social justice... Railroad management should be more self-critical in this regard. It is doing too little to resolve problems vitally important to the people.

As noted during the course of the session, strong reprimands are appropriate for the unsatisfactory state of discipline, for the poor effectiveness of measures taken to curtail negative phenomena in departmental trade and public utilities facilities, for poor supervision of

observance of the law concerning the scheduling of work and time off. The absence of fundamental change in resolving the most pressing social issues has sharply aggravated the moral-psychological climate in collectives and has prompted them to express protest in such forms as the conduct of strikes in several enterprises.

The report of the railroad chief was full of promises and assurances with regard to perfecting line operations and improving the working conditions, everyday life, and rest and recreation opportunities of railroad personnel.

"Viktor Borisovich, you have made a lot of promises to the railroad workers of the Sukhumi Locomotive Depot," stated Givi Anchabadze, secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee and chairman of the Abkhaz ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, addressing the railroad chief. "You have to make good on your promises. Otherwise you will lose trust, people will no longer believe you."

"What has the appointment of Comrade V. Blazhiyevskiy as chief of the Trans-Caucasus Railroad System yielded the railroad?" asked Nugzar Sadzhaya, head of the department of party-organization and cadre work of the Georgian CP Central Committee. "We have to say frankly that nothing special has come of it as yet. His high degree of professionalism alone will not help matters. You can have many good plans, but action is the important thing. People are tired of promises. Viktor Borisovich must prove by his actions that he is capable of radically restructuring the functioning of the Trans-Caucasus Railroad."

At present, the discussion indicated, certain positive symptoms are perhaps evident. But they are not resolving matters. This year our railroad has failed to fulfill the plan according to every basic index. Moreover, the branch trade union committee and the party committee for administration are practically non-functioning. Comrade Blazhiyevskiy must significantly enhance the responsibility of the leaders of all railroad services and subunits, must fundamentally restructure their work style. Incidentally, this also applies to other management leadership personnel we have who are not in step with today's requirements.

Generalizing the results of discussion of the report, Givi Gumbaridze pointedly presented the matter of the railroad chief's responsibility for deficiencies, serious omissions, and breakdowns. He noted that it would be more advantageous for Blazhiyevskiy to state before the bureau his specific thoughts regarding the work style and methods of his assistants and the party committee for railroad management. Unfortunately, he did not present a program dealing with how to correct the situation. The leadership of the Trans-Caucasus Railroad clearly lacks a sense of responsibility and political feeling. In extreme situations it manifests excessive composure, often helplessness.

The railroad collective, many thousand members strong, is poorly informed with respect to its leaders, who

seldom meet with the workers. As a result we see violations of discipline and an increase in accidents. The prestige of the leadership lies with the leaders themselves—they must get down to business and solve the problems which are troubling railroad workers and the entire republic.

In its adopted resolution, the bureau of the Central Committee has stated the inadequacy of CPSU member V. Blazhiyevskiy's work in directing the Trans-Caucasus Railroad and has warned him of the necessity to take resolute, purposeful measures concerning the entire complex of problems associated with intensive development and improvement of the functioning of railroad transportation in the republic. He and other communist managers of the railroad have been given specific tasks with respect to improving their work style and methods.

The bureau discussed other matters in addition to those mentioned above, specifically—measures to effect further improvement in the Tbilisi State Music Theater imeni Vaso Abashidze, party rehabilitation of a large group of individuals, victims of the repressions of the '30's and '40's and the beginning of the '50's. The bureau tasked the Party Control Commission of the Georgian CP Central Committee with preparation of detailed materials on the rehabilitation work being accomplished and with familiarizing a wide circle of the republic community with this effort through the mass media.

Gumbaridze Reviews Draft Laws on Constitution, Elections

90US0264A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
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[Report of Georgian CP Central Committee First Secretary and Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Chairman G. G. Gumbaridze at the 12th session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation: "On Draft Laws Concerning Changes and Amendments to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Georgian SSR, and Elections of Georgian SSR People's Deputies and People's Deputies of Local Soviets"]

[Text] Esteemed deputies!

We can all sense the tense circumstances in which the latest session of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet is beginning its work. It will probably be very difficult for the present generation of deputies to recall how any session could be held at such an urgent, critical, and decisive time.

The situation is extraordinarily complex. Its relative stabilization and comparative calm in certain regions could change at any time. Emotions predominate, profound inner processes are taking place, and mutually exclusive demands have become frequent.

Under such conditions we need great wisdom. We must find the only correct, objective, and just solution. It must

be consistent with the principles of the Constitution and the law. No one has the right not to obey the Constitution and the law. It would be impossible to avoid complete chaos otherwise.

Every decision the session takes today, indeed each word spoken from this rostrum, can essentially determine the future development of the political situation and its future fate. No deputy, no one among us, has ever before faced such responsibility or needed such wisdom, common sense and logic. At the same time, none of us have ever before needed to manifest such high principles and standards as today, at this session.

What we need above all is dialogue on all levels, in particular the level of people's deputies. We need a broad spectrum of views, a persistent search for political methods of settling differences, certainly on a principled basis. This is the only way to avoid excesses and tragedies.

You recall how we were able, drawing on our own resources, to forestall any further development of uncontrolled processes in Lower Kartlia and stabilize the situation there, thanks to the coordinated efforts of the republic's leadership, the law enforcement organs, and the public. We were also able to make certain mutually acceptable decisions in Abkhazia, even though we were on the brink there. But I must also inform the session that we still face a great deal of work to fully normalize the situation and resolve many problems in that regard.

We agree completely with the idea, stated here, that this session must be guided by the new era. Our people have waited for it a long time, although there were objective reasons why it has been delayed.

The draft laws that have been submitted to the session for discussion represent legal-political documents of extraordinary importance. They must provide a firm foundation for Georgia's national-state development and foster processes of democratization and glasnost, the shaping of a law-governed state in the republic.

No less important is the fact that the spirit of these documents is in full accord with the aims of the draft Concept of National Development of Georgia, which was drawn up with the active participation of party, soviet, and economic organs, scientific-research institutions, and labor collectives of the republic, our whole society, and which was submitted for public discussion two months ago by the Georgian CP Central Committee.

The drafts of the legislative acts under discussion contain many important innovations and changes. The main thing is that they create the conditions for resolving fundamental national-state questions on a profoundly democratic basis. They shape a reliable constitutional mechanism and guarantees for pluralism and alternative approaches.

The publication of these documents for public discussion was met with great interest by our people, our

youth, and the public at large. Free, unrestricted, extremely useful exchanges of opinion took place, and debates and discussions were organized.

Many practical proposals and criticisms were expressed in the pages of the press, on television and radio, and at meetings of labor collectives. Interesting proposals were submitted by the appropriate commissions and working groups of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and by individual deputies. Important recommendations are to be found in letters that have come in to party and soviet organs.

A total of around 62,000 persons took part in examining the draft laws, and almost 25,000 spoke.

Special mention must be made of the very constructive work done by the Society for Democratic Elections in Georgia and the Georgian People's Front. Their members have taken direct and active part in the work of the relevant commissions of the Supreme Soviet. At the same time, the Constitutional Commission has made a careful study of their proposals, which are endorsed by the collectives of the Melikishvili Institute of Physical and Organic Chemistry (Georgian Academy of Sciences), the Children's Clinical Hospital of the Transcaucasian Railroad and the Sukhumi Locomotive Depot, the Telavi Historical-Ethnographic Museum, and other organizations and institutions, as well as the Rustaveli Society, the Gori Regional Chapter of the People's Front, Rustaveli Society and People's Front organizations of the Mion Association, and others.

In particular, an analysis of the proposals of the Society for Democratic Elections in Georgia and the People's Front has led to the conclusion that the changes and amendments that have been submitted for discussion need to incorporate several new articles and points, and that the wording of some of the propositions needs to be changed.

It can be stated, however, that overall the draft laws submitted today are the fruit of shared thinking and joint efforts and embody practically all alternative considerations that have been stated so far. We wish to emphasize that we are firmly in favor of having future legislation and overall parliamentary activities continue under conditions of this kind of dialogue and cooperation.

As is well known, at first it was proposed that the present session examine changes in just those points relating to the new elections. But the course of events, public opinion, and the joint efforts that were mentioned above have revealed the necessity of introducing many other essential questions right today. Especially since the array of questions that are extraordinarily important from the national-state standpoint, pertaining exclusively to the competence of Georgia's highest organ of authority, is expanding considerably. This refers in particular to such questions as the state borders of Georgia, the right of free secession from the Soviet Union, the validity of laws and

other legislative acts of the USSR within republic territory, the formation of the republic's domestic and foreign policy activities, the deciding of issues of confidence [doveriye] in the Georgian government or individual members thereof, and so on.

First of all we should like to touch upon changes introduced into Articles 10 and 11 of the republic's Fundamental Law. These deal with forms of ownership, defining its subject [subyekt] and object [obyekt] more precisely, and the nature of national wealth and property. We believe the new version of the above articles accords better with the tasks of perestroyka and confirms the republic's right not only to determine its own forms of property ownership but also to stipulate constitutionally its right of ownership of the land, minerals, water, forests, and other natural resources, also basic means of production in any sector of the national economy.

This article is of special importance in terms of consolidating Georgia's sovereignty. In general it is impossible to speak of sovereignty if the base of that sovereignty—the nation's wealth—is not owned by it. It was just this interpretation of sovereignty that served as the basis for the 30 December 1922 Treaty on the formation of the Soviet Union and the 1924 USSR Constitution. The Georgian SSR Fundamental Law of 1927 stipulated that the land, the forests, waters, and minerals within the whole territory of the republic constitute the property of the state of the workers and peasants of Georgia. The 1922 Treaty is the international-legal base of all Constitutions of the USSR. For this reason, none of the subsequent Constitutions revoked the union republic's right of ownership to its natural resources, although they did not stipulate this right directly.

The new version of Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution will provide a firm juridical guarantee of the supremacy of Georgia's authority in a most vital sphere of social life. At the same time, it does not rule out the possibility of transferring rights of ownership and use to all-union authorities and other republics, although all of this must be regulated by a reliable legal mechanism.

The Commission submits for discussion a new version of the wording of Article 69 of the Georgian SSR Constitution, proposed by the Society for Democratic Elections in Georgia. They propose the following formulation of this article:

"The Georgian SSR shall retain the right of free secession from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This right shall be sacred and inviolable.

"It shall be impermissible to annul or restrict the Georgian SSR's right of free secession from the USSR by any act of the supreme authority of the USSR or by any other means.

"From the moment of any decision to annul the Georgian SSR's right to free secession from the USSR, the Georgian SSR shall be considered to have seceded from the USSR.

"The same result shall ensue from any refusal to comply with a demand of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet to annul or change an act which restricts the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic's right of free secession from the Soviet Union. The question as to whether or not the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic's right of free secession from the USSR is thus restricted shall be decided by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet."

Excessive centralization of legislative and administrative organs and the proliferation of arbitrary, voluntaristic acts in effect changes the essence of the republic's sovereignty and unjustifiably restricts its interests and obstructs the activization of its socioeconomic and intellectual potential.

A reliable barrier must be put up against all of this by substantial changes and amendments to the republic's constitution. It is essential to take maximum account of the republic's sovereignty, interests, and national specifics and traditions. This is in fact the purpose of the new version of Article 77, which states: "The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet shall revoke the validity of laws and legally binding acts of the USSR within the republic's territory if it finds that they are not in accord with the republic's interests. In doing so, it shall submit to the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee and the organ which promulgated such laws and legally binding acts, certain proposals designed to bring them into line with the republic's interests. In the event that no agreement can be reached, these laws and legally binding acts of the USSR shall not be valid within the territory of the Georgian SSR."

The model of the new organizational structure of Georgia's supreme authority is of considerable interest.

Before dwelling on this matter, a few words about the Georgian term *uzenaesi* ("supreme"), which is mentioned repeatedly in the draft laws submitted to the session for discussion. This term, which disappeared from our political vocabulary without any basis whatsoever, renders with exceptional precision, we think, the essence of this very highest organ, its hierarchical position, function, purpose, and powers. In addition, we get rid of a tautology. The reinstatement of this word to its legitimate rights will unquestionably improve Georgian juridical terminology. It is more Georgian, more accurate. Specialists and the public at large are of the same opinion in this regard.

Now about the new model of supreme authority. The Draft Law on Changes and Amendments to the Constitution does not stipulate the convocation of a republic congress of people's deputies.

What was the motivation of the Commission for the Formulation of Draft Laws on the Constitution and Elections when it submitted such a proposal to the Supreme Soviet? First, on grounds that in order to form such a congress it would be necessary to create a very large corps of deputies, and it would be very difficult to

ensure fruitful work by the corps in terms of organization. Secondly, and no less important, that rejecting such a congress will make it possible to preserve genuinely democratic procedures. The republic's working people will elect their supreme authority—the entire membership of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet—directly, by direct means.

The draft Law on Changes and Amendments to the Constitution calls for limiting the number of people's deputies to 350. During the discussion of this document, it was suggested that it would be better to limit the number of people's deputies to 300—that is, in the future Supreme Soviet there would be 140 fewer persons than now. In the opinion of experts, this number is fully sufficient to ensure full representation in the supreme organ of authority for the whole population, for all social strata and groups, all autonomous entities and administrative-territorial regions of the republic.

It is of extraordinarily fundamental importance to decide this matter correctly. The effectiveness of the future parliament will largely depend on how correctly we determine both the total number of people's deputies of the Supreme Soviet and the number of deputies working away from their regular jobs. We also need to give careful thought to how to staff the working groups of supreme authority by democratic means, how to ensure optimal rotation of people's deputies.

Clearly, the same approach will be necessary in deciding questions of the formation of permanently functioning links of local soviets.

The Draft Law delimits the legislative and executive functions more precisely. It considerably enlarges the list of officials who, by virtue of their official position, cannot simultaneously serve as people's deputies. These include, in particular, ministers, chairmen of state committees, and heads of particular departments and their deputies. This will enhance the democratic character of the formation of the elective organ and at the same time constitute a guarantee that people's deputies will not fall under the influence of executive organs and their heads.

We also consider it to be a step forward that we have rejected holding district [okruzhnyye] pre-election assemblies. It must be acknowledged that this not so very democratic mechanism has sometimes been utilized locally to get rid of candidates they deemed undesirable. I should like to inform you right here that the legislative commission has also decided not to have the draft law include the practice of holding district assemblies.

The draft law also rejects the election of people's deputies directly from the social organizations. The public will vote for all deputies exclusively by election districts. In this way, we believe, we will better ensure the democratization of the mechanism of the election of deputies to the organ of supreme authority. There is no doubt that the direct representation of social organizations in the person of people's deputies has certain advantages, but practice has shown that to a certain extent it does not

accord with certain fundamental principles of the Soviet election system, such as universal, equal, and direct elections.

We also consider unacceptable the proposal made by certain members of the intelligentsia to provide "quotas of deputies" for Pshavians, Khevsurs, Tushetians, and Gudamakarians. If such an exception were made, the general principle would be violated. Then "quotas" would have to be extended to others, including social organizations. It is quite another matter that we must do the maximum to foster the socioeconomic and cultural development of these highland regions of Georgia and their population.

Why do we reject the election of people's deputies from the social organizations? First of all, under such a procedure a rather large group of deputies would not be elected directly by the public. Secondly, one voter would have two or more votes. Finally, account must be taken of the fact that where deputies are elected directly from the social organizations we get a multi-stage election system, at the concluding stage of which the deputy is elected by the administrative organ of that organization, which consists of several hundred persons at most, whereas there are thousands of voters in the election district.

Naturally, this approach to the formation of the corps of deputies must not hinder the creation of a highly intellectual, competent parliament. Without such a parliament it will be very difficult for us to make serious progress on the path of perestroika and to fully activate the nation's energy, the whole potential of our society. The Supreme Soviet must include more of the best representatives of our scientific-technical and creative intelligentsia, young people, and social organizations. And, most important, highly-competent specialists such as jurists, economists, historians, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and so on. This is essential if we want to have a parliament appropriate to a civilized country.

The documents that have been submitted for discussion also contain many other excellent innovations. We believe that making socialist pluralism a reality and fostering the political views and interests of the various social groups and strata will go a long way toward facilitating the further democratization of the mechanism of nominating deputy candidates and forming election commissions.

The elections themselves are held for single-mandate election districts. At the same time, it has been deemed advisable not to limit the number of candidates for deputy.

A truly democratic mechanism is being formed to ensure the effective work of the organs of people's rule. Only citizens of Georgia shall enjoy positive suffrage and eligibility. This is by no means in conflict with the principle of equality of elections. The main purpose of extending suffrage exclusively to citizens of the republic is to create truly workers' organs of authority, not to have

a single deputy who is not part of the people and does not know the voters, their troubles and aspirations. Our parliament, our city and rayon Soviets of People's Deputies, need knowledgeable people, competent and creative, real professionals.

As a genuinely popular, permanently functioning parliament is created, relations and contacts between deputies and the voters acquire completely new qualitative content. Members of the parliament must do everything they can to determine the needs of their constituents and help them in exercising their constitutional rights. The only kind of voter who can elect such a deputy is one who lives permanently in the particular election district or region of the republic.

It is probably not necessary to demonstrate that persons in the republic temporarily on business, people who have come here on vacation or for some other purpose, whose stay in Georgia coincides with election day, cannot make a correct choice, nor are they all they interested in such a choice.

We want to repeat once more that this kind of regulation by no means infringes upon the interests of people of any nationality. The draft laws on the elections proclaim that in Georgia, the right to vote shall pertain to every citizen of the republic, regardless of his origin, social or property status, racial or national affiliation, sex, education, native language, attitude toward religion, length of residence in a given locality, or type and kind of occupation.

The age qualification for deputies to the republic's Supreme Soviet is to be set at 21. On what basis do we set this age qualification? Primarily the fact that every deputy to the Georgian Supreme Soviet should have a certain amount of life experience. Without it he cannot fully take part in the work of the highest permanently functioning organ of state authority. The same practice is stipulated by Soviet and advanced foreign legislation.

The powers of the central as well as district and precinct election commissions are considerably broadened. The term of office of the central and district election commissions is increased to five years. In the course of elections to city and rayon soviets, district election commissions will not be formed. Their functions will largely be carried out by precinct election commissions.

In the course of elections of republic people's deputies, district election commissions will not have the right to schedule runoffs throughout the whole election district but only in the election precinct where the results of the vote have been annulled. This innovation is of great importance now, because in any particular district or precinct sometimes ten or even more deputy candidates may be running for one mandate. In such cases, perhaps none of them will garner the necessary number of votes. We have seen convincing instances of this in the recent elections of new deputies to the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet to replace ones removed.

In our opinion, the draft laws that have been submitted for discussion by and large correctly determine the structure and powers of the highest and local organs of authority and ensure confirmation of the new election system. We expect that they will provide a firm foundation for strengthening the republic's sovereignty and citizens' full exercise of their constitutional rights.

We also find acceptable the proposition that is formulated in Point 18 of Article 104, which requires that for a person to be appointed chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers he must appear before the Georgian Supreme Soviet and announce his program.

Also meriting attention is the idea, set forth in Article 124, which stipulates the procedural rules governing the Supreme Soviet's proclamation of a vote of confidence or no-confidence for the head of the government and particular members of the Council of Ministers.

We also consider as a sign of increased democratization the proposed procedure for recalling the Chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet and filling the vacant post, which is formulated as follows in Article 114: "The Chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet may be recalled by secret ballot at any time by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, given a two-thirds majority of its membership. A vote on the question of recalling the Chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet shall be held in case it is demanded by at least one fifth of the people's deputies of the Georgian SSR.

"In the event that the Chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet is dismissed from his post before his term expires, the Supreme Soviet shall elect a Supreme Soviet Chairman within a month's time. Prior to the election of a Supreme Soviet Chairman, the duties of the Chairman shall be carried out by the First Deputy Chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet.

"In the absence of the Chairman of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet or in the event that he is unable to carry out his duties, they shall be carried out by the First Deputy Chairman; if the First Deputy Chairman is also unable to carry out the functions of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet for the above reasons, they shall be carried out by a temporary Chairman elected from among the people's deputies of the Georgian SSR."

This regulation will rule out the possibility of the chief post of authority—the post of Chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet—being occupied even temporarily by a person not elected by the people.

As for the institution of martial law or a state of emergency within the republic's territory, the republic's opinion, its position, must unquestionably be decisive in this matter.

It is the republic which should determine measures relating to such a state. We have a right to know who, in any given situation, shall bear responsibility for taking

timely and necessary or, conversely, unfounded decisions. This point of view, this approach, we think, is most fully and precisely reflected in the new formulation of Point 7 of Article 113 of the draft law:

The Presidium of the Georgian Supreme Soviet....

"shall, on its own initiative or at the request of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, decide as to the necessity of declaring martial law or a state of emergency over the whole territory of the republic or in particular localities; it shall decide questions as to instituting special regimes of citizen behavior."

A suggestion has also been made to add to this Article the provision that the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium designate dates and days of special significance to Georgia and decide questions of the renunciation of Georgian citizenship [vykhod iz grazhdanstva].

In our opinion, it is also necessary to take account of the view of the Society for Democratic Elections in Georgia concerning the fact that political views should not prevent a citizen from exercising his right to vote, or restrict the voter's free expression of his will. Evidently, this provision must definitely be taken into account in Part 1 of Article 2 of the draft law on elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet.

From the moment a candidate is nominated for deputy, each such candidate shall be ensured equal rights.

We believe that the practice of having deputy candidates formulate pre-election programs is in full accord with the demands of democracy and glasnost. It will not be a formalistic act, a step dictated by opportunistic considerations. Deputy candidates will be given every opportunity to propagandize their pre-election program. Assemblies, meetings with voters, and the press, television, and radio will be used for this purpose.

In consideration of all this, a new version of Article 39 of the Draft Law on Elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet has been formulated. It states that "the deputy candidate's program may not contain war propaganda, calls for the violent overthrow or the replacement of the state and social structure established in accordance with the USSR and Georgian SSR Constitutions or for interethnic strife and hatred, and may not infringe upon the constitutional rights of citizens."

The Commission for Formulating the Draft Law on Elections also deems it possible to accept the proposal to formulate in Part 5 of Article 96 of the Georgian SSR Constitution a provision for creating a unified fund to finance elections of people's deputies. Such a fund, designed to provide each candidate equal conditions, will be formed at the expense of the state, enterprises, and social and other organizations.

In the process of examining proposals, certain ones have come in whose consideration, in our view, would not

serve to improve the draft law that has been submitted or ensure the profoundly democratic character of fundamental provisions.

For example, it has been suggested that Article 2 of the draft law on elections to the Supreme Soviet be amended to stipulate that universal suffrage would not pertain to all citizens of Georgia who have attained the necessary age but only to those who, in addition, reside permanently in our republic.

We find that it would be wrong to state the matter in that manner. First, it would be inconsistent with the proposition, which is developed in that Article, that the length of residence in a given locality cannot serve as the basis for restricting the right to vote. Secondly, the proposed amendment would not change the meaning of the Article that is already formulated, since according to existing legislation all persons permanently registered and residing in the republic are considered citizens of Georgia. We also believe it would be inadvisable to change the existing proposition of the draft law because work is already underway on a Law on the Status of Georgian Citizenship, which will give concrete form to all circumstances relating to this matter.

Another proposal would formulate Part 2 of Article 2 of the Draft Law on Elections such that a deputy to the republic's Supreme Soviet would not have the right to serve simultaneously as a deputy to another Soviet of People's Deputies of Georgia or the Soviet Union.

The authors of this proposal base it on the fact that inasmuch as the Georgian Supreme Soviet will be a permanently functioning organ, a member of it cannot simultaneously perform his duties adequately in another Soviet of People's Deputies.

This formulation of the question, however, ignores the fact that although the Supreme Soviet will in fact be a permanently functioning organ, it is the opinion of the Commission for Formulating Changes and Amendments to the Constitution that only one third of the total number of people's deputies—100—will be serving on it on a rotation basis while away from their regular jobs. This issue will be decided definitively by the new Supreme Soviet.

We think that it will be difficult enough to form the Supreme Soviet entirely of professional parliamentarians. And, in our opinion, that is not necessary. To create such an organ requires the necessary experience and political readiness of society, the necessary cultivation and skills of parliamentary activity. We have only just begun, in fact, to work along these lines. We are only now getting our first lessons in parliamentary work, parliamentary democracy. And that includes the present session.

Under such conditions, it is essential that we get the greatest possible number of worthy representatives of our society involved in the experience of parliamentary work.

That is why it is so vitally important now to determine the optimal number of people's deputies serving on the Supreme Soviet while away from their regular jobs. Genuinely professional parliamentarians must be developed in the process of serving on the Supreme Soviet. It is possible that not all deputies will prove to have the necessary qualities. For this reason, to release every deputy from his regular job immediately would seem to be premature.

One proposal that has come in calls for giving the right to vote only to Soviet Army servicemen (and members of their families) residing permanently in the republic, while restricting that right in the case of citizens on active military service. We believe that it would be wrong to accept such a proposal.

First of all, the task of creating national troop formations is a very topical one. If the above proposal were to be accepted, and the problem were to be decided affirmatively, it would revoke the right to vote of our countrymen on active military service in such units. Secondly, it would take away the voting rights of young people who are or will be on active military service in Georgia. The percentage of such young people among conscripts already adds up to nearly one third, and later on this percentage will rise considerably.

It has also been suggested that the right to nominate candidates for people's deputies of Georgia also be given to "groups of citizens... by way of submitting voters' applications," which would be reflected accordingly in Article 9 of the draft law on elections.

It would be wrong to introduce that innovation. It would lead to a violation of the principle of open and public holding of elections. Yet this principle is proclaimed in Article 7 of the draft law. Also to be considered is the fact that the draft law considerably widens the range of organizations having the right to nominate deputy candidates. They include collectives of secondary specialized and higher educational institutions. For the first time in the republic's election practices, this right is conferred on social movements, assemblies of voters in their place of residence, and others.

By way of legislative initiative, Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Deputy D. Khakhutaishvili has submitted to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies a proposal to introduce amendments in Paragraph 1 of Article 77 of the present USSR Constitution.

It relates to the union republics' participation in all-union organs on a parity basis and the introduction of the principle of unanimity in resolving crucial issues. On this basis, changes must be introduced in the applicable articles of the USSR and Georgian SSR constitutions. The Center for Research on State and Law of the Institute of Economics and Law of the Georgian Academy of Sciences believes that this proposal merits attention, but that it does require an integrated approach. If it is adopted, it will be necessary to formulate many articles of both the all-union and the republic Constitutions in a completely new version. At the

present time, however, it is felt that the introduction of such changes would not be advantageous. As is well known, the question of drafting a new USSR Constitution is already on the agenda. Deputy D. Khakhutaishvili's proposal ought to be considered in the context of that formulation.

Also worth noting is the following comment by People's Deputy P. Margvelashvili, relating to Article 98. It calls for the practice of giving voters' mandates to the deputies, who are then to submit the mandates to the applicable soviets.

We believe that the documents that have been submitted to the session for discussion will take on the force of law. They are intended to play a crucial role in the formation of organs of genuine people's rule. Until now, the apparatus of the executive branch [vlast] actually managed the work of the soviets; now, the situation is radically changed. Genuine state authority, both in the Center and in outlying regions, will be concentrated in the hands of the Soviets of People's Deputies, their sessions, parliamentary committees, and commissions. Soviets on any level will constitute the link of supreme authority, of the highest administration, within their territory.

The soviets alone will examine and resolve all crucial issues of state, economic, and social-cultural life.

In short, we are talking about the creation of a precisely functioning, genuine people's parliament. Such a parliament will not allow any state apparatus or department to dictate its will to the soviets. The functions of the people's deputies will change radically. They are the ones who will be called upon to engage in constant law-making, administrative, and monitoring functions and exert effective influence on the implementation of decisions.

Obviously, the title of deputy in a qualitatively new parliament will require that he possess not only the appropriate political and practical qualities but also high morality, a sense of high responsibility, profound professionalism and competence, outstanding talent and the ability to work with the public.

Undoubtedly our deputies will have to appeal to expert services for help, to specialists of the appropriate departments and institutions, and the public at large.

The strategic perestroika of the organs of authority is of cardinal importance to us. It is this perestroika which must ensure genuine realization of the right to national self-determination, the resolution of many years of accumulated problems in the sphere of national-state construction, the elimination of the deformations and distortions that were widespread at all stages of socialist construction and still exert a destructive effect on all spheres of social-political life.

In consideration of the above-mentioned tendencies, the restoration of the republic's sovereignty will unquestionably serve as an additional stimulus for its economic, social, and cultural-moral progress.

In short, it is a matter of genuine realization of the true essence of federation, of backing up the republic's sovereignty and powers with legal, constitutional guarantees.

The draft Concept of the National Development of Georgia must be considered as just the first step on the path of our republic's attainment of genuine sovereignty in the Soviet federation. In no case must there be any restriction on the republic's striving to search for more perfect forms of national-state development. This is why the changes and amendments we are thinking of making in the Georgian Constitution are by no means final. They touch upon only those articles of the Fundamental Law which stipulate the procedure for the formation and activities of the republic's highest organs of authority.

This constitutes just one step along the path of drafting a new Georgian Constitution.

The new Constitution will be designed fully to reflect the new political, economic, and social realities. For this reason, it seems to us, the Commission for the Formulation of Constitutional Questions must vigorously continue its activities in the future. Future elections of people's deputies to republic and local soviets will be conducted in accordance with the new election laws. We firmly believe that the amendments and additions proposed by the draft laws will create all the conditions necessary for the most resourceful and energetic people to be broadly represented in the parliament and local soviets of the republic.

We are convinced that all of this will accelerate processes of perestroika, democratization, and glasnost, the qualitative renewal of society; these efforts will help to defuse [razryadka] extremely tense sociopolitical situations and resolve the very urgent problems facing both our republic and our whole country today.

Latvian Communist Party Draft Statutes

90UN0640A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
23 Dec 89 p 4

[Draft statutes of the Latvian Communist Party proposed by scientific associates at the Latvian CP Central Committee's Institute for Party History]

[Text] I. General Provisions

1. The Latvian Communist Party is a voluntary socio-political organization which vigorously fights for an independent Latvia in which the ideals of democracy and social justice will be implemented.
2. The Latvian Communist Party is an independent organization which unites in its ranks residents of Latvia from various ethnic backgrounds; it is active in the entire territory of Latvia.
3. The Latvian Communist Party is a constituent part of the socio-political system of the republic. It functions independently within the framework of the Constitution

and laws of the Latvian SSR, in keeping with the program and statutes of the Latvian Communist Party.

4. The main goal of the activities of the Latvian Communist Party is to restore the state independence of Latvia which makes it possible to preserve and develop the indigenous nationality in its motherland, to ensure the cooperation of all ethnic groups residing in Latvia on an equal footing, to implement the principles of social justice, to create a democratic, law-governed state, and to overcome the moral, demographic, economic, and ecological crises.

With a view to achieving these goals, the Latvian Communist Party uses democratic, non-violent, constitutional methods in the spirit of most extensive glasnost; resolutely renounces administrative approaches, the monopolization of power, claims to an absolute truth; and condemns any violence, discrimination, and propaganda of hostility.

II. Latvian Communist Party Members

6. Any resident of Latvia 18 years and older who recognizes the program and statute of the Latvian Communist Party, belongs to one of the primary party organization, and supports the party financially by paying membership dues may become a Latvian Communist Party member.

7. Latvian CP members cannot simultaneously be members of other parties.

8. It is a duty of Latvian CP members to aid in the accomplishment of tasks set in the Latvian Communist Party program, to comply with the requirements of the Latvian Communist Party statute, and to reinforce the authority of the party by their activities and behavior.

9. Latvian CP members are entitled to:

- nominate themselves or other members of the Latvian Communist Party in elections to party organs, elect the party organs, and be elected to the party organs;
- personally participate in party meetings, sessions of party bureaus and committees, and receive information on the activities of the party and its organs;
- freely discuss the issues of policy and practical activities of the party at party meetings, conferences, congresses, meetings of party bureaus and committees, in the press, on the radio and TV, offer solutions, advocate revising or canceling earlier decisions, take part in creating alternative platforms on the issues of party tactics, and criticize any communist;
- submit questions, proposals, and petitions to any echelon of the party and receive responses on the substantive issues in his petition;
- be defended by the party in the event of unjustified accusations.

10. Admission to Latvian CP membership is practiced on an individual basis, proceeding from a personal written petition; in the course of this, the individual wishing to join the party may freely elect the primary party organization to which he wishes to belong. The issue of admissions to the party is discussed and resolved at an open meeting of the primary party organization. A resolution on admission to the party is considered passed if two-thirds of the members of the primary party organization vote in favor of it in a secret ballot. The primary organization issues membership cards to the individuals joining the party. Substantiated objections to refusals to grant admissions may be taken to a territorial appeals commission; the commission reviews the petition and, if necessary, suggests that the primary party organization discuss the issue again. The primary organization makes its final decision on the petition within 30 days.

11. If a Latvian CP member does not comply with the program of the party or violates its statutes a primary party organization may expel him from the ranks of the Latvian Communist Party. The issue of expelling a Latvian CP member is discussed and resolved at an open party meeting of the primary party organization. The decision on an expulsion from the party is considered adopted if no fewer than two-thirds of the members of the primary party organization vote for it in a secret ballot.

An individual expelled from the party has a right to appeal within two months to the territorial appeals commission or the Central Appeals Commission which review the petition and, if necessary, suggest that the primary organization consider the issue again at its meeting; the organization makes a final decision on the petition within 30 days.

12. Individuals convicted of a common crime by a court are expelled from the ranks of the Latvian Communist Party.

13. Appeals by individuals expelled from the Latvian Communist Party are reviewed by the Appeals Commission within 60 days of their receipt.

14. A Latvian CP member is entitled to leave the party having notified his primary party organization of it in writing. A Latvian CP member who has not paid membership dues for three months for no valid reason is considered to have left the party.

15. A Latvian CP member who cannot participate vigorously enough in the work of his primary party organization due to his age, an illness, or another valid reason may be granted the status of a party reservist or an honorary veteran of the party on the basis of his written petition by a decision of a meeting of the primary party organization. Party reservists and honorary party veterans enjoy the same rights as the rest of party members; however, they cannot be elected to the leading organs of the party or elected delegates to party conferences and congresses. The status of a party reservist may be permanent or temporary.

III. Organizational Structure of the Party

16. Primary party organizations are set up at the place of work or residence of communists and belong to district and rayon (in the city of Riga) territorial party organizations. The organization to which the communists of a particular territory belong is superior with regard to all party organizations belonging to it.

17. All party organizations are autonomous in resolving local issues.

18. For a primary party organization, a meeting is the supreme organ of the party organization whereas for territorial party organizations it is a conference and a Latvian CP congress. A meeting, conference, or congress have a quorum if no fewer than two-thirds of the members of the primary party organization or elected delegates are present.

19. A meeting elects the bureau of a primary party organization and a secretary, and in primary organizations consisting of fewer than 15 members, a secretary and a deputy secretary. A conference elects a party committee, its bureau, and first secretary. A congress elects the Latvian CP Central Committee, its Politburo, Secretariat, and a first secretary. The number of candidates nominated for elected posts should not be restricted. A communist should not be elected to the same post for more than two consecutive terms.

The Latvian CP Central Committee and its district and rayon committees set up an apparatus for conducting routine work on organizing the execution and verification of party decisions and rendering assistance to subordinate organizations in their activities.

The structure and staffing of the party apparatus are determined by relevant party committees.

20. Once a year, all elected party organs should report on their work to the communists who have elected them.

21. Permanent or temporary commissions and working groups for various issues of party work may be created at party committees; likewise, other forms may be used to enlist communists in the work of party organs on a volunteer basis.

22. Control organs of the territorial party organizations and the Latvian Communist Party (party appeals commissions and party finance commissions) are autonomous in resolving all issues. They are elected at the party conferences and the congress and report to these organs. Their decisions cannot be canceled by relevant party committees. Differences which emerge between a control organ and a party committee are settled by a party meeting, conference, or congress.

23. Party organs are elected by a secret ballot. Secretaries and deputy secretaries of primary party organizations consisting of fewer than 15 party members may be elected, with the consent of communists, by an open vote at the meetings of primary party organizations and in

party groups. The same procedures apply to the elections of delegates to the conferences of territorial party organizations and Latvian CP congresses in these primary party organizations.

24. Meetings of the aktiv of the Latvian Communist Party, oblast (Riga, Vidzeme, Zemgale, and Latgale), district, and rayon (in the city of Riga) organizations of the Latvian Communist Party are convened in order to discuss the most important Latvian Communist Party decisions and develop measures for their implementation, as well as to consider the issues of local life.

25. Discussions and referendums within the framework of the entire Latvian Communist Party, as well as oblast, district, and rayon (in the city of Riga) party organizations are possible on controversial and insufficiently clear issues.

Party-wide discussions and referendums are held on the initiative of the Latvian CP Central Committee, on the demand of one-third of party organizations, or one-third of party members.

Discussions and referendums in territorial party organizations are held on the initiative of the Latvian CP Central Committee or relevant party commissions, on the demand of one-third of the primary party organizations belonging to a territorial party organization, or of one-third of the members of a territorial party organization.

Primary Party Organizations

26. Primary party organizations constitute the foundation of the Latvian Communist Party.

Primary party organizations are created at the place of work or residence of party members if there are at least three party members. Primary party organizations may be created within various associations, societies, and clubs if no fewer than three communists who are members of such an association, society, or club so wish. Within 15 days of the founding meeting, primary party organizations are registered at the elected organ of the relevant territorial party organization.

27. A party meeting convened at least once in three months is the supreme organ of a primary party organization. The meetings are also convened if one-third of the members of the party organization demand it. Election meetings in primary party organizations are held at least once every three years by a decision of the party buro or on the demand of one-third of the members of a primary party organization.

28. Party groups headed by group organizers may be created within a primary party organization if necessary. Group organizers are elected for one year.

29. The operation of a primary party organization is discontinued if two-thirds of the members of the primary organization so demand.

30. With a view to pooling their efforts and coordinating their activities, several primary party organizations may set up or elect joint coordinating organs. The structure, jurisdiction, and tasks of these organs are determined by a joint meeting of members or delegates of united party organizations.

Supreme Organs of Latvian CP Territorial Organizations

31. A district (rayon) conference convened by a district (rayon) committee at least once in five years, or an extraordinary conference convened within 30 days by a decision of the committee or on the demand of one-third of the primary party organizations belonging to the proper territorial party organization, or one-third of the total number of Latvian CP members belonging to this organization, is the supreme leading organ of district and rayon (in the city of Riga) Latvian CP organizations.

32. Rates of representation at a district (rayon) party conference are determined by the proper party committee.

33. A district (rayon) party conference hears reports by the party committee, the party appeals committee, and the party finance committee; confirms the credentials of representatives of primary organizations delegated to the party committee; elects other members of the committee, the buro of the party committee, and the first secretary, as well as the party appeals commission, the party finance commission and the chairmen of these commissions, delegates to a Latvian CP congress, a member of the Latvian CP Central Committee from the territorial organization; and discusses the most important issues of operation of the party organization.

34. Relevant party committees manage the activities of the district (rayon) Latvian CP organizations between conferences. A plenum of a district (rayon) committee is convened at least once every six months. Between the plenums, the buro of the committee manages the work of the party committee.

35. With a view to sharing the experience of party work, setting forth long-range tasks, and coordinating their activities, party organizations unite in the oblasts (Riga, Vidzeme, Kurzeme, Zemgale, and Latgale) setting up coordinating organs within these areas. The structure and responsibilities of these organs are determined by a conference of delegates of the districts (rayons) which belong to a particular area.

Supreme Organs of the Latvian Communist Party

36. A congress is the supreme organ of the Latvian Communist Party. A regular Latvian CP congress is convened at least once every five years. The convocation of a party congress and its agenda are announced no later than 90 days before the congress.

Extraordinary congresses are convened by a decision of the Latvian CP Central Committee or on the demand of

one-third of the party organizations or one-third of the members of the Latvian Communist Party. An extraordinary congress is convened within 60 days.

37. Delegates to the congress are elected at the meetings of primary party organizations and conferences of territorial party organizations.

The rates of representation at the congress of the party are determined by the Latvian CP Central Committee. Primary party organizations which have fewer members than the rate of representation calls for unite and elect common delegates.

38. If the Central Committee fails to convene an extraordinary congress within the period of time specified in Article 36 of the statute, the organizations which have demanded that the congress be convened have a right to set up an organizational committee for convening the extraordinary congress which has the powers of the Central Committee of the party.

39. The congress:

- hears reports by the Central Committee, Central Party Appeals Commission, Central Party Finance Commission, confirms the credentials of representatives of territorial party organizations delegated to the Latvian CP Central Committee, elects the rest of the membership of the Central Committee, the Politburo, Secretariat and the first secretary of the Central Committee, Central Party Appeals Commission, Central Party Finance Commission and the chairmen of these commissions, and editors of the central publications of the party press;

- adopts, revises, and amends the Latvian CP Program and Statutes by a two-thirds majority;

- sets key directions for the policy and practical activity of the party.

40. The Latvian CP Central Committee may convene a party conference between congresses in order to discuss the most significant issues of the operation of the Latvian Communist Party.

41. Between congresses, the Latvian CP Central Committee represents the Latvian Communist Party and manages its work. A Latvian CP Central Committee plenum is convened at least once every six months. Between Latvian CP Central Committee plenums, its bureau manages party work, and the Latvian CP Central Committee Secretariat considers current issues and verifies execution.

IV. Party Funds

42. Funds of the Latvian Communist Party and its organizations consist of membership dues, proceeds from the commercial operations of the party, and other proceeds.

43. Thirty percent of the total amount of party membership dues remain at the disposal of primary party

organizations. Procedures for the use of the remainder of the funds are set by the Latvian CP Central Committee.

44. The following amount of monthly membership dues is paid:

Latvian CP members who make (net) up to R100 [rubles] pay 20 kopecks, those making between R101 and R300 pay 1.5 percent, and those making more than R300 two percent of their monthly salary.

45. It is necessary to pay admission dues in the amount of two percent of monthly wages when joining the party.

46. Members of the party may make voluntary donations to the funds of a party organization or a party organ with or without an indication of the purpose of the donation.

47. Elected organs in party organizations should regularly inform the party organizations about the use of party funds.

V. Symbols of the Party

48. The Latvian Communist Party has its own emblem.

49. "With a Battle Cry on Their Lips" is the anthem of the Latvian Communist Party.

50. "There Is No Victory Without Struggle" is the motto of the Latvian Communist Party.

Version of Draft Latvian CP Rules

90UN0602A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
22 Dec 89 p 2

[Draft by authors of "Message to Latvian Communists," (TSINYA, 16 December): "Latvian CP Rules"]

[Text] On 30 August 1989 a Latvian CP Central Committee plenum adopted the Latvian CP Program of Actions, entitled "Along the Path of Latvia's Sovereignty," which was a necessary step along the path preparing the 25th Latvian CP Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress. The program of actions offered for broad discussion two versions of the party's further development, so that recommendations to the congress concerning changes in the party's Rules and Program could arise during the broad discussion. This discussion has been broadening, and within its framework we are publishing one of the versions of the draft of the Latvian CP Rules.

I. General Principles

The Latvian Communist Party is an independent sociopolitical organization with its own Program and Rules. As a component of the republic's sociopolitical system, it carries out, with the aid of its members, its activities in society and in agencies of state administration in conformity with the Latvian SSR Constitution. Its goals and tasks are defined by the Latvian CP Program.

The Latvian Communist Party constructs its relationships with the Communist and other parties in the union

republics and other states on the basis of the commonality of the ideas and goals, principles of mutual respect, and completely equal partnership.

In order to carry out the goals of perestroyka, the Latvian Communist Party can delegate its members to CPSU political agencies that have been created on parity principles.

The status of the Latvian Communist Party develops in conformity with the republic's sovereignty.

1. The Latvian Communist Party is a voluntary sociopolitical organization that channels its activities into creating a society based on the principles of democratic socialism.

2. The Latvian Communist Party unites within its ranks representatives of the various nationalities living in Latvia, and operates on its entire territory.

3. The Latvian Communist Party, as a component of the sociopolitical system, operates independently within the framework of the Latvian SSR Constitution and laws, in conformity with the Latvian CP Program and Rules.

4. Completely defending the right of nations to self-determination, the Latvian Communist Party participates in the creation of an independent, democratic, socialist Latvian state.

5. In order to achieve these goals, the Latvian Communist Party uses democratic, uncoercive, and constitutional methods. It categorically rejects administration by fiat, the monopoly of power, and the laying claim to absolute truth, and opposes all kinds of violence, discrimination, and the incitement of national animosity.

6. Joint actions and the observance of the interests of the minority are guaranteed in the work of the party organizations and governing agencies. Party discipline is based on each member's conscientious fulfillment of his duties.

II. Members of the Latvian Communist Party

7. Any inhabitant of Latvia can be a Latvian CP member if he has reached the age of 18 years, recognizes and carries out the party's Program and Rules, works in one of the primary party organizations, and pays his membership dues.

8. A Latvian CP member cannot be simultaneously a member of another party.

9. It is the duty of the Latvian CP member to promote the attainment of goals presented in the party program, to be an example in the execution of his civic duty, and, by his actions, to help to strengthen the party's unity and authority.

10. A Latvian CP member has the right:

—to nominate himself or others for election to party agencies, and to elect and be elected to those agencies;

—to participate personally in party meetings and bureau and committee sessions, and to receive information about the activities of the party and its agencies;

—to discuss freely at party meetings, bureau and committee sessions, plenums, conferences, and congresses, and in the mass media, questions of the party's policy and practical activities; to make recommendations concerning the making of decisions; to insist on the reconsideration of previously made decision if that is required by the political situation; to participate in developing questions of tactics when creating alternative platforms; and to criticize any party member;

—to submit questions, statements, and recommendations to any party level and to receive an answer dealing with the substance of the matter submitted;

—to be defended by the party in instances of unjustified accusations.

11. A person is accepted as a Latvian CP member on an individual basis. New members are accepted from among candidates who have completed a probationary period as a candidate member and who, at a meeting of a primary party organization, have expressed the desire to become a party member. The question of acceptance into the party is discussed and resolved by a meeting of the primary party organization. Membership cards are issued to the accepted members at the party's gorkoms and raykoms.

12. For failing to fulfill the party Program or for violating the party Rules, a Latvian CP member can be warned by the primary party organization or can be expelled from the party.

Party members working in elected city, rayon, city-rayon, and republic party agencies are expelled by the appropriate agency if this question has not been resolved by the appropriate primary party organization.

13. The question of acceptance into the party or expulsion from it is considered to be resolved if no less than two-thirds of the members of the primary party organization have voted for it by open vote.

14. Appeals by persons who have been expelled from the party or who have not been accepted into it are considered by appeal commissions within no more than two months after the day of receipt of the appeals. If necessary, the question is reconsidered at a meeting of the primary party organization within no more than one month after the receipt of the statement, with the meeting's decision being final.

15. A Latvian CP member has the right to leave the party by giving written notification concerning this to his primary party organization.

16. Latvian CP members who for objective reasons (temporary-duty assignments, illness, old age, etc.) cannot participate in party work can, by a decision of a meeting of the primary party organization, participate in

party work and support it materially, to the extent of their capabilities. These members have the same rights as the other party members, but they cannot be elected to governing party agencies, or as delegates to party conferences and congresses.

III. Latvian CP Candidate Members

17. Persons who wish to enter the party have a probationary period as a candidate member established for them, which period is necessary for the party to become acquainted with their personal qualities and their readiness to execute the Latvian CP Program and Rules. The probationary period for the candidate member is set for up to one year.

18. A person is accepted as a candidate member in an individual procedure on the basis of a statement at a meeting of a primary party organization, by open vote, by a majority of the votes.

19. Upon the expiration of the candidate member's probationary period, the primary party organization resolves the question of the acceptance of the candidate member to the Latvian Communist Party.

20. Candidate party members participate in party meetings with the right of a consultative vote. Candidate party members cannot be elected to governing party agencies, or as delegates to party conferences or congresses.

21. Candidate members of the Latvian Communist Party pay party dues in the same amounts as the party members.

IV. Organizational Structure of the Party

22. Primary party organizations are created at Communists' place of residence and work and are united into rayon, city, and city-rayon territorial organizations.

23. All the primary party organizations are autonomous in deciding local questions.

24. The highest governing agency of the party organization is the meeting (for primary organizations), conference (for territorial party organizations), and congress (for the Latvian Communist Party). A meeting is empowered to make decisions if more than one-half the members of the primary party organization is present at the meeting. A conference or congress is empowered if two-thirds the elected delegates are present.

25. A meeting elects the buro and secretary of the primary party organization, but primary party organizations having fewer than 15 party members elect a secretary and his deputy; a conference elects a party committee, buro, and first secretary; and a congress elects the Latvian CP Central Committee, buro, and first secretary. The number of candidates nominated to fill the elected party positions must not be limited. Communists can be elected to one and the same elected party agency for no more than two consecutive terms.

In order to carry out current work to organize the execution of party decisions and render assistance to the lower organizations in their actions, an apparatus is created at Latvian CP Central Committee and the party's raykoms and gorkoms.

26. All the elected agencies must give a report once a year to the Communists who have elected them.

27. The party committees can create permanent or temporary commissions or working groups to deal with various questions of party work, and can also use other forms to involve Communists in the actions of the party agencies on public principles.

28. The control agencies of the territorial party and the Latvian Communist Party (party appeal commissions and party auditing commissions) are autonomous in resolving all questions; they are elected at party conferences or the party congress and are reportable only to those agencies. Their decisions cannot be revoked by the corresponding party committees. Differences of opinion that arise between the control agency and the party committee are resolved by the party meeting, conference, or congress.

29. Members of elected agencies who, for objective reasons (prolonged temporary-duty assignments, illness, change of place of residence or work, etc.), cannot fulfill their duties are released from these duties on the basis of their personal statement.

30. If necessary, discussions and referendums are possible on the scale of the entire Latvian Communist Party. All the party discussions and referendums are conducted by the Latvian CP Central Committee or, if required, one-third of the primary organizations of the Latvian Communist Party or one-third of the party members.

31. If one-third of the members of a primary party organization do not agree with a decision of a higher party agency with respect to that primary organization, the primary party organization states the reasons for its lack of agreement, does not fulfill that decision, and acts to change it.

Primary Party Organizations

32. Primary organizations are the basis of the Latvian Communist Party.

Primary party organizations are created at the party members' place of residence or work, provided there are no fewer than three party members.

Associations, societies, and clubs can create party groups if that desire is expressed by no fewer than two-thirds of the members of that association, society, or club.

At congresses, conferences, and meetings convoked by state and public organizations, and at local agencies of those organizations that have no fewer than three party members, party groups can be created. The task of these

groups is to carry out the party's policy in the appropriate nonparty organizations

The primary party organization registers at the appropriate territorial party organization, by submitting a copy of the meeting minutes and a list of Communists within five days after the conducting of the constituent meeting.

33. The primary party organization determines its own structure and is autonomous in resolving all local questions.

34. The highest agency of the primary party organization is the party meeting, which is conducted as needed, and also when this is demanded by one-third of the members of the primary organizations. The meeting is empowered to make decisions by a majority of the votes if more than one-half the members of the primary party organization are present at the meeting. Election meetings at the primary party organizations are conducted no less frequently than once every two years or on the basis of the decision of the party buro or the demand of one-third the total number of party members.

35. The meeting elects the buro of the primary party organization and the secretary. At primary party organizations having fewer than 15 party members, the meeting elects a secretary and his deputy.

The current work of the primary party organization is managed by the buro, the quantitative makeup of which is established by the party meeting, or, in primary organizations having fewer than 15 party members, the secretary and his deputy.

36. The primary party organization in its actions:

- implements the Latvian CP Program and observes the requirements of the Latvian CP Rules;
- accepts Latvian CP candidate members and members; spends party funds in the established volume; and transfers the dues to the account of the higher agency;
- shows concern for the political astuteness of the members of the primary party organization; and has the right to receive from them information about the fulfillment of the assigned duties and the requirements stated in the Rules;
- nominates candidates for party and state agencies;
- can be a juridical person.

37. For purposes of uniting the forces and coordinating the actions of several primary party organizations, common coordination agencies can be created or elected.

The structure, competency, and tasks of these agencies are determined by a general meeting of the members and delegates of that united primary organization.

38. The actions of the primary party organization must cease if that is demanded by two-thirds of its members.

Territorial Organizations of the Latvian Communist Party

39. Primary party organizations, on the basis of administrative-territorial division, are united into rayon, city, and city-rayon party organizations.

The status of the territorial organization is determined by the Latvian CP Central Committee.

40. The highest governing agency of the rayon, city, and city-rayon organizations of the Latvian Communist Party is the conference, which is convoked by the appropriate committees no less frequently once every five years, or report conferences, which are convoked once every two or three years. Special conferences are convoked on the basis of a committee decision or at the request of one-third of the primary party organizations that are included in the appropriate territorial party organization, or one-third of the total number of Latvian CP members who are included in that organization.

Special conferences are convoked within two months after the enactment of the decision.

41. The quotas for representation at a rayon party conference are established by the appropriate party committee.

42. Delegates to a rayon conference are elected by direct secret voting. At primary party organizations having 15 members or less, the delegates to the conference can also be elected by open voting.

43. The conference of a territorial party organization has the right:

- to make decisions independently about the organization's political or internal actions, if they do not contradict the Latvian CP Program and Rules;
- to form the organization's committee and to define its quantitative makeup, structure, and competency;
- to elect the first secretary of the committee that organizes the work of the committee buro;
- to elect an appeals committee and auditing commission and their chairmen;
- to discuss the organization's budget and the use of that budget;
- to elect and recall Latvian CP Central Committee members from the territorial party organization;
- to make recommendations concerning necessary amendments in the Latvian CP Program and Rules.

44. The conference of the territorial party organization listens to reports from the party committee, the appeals commission and the auditing commission, and, by secret voting, elects the members of the party's raykom from

among the candidates nominated by the primary party organizations, and also elects the buro members.

45. The committee of a territorial party organization:

- registers the primary organizations; coordinates their actions; and keeps records of the issuance of Latvian CP membership cards;
- coordinates the initiative of the primary party organizations; and recommends candidates for election to party and state agencies;
- elects the remaining committee secretaries; and appoints the editors of the party press;
- annually approves the party budget;
- in order to carry out its executive functions, creates a secretariat, and approves the structure of the apparatus and its workers;
- delegates the guidance of the work of the secretariat to one of the secretaries of the territorial organization.

46. The plenum of a committee of Latvian CP territorial party organization is convoked as needed, but no less frequently than once every six months. During the period between plenums, the party work is managed by the committee buro.

47. Members of the committee or secretariat cannot be members of the appeals commission or auditing commission.

Highest Agencies of the Latvian Communist Party

48. The supreme agency of the Latvian Communist Party is the congress. Regular congresses are convoked by the Latvian CP Central Committee no less frequently than once every five years. The convoking of a party congress and the agenda are announced no later than three months before the congress.

Special congresses are convoked by decision of the Latvian CP Central Committee or at the demand of one-third of the primary organizations or one-third of the Latvian CP members. A special congress is convoked on a date two months after the passage of the resolution.

49. In the event of failure by the Latvian CP Central Committee to convoke a special congress by the indicated deadline, the organizations that demanded the convoking of a special congress have the right to form an organizing committee, enjoying the rights of the party's Central Committee to convoke a special congress.

50. The quotas for representation at a party congress are established by the Latvian CP Central Committee. Primary party organizations having a smaller number of members than the representation quota unite and elect common delegates. By means of secret voting, 50 percent of the congress are elected at primary party organizations and 50 percent are elected at conferences of territorial party organizations.

51. The Latvian CP Congress:

- accepts the Latvian CP Program and Rules and makes amendments in them if two-thirds of the congress delegates have so voted;
- defines the strategy and tactics for carrying out the Program;
- defines the directions to take in cooperating with other party, public, and sociopolitical organizations and movements;
- forms the Latvian CP Central Committee; establishes its numerical makeup and structure; and defines the competency of its activities;
- elects the Central Committee's first secretary, who organizes the work of the Central Committee and the buro;
- elects a republic-level appeals commission and republic-level auditing commission and their chairmen; and defines their functions and competency;
- discusses the party budget and its use;
- delegates its representatives to the political agencies of the CPSU.

52. The congress listens to reports from the Central Committee, the appeals commission, and the auditing commission, and acting upon the proposal of the territorial party organizations, by secret vote, elects the makeup of the Central Committee.

The first secretaries of the city, city-rayon, and rayon territorial party organizations, for the period of time when they are serving in those agencies, are endowed with the powers of Central Committee members.

53. The Latvian CP Central Committee:

- defines the status of the territorial party organizations, and coordinates their activities;
- coordinates the initiative of the territorial party organizations, and nominates candidates for election to the party and state agencies;
- elects the Central Committee secretaries and buro members, and appoints editors of the press;
- annually approves the party budget;
- convokes Central Committee plenums as needed, but no less frequently than once every six months;
- in order to carry out its executive functions, creates a secretariat, and defines the structure, competency, and operating procedures for the apparatus. In order to organize the work of the secretariat, it appoints one of the secretaries.

54. Members of the Latvian CP Central Committee and Secretariat cannot be elected to the appeals commission or auditing commission.

55. During the period between plenums of the Latvian CP Central Committee, the party work is managed by the elected buro.

56. During the period between congresses, in order to discuss very important questions of the activities of the Latvian Communist Party, it is possible to convoke a party conference.

Party's Monetary Funds

57. The monetary funds of the Latvian Communist Party and its organizations are made up of membership dues, income from the party's economic activities, and other receipts.

58. Thirty percent of the total amount of membership dues remains at the disposal of the primary party organization.

The procedure for using the party's remaining monetary funds is established by the Latvian CP Central Committee.

59. The monthly membership dues for Latvian CP members are established in the following amounts: persons having monthly earnings of up to 100 rubles pay 20 kopecks; up to 250 rubles, 1.0 percent; up to 400 rubles, 1.5 percent; more than 400 rubles, 2.0 percent of their monthly earnings.

60. Entrance fees when entering the party are paid in the amount of 2 percent of the person's monthly earnings.

61. Party members can donate monetary means or other property to meet party needs, with or without an indication of how the donation is to be used. Such donations are also accepted from purposes who are not Latvian CP members.

62. Elected agencies of party organizations must regularly inform the party members about the use of the party's monetary means.

Delegates Hold Separate Congress

90UN0593D Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
22 Dec 89 p 4

[Text] During the lunch break yesterday, the delegates to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress who had voted for an independent Lithuanian Communist Party within a CPSU in renewal met with journalists in the press center. Attending the briefing were V. Shved, first secretary of Vilnius' Oktyabrskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee]; Prof Yu. Yermalavichyus; I. Mikhalkovich, secretary of the Vilnyusskiy Raykom; and A. Kulakov, secretary of the newly formed party committee of the Snechkus community.

In his opening remarks V. Shved said that, following the adoption of the declaration and the resolution on the independent status of the Lithuanian Communist Party, concern had arisen among some of the delegates and also in certain primary organizations.

"Yesterday," V. Shved said, "at around 2300, a republic party conference was begun by 135 delegates holding the view that an independent Lithuanian Communist Party should remain within the CPSU. It was decided that this conference should work similarly to and in parallel with the congress which is now under way, not at the same time, of course, but in the evenings, as a rule. A 13-man organizational bureau was elected for organizing the work of the party conference. I wish to emphasize that this is not some alternative Central Committee but a working body, whose concern is current questions of the organization of the party conference. Its first meeting was held yesterday, and the conference continues. The agenda is as follows: Organizational matters, development prospects, the adoption of documents, and, possibly, questions on the formation of executive bodies."

The journalist guests evaluated the current situation as a splintering (this term was, it is true, questioned by some members of the press) of the Lithuanian Communist Party from the CPSU. Having expounded their concept, which they expressed at the congress also, the delegates answered a number of questions put by Soviet and foreign journalists. Specifically, V. Shved explained their reluctance to be part of the Lithuanian Communist Party with factional status by the fact that in having recognized the new program and statute of the Lithuanian Communist Party they would thereby have placed themselves outside of the CPSU, which does not correspond to their basic aim. The delegates to what now amounts to two party forums could not point to any constructive paths toward a solution of the current problem.

Lithuanian Communist Party Election Appeal

90UN0644A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
27 Dec 89 p 4

[Election appeal issued by the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress to the "communists and working people of all nationalities and the entire electorate of the republic" in Vilnius; date not given]

[Text] The elections of deputies of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet are approaching. Inhabitants of the republic will in accordance with their wishes form a parliament, whose job it will be to guarantee the conditions of our republic's successful progress along the path of economic prosperity, the aspiration to independence, the successful solution of acute social questions, organization of the economy, the recovery and development of national culture, and the establishment in all walks of life of morality, humanity and justice.

Having renounced the monopoly right to decide the fate of the inhabitants of Lithuania, having honestly and

candidly evaluated its contradictory and dramatic past, having separated its functions from the state and economic institutions and having legalized at the 20th Congress the sovereign right to work in the name of a free Lithuania—this is how the Lithuanian Communist Party is proceeding toward the election campaign today. It is moving into the open political arena with a respectful attitude toward its opponents and profoundly aware that the present political strategy will condition the historical future of Lithuania and the life of its children and descendants.

What will concern it most, what primarily will direct the activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party, having the parliamentary opportunity to work for the good of its native land and its citizens?

The aspiration to the national ideal is the will of every people, of which no one has the right not to take account. Today this ideal is the creation of Lithuanian statehood and the real legalization and interpretation of its sovereignty. A free, law-based, democratic state of a high culture, a civil society, socialism for man, the people's self-management—the Lithuanian Communist Party is prepared to work for the good of such a future. Only such a Lithuania will ensure the well-being and equality of all inhabitants, regardless of their nationality, social position and beliefs.

There may be various ways to this goal. That offered by the Lithuanian Communist Party is the peaceful, parliamentary, and constitutional way envisaging specific stages and their particular sequence. This way is practicable and consistent and will require the minimum of losses and deprivations. We must even today aspire to equal and mutually profitable cooperation with other republics and foreign countries. On the agenda of priority action stand constitutional reform, the establishment of democracy, the practical realization of the priority of the laws of the republic and the right to manage independently that which it has won and other steps in the direction of statehood. At the same time the Lithuanian Communist Party is firmly convinced that the aspiration to statehood is inconceivable without political stability, well-considered and realistic steps and the consolidation of all political and social forces.

Supporting the constitutional priority of the soviets, elected by the people, it will henceforth accomplish its aims and ideas by relying on its members in whom the sense of civic duty is developed to the greatest extent, on the people elected to the soviets and on their moral and intellectual authority and competence. The soviets of people's deputies, elected on new principles, should become the competent, sole, and plenipotentiary executor of the will of the people.

Shaping the material basis of the people's well-being, we must become the true masters of our land and orient forces and intellect toward achieving the common goal. Intellectual maturity and moral responsibility and the traditional industriousness of its (sic) people will secure

actual realization of the ideals of revival—will return meaning to labor, enhance material well-being, and make for an atmosphere of benevolence in the home and in the state. In the face of reality the Lithuanian Communist Party has amplified and adjusted many directions of its activity, taking as a basis democracy and glasnost and the return of rights of the church to believers, having mapped out a program of social measures and having provided for the equality of the peoples and the freedom of creativity and the development of culture. A great deal has to be done to overcome the economic crisis, the decline in morality and other negative trends. But it would be dishonorable to promise to quickly do everything for everyone in the name of election popularity. This would be just another variety of social demagoguery.

Man. Family. People. State. In this order, with the maximum satisfaction of material and spiritual requirements, do we conceive of the burgeoning of an independent Lithuania. There is not nor can there be anything trifling and secondary in the full existence of man. High-quality diet, accommodation, consumer goods, treatment, wages, pensions, recreation, a youth act, protection of the greatest resource—infancy—this complex set of problems of man's well-being is our main concern. The essence is social justice, the abolition of privileges and discriminatory restrictions, and restoration of the value of conscientious labor. We emphatically support the preservation of our common home—nature.

We can no longer tolerate the "shadow" economy, profiteering, bribe-taking, violence, embezzlement, the squandering of state resources, and lax management.

Understanding that only an efficient economy permits the solution of social problems, the Lithuanian Communist Party will do everything for the quickest dismantling of the administrative-command system of the economy and for a fundamental rationalization of the economy with the freeing of market mechanisms. The democratization of economic and managerial processes, the equal functioning of all forms of ownership and the organization of production, their healthy competition, the maximum demonopolization of the economy, an anti-inflation program, the openness of economic relations, and an autonomous financial and budget system are the main guarantees of real economic sovereignty. Flexible pricing and tax policy and other economic levers should enhance production efficiency. Only the development of science-intensive production could guarantee Lithuania a fitting place in the world system of the division of labor.

The criterion and goal of all aspirations and actions of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the future socio-economic system which it will support is man and his happiness, well-being, and spirituality.

The basic duty of national culture is the revival and strengthening of man's morality and the enrichment of the spiritual, intellectual, and aesthetic content of the

personality. The party is prepared in all aspects to enrich the development of aesthetic activity and ensure its historical continuity and effective social existence. A problem of particular significance is a humanized and humanitarian national school, a state system of aesthetic education, and a new concept of the administration of culture.

In this connection we are obliged to emphasize that it is essential to consider national singularities and the spiritual requirements of people of other nationalities who have chosen Lithuania as their homeland.

A worthy contest of candidates for deputy, a noble duel of personalities, will begin in this election period.

The party will nominate as candidates for the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet the communists who in the grip of an authoritarian regime remained loyal to the people and man. Young people—with an expansive outlook and active thinking—innovatively changing the traditions of party life will run together with them. A difficult duty has befallen all of them—answering for mistakes which were not their fault, persuading society as to the humane content of the ideas of the Communist Party, and infecting society with their patriotism, learning, experience, and moral principles.

The future members of parliament—professionally and personally competent—will have to be economists, lawyers, politicians, and cultural experts, always remaining attentive to the fate of each citizen. We are convinced that the Lithuanian Communist Party has raised personalities capable of working productively for the good of the republic and accelerating its historical gait.

We will all create Lithuania. Daily. All together.

There is one motherland.

Delegates View Future of Lithuania Party

90UN0593B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
22 Dec 89 pp 2, 3

[Unattributed report: "Debate on Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Political Report to 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] In the opinion of Rimantas Lauzhikas, secretary of the party committee of the Panevezhis Engine-Driven Compressors Plant, having begun to analyze our political party activity candidly and self-critically, we cannot say unequivocally whether what we have achieved and what we have done has occurred at the willing of Lithuania's communists. The more consistently we look into matters, the more doubts that arise. The findings of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet commission on the events of 1939-1940 are sufficiently well-founded confirmation of this. We are hearing many bitter facts of falsehood in the reminiscences of participants in the Great Patriotic War. We are beginning to make a different assessment of the events of

the postwar resistance and the influence thereon of Lithuania's communists. We see that this was the result of the activity of the political system of the center, to which not only Lithuania's activists but our entire people were forced to submit.

The Lithuanian Communist Party has not been independent since the very start of its formation and cannot be such while we are members of the CPSU. This is confirmed by the resolutions of the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo on the Baltic republics.

Only by deciding our fate independently can we hope for improvement. This is what the majority of communists of Panevezhis thinks. This is graphically indicated by the data of a sociological survey. Some 87 percent of those polled support an independent Lithuanian Communist Party with its own program and statute and operating in accordance with the republic Constitution.

In the speaker's opinion, it will be difficult at the congress to finally word the party's program documents, but the main goal of the party is clear—the creation of an independent democratic socialist Lithuanian state. CPSU members should understand us correctly. Panevezhis' communists advocate not splittist activity but the party's independence in order that it might be possible to achieve real results of perestroyka and equal partnership relations with the CPSU and other parties.

R. Lauzhikas observed that doubts were heard during the preparations for the congress as to whether it might not be better to refrain from radical actions.

I wish to repudiate this on the basis of the example of the party organization of the Panevezhis Engine-Driven Compressors Plant numbering more than 300 communists, the secretary of the plant concluded his speech.

We have all been brought to this hall by the idea of an independent Lithuanian Communist Party, Yonas Budryavichyus, first secretary of the Paskvalskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee], said. Society is concerned to see the party take the path of radical change, serve the interests and meet the aspirations of all people and solve urgent problems promptly.

We have been afforded a historic opportunity—to lead the party out of crisis, purge it, and fundamentally democratize it. We cannot let this opportunity pass. This would be an unforgivable error. M.S. Gorbachev understands these processes and has a tolerant attitude toward them. He said at the CPSU Central Committee December Plenum: "We proceed from the fact that each people has the right to decide its fate independently, including choice of system and paths, pace and methods of its evolution." What is happening with us and in the East European socialist countries is the natural result of the particular stage of perestroyka. The inhabitants of Lithuania are fully resolved to restore their lost independence and statehood. For this reason the Lithuanian Communist Party cannot act in isolation from these aspirations.

The goal of the Lithuanian Communist Party is, as Comrade A. Brazauskas emphasized in his report, an independent, democratic, law-based, socialist Lithuanian state. It would then be doing its duty. The recreation of a sovereign state does not mean the severance of economic, cultural and other ties to the USSR and the other republics. However, these ties must acquire new content, and it is essential that they be constructed on the principles of partnership and equality.

A poll of communists of Pasvalskiy Rayon organized on the eve of the congress showed that 90 percent of the communists support an independent Lithuanian Communist Party with its own program and statute maintaining relations with the CPSU on an equal basis. The rayon's communists essentially support the basic provisions of the draft statute and at the same time put forward their proposals and additions. We need to find a reasonable compromise and only on this basis draw up a common program. We wish by way of the creation of an independent Communist Party to ensure that a detachment of really active communists which can operate independently in the political situation which has taken shape in the republic be formed. The following task has moved to the forefront—consolidation of the democratic and progressive forces. Groupings of various persuasions in the party are frequently paralyzing the party's united activity. Unity is needed more today than ever. A split in the party would be a blow not only to perestroika but to all of Lithuania. Those who wish to preserve the old structures of the CPSU should think seriously about this.

The authority of the Lithuanian Communist Party will depend on implementation of the economic program and a rise in the subsistence level. The priority actions drawn up in the program lack precisely a section stipulating the way in which this program will be realized and by what methods and at what pace and by whom specifically it will be fulfilled. Another shortcoming of this program is the insufficient attention paid to the farmer and to agriculture. It is essential to draw up a program of an upsurge in agriculture and to determine how we will manage the farm in the future. It is essential to resolve questions of centralized capital investments, material resources, contracting, and so forth. This would ensure the working people's confidence in the party and its goals.

Having begun his speech with the assertion that the question of the party's existence was predetermined by others, Romualdas Ozolas, chief editor of the newspaper ATGIMIMAS, went on to emphasize: Communism as a method of the socio-centrist perception of the world emerged in the 19th century with the appearance of mass production and mass consumption. It engendered an organ of self-realization also—the communist party. The domination of communist parties or, at least, claims to this is a significant feature of 20th century life. Alas, nowhere, with the exception of the former Russian Empire, has the Communist Party succeeded in firmly establishing itself completely. Into what all this has developed we unfortunately know. Obviously, it is with

good reason that the world is now in such turmoil and that a fundamental dismantling of Stalinism has begun. This implants hope that the end is finally arriving for the designs of the realization of communism as Christianity turned inside out.

Now everyone can see that the so-called way to communism has led nowhere. However, the experiment of the building of communism has created a certain way of life and a particular type of man. The feature of this way of life is estrangement in relation to reality, the feature of this man, ideological one-sidedness bringing about a multitude of abnormal phenomena of spiritual and practical life. Can these people change? Yes, but it will take a great deal of work. Only, evidently, by taking to our graves many of our properties and attributes will we be able to make room for other people and a different way of life. But what would we achieve now were we to disband the Communist Party or, at least, change its name?

The Lithuanian Communist Party, in the speaker's opinion, must itself have done with these secret games with Moscow, which it began in the times of the Lithuanian Republic even, and of its own free will switch to normal political relations with the future Communist Party of Russia. The Lithuanian Communist Party is obliged to participate in the restoration of what it destroyed—an independent Lithuania.

The main internal problem of the Lithuanian Communist Party, in the speaker's opinion, is its democratization. This means not a liberalization of its principles but the free possibility of the expression of concepts formulated in the party. The main aim of the party—restoration of Lithuania's independence—is acceptable even to certain supporters of Ivanov or Kuchеров, and for this reason the first step of the party's democratization should be as follows: Affording those to whom the idea of an independent Lithuanian state as the main goal of the Lithuanian Communist Party is unacceptable an opportunity to detach themselves.

The KPL [new Lithuanian Communist Party] as the democratization of the Lithuanian Communist Party means an opportunity for having in the actual organs of power representation of the pluralism of the members' views proportionate to their number. It may be secured only by having legalized traditions, which could realize in practice the possibility of proportional representation in the highest organs of power.

Mindaugas Stakvilyavichyus, first secretary of the Shyalyay Gorkom [City Party Committee], proposed an end to the debate. Supporting the opinion of Delegate D. Morkunas, he said that the example of this delegate illustrated the truth that the party is not standing still and that its development is a dynamic process. Not doubting that the party would change in the future also, the speaker expressed the hope that changes would occur in the CPSU leadership too. We should not in adopting

the congress' documents, therefore, renounce cooperation with the CPSU. Lithuania's communists should contribute to the faster restructuring of the CPSU.

In a rejoinder to the speech of Delegate B. Genzyalis he observed that he was not afraid of blackmail by the military. On the contrary, he would like to see the Soviet Army marching together with us toward an independent Lithuania and it setting an example for other republics and the union.

Much is being said about the fact that the center is guilty of delay. But we ourselves are no less guilty of this, M. Stakvilyavichyus emphasized. Is it not we ourselves who have been submissive, was it not we who bartered our ideals for a "grain of gold and a mess of pottage"? It therefore needs to be said out loud that the blame lies with us also. And we need to swear before the face of Lithuania that we will be different.

Speaking as chairman of the congress' commission for preparation of the new statute of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the party's action program, Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, said:

Yesterday, at your behest, the large and competent commission, on which there are many craftsmen of pen and word, political scientists and specialists in history and law, drew up two documents, which you received when you registered. They are short.

First, a few words about the resolution. It sets out the specific position formulated following an evaluation of the speeches and debate in the party and also at the meetings of our delegates held in cities, rayons and zones. The second document is the declaration. You will evidently have noticed that the resolution records that the Lithuanian CP Central Committee is charged with determining the procedure of realization of the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party. It was assumed that it would be expedient, possibly, to also submit for your discussion a third document regulating the procedure of realization of the status. However, your commission proposes deciding this question immediately following the congress at the Lithuanian Communist Party First Plenum.

I was, I confess, astonished when, yesterday, toward the end of our working day, voices were heard to the effect that it was necessary to end the debate and adopt cardinal decisions right away. We should not do this right away, I believe. The more so in that we have together decided that the ballot will be individual. The step that we will take today is very responsible, and for this reason various opinions need to be heard, not only by the delegates here but also by those listening to us on the radio or watching us on television. We have the time, no one is hurrying us. But, on the other hand, we need to seek advice as to whether or not we should shorten our speeches. Important issues will be discussed, therefore

let as many delegates express their opinion as possible. And only then may we adopt documents which have been thoroughly discussed.

The commission also discussed the version of the possible ballot paper. They have been prepared, and it would be good were you to express your opinion as to their content. It is proposed inscribing thereon the name and number of the seat and also two statements, for which the delegate votes.

The first statement is for an independent Lithuanian Communist Party with its own program and statute. That is, for the aim set forth in the draft declaration and resolution. If necessary, what the relations with the CPSU should be could be expounded in more detail. I believe that, having confirmed the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party, we should not forget about relations with the CPSU. They are important for us in this transitional period, at the time of preparation for the 28th CPSU Congress.

Now about the second point on the ballot paper—for an independent Lithuanian Communist Party within a renewed CPSU. Although there is a certain contradiction here, it is eased by the words "in renewal". After all, we do not know what a renewed CPSU will be like and do not even have an idea as to its organizational structure. It is possible that our aspirations and people's mood will fully coincide with the organizational structure to be offered in the draft document for the 28th congress.

A. Brazauskas recalled that it was necessary in the ballot to leave just one version and to sign off. There may undoubtedly also be on the ballot papers postscripts, and the delegate may set forth his opinion as to how he himself conceives of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

I address the congress at the behest of the rayon party organization and the majority of communists, Stefaniya Serzhantovich, tractor driver of Vilnyuskiy Rayon's Pobeda Kolkhoz [Collective Farm], said. But I was not given leave to speak yesterday on principle. I saw our democracy in practice. I therefore see no point in delivering my speech in full.

For a year we communists have been living under a moral press on the part of various forces. We have not been receiving objective information and have been indoctrinated continually. For a year we have heard only Sajudis, and there has been no discussion of the draft program and statutes, of alternative versions particularly.

The course of the congress bears witness to an anti-democratic trend. Where has it been seen that there has been individual voting? All countries and all parties proclaiming democratization practice the secret ballot. But at our congress individual voting is being introduced. Is it, possibly, the intention to record all the dissidents and compile a list? How is it that the leaders of

Sajudis are once again addressing the congress? Have we assembled to create a new party for Sajudis, for its political ambitions?

S. Serzhantovich believes that the aim of the creation of a Lithuanian Communist Party with its own program and rules would lead to the elimination of the CPSU and a single political state. The program and rules should therefore not be adopted.

As a delegate to the congress, the speaker continued, I am dissatisfied both by the content of the report and the nature of the debate. I support the proposal concerning the holding of a referendum. I categorically oppose the individual ballot on any issue. I ask the congress delegates to consider also that it is a representative of the working class who is speaking.

S. Serzhantovich appealed to the congress not to split the party and said that the Lithuanian Communist Party would be independent with its own program and statute and organizational and economic independence and should build its relations with the CPSU and the communist parties of the republics on principles corresponding to the realities of life and the transitional period.

I would not want to start campaigning since I believe that the opinions and positions at the congress have been characterized sufficiently precisely, Vladislav Shved, first secretary of Vilnius' Oktyabrskiy Raykom, said. One thing is clear: The status of the Lithuanian Communist Party has to be changed appreciably. The editorial commission has proposed draft documents on a change in the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party. We could agree with certain propositions of these documents did they not proclaim withdrawal from the CPSU and the creation of an essentially new Lithuanian Communist Party with its own program and rules. I believe that it would be more correct for these documents to speak about an independent Lithuanian Communist Party. Indeed, despite the declaration of ties to the CPSU, the proposed Lithuanian Communist Party is not a party dependent on the CPSU. The draft documents of the Lithuanian Communist Party testify to this. I would like to agree with the assertion of Delegate A. Gazaryan that the Lithuanian Communist Party's ties to the CPSU would ultimately acquire new, qualitative contents. Yes, I could agree were it not for one point. The congress is proclaiming the new qualitative relations unilaterally. But the mere concept of relations always presupposes another party. Unfortunately, the second party in our dialogue is not as yet present. In addition, the lack of a concerned response to the arguments set forth by M.S. Gorbachev in the appeal to the communists of Lithuania concerning the fact that the Lithuanian Communist Party could be fully independent in deciding local issues within the CPSU also is to be regretted. And a split of the CPSU into national parties cannot be permitted.

The congress' adoption of the resolution on the new status of the Lithuanian Communist Party would essentially be the start of the division of the CPSU. As many

speakers maintain, there would, possibly, be association with the CPSU on a new level. But today this would nonetheless be withdrawal from the CPSU. And it would hardly be to the benefit of either our party or the CPSU.

The following assertion is being used as an argument in support of this step. The Lithuanian Communist Party is called on to create a law-based democratic state, and this is possible "only in an independent Lithuanian state". This categorically and unceremoniously! Only, certainly, not in a state dependent on the USSR. But, after all, the CPSU also has set this assignment. It was for this that perestroika was initiated. Consequently, the declaration of the independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party would mean a lack of faith in the possibility of renewal of the CPSU. A whole number of delegates spoke about this yesterday, incidentally. Here, surely, is the main reason for the confrontation in the Lithuanian Communist Party today. On the one hand people who do not believe in the renewal of the CPSU and the USSR, on the other, people who have not lost their faith in this. And we should certainly not be called a "fifth column" for this. The interests of Lithuania are dear to all of us. If there is a deterioration in the economic situation, there will be equal suffering, regardless of nationality and belief—by Lithuanians, Russians, Poles, and everyone else.

We are for the independence of both the Communist Party and the republic. But we believe that this may be secured within a renewed CPSU and USSR. Although, of course, this is unpopular today and considered undemocratic even. But would a decision of the 20th congress on the proclamation of the independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party be democratic and competent? After all, everyone in this hall has written out applications to join the CPSU. Therefore the right to withdraw from the CPSU belongs not to the congress but to each party member individually. Only such an approach would be really democratic. I therefore support the writer V. Petkyavichyus on the need for a party-wide referendum on questions of proclamation of the status of party independence.

The speaker called attention to the fact that it was no secret that in the event of proclamation of an independent Lithuanian Communist Party some of the members of the republic party organization would remain in the CPSU. On behalf of the group of delegates championing the idea of renewal of the CPSU he told the congress that the group reserved the right to perform the necessary organizing work to rally and unite members of the Lithuanian Communist Party remaining in the CPSU. The optimum version making it possible to avoid separation of the Lithuanian Communist Party from the CPSU, the delegate said in conclusion, would be the adoption of the basic documents of the congress as proposals for the 28th CPSU Congress. I fully support here the opinion that the 28th congress needs to be held as soon as possible.

Vytautas Kardamavichyus, chief of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers Main Archives Administration,

who supported the position expounded by V. Shved, read out a draft resolution of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress on the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party within the CPSU prepared by 250 of its delegates.

"The Lithuanian Communist Party operates independently and creatively within a CPSU in renewal and on a par and together with all the communist parties of the Soviet socialist republics in accordance with Leninist principles. In all its activity the Lithuanian Communist Party is guided by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and aspires to the realization of the socialist interests of the working class and the whole people. Scientific theory enables the Lithuanian Communist Party to play the part of political vanguard of all strata of the republic's working people. For the purpose of realizing this possibility the Lithuanian Communist Party is restructuring its organizational and ideological work, renouncing the functions of administration of the state which are not characteristic of it and encouraging by means of ideological influence and measures of persuasion the historic creativity of the people's masses in all spheres of economic, social, political, and cultural life.

"The main goal of the Lithuanian Communist Party is, under the conditions of perestroika, overcoming the deformation of socialism and achieving a qualitatively new state, which is distinguished by genuine humanism, consistent democracy, social justice, and a high degree of civilization. To this end the Lithuanian Communist Party aspires to the revival of the Leninist concept of socialism and to a renewal in accordance with its principles of all spheres of social life.

"In accordance with its international spirit, the Lithuanian Communist Party contributes to the restructuring of the whole of the CPSU and the strengthening of its ideological and organizational unity. In accordance with the CPSU Program and Statute, the Lithuanian Communist Party aspires to enhance the moral fiber of all communists, democratize party life, broaden the collective nature of the party leadership, and strengthen party discipline. All this should help Lithuania's communists comprehensively consider the social and national living conditions of the republic and tackle successfully the tasks of perestroika."

We communists have come to the forum which is to make the choice not empty-handed but with our own position and our own attitude toward the path that we will take, Algis Rimas, first secretary of the Marijampolskiy Gorkom, said. The inhabitants of Lithuania and the Lithuanian people aspire to independence and statehood and see this as the future and *raison d'être*. On whether to be or not to be an independent party and on its resolve to contribute to the creation of a democratic, socialist, independent Lithuanian state our future depends. If we, all the communists living in Lithuania, do not avail ourselves of the historic opportunity to become an independent party, the list of mistakes of the Communist Party will be added

to. We are motivated to combine the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party with that of the sovereign republic by the stage of economic independence which has been reached and the multiparty system which is being created in the political life of the republic. In addition, we need to evaluate the natural processes of renewal which are occurring in the European socialist countries.

We understand the resolve of Lithuania's communists to make a choice not only as an endeavor to create an independent Lithuanian Communist Party but also as an acceleration of the restructuring of the whole of the CPSU. The ideas of independence, albeit hesitantly, are already being imbibed in the parties of other republics. There is a proposal for the creation of a Communist Party of Russia. Sensing the mood and expectations of the public and trying to accelerate perestroika in the political life of the whole country and the CPSU, we call on the congress to adopt an appeal to the communists of all union republics that they make the choice as quickly as possible and become independent and explain therein the motives for our decision.

We communists are united by the noble idea of perestroika based on democracy and humanism. Listening to the speeches of the congress delegates and their conversations, one is persuaded increasingly that the aims of both the right and the progressive, left wing of the Communist Party coincide in principle. These are the recreation of genuine statehood, economic independence, democratic socialism, and the independence of the Communist Party.

The speaker called on the congress delegates to unite in the name of these aims and decide the fate of the communist movement of Lithuania responsibly and with foresight. He expressed the opinion of the majority of communists of Marijampole: The Lithuanian Communist Party should be an independent party with its own program and statute. Only such a party, according to the speaker, would be turned to face man, would live the aspirations and hopes of the inhabitants of Lithuania, and could consolidate all progressive forces for arduous and responsible work in the name of the republic's bright future. The resistance of some communists to these processes of the democratization of party life testifies that the ideas of dogmatic Marxism-Leninism and centralism are still alive in their hearts and minds. They have nothing in common with living, creative Marxism-Leninism and with the ideal of socialism. Outdated thinking is a serious brake on the future, but the future, like the passage of time, cannot be stopped. Those to whom Lithuania and the people's welfare are dear must understand that there awaits us great and very crucial work, in the name of which we need to be decisive, united, wise, and industrious.

On behalf of the delegation the speaker supported individual voting and the draft resolution and declaration of the congress.

I would like to voice our opinion that this congress should be called the first congress in the history of the

Lithuanian Communist Party since it was registered, Pyatras Mikyalenis, first secretary of the Kaunasskiy Raykom, said. It is not true that we have assembled for it to renounce the one-party system in Lithuania. We have renounced the system whereby the party was a form of power which monopolized all state and public life.

Has the Lithuanian Communist Party been a force which has had its own goals determined by the inhabitants of Lithuania? Permit me to quote an extract from the minutes of the bureau of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Lithuanian Department of 10 November 1918. Rasikas is speaking: "We stand opposed to independence and want Lithuania to be a part of the Russian Soviet Republic. We are forming soviets there and staffing their committee and its departments. We must in the near future organize a coup there. We need to create an army subunit immediately and proceed therewith via Dvinsk to Vilnius." As of 10 October of the same year the Communist Party had 795 members. Was it in accordance with their wishes that they opposed the recreation of an independent Lithuania and the aspirations of the nations? This was the expansion of Soviet Russia into Lithuania. On the second occasion Lithuania's communists performed this mission in Lithuania in 1940 (there were 2,200 of them at that time). Our state was dissolved on the map of the Soviet Union.

Of what kind of parties as political organizations may we speak when we recall these depressing stages of Lithuania's history? And was it different at the time of collectivization, which was conducted three times as quickly as in Russia.

There is today to the party's independence, which cannot be an end in itself, no alternative. Its purpose is people's welfare. It is not necessary today to determine precisely and limit the framework of the instructions but to trust the newly elected Central Committee and its leadership and enable it to act freely. After all, it is not clear what the situation after the congress will be and how events will develop in the future.

Edvardas Titishkis, first deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR People's Control Committee, observed that the resolution was of great significance for the fate of the Lithuanian Communist Party and Lithuania's future. I believe that the resolution and the declaration need to be discussed in all primary organizations and by all communists. I believe that the communists would support this idea. If this does not happen, I suggest that a third wording be recorded, E. Titishkis continued. Namely, an independent Lithuanian Communist Party whose relations with the CPSU are based on the proximity of strategic goals of perestroika, and until the 28th congress, on organizational ties per mutual arrangement.

I see fundamental differences in the declaration and the resolution. Whereas the first, second, and third paragraphs of the declaration record that the congress supports equal relations and cooperation between the Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU and the

communist parties of the other republics, this is absent in the resolution. The resolution says that the Lithuanian Communist Party maintains equal partnership relations with the CPSU and other parties, public organizations, and movements. This is very broad wording. I would not want to maintain relations with "Pamyat" or the Democratic Union, which operate in Russia, and also with the hotheads who have united in the "Yedinstvo" organization. Relations should be maintained with those who are close to us in terms of their ideological positions and goals. At the end of the 20th century mankind has finally condemned communism as an idea and Leninism as a forcible method of realization of this idea, Linas Alishkyavichyus, mechanic-repairman of the experimental farm of the Lithuanian Research Institute of the Mechanization and Electrification of Agriculture, emphasized in his speech. Communist parties are disappearing throughout the world, and their programs are increasingly approaching those of the social democrats. Evaluating the communists' contributions to Lithuania in 1940 and subsequently, in the period of mature socialism, it is not difficult predicting the future of this party now, when Lithuania aspires to independence. Therefore, the speaker said, we shall not with this congress fool the inhabitants of Lithuania since it is clear to everyone that this is merely an attempt to launder the service jacket, the blood-stained service jacket. Nor will all the talk about reorganization fool them. Nor assurances that we have assembled for a congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party. There is no such party. This would be interpreted thus: The communists are lying to one another and all of Lithuania yet again.

On behalf of the group of Kaunas delegates the speaker proposed that the declaration include three main points. First, the main aim of the Lithuanian Communist Party is recreation of an independent Lithuanian state and the creation of a democratic society. A party which fails to proclaim such a goal is of no use to Lithuania and, perhaps, is contraindicated even. Second, this goal can only be approached by an independent Lithuanian Communist Party not participating in any electoral bodies and the formation of any common policy with another party. This must be a party of Lithuania for Lithuania. And, third, not having cut the umbilical cord attaching it to the Communist International, reorganizing an independent Lithuanian Communist Party is impossible. An independent party could only be established. The speaker proposed with the adoption of this declaration closure of the congress of the Lithuanian organization of the CPSU and the opening of the constituent congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

Stasis Uosis, professor at Vilnius University, expressed his opinion in connection with the content of the ballot paper. Specifically, its second item. The second version of this ballot should not be worded in this way. It is unclear what is meant by the proposition—voting for a Lithuanian Communist Party within a CPSU under reconstruction. What should it restructure and into what should it restructure itself? We need to be specific in

the wording concerning the kind of CPSU of which those voting for this version agree to be a part. If we aspire to independence, we also aspire, consequently, to nondependence, S. Uosis emphasized. For this reason we must have our own party also. There can be no question of an independent republic, as a state, if a party of a foreign state operates therein. We should remember 1940 and the role of this party in the events of that time.

The second paragraph of Clause 2 of the resolution says that the Lithuanian Communist Party maintains equal partnership relations with the CPSU, other parties and public organizations and movements. But who can guarantee that the CPSU will remain? If we have today begun to talk about the fact that we are creating a law-based state, we should, consequently, know what kind of state this is. May the USSR be preserved as a state or may it not? It is declared that the USSR should be a state based on the rule of law, but the union republic should be a state (and this is being maintained also). But in this case the USSR could be formed as a union of law-based states. The CPSU could not then exist as such for it would correspond to the structure of an imperial state. Consequently, we cannot leave this word in the document.

Clause 3 of the resolution declares realization of the ideal of socialism and social justice. I wish to ask the authors, and all of us, whether we know today what socialism is. Are we not confusing two different things. After all, we essentially speak about social justice as a legal category and hereupon speak about socialism as an economic category. I believe that the word socialism should be crossed out of all the documents and that we should speak only about social justice.

Nor do I agree with Clause 5 of the resolution. The procedure of implementation of the status needs to be entrusted not to the Central Committee—we do not, after all, as yet know who will constitute it. It seems to me, S. Uosis said in conclusion, that we should formulate this clause at the congress.

Today I understand the spiritual condition of "aggrieved" minority, Vitautas Lyutikas, head of a department of Vilnius' Engineering-Construction Institute, said. Lithuania's communists have also for many years been in the shoes of the CPSU. Why are some people upset that relations with the CPSU will be severed? After all, it is a question of eliminating the Lithuanian Communist Party's organizational subordination to the CPSU Central Committee.

The center itself for a long time prompted us by practical action to venture this step which we have taken today. On the initiative of the Stalinist center Lithuania's best communists were wiped out, the republic's independence was buried by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and in 1941 and the postwar years hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of Lithuania were transported from their fathers' land. The Zhdanov center began a "witchhunt"—against scholars and people working in the arts—

Khrushchev thought up the "corn era," Brezhnev introduced the tuition of certain subjects in Russian in Lithuanian and Polish schools.

The delegate observed that the disastrous policy for the state, dependent on the whims of Moscow leaders, had forced Lithuania's communists to be the troubadours of this policy in the republic and obedient servants of the CPSU. He also observed that the opinion on the Baltic Highway, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Sajudis, Russian, forms of ownership and, finally, the degree of economic independence were now once again being dictated from the center. For this reason it is better to be a cautious than a close partner.

We have gathered here to decide the way in which we will live in the future and whether or not Lithuania will be independent. This question needs to be approached with all due responsibility, and each of us should remember that we are first of all communists and at the same time people who should answer to the people not with demagoguery, not slogans, and not a struggle for power but by our labor and struggle for the happiness of each inhabitant of the republic. Only thus do I understand the duty of the communist both at the present time and in the future, Yakub Yakubovskiy, captain and director of the Lithuanian Fish Industry Production Association, said. We are deciding the way in which we will live in the future. This is very disturbing for the seamen. Working under extreme conditions for six months and more, we are very keenly aware of the problems which are arising with us. And I can with all due responsibility say just one thing: If all people worked like we work at sea, we would have no need now for assembling this congress and deciding whether there should be an independent Lithuania or not.

(Conclusion of Ya. Yakubovskiy's speech and continuation of the debate in the next issue.)

Delegates Discuss Future of Party

90UN0595C Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
23 Dec 89 pp 2, 3

[Report on debate during afternoon session of 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress in Vilnius; date not given]

[Text] The delegates who support unity with the CPSU met on 9 December in the Palace of Unions, the speaker continued. I overheard by chance a conversation in the lobby. Comrades of Lithuanian nationality were saying: They are playing games. I disagree, this is our common cause, not a game. Because we have to live and work here, in the republic. People have been right to mention here, incidentally, that only 23 delegates represent workers and peasants. Does this not tell us something? That people are at work, that they have no time to speak, they have to work. But we have turned these talking shops into I know not what.

Together with my crew I go to sea once again on 3 January. I would like to wish all communists, all ordinary people of the republic New Year's happiness and health and that they may independently, to whatever party they belong, of whatever body they are members, simply be men and not forget that they have to live and work on this earth.

The organized discussion of the party's status is not, as we can see, producing the results and the actions which the majority of communists expected, Yuožas Kuolyalis, adviser at the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium, said. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that everyone—the Central Committee Politburo, M.S. Gorbachev himself, the CPSU Central Committee December Plenum—has taken note of this. I believe that this is well founded and fair since the activity of our party organization and its fate is not someone's private concern but the concern of the party of the whole country.

I wish to emphasize that those who believe that there are not in the republic sufficient forces to ensure that the Lithuanian Communist Party in the future also, under the new conditions, renewed and independent, be ideologically and organizationally united with the CPSU and that Lithuania, as a sovereign state, participate with might and main in the restructuring of both its own republic and the country as a whole are mistaken. I have to say that the party organizations of the production outfits particularly are not defenseless in the face of "national careerists," as they were colorfully called by the Ukrainian writer Boris Oleynik, people's deputy of the USSR, who with cheap promises are endeavoring to carry with them people who have become overexcited at mass meetings. It is being naively hoped that the communists also may, like goslings, be enticed from one party and herded into another with different aims and ambitions from the former one, as we see from the draft documents presented to the congress. Of what party to be a member—this is the personal business of each individual. Under the influence of the opposition we have made manifest mistakes, having failed to take into account the alignment of class forces and their correlation in the party and society. The decisive forces of perestroika—the workers and peasants—have been supplanted in the control of social processes by other social groups. It is therefore obvious and natural that serious parallel structures are already appearing both in the party and in management of the economy. After all, there are only one or two workers and peasants at this congress also. Is this not a deformation? And people want to decide the fate of the Lithuanian Communist Party without their proper participation.

The conclusion is as follows: We are being pushed onto the path of pseudo-innovation, although attempts are being made to have us believe that we are proceeding at the head of the restructuring of the whole party and that we are the first. Indeed, it is a great pity that our party organization has proven the weakest link throughout the party structure.

I should like to think that it is still possible today to think again, otherwise we will really end up in a deep and turbid ditch. There is no alternative. We need today at any price to preserve a united, strong Communist Party. We will be doing nothing to help the people outside of the CPSU.

In conclusion I would like to call your attention to a thought of Engels, the essence of which is as follows: A mass of stupidities is perpetrated in every revolution.... When people finally calm down, they will necessarily conclude that we have done much which could not have been done better and have not done much that we should have done.

The Lithuanian Communist Party must be independent and should construct its cooperation with the CPSU only on the basis of horizontal relations, Domiyonas Shnyukas said, expressing the opinion of the communists of the Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, being chairman of this committee. The announcement of an independent Lithuanian Communist Party means support for M.S. Gorbachev personally and the progressive part of the CPSU.

I believe that such processes will expand and that the conservative part of the CPSU will feel that it also should not be caught napping. Incidentally, death throes are taking their course among the socialist countries of East Europe also, I refer here to Romania. The whole world knows about the bloody clashes and the casualties of the forces of repression. On behalf of my outfit I have proposed that the presidium honor the memory of these victims with a minute's silence.

Aleksandras Zhalis, pro-rector of the Lithuanian Conservatory's Klaypeda faculties, supported the draft documents and said that he had a statement of Klaypeda's communist fishermen addressed to the presidium of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. The statement says that a party conference of the fish industry production association was held on 17 November at which the platform of the delegates to the congress from this party organization was adopted; the essence of which is that the Lithuanian Communist Party should be an integral part of the CPSU. However, when this platform was adopted, no one took account of the alternative opinion. For this reason some of the conference delegates expressed it separately and advocated an independent Lithuanian Communist Party, whose main goal is the creation of a democratic society in Lithuania based on the principles of humanism and trust and a new model of law-based socialism. The party should have its own program and statute.

Egidijus Bichkauskas, investigator for particularly important cases of the Lithuanian SSR Procuracy, declared that the assertion of some of the delegates who had spoken prior to this regarding the undemocratic nature of individual balloting was entirely unfounded. Individual balloting is employed both at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and in the parliaments of

absolutely all democratic countries. This is practiced to ensure that each voter sees how this representative or the other whom he has elected has voted. There have also been proposals in connection with a party referendum. Such a referendum has in practice already been held since the delegates were elected to the congress with regard for two most important points: Whether the communist advocated an independent Lithuanian Communist Party or not. For this reason it remains now merely to formalize this referendum and announce its results.

In the opinion of E. Bichkauskas, the main aim of those demanding a referendum in the party is to postpone a decision until the 28th CPSU Congress. And the make-up of the delegates to this congress, E. Bichkauskas believes, will be similar to the composition of the present Congress of USSR People's Deputies. In terms of the number of deputies the Congress of USSR People's Deputies may in fact be held given the participation only of the representatives of four republics. Eleven republics may not participate, but, in accordance with the current regulations, the congress would still be competent. The congress may enact any law if merely the delegates from the Russian Federation vote for it.

Egidijus Bichkauskas proposed an amendment to Clause 2 of the resolution under discussion. It should not distinguish any specific party, even less should it specify that the Lithuanian Communist Party maintains relations with the CPSU. Perhaps the CPSU will not want to maintain relations with us, he said. We should not write "maintains". We should use the words "will maintain relations" and stipulate the conditions. Given mutual understanding, mutual tolerance, and equality, say.

The delegate also called attention to an important legal nuance in Clause 4 of the decree. Currently, the Lithuanian Communist Party is an integral part of the CPSU. Therefore, in accordance with the CPSU rules, this resolution should correspond to the resolutions of the superior party organization. That is, if the resolution is adopted first the CPSU would have the right to cancel it. For this reason there should, from the legal viewpoint, be no Clause 4. It is necessary to adopt prior to this a declaration which reflects the moment of self-determination, and only after this adopt the resolution.

Clause 5 proposes charging the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee with determining the procedure of realization of the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party. This is too complex. The principles of realization should be adopted at the congress, at least. For this reason it is proposed that Clause 5 of the resolution read as follows: "To charge the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee with determining the procedure of realizing the status of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the basis of specific principles stipulated at the congress."

The question on whose direct discussion we have embarked is one of principle, and we need not be tossing

and turning, switching to precise wording, Eduardas Vilkas, chief academic secretary of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Presidium and director of the Institute of Economics, said. The question is whether the Lithuanian Communist Party is independent or not. Answering it is very simple: All parties are the foundation of the state's political system. The entire political system is constructed such that it express the will of the people. In our case this means that only the party which expresses the will of the Lithuanian people, primarily the party which secures the nation's right to self-determination, has the right to exist. A right which is recognized throughout the world and which is primary in relation to any other theories and policy.

It has seemed to me that the comrades campaigning for a Lithuanian Communist Party within the CPSU do not recognize the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination. And in that case the continuance of they themselves in Lithuania becomes in a sense problematical. It seems to me that the sole mode in which all nations in Lithuania may live well is through consideration of one another's interests. And it is altogether impossible for all to live well unless account is taken of the Lithuanian people's right to self-determination. This should make the voting easier for all of this. Either we are for the right to self-determination and therefore for an independent Lithuanian Communist Party or the reverse.

We all support, in words, in any event, three basic principles: liberalism in the economy, democracy, and human rights. We are all also for social justice, social equality, and social safeguards. And, finally, the Lithuanian Communist Party wishes today to declare its self-determination and the fact that it recognizes a fourth principle also—that of national distinctiveness. These four principles define the meaning of the social democratic and socialist parties of West Europe.

We are greatly in need of realism. The CPSU must figure in the documents since it has not disappeared anywhere, and we need to concern ourselves with maintaining good relations with the CPSU, the delegate said in conclusion.

I am a production worker, Gennadiy Tarasov, deputy general director of the "Vilnyusskiy Zavod Toplivnoy Apparatury" Production Association, said. I have given more than half of my life to the service of Lithuania and am not complaining about this but am proud of it. I have believed my whole life that I would work honestly in Lithuania and thereby be of benefit to the Soviet Union also. I have never distinguished between people on a nationality basis and value them for their practical qualities. Today I see that practically all speakers at the congress are calling for the cohesion of ranks, humanism, and democracy. I support this, but to what does such democracy amount? That we will vote individually? Or to the fact that people are venting their anger at the speech of the communist Kuolyalis for the fact that he sees the Lithuanian Communist Party as an equal among equals within the CPSU. Surely it is clear that status does

not mean Communist Party rules. And, further, I, as a production worker, am worried about questions of material-technical supply under the conditions of economic independence. I would like to say right away I also have long been in favor of it. However, we will either not be given the supplies or they will be disrupted. Other republics have begun to look on us with distrust. And yet here we are now isolating ourselves even more and walling ourselves off.

I now put to you, comrade delegates, the following issue. Many speakers have spoken of equality with the CPSU. There are, possibly, some things I do not understand, but I believe that the CPSU means all of us. And all the union republics are equals among equals. That we need to present at the 28th CPSU Congress proposals pertaining to the independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party is a different matter. I believe that CPSU Secretary V.A. Medvedev should, in coming to the republic on the eve of our congress, have told the communists clearly what radical changes in the CPSU Program and Rules would be proposed to the 28th CPSU Congress. This might, perhaps, have removed a number of questions to some extent.

In conclusion the speaker supported a referendum on the question of the communists' self-determination.

Arvidas Matulenis, acting director of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law, was given leave to speak.

Comrade communists, he said, mention has been made here of the opinion of the inhabitants and communists of Lithuania. We already know it. A wide-ranging sociological survey was conducted throughout the republic in the period 25-30 November of this year. Some 56 percent of those polled advocated an independent Lithuanian Communist Party, eight percent, an autonomous Lithuanian Communist Party within the CPSU, six percent were opposed to splitting the CPSU, 13 percent of those polled had no opinion, and questions concerning the Lithuanian Communist Party were of no interest to 16 percent.

Another question dealing with elections was answered as follows: Twenty-nine percent of Lithuanians would not vote for any kind of Lithuanian Communist Party. They will not believe us whatever resolutions we pass. In the communists' opinion, this survey is in fact a kind of referendum. Some 61 percent of communists advocated an independent Lithuanian Communist Party, and 19 percent, an autonomous Lithuanian Communist Party within the CPSU, 12 percent were opposed to a split in the CPSU, and there were even two percent no longer interested in questions of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

Having requested permission to speak, the writer Vitautas Petkyvichyus clarified certain points of his speech of the day before.

Valeriyonas Baltrunas, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, expressed his opinion concerning the draft documents of the congress and

submitted proposals. In his opinion, Clause 1 of the congress resolution should, instead of the word "reorganize," read: "To proclaim an independent Lithuanian Communist Party". He recalled the Central Committee political report to the Lithuanian Communist Party congress, emphasizing the thought thereof to the effect that the aim of the congress was not only the creation of an independent Lithuanian Communist Party with its own program and statute but also its unification for the accomplishment of further, very complex tasks. For this reason each delegate should, without haste, think very seriously about wording of the draft resolution which is diametrically opposed. The delegate proposed including on the individual ballot paper a third version.

I agree fully with the opinion of certain speakers that each delegate will have sufficient boldness and resolve to append his signature to any wording, V. Baltrunas said. While agreeing with the results of the sociological survey announced by esteemed A. Matulenis, I would like to stress that approximately 700 of the delegates who sent in replies to the questions of the poll are of the following opinion: An independent Lithuanian Communist Party with its own statute and program should not forfeit parity ties to the CPSU and the communist parties of the fraternal republics. If we today vote only for the two versions, could we avoid a split in the Lithuanian Communist Party? Communists must think about how, in this complex political context, in this complex situation, to maintain the unity of the ranks of the Lithuanian Communist Party. Our opponents recognize that the Lithuanian Communist Party is a most effective force of perestroika. It is capable of preserving the stable situation which has prevailed in the republic until now. The first reaction of today's meeting in the hall and certain speeches show that opinions are polarizing. I shall not quote either Greek or Roman sages or American philosophers but will recall one good saying: "Look before you leap". A very serious decision is expected from us by both Lithuania and 200,000 Lithuanian communists. We could make various forecasts: Some will leave, some will not join any party. Time will tell how things subsequently shape up. But it seems to me that there remains in the hearts, in the party conscience, and in the convictions of each of us the desire to preserve a united Lithuanian Communist Party. And one more thought about the voting procedure: We should not turn down the proposal that on such an important issue it would be expedient to muster two-thirds of the vote of the delegates to the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress.

Yuoza Dringlyalis, secretary of the executive committee of the Varenskiy Rayon soviet of people's deputies, suggested that the resolution record a proposal present in the version prepared by the Academy of Sciences, that is, that at the present time the goals and aspirations of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU do not coincide. The speaker went on to voice the opinion that those thirsting for a referendum were pursuing the sole aim of dragging out the decision on an independent Lithuanian Communist Party; they hope that in this

time something could, possibly, happen in Moscow, that the present leadership of perestroika might be removed and that they would achieve their ends. A referendum was held in the course of the election of delegates to this congress. In addition, a poll and a debate in the party, in which the majority of party members advocated an independent Lithuanian Communist Party, were conducted. This is why another referendum is not necessary since one has already been held, Yu. Dringyalis observed in conclusion.

Ignas Nauyekas, secretary of a military unit party committee, was given leave to speak. Noting that he lived in the Soviet Union and served in the Soviet Army and did not consider Russian a foreign language for him, he addressed the delegates therein:

Dear Delegates! I would like to thank you for the confidence shown in us yesterday. We understand that this was not easy, he said. I made the decision to speak yesterday. I was prompted to do so when it had become known that the presidium had received a note from the Klaypeda delegation which maintained that insults and threats against the congress had been heard coming from the military. We would beg to apologize if some people have misunderstood us. But we emphatically object to the attempts to once again pin labels on us and make us out to be a scarecrow like the posters which were put up yesterday at the entrance to the building. We are accused of making threats. But this is not the case. It is more often than not us and many others who are threatened. Not only threatened but also insulted. I shall not dwell on the trifling instances, of which you are all aware. But is not the statement of the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Youth Affairs that 70 percent of officers and 90 percent of sergeants beat the soldiers an insult? We do not conceal the fact that there are obviously in the Soviet Army today, as everywhere, very many problems. We do not conceal them and are endeavoring to eliminate them. We do not conceal them when people speak with us as equals, and not for the purpose of insulting us. We have always aspired to help people and maintain warm relations with the local population and the enterprises. I wish to emphasize that it is not all that important to us who loves whom and who votes for whom, this congress included. It is our business to ensure that Lithuania's borders are its borders, like the borders of the Ukraine, Russia, and the other republics.

When, yesterday, the question of depriving us of credentials was being decided, the speaker continued, esteemed Comrade Delegate Zhalis from Klaypeda asked: Was the commitment of Soviet forces to Lithuania in 1940 occupation or not? We military delegates are not empowered to decide this question but I shall express the opinion of the military, of our communists. In our view, the commitment of forces to Lithuania, per an arrangement with the government of that time, was not occupation. This is a matter for historians and politicians, and did we military have anything to do with this? Nor, evidently,

need we answer these questions. I am therefore amazed as to where such malice in some speeches in respect to the military comes from.

I. Nauyekas said in conclusion: We communist military support a united CPSU. We cannot be and have no intention of being members of two parties.

Doctor of Legal Sciences Ivan Kucheroov asked to speak. Expressing his opinion regarding the draft declaration, he observed that certain wording should be changed. Specifically, he criticized the interpretation of the definition of the Lithuanian Communist Party's relations with the CPSU.

I. Kucheroov went on to say: I would very much like to say many pleasant things about Comrade A. Brazauskas' report. It had very much to say that was good in the sense of the Lithuanian Communist Party proceeding from the interests of the people and displaying concern for their goals, well-being, democracy, and such. However, it has already been mentioned here that there is a divorce from reality. Even in terms of the composition of the congress it may be sensed that various, far from coincident, social forces are represented here. So can we in this situation establish a humane democratic system? Under conditions where tension has been spurred and where social demarcation is strong, I fear that we will with phrasemongering lose the value of democracy. Availing themselves of the fact that reforms cannot be implemented throughout the country all at once, some social forces are attempting to press ahead and take political power in the republic, having supplanted all others, the Communist Party, say.

Concluding his speech, I. Kucheroov broached the question of the revival of statehood, around which, in his opinion, there also was much that was nebulous. He emphasized that there are in the republic social forces which are now laying claim to power. This is why it has been necessary first of all to render the Lithuanian Communist Party declassé and explode it from within, the speaker observed.

Continuing the debate about total independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party, the writer Raymondas Kashauskas emphasized: The step we are taking today is, possibly, new, but many will be taking this path tomorrow. This is, perhaps, the last opportunity for our party to do something good for its people and assist the recreation of an independent Lithuania, which it helped bury. This is the sole possibility of itself surviving as a social force. If we act otherwise, an absolute majority of people will quit the party. It will disintegrate, although headed by such figures whom the people respect as Brazauskas, Berezov, and Paletskis. Those who have neither ideals nor ideas nor a desire to change anything will be left. The Lithuanian people will have no need of such a party. I therefore call on all of you, dear delegates, Lithuanians, Zhemayty, who saved Lithuania, who accompanied Vitautas at his negotiations with Yogayla at Kaunas, all of you—the present Russians of Lithuania

and the present Poles of Lithuania, Belorussians of Lithuania and Jews of Lithuania—here is our common land, we have no other.

The re-creation of our state will not harm the Soviet Union, just as it is not harmed by the existence of a peaceful Finland, a peaceful Denmark, or a changing Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Lithuanian Communist Party will cooperate with the CPSU or the RKP (Russian Communist Party). There is a precedent for cooperation between the states. This is the peace treaty of the twenties, which was signed with Lenin's blessing and supported by the Declaration of the Russian Peoples, unfortunately unrealized. This treaty between the Soviet Union and Lithuania was extended repeatedly. It was to have terminated on 31 December 1945, but what happened in Lithuania on 31 December of that year you know. Gorbachev's words to the effect that each people has the right to independently decide its own fate, including choice of system and mode, pace and methods of evolution, sound the same for all the peoples of East Europe, us included. We are no worse. We are not inferior. We are the same. Esteemed delegates, an absolute majority of Lithuanian communists supports an entirely independent party, and I believe that the composition of the delegates and the results of yesterday's various ballots are confirmation of this. But how will those who have not made their choice vote? It would be a dreadful mistake were the results of the voting to be at variance with our aspirations. Let us act before it is too late so that Lithuania not turn its back on us and so that our our descendants not be ashamed of us.

Kazimera Prunskene, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers, said that she supported the first proposal—reorganization of the Lithuanian party organization of the CPSU into an independent Lithuanian Communist Party with its own statute and program. Not only the organizational but also, and even more importantly, possibly, the ideological and political independence of the Lithuanian Communist Party is necessary. After all, hitherto it has been not the results of labor but control which has been of importance to the CPSU. I would like to remind you that prior to the congress even the Lithuanian Communist Party had a status different from that of the CPSU. The Lithuanian Communist Party is not a leading party. We did not succeed in getting onto the agenda of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies discussion of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution. We remained in the minority. And not without the assistance of the CPSU apparatus, evidently.

I cannot imagine how we would exercise economic independence if one Lithuanian party—the Communist Party—were to remain under the jurisdiction of the CPSU. After all, there are both in its membership and its apparatus reactionary forces opposed to Lithuania's economic independence.

In conclusion K. Prunskene called on all delegates to vote for the proposed declaration and resolution.

Algimantas Brazaytis, chief of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers Main Administration for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press, expressed the opinion that any political party or organization should before reorganization or liquidation ask itself whether it is necessary? Both the congress delegates and the participants in the picket are asking this.

A. Brazaytis is convinced that Lithuania needs the party. First, for the accomplishment of the goals of the republic's independence and socialist values. Some 77 percent of Lithuania's inhabitants supported the latter. Delegates should not forget this when discussing the party program and other documents. Those who want the Lithuanian Communist Party to go into liquidation may switch to other political organizations.

The delegate emphasized that the Lithuanian Communist Party is the sole political channel of communications with the Soviet Union. No other party has this possibility. For this reason the problematical nature of relations with the CPSU should not be ignored either. A complete severance of relations would do neither Lithuania nor the communists any good.

The speaker proposed supplementing the resolution, which speaks of the main mission of the Lithuanian Communist Party being Lithuania's independence and the building of a democratic society. Supplementing as follows: The building of a democratic socialist society and humanitarian ideals and freedom of the individual. In addition, A. Brazaytis proposed wording the final paragraph of the declaration in the sense that the congress supports the equal relations and cooperation of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU and that the party of our republic is not severing relations with the CPSU.

I consider it necessary to speak about the fact that our congress is not competent either to create or proclaim a new party, Valeriy Ivanov, spokesman for the "Venibe-Unity-Jednosc" movement, declared. Holding the party card of one party in one hand and voting for the formation of another with the other is blasphemy. It seems to me that our congress is not a constituent congress. It is necessary for the holding of a constituent congress at least that the primary party organizations elect delegates to this congress—I mean a constituent congress—and create their own party. We are as yet in one party, we have one form of party card. Or, at least, put aside these party cards.

Lithuanian Draft Party Program Discussed

90UN0643G Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
27 Dec 89 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Discussion of the Draft Program of the Lithuanian Communist Party"]

[Text] Yustinas Karosas, dean of the philosophy department of Vilnius University, commented on two versions of the program presented for discussion. The second

version is a kind of amendment to the program's basic theses prepared by the Central Committee working group. It is guided by the so-called "single-phrase concept," certain provisions and words being inserted into the draft theses which essentially alter their entire substance. These words—socialism and Marxism-Leninism—have not only a meaning in principle for the program, but also help in understanding the unbalanced accusations of anti-socialism and anti-Marxism leveled against the authors of the first version of the program.

Socialism in general has a two-fold meaning today. According to the first, it is a priority of collective social life over private, individual life. This kind of socialism is an immutable yardstick, by which we should measure the degree of perfection and equity of society and the individual, his thoughts and moods. Neither society nor the individual should go beyond the framework of socialism. And it is entirely insignificant that people's interests do not fit within the sacred framework. Consequently it is all the worse for people, and not for the dogma into which it is necessary to forcibly squeeze, ideologically or even physically, the individual and an entire people. Let millions live in poverty as long as socialism triumphs. It is traditionally said that socialism is the antithesis of faith, for it is founded on science. But such a model of socialism—stubbornly praised by advocates of "Unity" ideas—constitutes that very same blind faith, a single-minded social orientation comprising an opium of human consciousness. Such an approach is difficult, therefore, if not impossible to refute, alluding to scientific argument. Like a value in its own right, it can simply be accepted blindly or repudiated. And it is entirely unimportant that the achievements of the world and Europe, and finally—of developed or mature socialism in the Soviet Union have brutally, clearly proven the practical ineffectiveness and disaster-orientation of the "holy" model of socialism.

The second understanding of socialism, to which the aims of an independent Lithuanian Communist Party are tied, entails the effective management of social life and economic matters on such a scale that it actually yields practical results. Socialism is replete with meaning and feasible only insofar as it stimulates the natural development of the economy and serves to benefit mankind. What we have had so far was a kind of mockery of the concept of socialism. We made the world laugh, proclaiming ourselves the vanguard of the process of civilization, while in fact we were clambering through its lower levels. The watershed between these two concepts of socialism is democracy. According to the first approach, socialism is a kind of "present" given to the backward people for all time by the enlightened sorcerers of socialism. The political party which personifies their wisdom therefore constitutes a vanguard. It is from this that the totalitarianism appears which we know so well. The second approach views socialism as a matter of the people, of society itself. In short, it repudiates a utopia, the indestructible ideal established beforehand, to which the fate and fortunes of people and nations must adapt.

In Marxism prior to deformation, a democratic socialism freely chosen by the people themselves was an understandable phenomenon in its own right. But arriving on the socio-economic soil of a poorly developed land, its concept acquired the priority of political force, and in the Stalinist dictatorship of the proletariat assumed structural contours which had nothing in common with democracy or with humanity in general. Herein lies the great tragedy of Marxism-Leninism, resolutely abandoned by the Lithuanian Communist Party in favor of a new program and new statutes. "We are obliged to show maximum attentiveness to the party program in economic and social matters," stated Valdimiras Zhvirblis, first secretary of Pakruoyskiy Raykom [rayon committee] of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

"The efforts of the party must be directed towards benefiting people. The party is obliged to encompass people's cares and aspirations. The party program must clearly outline how it intends to improve the lives of rural inhabitants. If we fail to concentrate our attention on the village, on the problems of farming, we will not achieve the rebirth of all of Lithuania. Farming is in need of capital investments, a significantly improved social infrastructure, and priorities for development. A special section in the program must be devoted to problems of perestroika in the village. After all," the delegate stressed, "the village is the cradle of spirituality of the people, the bread-winner, the source of raw materials for export."

A clear party position must be stipulated in the program regarding matters of providing social security for aged single people and the disabled. The party's stance with respect to an integrated solution to the problems of young families, and to the work and living conditions of women, is not stipulated with sufficient clarity. In addition, several program provisions should be formulated more simply so as to be more clearly understandable to every individual.

"One existing problem not mentioned in the draft—and this is necessary—is the relationship between the church and the party," noted Vaydotas Daunis, chief editor of the newspaper KRANTAY. "It is stated in one paragraph of the second section that the Lithuanian Communist Party supports the efforts of the church in strengthening the moral fiber of society. This is clearly inadequate. Dissociating ourselves from anti-social, anti-state activities is very important, of course. But at the same time, a paragraph should be inserted in the second section stating that the Lithuanian Communist Party condemns those who take part in repressions against the Catholic Church. The draft states that the Lithuanian Communist Party acknowledges the church's positive worth. This means such worth is an opportunistic matter. The church has returned, but if it can again be removed... It is therefore proposed that a cardinal provision be stipulated to the effect that the Lithuanian Communist Party condemns repressions against other faiths. Synagogues have been destroyed as well as churches."

Yustas Paletskis, chairman of the commission on editing the draft Program of the Lithuanian Communist Party, expressed his gratitude for the numerous suggestions and proposals. The commission has tried to take them into account. Most of the proposals were handed over to the commission so it could draw up a program of action and prepare the election platform, insofar as the more specific proposals are recorded here.

Program provisions were then discussed in detail and lively discussion took place in the hall. Delegates introduced proposals which were then discussed and refined.

Rejoinders from the hall: the organizational bureau formed 20 December, at the conference of those 20th Congress delegates subscribing to the Lithuanian Communist Party platform in favor of a renewed CPSU, sent a telegram to the CPSU Central Committee on 21 December—and I stress the time—18 hours and 20 minutes after the Statute of the Lithuanian Communist Party was adopted, containing the following message: "In Vilnius on 20 December the work of a conference of delegates of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress who were not in agreement with the congress decision on the party's actual departure from the composition of the CPSU began. The purpose of the conference is to ideologically and organizationally unite communists of the republic subscribing to the platform of the Lithuanian Communist Party as a renewed, united CPSU. The Organizational Bureau."

New Lithuanian Communist Party Statute

90UN0595B Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
23 Dec 89 pp 1, 2

[Lithuanian Communist Party statute adopted by the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress in Vilnius on 21 December]

[Text] I. Lithuanian Communist Party Statute

The Lithuanian Communist Party is an independent political organization with its own program and statute. The Lithuanian Communist Party is an integral part of the political system of Lithuania uniting on a voluntary basis citizens of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] sharing the aims of the Lithuanian Communist Party. The party proclaims its aims in the Lithuanian CP Program and accomplishes them in accordance with the constitution and laws of the Lithuanian SSR.

II. General Principles of Activity

1. Voluntary approach. People join and leave the Lithuanian Communist Party of their own free will. Party organizations are formed and unite independently, being incorporated in the overall structure of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

2. Freedom of belief. The party is tolerant of differences in the convictions and religious beliefs of its members which do not conflict with values common to all mankind.

3. Free expression of opinion. Party members express their opinions freely, address an initiative to people of like mind, party and state authorities and the public and may disagree with the position of a majority which has taken shape on individual issues and seek implementation of their own platform.

4. Collegial approach. Resolutions in the party are adopted democratically, on the basis of the opinion of a majority that has formed at meetings of the primary party organizations, at conferences and congresses, and in debate.

5. Glasnost. The party's activity in society is based on glasnost. Questions of intra-party life are elucidated first of all among party members.

6. Party discipline. This is an essential condition of party activity ensuring the purposiveness of endeavors and actions.

7. Development of democracy. Each party member and organization displays concern for the development of democratic standards and traditions.

III. Party Members

8. Any citizen of the Lithuanian SSR who has reached the age of 18 and who recognizes the program and statute of the party, participates in the activity of a primary organization, and materially supports the party may be a member of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

9. A member of the Lithuanian Communist Party may not be a member of other parties.

10. A person wishing to join the party submits an application to the primary organization at his place of work or residence and artistic or other individual activity and becomes a member thereof if two-thirds of the members of the organization present at a general meeting vote for him.

11. Inhabitants of the republic supporting the activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party may be party supporters, having expressed their wish to be so to a primary organization and having obtained its approval. Party supporters participate in party activity with a voice, but no vote and support the party materially as far as possible.

12. Rights of the party member.

12.1. To elect and to participate in the activity of any primary organization. To transfer from one primary organization to another, having obtained the consent of the majority of members of the latter present at a meeting.

12.2. To debate at party meetings and various party forums and in the party press questions of the policy and practical activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party and to criticize any member thereof or any party body.

12.3. To address to any party organization or body thereof any statement, proposal, question, or initiative and obtain a specific answer from them.

12.4. To nominate candidates for offices in all elective party authorities and to elect and be elected.

12.5. To participate in discussion of its activity in any party body.

12.6. To be under the party's protection in the event of an unwarranted accusation against his activity.

13. Duties of the party member.

13.1. To abide by the program of the Lithuanian Communist Party and comply with the requirements of the statute.

13.2. To fulfill decisions of the party authorities. In instances where a decision is unacceptable to a party member, he may not comply with it and may set forth and defend his own position, but not prevent its fulfillment by others.

13.3. To fulfill obligations to the party organization and its authorities.

13.4. To be tolerant of his party comrades and to respect their opinion and rights.

13.5. To pay his membership dues.

14. Party members who for objective reasons (lengthy assignment, serious illness, old age, and so forth) cannot actively participate in party activity, participate therein with the consent of a meeting of the primary organization and support the party materially at their own discretion and according to their abilities.

15. A member of the party may freely leave it, having submitted written notice of his decision to the primary organization.

Return to the party is interpreted as joining anew.

16. If a party member fails to comply with the Lithuanian CP Program and violates the statute, the primary organization may by two-thirds vote of those participating in a meeting of its members caution him or expel him from the Lithuanian Communist Party.

16.1. In the event of disagreement with expulsion from the party, it is possible within 30 days to lodge an appeal with the party territorial or republic commission of appeal. The commissions examine appeals within 60 days. An appeal on this issue may be lodged only once with the same commission. Within a month the primary party organization discusses the commission's findings. Unless the primary organization changes its decision, the expulsion takes effect as of the time of the first discussion.

16.2. A primary organization, and in exceptional cases, a plenum of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee or a congress, has the right to restore party membership.

A person expelled from the party has the right to rejoin the Lithuanian Communist Party after no less than two years have elapsed since his expulsion.

IV. Organizational Structure of the Party and the Primary Party Organizations

17. The basis of the party is the primary organization.

18. Formation of the primary organization.

18.1. The primary organization may be formed at the place of work or residence and of artistic and other individual activity. It is composed of no less than five party members who have so declared a desire at a general meeting.

Primary organizations are formed on the initiative of the communists and also at the suggestion of committees of party territorial organizations.

18.2. Within 15 days the primary organization notifies the territorial party elective body of its decision. It is registered per the minutes of the meeting which are submitted and the list of its members, which is altered in the event of a change in the number of members.

18.3. The primary organizations may at their discretion determine their own organizational structure.

19. The Primary Organization:

19.1. Implements the Lithuanian CP Program guided by this statute.

19.2. Independently adopts and fulfills resolutions connected with its activity. Expresses its position and submits its proposals pertaining to questions of party and public life.

19.3. Implements resolutions of superior elective authorities. In the event of two-thirds of the members of a primary organization disagreeing with a resolution of a superior elective authority, does not fulfill it, giving reasons for this, and seeks its revision.

19.4. Admits members of the Lithuanian Communist Party, keeps a register of party members, disposes of the assets of the organization, makes the specified contributions for the upkeep of the party authorities and for the organization of joint activities, and encourages and punishes its members.

19.5. Displays concern for the political culture of its members and has the right to obtain from them information concerning fulfillment of their duties stipulated by the statute.

19.6. Nominates candidates for party, state, and economic bodies and public organizations.

19.7. May be a legal person.

20. The highest authority of the primary organization is the general meeting of members convened as necessary, but not less often than once every three months. A meeting must be convened also if this is demanded by one-fifth of the organization's members.

The meeting is competent if more than half the members of the organization are present.

Resolutions are adopted by majority vote of the members of the organization present at the meeting except in instances stipulated by Articles 10, 16, and 19.3 of this statute.

21. The meeting elects the organization committee, its secretary, deputy secretaries, and a treasurer. In small organizations a secretary of the organization, his deputies, and a treasurer are elected.

22. Wishing to unite efforts geared to common activity and present their positions simultaneously, without forfeiting the rights of a primary organization provided for by the statute, primary organizations may create or elect general coordinating authorities. Their structure, assignments, and jurisdiction, the hiring of personnel, and conditions of party and economic activity are determined by the amalgamated primary organizations at a general meeting of their members or delegates. Such organizations are called joint primary organizations. They do not acquire the jurisdiction of a territorial organization.

23. The activity of the primary organization is terminated when this is demanded by two-thirds of the members of the organization or by decision of the committee of the territorial organization when its activity is contrary to the Lithuanian CP Program and Statute.

In the event of disagreement with the decision of the territorial organization committee, a final decision is made by the republic commission of appeal.

Party Territorial Organizations

24. Primary organizations are united by administrative-territorial division of the republic in city and rayon party territorial organizations of republic jurisdiction. In cities with a rayon division, rayon territorial organizations of the city may be formed at the decision of the party members. The status of territorial organization is determined by the Lithuanian CP Central Committee.

25. The highest authority of the territorial party organization is the general meeting of members or conference of delegates. They are convened as necessary, but not less often than once a year. A meeting or conference may be convened also if this is demanded by one-fifth of the communists or one-third of primary organizations.

The meeting and conference are competent if two-thirds of the members of the territorial organization participate therein and are represented thereat.

26. Delegates are elected in the primary organizations. The representation quotas are determined by the executive body of the territorial organization.

27. Resolutions of the meeting or the conference are passed by more than half the votes of the members of the meeting or delegates to the conference.

28. The Meeting or Conference of the territorial organization:

28.1. Independently adopts various resolutions concerning the political and internal activity of the organization.

28.2. Forms the committee of the organization. Elects the first and other secretaries of the committee, who organize the work of the committee and the bureau.

28.3. Elects the commission of appeal and financial commission and their chairmen and deputies.

28.4. Discusses the budget of the organization and its use.

28.5. Elects and recalls a member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee from the territorial party organization.

29. At the time of formation of the territorial organization committee some members of the committee are elected or recalled directly by the primary organizations. The meeting or conference elect the other members. The quotas of direct delegation are determined by the committee with regard for the proposals of the primary organizations.

30. The Territorial Organization Committee:

30.1. Registers the primary organizations and coordinates their activity, keeps a record of the members of the party, and issues Lithuanian Communist Party membership cards.

30.2. Reconciles the primary party organizations' proposals pertaining to the nomination of candidates for party and state bodies and public organizations.

30.3. Confirms the editors of publications of the party press.

30.4. Annually confirms the organization's budget.

30.5. Convenes a plenum as necessary, but not less often than once every three months.

30.6. The activity of the organization between plenums of the committee is directed by the bureau which it elects.

30.7. For the exercise of executive functions creates a secretariat, for the organization of whose work it appoints a secretary.

31. The members of the organization committee and staff of the secretariat may not be members of the

commission of appeal and the financial commission. The committee and the primary organizations are guided by the findings of these commissions.

Republic Party Authorities

32. The highest party authority is the congress. It is convened by the Lithuanian CP Central Committee not less than once every five years. The date of the congress and the agenda are announced not later than three months prior to the congress. A special congress is convened by the Lithuanian CP Central Committee on its own initiative or when this is demanded by more than one-fifth of the members of the party or one-third of the primary organizations. In the event of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee refusing to convene a special congress, the organizations demanding this have the right to create an organizing committee enjoying the right of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee to convene a special congress.

The date and agenda of the special congress are announced not later than two months prior to the congress. The congress is considered legitimate if more than two-thirds of the members of the party are represented.

32.1. The delegates to the congress are elected in the primary organizations per the representation quotas determined by the Lithuanian CP Central Committee. Primary organizations with a membership less than the representation quota unite and elect common delegates. Delegates may also be elected at meetings (conferences) of the territorial party organizations.

32.2. Resolutions of the congress are passed by majority vote of the participating delegates with the exception of Article 33.1.

33. The Congress:

33.1. Confirms and alters the Lithuanian CP Program and Statute by two-thirds vote of the participating delegates.

33.2. Determines the strategy and tactics of implementation of the program.

33.3. Maps out the directions of cooperation with other parties and public organizations and movements.

33.4. Forms the Lithuanian CP Central Committee. Elects the first and other secretaries of the Central Committee, who organize the work of the Central Committee and its Bureau.

33.5. Elects the republic commission of appeal and financial commission and their chairmen and deputies and determines their functions and jurisdiction.

33.6. Discusses the party budget and its use.

34. At the time of formation of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee some of its members—one per territorial organization—are elected at meetings and

conferences thereof. The congress elects the rest of the Central Committee members.

35. The Lithuanian CP Central Committee:

35.1. Accords the party organizations the status of territorial organizations and coordinates their activity.

35.2. Reconciles the proposals of the territorial party organizations pertaining to the nomination of candidates for the republic party, state, and economic authorities and public organizations.

35.3. Confirms the editors of publications of the party press.

35.4. Annually confirms the party budget.

35.5. Central Committee plenums are convened as necessary, but not less often than once every three months.

35.6. The party's activity in the period between plenums of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee is directed by the bureau which it elects.

35.7. The Lithuanian CP Central Committee creates for the exercise of its executive functions a secretariat, for the organization of whose work it appoints a secretary.

36. Members of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee and staff of the secretariat may not be members of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee Commission of Appeal and Financial Commission, and the party organizations and their bodies are guided by the findings of these commissions.

37. The Commission of Appeal:

37.1. Hears the appeals of party members and party organizations, settles their disputes, and interprets the application of the general provisions of the Lithuanian Communist Party Statute.

37.2. Coordinates the activity of the commissions of appeal of the party's territorial organizations and renders them methods assistance.

37.3. The commissions of appeal of the party's territorial organizations are guided by this statute and the regulations governing the commission of appeal.

38. The Financial Commission:

38.1. Monitors the financial and economic activity of the Central Committee and enterprises and organizations of the party.

38.2. Coordinates the activity of the financial commissions of the party's territorial organizations and renders them methods assistance.

38.3. The financial commissions of the party's territorial organizations are guided by this statute and the regulations governing the financial commission.

V. The Party's Organizational Guidelines

39. Delegates from the party organizations to a conference and congress and also executive authorities and commissions and secretaries of the Central Committee and also committees of the territorial party organizations and commission chairmen and their deputies are elected by direct secret ballot.

40. The term of the elective party authorities and territorial party organizations is five years, of the primary organizations, two to three years. Party members may be elected to the same executive office of an elective body for no more than two terms in succession.

41. Members of elective authorities who are unable for objective reasons (lengthy assignment, illness, and so forth) to perform their duties are exempted from them at their request or in the event of their tendering their resignation by decision of the authority of which they are members. Members of elective authorities directly elected at a meeting, conference, or congress who fail to perform their duties in these authorities or who have forfeited trust may be released by secret ballot of two-thirds vote of the members of the authority.

If necessary, others are elected in their place in the established procedure. The elective authorities may not be replenished by co-option.

42. On particularly important questions of the activity of the whole Lithuanian Communist Party or an individual territorial organization the appropriate committee announces on its own initiative or at the demand of one-third of the primary organizations or one-fifth of the party members within a month following presentation of the demand a party debate.

43. If a political initiative in a primary organization is supported by one-fifth of party members or one-fifth of the primary organizations operating on the territory or one-fifth of territorial organization committees, a meeting, territorial committee, or the Lithuanian CP Central Committee respectively must express its position on this issue.

44. The elective authorities of the party and its organizations annually render account to the lower party organizations.

45. Permanent staff of the party executive authorities is hired and dismissed in accordance with the Lithuanian SSR Code of Labor Legislation.

46. The party statute is the basic document regulating intra-party life. Instructions pertaining to the registration of party members, the management of finances, and record-keeping are confirmed by the Lithuanian CP Central Committee following preliminary discussion of their basic principles at the congress.

VI. Party Funds

47. The funds of the party and its organizations are composed of membership dues, income from the party's economic activity and donations from party members and those in sympathy with its activity and also the contributions of other people and organizations and other receipts.

48. Membership contribution.

48.1. An initial contribution constituting of two percent of basic monthly earnings is levied when one joins the party.

48.2. The monthly membership contribution is determined on the basis of the monthly wage in the following amounts:

—R100 and less—20 kopecks;

—From R101 to R200—one percent;

—From R201 to R300—1.5 percent;

—Over R300—two percent.

By decision of the primary organization membership dues may be deducted for three months at a time and also deducted from earnings in centralized fashion via the cashier's office. The primary party organizations may exempt from communists' membership dues non-working pensioners and invalids and also women raising children three years old and under.

48.3. Members of the Lithuanian Communist Party who are also members of the Lithuanian Communist Youth League pay a party membership contribution in the amount of one percent to Komsomol [Communist Youth League] funds, the rest, to party funds.

49. Thirty percent of membership dues remains with the party organization, 70 percent is for all-party affairs.

50. The primary organizations, territorial organization committees, and the Lithuanian CP Central Committee may, to replenish their resources, organize business ventures in accordance with the laws of the republic regulating economic activity.

51. The elective authorities of the party organizations must notify the party members once a year of the budget and its fulfillment.

Party Decree on Gorbachev Speech, Meeting

90UN0643D Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
6 Dec 89 p 1

[Resolution of the 22d Plenum of the Lithuania CP Central Committee: "On the Address of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev to the Communists of Lithuania and Discussion of the Situation in the Lithuanian Communist Party at a Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo"]

[Text] 1. In preparing for the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party, to treat attentively the address of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev to the communists of Lithuania, and also the results of the discussion at the CPSU Central Committee Politburo meeting regarding the situation in the Lithuanian Communist Party.

The plenum calls upon congress delegates and party organizations to exercise every degree of responsibility in resolving issues pertaining to the democratization of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the establishment of its new status, to consolidate the practical actions of communists, and to use dialogue in imparting to them a constructive attitude towards the future development of the country and the republic, of the CPSU and the Lithuanian Communist Party.

2. To obligate the Buro of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee to generalize the proposals of party organizations and all communists with respect to accelerating perestroika in the party and substantively re-examining its role and functions in social life, its methods of operation, and its organizational principles and provisions established by regulation. To recommend proposals for approval at the coming forum of communists of the republic and present them to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Brazauskas Holds Press Conference 21 Dec

90UN0595A Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
23 Dec 89 pp 1, 4

[Report on news conference held by A. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Communist Party of Lithuania, in the press center of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress in Vilnius on 21 December]

[Text] All journalists accredited here gathered in the press center late in the evening on the third day of the congress. Their interest was understandable: It was none other than Algirdas Brazauskas himself, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, who had promised to meet with them. Those gathered around the monitors were following the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress, but many of them also heard the news reported by S. Pabedinskas on Lithuanian Radio at 1930 concerning M.S. Gorbachev's meeting with people's deputies from Lithuania participating in the Second Congress of People's Deputies. The meeting was held during the lunch break and lasted 20 minutes. As S. Pabedinskas reported, M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, observed that he was unhappy that the Lithuanian republic organization of the CPSU had declared an independent Lithuanian Communist Party with its own program and statute. He pointed out that this had to be decided at a CPSU Central Committee plenum. Only the plenum had the right to decide questions of the mutual relations of the Lithuanian Communist Party and the CPSU.

M.S. Gorbachev also acknowledged that he had not expected so emphatic a step by Lithuania's communists.

The radio correspondent observed that the deputies from Lithuania were not lacking in congratulations—some deputies approved of the Lithuanian Communist Party's decision.

This piece of news, which flashed around the press center like lightning, heated passions to the maximum. According to the Vremya program, which was awaited with impatience, this news was fully confirmed. Hereupon the journalists received also the draft telegram to M.S. Gorbachev from the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress. A situation truly evoking great interest and requiring further clarification had been created.

At 2130 hours Algirdas Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee, entered the press center's conference hall to applause. A. Zhukas, a journalist who chaired the press conference, declared straight away that it would be more expedient to begin the meeting with questions since the congress had been followed very closely by everyone and that there was hardly anything to be added. Those present readily agreed, and the questions showered forth.... We are already familiar with many of the questions, of foreign journalists particularly. But even those, albeit repetitive, questions did not diminish the significance of the meeting. I was struck by the patience and respect with which A. Brazauskas treated the press corps. It was not the first time that this had been noticed, incidentally. Despite the lateness of the hour, the first secretary was experiencing no fatigue, seemingly. Truly many questions were asked during the one and a half hours of the conference. We shall adduce here only some of, in our opinion, the most interesting questions.

[Spanish EFE NEWS AGENCY] We have just learned from the Vremya program of M.S. Gorbachev's message to the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress. How would you comment on this?

[Brazauskas] I also learned about this via the same information channels as you. I cannot add anything to what was said in M.S. Gorbachev's statement. When the CPSU Central Committee plenum will be held I also do not as yet know. I only hope that it is not this week.

[Goeteborg Television] What can you say, esteemed first secretary, about your telephone conversation with M.S. Gorbachev today?

[Brazauskas] I received a call during the lunch break today from Comrade Gorbachev. He asked me first of all whether it was true that the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress had adopted the corresponding documents by which the Lithuanian Communist Party had been declared independent. I had no choice but to say "yes". After this, the conversation took a more detailed turn. The general secretary spoke about the complexity of this decision adopted by the Lithuanian Communist Party.

He said that this decision would exert a negative influence on the activity of the whole of the CPSU. Incidentally, members of the CPSU Central Committee and others, in the form of notes and questions to him on this matter during a break in the Second Congress of People's Deputies, had asked him to explain how the Politburo would react to our decision.

[THE GUARDIAN] Permit me once again to return to the conversation with M.S. Gorbachev. We have learned from unofficial sources that Mikhail Sergeyevich also told you that he intended to impose a curfew and commit military units and that he would have you removed as first secretary. I wish to assure you that this will not happen and cannot happen because you are now in a different party... (laughter)

[Brazauskas] This is on the anecdotal level. There was, I assure you, no talk of this. Even prior to the forum of Lithuania's communists I had spoken on the telephone with M.S. Gorbachev repeatedly, and he himself had during one conversation fallen to thinking about what my status in Moscow as the first secretary of an independent Lithuanian Communist Party would be. I replied that our relations with the CPSU had always been good and would remain so.

[YAUNIMO GRYATOS] You have said that you will attend the plenum in Moscow. Is it just you who has been invited?

[Brazauskas] I do not know, possibly others will be invited also. It would be better were some people alongside me.

[Sajudis Information Agency] What do you think, will the new Lithuanian Communist Party have more allies or opponents in the CPSU Central Committee?

[Brazauskas] Regrettably, it could be said that there will most likely be fewer allies.

[The Yugoslav newspaper VESTNIK] The 20th Lithuanian Communist Party is currently in session. Could not the decision be made there and you set off for the CPSU Central Committee plenum as a delegation?

[Brazauskas] We could seek advice at the congress, but there is no point discussing this matter. When we learn how the CPSU Central Committee plenum views this question we will have a need to consult. Our reaction to this now is probably the same as that of all you here present. There is much that is uncertain. I believe that the CPSU Central Committee Politburo decision on the immediate convening of a CPSU Central Committee plenum was not an easy step either. After all, the plenum will have to decide something.

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] Will the Lithuanian Communist Party, having become independent, be able to win the sympathies of the electorate at the forthcoming elections and secure its position in the country's parliament?

[Brazauskas] A fair question. But acting the prophet is most difficult. Who can say now what the situation will be in two, three, or five months or a year? You have witnessed how the Lithuanian Communist Party changed within a day. I believe that people in Lithuania understand and recognize what a crucial step the Lithuanian Communist Party has taken. I believe also that the responsibility that we have assumed will serve us well at the elections. Both the program and statute of the Lithuanian Communist Party reflect not only the aspirations and hopes of the communists but of an absolute majority of the population also.

[NOVOSTI] What do you think, esteemed first secretary, will the young people now replenish the ranks of the independent Communist Party, as USSR People's Deputy A. Chekuolis said at the congress?

[Brazauskas] It would be very gratifying were our young people to understand and support us.

[KOMMUNIST] What would the leadership of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee do were the independent Lithuanian Communist Party not to be supported at the coming CPSU Central Committee plenum and V. Shved's party to be supported?

[Brazauskas] Once again from the field of forecasting... I allow that it could happen this way. But I believe that the independent Lithuanian Communist Party is a party of communists and I do not even see a fundamental difference between the independent Lithuanian Communist Party and that which is now being formed here. I believe that this is more a question of principle.

[OGONEK] Please tell us, did Moscow anticipate the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress adopting this decision?

[Brazauskas] I believe it had to have done so. At the meeting of the Politburo in which the Lithuanian CP Central Committee Buro participated we did not conceal the fact that this possibility existed. We also said that the majority of communists in Lithuania supported an independent Lithuanian Communist Party with its own program and statute. V.A. Medvedev also was persuaded of this when he visited Lithuania. I therefore believe that the decision of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress came as no surprise in Moscow.

[Swedish Television] Are you sure that M.S. Gorbachev really understood you?

[Brazauskas] I believe that Comrade Gorbachev understood us. But, alas, I am not sure that other comrades understood us.

[TASS] A year ago it was being said that economic independence also was a utopia and that such a path meant comminution of the economy. But this has now been legalized. Surely in a month or two, federalism in the party will also be seen as an objective process?

[Brazauskas] It would be very good were there such optimists as you everywhere. Negotiating would then be somewhat easier.

[Central Television and All-Union Radio] You are most likely, esteemed secretary, in a hurry to be in the hall of the congress, where the voting continues. So let me avail myself of the right to ask you one last question. How do you evaluate the work of the congress and of the delegates themselves?

[Brazauskas] I like the delegates. There is a lack of formalism. We are not working to a script organized in advance. The dialogues are intensive, but constructive. The delegates are working very actively and fruitfully in various commissions, of which at this congress there are many. So all is normal.

Far from all the questions and answers made it into our account of the press conference. Let us hope that those whom we have not quoted do not take offense. The journalists both greeted and said farewell to Algirdas Brazauskas, newly elected first secretary of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee, to applause.

Yustas Paletskis and Kyastutis Glavyatskas, who had been elected secretaries of the Lithuanian CP Central Committee at the congress, held a press conference on 22 December in the press center of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress. They answered journalists' questions concerning the prospects of the party's activity and the republic's further political and economic development.

Moldavian Electoral Okrugs Formed

90UN0491A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 29 Nov 89 pp 3, 4

[Resolution of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of People's Deputies of the Moldavian SSR: "On the Formation of Electoral Okrugs for the Election of People's Deputies of the Moldavian SSR"]

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission for Elections of People's Deputies of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], in accordance with Article 98 of the Moldavian SSR Constitution and on the basis of Article 15 of the Moldavian SSR Law "On Elections of People's Deputies of the Moldavian SSR," resolves:

To form the following electoral okrugs for elections of people's deputies of the Moldavian SSR:

City of Kishinev

Dnestrovskiy Rayon

1. Kirovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 12), 8,400 voters.
2. Budeshtskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 26), 7,800 voters.
3. Zadniprovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 48), 7,400 voters.

4. Electoral okrug Energetikov (center—High School No 62), 10,339 voters.
5. Kutuzovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 72), 7,400 voters.
6. Novochehanskii electoral okrug (center—Moldavian SSR Youth Center, Yu.A. Gagarin Branch), 7,100 voters.
7. Atavaska electoral okrug (center—Dnestrovskoye association "Plodovoshch"), 7,100 voters.
8. Zavodskoy electoral okrug (center—"Plodselkhoz-mash" production association), 6,300 voters.

Leninskiy Rayon

9. Kishinevskiy-Leninskiy electoral okrug (center—Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences), 7,618 voters.
10. Iskovskiy electoral okrug (center—Palace of Culture of the knitted-wear production association "Styaua Roshie"), 6,479 voters.
11. Komsomolskiy electoral okrug (center—Palace of Culture of Kishinev State University imeni V.I. Lenin), 7,310 voters.
12. Universitetskii electoral okrug (center—Moldavian SSR Ministry of Social Welfare), 7,494 voters.
13. Dokuchayevskiy electoral okrug (center—Kishinev College of Electrical Engineering in Communications), 7,254 voters.
14. Akademicheskii electoral okrug (center—Institute of Plant Physiology and Biochemistry of the Moldavian SSR Academy of Sciences), 6,859 voters.
15. Dzerzhinskii electoral okrug (center—High School No 39), 6,765 voters.
16. Gertsenskiy electoral okrug (center—Kishinev Medical School), 7,149 voters.
17. Agronomicheskii electoral okrug (center—Clubhouse of the "Vireul" Scientific-Production Association), 7,692 voters.
18. Tatarbunarskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 24), 7,153 voters.

Oktyabrskiy Rayon

19. Gribovskiy electoral okrug (center—training center of the Kishinev Agricultural Institute imeni M.V. Frunze), 7,909 voters.
20. Chevkarskiy electoral okrug (center—experimental machine-shop plant of the "Agroprommash" Production Association), 6,723 voters.
21. "Doyna" electoral okrug (center—High School No 46), 8,100 voters.
22. Karmanovskiy electoral okrug (center—Athletic Riding School), 7,823 voters.
23. Dimitrovskiy electoral okrug (center—Koki School of Music), 7,646 voters.
24. Dimovskiy electoral okrug (center—City Teachers Training College), 6,100 voters.
25. Moskovskiy electoral okrug (center—Trade-Unions Palace of Culture), 8,339 voters.
26. Florilor electoral okrug (center—High School No 45), 6,427 voters.
27. Studencheskiy electoral okrug (center—Palace of Culture of the "Mezon" plant), 6,835 voters.

28. Bubnovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 40), 6,740 voters.
29. Ryshkanovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 8), 6,443 voters.
30. Ilyashenkovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 21), 7,588 voters.
31. Shtefan-chel-Mare electoral okrug (center—High School No 9), 6,527 voters.
32. Molodezhnyy electoral okrug (center—Scientific Research Institute of Planning of the Moldavian SSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee]), 5,662 voters.
33. Naberezhnyy electoral okrug (center—High School No 36), 7,057 voters.
34. Krikovskiy electoral okrug (center—Krikovo city-type settlement), 8,052 voters.

Sovetskiy Rayon

35. Aeroportskiy electoral okrug (center—"Orion" Palace of Culture of the "Kodry" furniture and wood-finishing production association), 7,150 voters.
36. Muncheshtskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 31), 7,010 voters.
37. Krasnodonskiy electoral okrug (center—Kishinev Road-Building Vocational School), 7,460 voters.
38. Zakarpatskiy electoral okrug (center—dormitory of the "Floare" experimental production association), 6,500 voters.
39. Zoologicheskii electoral okrug (center—High School No 6), 7,530 voters.
40. Botanicheskii electoral okrug (center—High School No 60), 8,060 voters.
41. Grenoblskiy electoral okrug (center—the teen club "Oktombriye" of Housing and Work Zone 25), 7,170 voters.
42. Unguryanovskiy electoral okrug (center—Military Service of the State Committee on Hydrometeorology), 7,870 voters.
43. Belskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 3), 7,660 voters.
44. Plovdivskiy electoral okrug (center—I. Repin Art Teachers Training School), 7,800 voters.
45. Khristo Botev electoral okrug (center—High School No 29), 7,870 voters.
46. Gaydarskiy electoral okrug (center—the sports and cultural center of "Signal" plant), 7,200 voters.
47. Varshavskiy electoral okrug (center—the recreation and reading center of Housing and Work Zone 22), 7,220 voters.
48. Minskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 32), 7,790 voters.
49. Zelinskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 28), 7,480 voters.
50. Timoshenkovskiy electoral okrug (center—dormitory No 36 of Special Mechanization Directorate No 11), 7,470 voters.
51. Kerchenskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 55), 7,040 voters.
52. Synzherskiy electoral okrug (center—Synzhera village high school), 6,270 voters.

Frunzenskiy Rayon

53. Frunzenskiy electoral okrug (center—United Development Center of Assortments, Fashion, and Culture), 7,502 voters.
54. Nyaga electoral okrug (center—Kishinev State Teachers College imeni I. Kryange), 7,037 voters.
55. Perekopskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 22), 6,367 voters.
56. Kuybyshevskiy electoral okrug (center—the teen club of Housing and Work Zone 8), 7,408 voters.
57. Delyanu electoral okrug (center—High School No 47), 7,130 voters.
58. Yeminesku electoral okrug (center—High School No 25), 7,370 voters.
59. A. Onika electoral okrug (center—dormitory of the Sanitary Engineering Procurement Plant), 7,132 voters.
60. Nevskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 5), 8,579 voters.
61. Muzicheskii electoral okrug (center—High School No 18), 7,256 voters.
62. Chernyshevskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 59), 6,964 voters.
63. A. Donich electoral okrug (center—the research institute of scientific and technical information of Moldavian SSR Gosplan), 7,009 voters.
64. Panfilovskiy electoral okrug (center—the training institute of the Moldavian Main Administration for Energy), 8,508 voters.
65. Durlsheshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Palace of Culture of Durlsheshty settlement), 8,799 voters.

City of Beltsy

66. Leningradskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 6), 7,650 voters.
67. Artemovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 13), 7,700 voters.
68. Bolgarskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 17), 7,650 voters.
69. Volodarskiy electoral okrug (center—"Stroitel" sports complex building), 8,000 voters.
70. Voroshilovskiy electoral okrug (center—building of the Polytechnic Institute), 7,700 voters.
71. Gorkovskiy electoral okrug (center—driving-school building of DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] School No 14), 8,000 voters.
72. Kievskiy electoral okrug (center—the DOSAAF club building), 7,800 voters.
73. Kolesovskiy electoral okrug (center—"Ogonek" Palace of Culture), 7,800 voters.
74. Komarovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 9), 8,000 voters.
75. Lomonosovskiy electoral okrug (center—railroaders' club building), 8,000 voters.
76. Nekrasovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 2), 7,660 voters.
77. Fabrichnyy electoral okrug (center—educational workers' building), 7,650 voters.
78. Khotinskiy electoral okrug (center—Palace of Culture of the V.I. Lenin Plant), 8,000 voters.

City of Bendery

- 79. Severnyy electoral okrug (center—"Severnyy" micro-rayon club), 6,700 voters.
- 80. Solnechnyy electoral okrug (center—High School No 16), 8,700 voters.
- 81. Odesskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 18), 8,300 voters.
- 82. Pionerskiy electoral okrug (center—management of the Bendery Experimental Repair Plant), 7,750 voters.
- 83. Zheleznodorozhnyy electoral okrug (center—Agricultural Professional-Technical Institute 52), 7,100 voters.
- 84. Chkalovskiy electoral okrug (center—club of the canning plant), 7,750 voters.
- 85. Benderskiy-Leninskiy electoral okrug (center—"Orbita" club), 7,200 voters.
- 86. Yuzhnyy electoral okrug (center—High School No 10), 6,900 voters.
- 87. Pushkinskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 5), 7,700 voters.
- 88. Pridnestrovskiy electoral okrug (center—P. Tkachenko Palace of Culture), 6,600 voters.
- 89. Pervomayskiy electoral okrug (center—Children's Sports School No 1), 7,400 voters.
- 90. Industrialnyy electoral okrug (center—"Shelkovik" Palace of Culture), 7,900 voters.

City of Dubossary

- 91. Dubossarskiy-Zapadnyy electoral okrug (center—Eastern Electronics Networks club), 8,265 voters.
- 92. Dubossarskiy-Tsentralnyy electoral okrug (center—"Iskra" movie theater), 9,006 voters.
- 93. Dubossarskiy-Vostochnyy electoral okrug (center—City Palace of Culture), 6,363 voters.

City of Kagul

- 94. Kagulskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 6), 8,900 voters.
- 95. Priprutskiy electoral okrug (center—Makarenko Teachers College), 9,200 voters.
- 96. Promyshlennyy electoral okrug (center—Hydromelioration Sovkhoz [state farm] Technical College), 7,700 voters.

City of Orgeyev

- 97. Orgeyevskiy electoral okrug (center—Orgeyev Tobacco and Fermentation Plant), 7,374 voters.
- 98. Kishinevskiy electoral okrug (center—Teachers College), 8,797 voters.
- 99. Proletarskiy electoral okrug (center—City Palace of Culture), 7,524 voters.

City of Rybnitsa

- 100. Rybnitskiy-Frunzenskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 10), 8,090 voters.
- 101. Rybnitskiy-Mayakovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 7), 7,815 voters.
- 102. Rybnitskiy-Komsomolskiy electoral okrug (center—City Palace of Culture), 8,029 voters.
- 103. Rybnitskiy-Kirovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 6), 8,862 voters.

- 104. Rybnitskiy-Borodinskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 11), 7,277 voters.

City of Soroki

- 105. Sorokskiy electoral okrug (center—the agricultural college), 7,500 voters.
- 106. Sorokskiy-Leninskiy electoral okrug (center—the knitwear factory), 11,500 voters.
- 107. Novosorokskiy electoral okrug (center—"GRIN" club), 8,000 voters.

City of Tiraspol

- 108. Tiraspolskiy-Komsomolskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 19), 7,748 voters.
- 109. Vostochnyy electoral okrug (center—High School No 12), 7,936 voters.
- 110. Dnestrovskiy electoral okrug (center—"Energetik" Palace of Culture, Dnestrovsk city-type settlement), 8,468 voters.
- 111. Zapadnyy electoral okrug (center—Food Production Technical School), 6,959 voters.
- 112. Kakhovskiy electoral okrug (center—gas works production directorate), 6,392 voters.
- 113. Kirovskiy electoral okrug (center—Secondary Professional-Technical School No 20), 6,689 voters.
- 114. Kommunarskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 11), 6,540 voters.
- 115. Kurchatovskiy electoral okrug (center—dormitory No 7 of the Cotton Production Association), 6,631 voters.
- 116. Kuybyshevskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 14), 7,132 voters.
- 117. Krasnodonskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 16), 7,059 voters.
- 118. Lermontovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 15), 7,705 voters.
- 119. Oktyabrskiy electoral okrug (center—"Sovremennik" Palace of Culture), 7,679 voters.
- 120. Sverdlovskiy electoral okrug (center—City Palace of Culture), 6,753 voters.
- 121. Timiryazevskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 7), 6,672 voters.
- 122. Tkachenkovskiy electoral okrug (center—Tkachenko plant club), 8,313 voters.
- 123. Tsentralnyy electoral okrug (center—Tiraspol State Teachers College imeni T.G. Shevchenko), 6,869 voters.
- 124. Chaykovskiy electoral okrug (center—High School No 17), 7,449 voters.
- 125. Shevchenkovskiy electoral okrug (center—Builders' Palace of Culture), 8,286 voters.

City of Ungeny

- 126. Ungenskiy electoral okrug (center—administrative building of the Agrarian Cooperative Production Association), 7,179 voters.
- 127. Pogranichnyy electoral okrug (center—High School No 2), 7,597 voters.
- 128. Promyshlennyy electoral okrug (center—dormitory of the carpet combine, Grechko Street), 7,141 voters.

Bessarabskiy Rayon

- 129. Bessarabskiy electoral okrug (center—Bessarabka city-type settlement), 9,270 voters.
- 130. Abakliyskiy electoral okrug (center—Abakliya village), 7,048 voters.
- 131. Avdarminskiy electoral okrug (center—Avdarma village), 7,130 voters.
- 132. Sadakliyskiy electoral okrug (center—Sadakliya village), 4,812 voters.

Brichanskiy Rayon

- 133. Brichanskiy electoral okrug (center—Brichany city-type settlement), 10,414 voters.
- 134. Belyavinskiy electoral okrug (center—Belyavintsy village), 5,952 voters.
- 135. Kolikautskiy electoral okrug (center—Kolikautsy village), 7,656 voters.
- 136. Korzheutskiy electoral okrug (center—Korzheutsky village), 6,419 voters.
- 137. Largskiy electoral okrug (center—Larga village), 8,352 voters.
- 138. Lipkanskiy electoral okrug (center—Lipkany city-type settlement), 8,691 voters.
- 139. Tabanskiy electoral okrug (center—Tabany village), 6,931 voters.
- 140. Tetskanskiy electoral okrug (center—Tetskany village), 7,098 voters.

Vulkaneshitskiy Rayon

- 141. Vulkaneshitskiy electoral okrug (center—Vulkaneshy city-type settlement), 7,455 voters.
- 142. Burlachenskiy electoral okrug (center—Burlacheny village), 6,306 voters.
- 143. Kolibashskiy electoral okrug (center—Kolibash), 8,544 voters.
- 144. Slobodzeya-Mare electoral okrug (center—Slobodzeya-Mare village), 8,528 voters.
- 145. Chishmikiyoskiy electoral okrug (center—Chishmikiy village), 8,671 voters.

Glodyanskiy Rayon

- 146. Glodyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Glodyany city-type settlement), 8,350 voters.
- 147. Bolotinskiy electoral okrug (center—Bolotino village), 7,579 voters.
- 148. Gizhdiyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Gizhdiyany village), 6,936 voters.
- 149. Starofundurskiy electoral okrug (center—Staryye Fundury village), 7,510 voters.
- 150. Sturzovskiy electoral okrug (center—Sturzovka village), 7,191 voters.
- 151. Chulchulskiy electoral okrug (center—Chuchulya village), 7,467 voters.

Grigoriopolskiy Rayon

- 152. Grigoriopolskiy electoral okrug (center—Grigoriopol city-type settlement), 7,200 voters.
- 153. Butorskiy electoral okrug (center—Butor village), 7,900 voters.
- 154. Delakeu electoral okrug (center—Delakeu village), 6,738 voters.

- 155. Karmanovskiy electoral okrug (center—Karmanovo village), 7,412 voters.

- 156. Malayeshitskiy electoral okrug (center—Malayeshity village), 6,230 voters.

Dondyushanskiy Rayon

- 157. Dondyushanskiy electoral okrug (center—Dondyushany city-type settlement), 7,965 voters.
- 158. Arioneshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Arioneshty village), 7,103 voters.
- 159. Korbu electoral okrug (center—Korbu village), 7,765 voters.
- 160. Maramonovskiy electoral okrug (center—Maramonovka village), 7,572 voters.
- 161. Plopskiy electoral okrug (center—Plop village), 6,668 voters.
- 162. Skayanskiy electoral okrug (center—Skayany village), 7,500 voters.
- 163. Tsaulskiy electoral okrug (center—Tsaul village), 7,181 voters.

Drokiyevskiy Rayon

- 164. Drokiyevskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Drokiya), 8,042 voters.
- 165. Drokiyevskiy-Michurinskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Drokiya), 6,744 voters.
- 166. Bolsheasnashenskiy electoral okrug (center—Bolshiye Asnasheny village), 6,381 voters.
- 167. Glavanskiy electoral okrug (center—Glavan village), 6,431 voters.
- 168. Gribovskiy electoral okrug (center—Gribovo village), 7,265 voters.
- 169. Zguritskiy electoral okrug (center—Zguritsa village), 7,880 voters.
- 170. Nikorenskiy electoral okrug (center—Nikoreny village), 6,451 voters.
- 171. Shurskiy electoral okrug (center—Shury village), 6,977 voters.

Dubossarskiy Rayon

- 172. Dorotskoye electoral okrug (center—Dorotskoye village), 6,887 voters.
- 173. Kochiyerskiy electoral okrug (center—Kochiyery village), 6,665 voters.
- 174. Koshnitskiy electoral okrug (center—Koshnitsa village), 7,085 voters.
- 175. Ustyinskiy electoral okrug (center—Ustye village), 7,782 voters.

Yedinetskiy Rayon

- 176. Yedinetskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Yedintsy), 8,640 voters.
- 177. Yedinetskiy-Aleksandrenskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Yedintsy, administration building of the V.I. Lenin Kolkhoz [collective farm]), 7,186 voters.
- 178. Bratushanskiy electoral okrug (center—Bratushany village), 8,262 voters.
- 179. Brynzenskiy electoral okrug (center—Brynzeny village), 8,566 voters.
- 180. Zabrichanskiy electoral okrug (center—Zabrichany village), 7,645 voters.

181. Kalininskiy electoral okrug (center—Kalininsk city-type settlement), 6,137 voters.

182. Parkovskiy electoral okrug (center—Parkovo village), 8,356 voters.

183. Tyrnovskiy electoral okrug (center—Tyrnovo village), 8,019 voters.

Kagulskiy Rayon

184. Zyarneshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Zyarneshty village), 5,888 voters.

185. Lebedenkovskiy electoral okrug (center—Lebedenko village), 7,872 voters.

186. Roshskiy electoral okrug (center—Roshu village), 7,125 voters.

187. Tatareshskiy electoral okrug (center—Tatareshy village), 5,871 voters.

Kalarashskiy Rayon

188. Kalarashskiy-Severnnyy electoral okrug (center—city of Kalarash), 8,151 voters.

189. Kalarashskiy-Yuzhnyy electoral okrug (center—city of Kalarash), 8,053 voters.

190. Volchinetskiy electoral okrug (center—Volchinets village), 8,102 voters.

191. Onishkanskiy electoral okrug (center—Onishkany village), 7,453 voters.

192. Sadovskiy electoral okrug (center—Sadova village), 7,402 voters.

193. Sipotenskiy electoral okrug (center—Sipoteny village), 7,504 voters.

194. Tsibiriskiy electoral okrug (center—Tsibirika village), 8,247 voters.

Kamenskiy Rayon

195. Kamenskiy electoral okrug (center—Kamenka city-type settlement), 9,916 voters.

196. Verkhnekugureshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Verkhniye Kugureshty village), 5,532 voters.

197. Nemirovskiy electoral okrug (center—Nemirovka village), 5,262 voters.

198. Rashkovskiy electoral okrug (center—Rashkovo village), 8,234 voters.

199. Senatovskiy electoral okrug (center—Senatovka village), 7,215 voters.

200. Khrustovskiy electoral okrug (center—Khrustovaya village), 7,037 voters.

Kantemirskiy Rayon

201. Kantemirskiy electoral okrug (center—Kantemir city-type settlement), 8,991 voters.

202. Baymakliyskiy electoral okrug (center—Baymakliya village), 6,278 voters.

203. Vishnevskiy electoral okrug (center—Vishnevka city-type settlement), 6,497 voters.

204. Goteshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Goteshty village), 6,942 voters.

205. Kyrpeshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Kyrpeshty village), 6,750 voters.

Kaushanskiy Rayon

206. Kaushanskiy-Severnnyy electoral okrug (center—city of Kaushany), 7,849 voters.

207. Kaushanskiy-Yuzhnyy electoral okrug (center—city of Kaushany), 7,887 voters.

208. Zaimskiy electoral okrug (center—Zaim village), 6,896 voters.

209. Tanatarskiy electoral okrug (center—Tanatary village), 7,446 voters.

210. Tokuzskiy electoral okrug (center—Tokuz village), 8,604 voters.

211. Khadzhimusskiy electoral okrug (center—Khadzhimus village), 8,475 voters.

Komratskiy Rayon

212. Komratskiy-Leninskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Komrat, "Energetik" Palace of Culture), 8,453 voters.

213. Komratskiy-Komsomolskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Komrat, rayon Palace of Culture), 9,083 voters.

214. Boroganskiy electoral okrug (center—Borogany village), 5,697 voters.

215. Dezginzhiyskiy electoral okrug (center—Dezginzha village), 5,472 voters.

216. Kirsovskiy electoral okrug (center—Kirsovo village), 7,212 voters.

217. Kongazskiy electoral okrug (center—Kongaz village), 7,268 voters.

Kotovskiy Rayon

218. Kotovskiy-Severo-vostochnyy electoral okrug (center—city of Kotovsk), 7,809 voters.

219. Kotovskiy-Yugo-zapadnyy electoral okrug (center—city of Kotovsk), 7,651 voters.

220. Karpinskiy electoral okrug (center—Karpineny village), 7,434 voters.

221. Krasnoarmeyskiy electoral okrug (center—Krasnoarmeyskoye village), 8,338 voters.

222. Lapushnyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Lapushna village), 8,233 voters.

223. Leushenskiy electoral okrug (center—Leusheny village), 7,800 voters.

224. Minzhirskiy electoral okrug (center—Minzhir village), 7,093 voters.

225. Sarata-Galbenskiy electoral okrug (center—Sarata-Galbene village), 8,417 voters.

226. Stolnichenskiy electoral okrug (center—Stolnicheny village), 6,421 voters.

Kriulyanskiy Rayon

227. Kriulyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Kriulyany city-type settlement), 8,768 voters.

228. Budeshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Budeshty), 8,083 voters.

229. Gyrtopul-Mare electoral okrug (center—Gyrtopul-Mare village), 7,918 voters.

230. Draslichenskiy electoral okrug (center—Draslicheny village), 7,436 voters.

231. Kruglikskiy electoral okrug (center—Kruglik village), 8,546 voters.

232. Stavchenskiy electoral okrug (center—Stavcheny city-type settlement), 7,614 voters.

233. Starodubossarskiy electoral okrug (center—Staryye Dubossary), 7,674 voters.

Keinarskiy Rayon

234. Keinarskiy electoral okrug (center—Keinar city-type settlement), 6427 voters.
235. Zolotiyevskiy electoral okrug (center—Zolotiyevka village), 6339 voters.
236. Rezenskiy electoral okrug (center—Rezeny village), 6124 voters.
237. Tarakliyskiy electoral okrug (center—Tarakliya village), 6066 voters.

Lazovskiy Rayon

238. Lazovskiy electoral okrug (center—Lazovsk city-type settlement), 6666 voters.
239. Lazovskiy-Staroyezarenskiy electoral okrug (center—Lazovsk city-type settlement), 6323 voters.
240. Aleksandrenskiy electoral okrug (center—Aleksandreny village), 6951 voters.
241. Kopachenskiy electoral okrug (center—Kopacheny village), 6692 voters.
242. Koshkodenskiy electoral okrug (center—Koshkodeny village), 7961 voters.
243. Novogechevskiy electoral okrug (center—Novyye Gechi village), 7220 voters.
244. Novosynzhereyskiy electoral okrug (center—Novaya Synzhereya village), 7038 voters.
245. Prepelitskiy electoral okrug (center—Prepelitsa village), 7370 voters.

Leovskiy Rayon

246. Leovskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Leovo), 8629 voters.
247. Knyazevskiy electoral okrug (center—Knyazevka village), 7470 voters.
248. Tomayskiy electoral okrug (center—Tomay village), 7020 voters.
249. Yargarinskiy electoral okrug (center—Yargara city-type settlement), 8248 voters.

Nisporenskiy Rayon

250. Nisporenskiy electoral okrug (center—Nisporeny city-type settlement), 9794 voters.
251. Balaureshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Balaureshty village), 6596 voters.
252. Boldureshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Boldureshty village), 6904 voters.
253. Varzareshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Varzareshty village), 6918 voters.
254. Choreshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Choreshty village), 6470 voters.
255. Chuteshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Chuteshty village), 5567 voters.
256. Chuchulenskiy electoral okrug (center—Chuchuleny village), 7146 voters.

Novoanenskiy Rayon

257. Novoanenskiy electoral okrug (center—Novyye Aneny city-type settlement), 7400 voters.
258. Bulbokskiy electoral okrug (center—Bulboaka village), 5900 voters.
259. Gyrbovetskiy electoral okrug (center—Gyrbovets village), 7300 voters.

260. Dzhamanskiy electoral okrug (center—Dzhamana village), 6400 voters.
261. Ketrosskiy electoral okrug (center—Ketrosy village), 7600 voters.
262. Merenskiy electoral okrug (center—Mereny village), 7100 voters.
263. Pugachenskiy electoral okrug (center—Pugacheny village), 7500 voters.

Oknitskiy Rayon

264. Oknitskiy electoral okrug (center—Oknitsa city-type settlement), 7040 voters.
265. Atakskiy electoral okrug (center—Ataki city-type settlement), 6898 voters.
266. Klokushnyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Klokushna village), 6598 voters.
267. Lipnikskiy electoral okrug (center—Lipnik village), 7090 voters.
268. Ruzhnitskiy electoral okrug (center—Ruzhnitsa village), 7439 voters.
269. Savskiy electoral okrug (center—Savka village), 6773 voters.
270. Frunzenskiy electoral okrug (center—Frunze city-type settlement), 6338 voters.

Orgeyevskiy Rayon

271. Bulayeshskiy electoral okrug (center—Bulayeshy village), 7107 voters.
272. Getlovskiy electoral okrug (center—Getlovo village), 6769 voters.
273. Ivanchskiy electoral okrug (center—Ivanča village), 8032 voters.
274. Kiperchenskiy electoral okrug (center—Kipercheny village), 7714 voters.
275. Kukuruzenskiy electoral okrug (center—Kukuruzeny village), 7061 voters.
276. Perechinskii electoral okrug (center—Perechino village), 7719 voters.
277. Suslenskiy electoral okrug (center—Susleny village), 6554 voters.
278. Chokyltyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Chokyltyany village), 7754 voters.

Rezinskiy Rayon

279. Rezinskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Rezina), 10,157 voters.
280. Ignatseyskiy electoral okrug (center—Ignatsey village), 6912 voters.
281. Kuyzovskiy electoral okrug (center—Kuyzovka village), 6625 voters.
282. Trifeshskiy electoral okrug (center—Trifeshy village), 7167 voters.
283. Tsarevskiy electoral okrug (center—Tsarevka village), 6304 voters.

Rubnitskiy Rayon

284. Bolshemolokishskiy electoral okrug (center—Bolshoy Molokish village), 8699 voters.
285. Kolbasnyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Kolbasna village), 8632 voters.
286. Popenkiy electoral okrug (center—Popenki village), 8414 voters.

Ryshkanskiy Rayon

- 287. Ryshkanskiy electoral okrug (center—Ryshkany city-type settlement), 9111 voters.
- 288. Ryshkanskiy-Rechanskiy electoral okrug (center—Recha village), 6,209 voters.
- 289. Varatikskiy electoral okrug (center—Varatik village), 7698 voters.
- 290. Zaykanskiy electoral okrug (center—Zaykany village), 7156 voters.
- 291. Koteshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Koteshty city-type settlement), 5308 voters.
- 292. Lyadovenskiy electoral okrug (center—Lyadoveny village), 7208 voters.
- 293. Mikhaylyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Mikhaylyany village), 6823 voters.
- 294. Peliniyskiy electoral okrug (center—Peliniya village), 7156 voters.

Slobodzeyskiy Rayon

- 295. Slobodzeyskiy-Vostochnyy electoral okrug (center—Slobodzeya city-type settlement), 8464 voters.
- 296. Slobodzeyskiy-Zapadnyy electoral okrug (center—Slobodzeya city-type settlement), 8,000 voters.
- 297. Blizhnekhtorskiy electoral okrug (center—Blizhniy Khutor village), 7310 voters.
- 298. Glinoyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Glinoye village), 8140 voters.
- 299. Kitskanskiy electoral okrug (center—Kitskany village), 6437 voters.
- 300. Nezavertaylovskiy electoral okrug (center—Nezavertaylovka village), 7774 voters.
- 301. Parkanskiy electoral okrug (center—Parkany village), 8,300 voters.
- 302. Pervomayskiy electoral okrug (center—Pervomaysk city-type settlement), 6241 voters.
- 303. Sukleyskiy electoral okrug (center—Sukleya village), 7557 voters.
- 304. Ternovskiy electoral okrug (center—Ternovka village), 7342 voters.
- 305. Chobruchskiy electoral okrug (center—Chobruchi village), 5306 voters.
- 306. Badichanskiy electoral okrug (center—Badichany village), 7625 voters.
- 307. Kainariy-Vek electoral okrug (center—Kainariy-Vek village), 6430 voters.
- 308. Kosoutskiy electoral okrug (center—Kosoutsy village), 7605 voters.
- 309. Pyrlitskiy electoral okrug (center—Pyrlitsa village), 6732 voters.
- 310. Red-Chereshnovets electoral okrug (center—Red-Chereshnovets village), 6394 voters.
- 311. Stoykanskiy electoral okrug (center—Stoykany village), 7344 voters.

Strashenskiy Rayon

- 312. Strashenskiy electoral okrug (center—Strasheny city-type settlement), 8321 voters.
- 313. Strashenskiy-Panasheshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Strasheny city-type settlement), 8300 voters.
- 314. Zubreshhtskiy electoral okrug (center—Zubreshty village), 6666 voters.

- 315. Kozhushnyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Kozhushna village), 7531 voters.
- 316. Lozovskiy electoral okrug (center—Lozovo village), 8209 voters.
- 317. Redenskiy electoral okrug (center—Redeny village), 7301 voters.
- 318. Rechanskiy electoral okrug (center—Recha village), 6466 voters.
- 319. Trushenskiy electoral okrug (center—Trusheny village), 8462 voters.

Suvorovskiy Rayon

- 320. Suvorovskiy electoral okrug (center—Suvorovo city-type settlement), 7698 voters.
- 321. Volontirovskiy electoral okrug (center—Volontirovka village), 6595 voters.
- 322. Yermokliyskiy electoral okrug (center—Yermokliya village), 5912 voters.
- 323. Karagasanskiy electoral okrug (center—Karagasany village), 6,128 voters.
- 324. Korkmazskiy electoral okrug (center—Korkmaz village), 7603 voters.
- 325. Olaneshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Olaneshty village), 8,396
- 326. Talmazskiy electoral okrug (center—Talmaz village), 6046 voters.

Tarakliyskiy Rayon

- 327. Tarakliyskiy electoral okrug (center—Tarakliya city-type settlement), 9985 voters.
- 328. Vinogradovskiy electoral okrug (center—Vinogradovka village), 5674 voters.
- 329. Kopchakskiy electoral okrug (center—Kopchak village), 6653 voters.
- 330. Svetlyy electoral okrug (center—Svetlyy settlement), 6040 voters.

Teleneshtskiy Rayon

- 331. Teleneshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Teleneshty city-type settlement), 7989 voters.
- 332. Budeyskiy electoral okrug (center—Budey village), 7873 voters.
- 333. Kazaneshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Kazaneshty village), 7049 voters.
- 334. Myndreshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Myndreshty village), 7267 voters.
- 335. Negurenskiy electoral okrug (center—Negureny village), 6673 voters.
- 336. Starosaratenskiy electoral okrug (center—Staryye Sarateny village), 7941 voters.

Ugnenskiy Rayon

- 337. Valya-Mare electoral okrug (center—Valya-Mare village), 7173 voters.
- 338. Gircheshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Gircheshty village), 7190 voters.
- 339. Korneshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Korneshty city-type settlement), 9133 voters.
- 340. Petreshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Petreshty village), 6618 voters.
- 341. Todireshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Todireshty village), 6308 voters.

342. Skulyanskiy electoral okrug (center—Skulyany village), 6156 voters.
343. Chetyrenskiy electoral okrug (center—Chetyreny village), 7789 voters.

Faleshtskiy Rayon

344. Faleshtskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Faleshty), 7725 voters.
345. Faleshtskiy-Kelugerskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Faleshty), 7725 voters.
346. Glinzhenskiy electoral okrug (center—Glinzheny village), 8775 voters.
347. Kalineshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Kalineshty village), 7270 voters.
348. Novochelakovskiy electoral okrug (center—Novaya Chelakovka village), 8031 voters.
349. Pynzarenskiy electoral okrug (center—Pynzareny village), 7510 voters.
350. Risipenskiy electoral okrug (center—Risipeny village), 7518 voters.
351. Khiliutskiy electoral okrug (center—Khiliutsy village), 7933 voters.

Floreshtskiy Rayon

352. Leninskiy electoral okrug (center—Leninskiy city-type settlement), 7548 voters.
353. Floreshtskiy electoral okrug (center—city of Floreshty), 8730 voters.
354. Floreshtskiy-gura Kamenchiy electoral okrug (center—city of Floreshty), 8049 voters.
355. Varvarovskiy electoral okrug (center—Varvarovka village), 7945 voters.
356. Markuleshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Markuleshty city-type settlement), 7004 voters.
357. Trifaneshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Trifaneshty village), 7768 voters.
358. Shtefaneshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Shtefaneshty village), 6526 voters.

Chadyr-Lungskiy Rayon

359. Chadyr-Lungskiy-Severnnyy electoral okrug (center—city of Chadyr-Lunga, administrative building of the S.M. Kirov Kolkhoz), 7874 voters.
360. Chadyr-Lungskiy-Yuzhnyy electoral okrug (center—city of Chadyr-Lunga, High School No 4), 6440 voters.
361. Valya-Perzhhey electoral okrug (center—Valya-Perzhhey village), 6160 voters.
362. Kazakliyskiy electoral okrug (center—Kazakliya village), 9017 voters.
363. Tvarditskiy electoral okrug (center—Tvarditsa village), 6347 voters.
364. Tomayskiy electoral okrug (center—Tomay village), 6696 voters.

Sholdaneshtskiy Rayon

365. Sholdaneshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Sholdaneshty city-type settlement), 8821 voters.
366. Vadul-Rashkov electoral okrug (center—Vadul-Rashkov village), 7171 voters.
367. Kotyuzhanskiy electoral okrug (center—Kotyuzhany village), 7762 voters.

368. Raspopenskiy electoral okrug (center—Raspopeny village), 8804 voters.

Chimishliyskiy Rayon

369. Chimishliyskiy electoral okrug (center—Chimishliya city-type settlement), 9391 voters.
370. Gradishchenskiy electoral okrug (center—Gradishche village), 6612 voters.
371. Gura-Galbeney electoral okrug (center—Gura-Galbeney village), 6722 voters.
372. Mikhaylovskiy electoral okrug (center—Mikhaylovka village), 7798 voters.
373. Chukur-Minzhir electoral okrug (center—Chukur-Minzhir village), 6369 voters.

Yalovenskiy Rayon

374. Yalovenskiy electoral okrug (center—Yaloven city-type settlement), 7742 voters.
375. Bardarskiy electoral okrug (center—Bardar village), 6536 voters.
376. Bachoyskiy electoral okrug (center—Bachoy village), 8471 voters.
377. Vasiyskiy electoral okrug (center—Vasiyeny village), 5513 voters.
378. Koteshtskiy electoral okrug (center—Koteshty village), 8362 voters.
379. Suruchenskiy electoral okrug (center—Surucheny village), 6296 voters.
380. Tsypalskiy electoral okrug (center—Tsypala village), 9063 voters.

V. Kiktenko

Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of People's Deputies of the Moldavian SSR

M. Apopiy

Secretary of the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of People's Deputies of the Moldavian SSR

Moldavian SSR Election Official Interviewed

90UN0604A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 2

[Interview with M.V. Apopiy, secretary of the Central Election Commission for Electing Moldavian SSR People's Deputies, by correspondent E. Shalimov: "Elections of Moldavian SSR People's Deputies and Local Soviet Deputies on February 25: The Only Criterium Is Personal Qualities"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Marchel Vladimirovich, we all followed with great interest the passage of the new law on elections in the republic parliament. But I do not think it would be superfluous to repeat some of its points and new elements it will introduce into the election campaign. It is set to begin imminently.

[Apopiy] First, let us be more precise. Strictly speaking, the election campaign has already begun, from the moment the 14th Session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet announced that the elections of Moldavia people's deputies and local soviet deputies were set for February 25, 1990. Preparations for the campaign

had begun even earlier, back when the first foundations for drafting and shaping the new law on elections were laid. It was a period when future voters became politically active and began to fight for a truly democratic law. This is why we got a law that altered significantly the electoral system in our republic and put it on a firm democratic footing. This galvanizes voters further and takes to a new level their interest both in the election campaign and in its final results.

I want to stress at the start that from now on elections will be based on one-seat electoral districts and universal, equal and direct suffrage by a free and secret vote. It is especially important that no limitation of voting rights are allowed. They are equal for all, regardless of nationality, sex, social origin, native language, creed, etc. In this respect, the Moldavian SSR law on elections differs from similar laws in some other republics, which have certain residency requirements, for example.

[Correspondent] However, at the session of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet there was a rather heated debate on the size of the collective that will have the right to nominate its own candidate. It was decided to set the minimum size at 100 employees. But there are many collectives with fewer members. They do not have the right to nominate candidates.

[Apopiy] I can see how at first glance this may seem to be a restriction. But it was not introduced for any political or legal reason; it was suggested by common sense. The law abolished the hurdle of district election meetings which were criticized so much during the elections of USSR people's deputies. True, such meetings allowed some members of the bureaucratic system to filter out candidates they did not like. At the same time, while in practice district meetings often did not serve democratic goals, they could fulfill a rational purpose of limiting the number of candidates placed on the ballot. Voters should be able to choose a candidate who is, in their view, most worthy of being elected from among several candidates, but when the list includes dozens of candidates the scope for error increases.

As to the individual voter, is his right to nominate candidates violated if he works at a small enterprises with fewer than 100 employees? I do not think so, since small collectives could band together to nominate candidates. In addition, everyone can do so at his place of residence.

[Correspondent] What norms govern this latter process?

[Apopiy] A meeting may propose a candidate for republic people's deputy if at least 300 voters are present. Not just any voters, but those who reside in the given district.

[Correspondent] Who may take the initiative?

[Apopiy] Such a meeting may be called by the Soviet of People's Deputies itself, but the initiative to nominate candidates belongs to organs of public activity of the

population or voter groups of at least 50 members by applying directly to the soviet. The latter must consider the nomination within three days.

[Correspondent] Now please say a few words about the Moldavian SSR Central Election Commission which you represent.

[Apopiy] As required by the law on elections, it was formed by the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet taking into account proposals of city and rayon soviets of people's deputies and republic associations of public organizations. Our commission was formed for a period of five years. In other words, during this period it has the power to solve all issues related to elections and is a permanent organ.

[Correspondent] What has the commission done already? Have you dealt with any controversial issues yet? How do preparations for the elections proceed?

[Apopiy] As the new law requires, on the fifth day after the elections were announced, the commission drew up electoral districts for the elections of republic people's deputies. We have 380 such districts, with 7,400 voters each. This is the model, so to speak. Obviously, it is impossible to divide the republic so precisely into districts. There are fluctuation in either direction due to natural boundaries of population centers, etc. I want to stress one thing. Now, for the first time, electoral districts were drawn not based on the total number of residents of a given territory but on the number of eligible voters. Naturally, this is more just and democratic. Districts have different age differentials and therefore different ratios of voters and nonvoters.

[Correspondent] What guarantee do we have that the districts on the list published in the press have equal number of voters?

[Apopiy] I repeat that it is impossible to achieve surgical precision. There are variations, but they are too small to affect the overall results of the elections. There is only one instance when the number of voters in a district is considerably larger than the established standard. It is the Sorokskiy electoral district, where almost 11,000 voters are registered. We received a request from the Chadyr-Langskiy Rayon to redraw district boundaries and even to alter their names. We have discussed these issues at the meeting of the commission.

[Correspondent] Marchel Vladimirovich, let us map up the approximate schedule of the election campaign in the republic for the readers of SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIA.

[Apopiy] In general, it is clear. Some 60 days prior to the elections, on December 27, nomination of candidates for Moldavian SSR people's deputies and local soviet deputies will commence and will go on until 30 days prior to the elections. The next stage, registration of candidates, will begin immediately and will stop 20 days prior to the elections.

[Correspondent] When may campaigning for a candidate begin?

[Apopiy] From the moment he has been nominated.

[Correspondent] Let us suppose we held a meeting to nominate our candidate for people's deputy. What next?

[Apopiy] You must submit the record of the meeting of the labor collective or residents to the election commission in a proper format.

[Correspondent] And if someone wanted to falsify this record, to raise the number of participants to 300, to doctor the results of the vote, etc.?

[Apopiy] I have only one advice in this case: to keep in mind the stiff penalties such actions may entail. The penalties are similar to ones for forging other official documents. But I do not expect any such incidents. It is in the interest of everyone to elect the most worthy candidates, those who not only could stubbornly defend some special interests or criticize furiously but propose workable solutions to problems, those who have already demonstrated this ability at some public post. There will be but one criterium, personal merits of candidates for deputies. The best can be elected only in an honest campaign.

We, members of the Central Election Commission, see our main purpose in directing the efforts of all social forces to view the election campaign in this light.

Ivashko Address to Ukrainian CP Plenum

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[Report by V.A. Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, at the 18 October 1989 Plenum of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee: "The Republic Party Organization's Tasks To Fulfill the Decisions of the CPSU Central Committee September (1989) Plenum"]

[Text] Comrades!

We are faced today with determining the tasks of the republic's party organizations pertaining to fulfillment of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee September 1989 Plenum, which, as is known, discussed in a critical and constructive spirit the main aspects of the party's activity, adopted the decision to convene its 28th congress in October next year and approved the CPSU platform on the nationality question.

We are beginning preparations for the congress in an extraordinarily difficult period, critical for perestroika, it may be said, when, as M.S. Gorbachev pointed out recently in a speech from this rostrum, it is as if tension in society is gathering physically. For this reason the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Politburo believes that the period of preparation for the congress should be truly pivotal for the republic's party organizations.

It needs to be shown in practice that the Ukrainian Communist Party is actively restructuring itself and vigorously conducting perestroika in all spheres of social life and, primarily, in the solution of urgent socioeconomic, ecological, and cultural problems. It is from such positions that we need today also to specify the tasks ensuing for us from the CPSU platform "The Party's Nationality Policy Under Current Conditions".

The Central Committee will have to render account of the progress of this work to the Communists and people of the Ukraine at the 28th Ukrainian CP Congress. The Politburo proposes that this congress be convened in September next year. It should, in the opinion of the Central Committee Politburo, study the following questions:

1. The progress of perestroika in the republic and the Ukrainian CP Action Program. Report of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee.
2. Report of the Ukrainian CP Auditing Commission.
3. Election of executive bodies of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

A draft plenum resolution on this question will be submitted for your examination.

We believe that the Central Committee should instruct the Politburo to prepare proposals concerning the time for the organization of the preconference report and election campaign, the congress representation quota, and the procedure of the election of its delegates in order that these proposals might be examined at a subsequent Central Committee plenum.

Renewing the Life of the Party Organizations, Emphatically Altering the Style of Work

Comrades!

The CPSU Central Committee September Plenum reached the extraordinarily important conclusion that the key to the solution of urgent problems of perestroika today is a fundamental renovation of the party itself. And this fundamental proposition should determine the content of our entire work on preparations for the upcoming CPSU congress. The congress is to accumulate party thought and enable us to proceed further ahead on the basis of the democratic experience which has been acquired.

What, in the opinion of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Politburo, are the principal areas of this work?

Primarily the further democratization of all intraparty life. A well-known proposition. But this is what I would like to emphasize. Many people still understand democratization simplistically, paying attention mainly not to the content but the form and the outward, procedural aspect, so to speak: how a meeting or plenum has been conducted, in what way a secretary has been elected, and

so forth. All this is undoubtedly important. But the main thing is to return to the Leninist understanding of the principle of democratic centralism.

It is essential to firmly establish in the life of the party organizations profound ideological and organizational unity, truly party-minded comradeship, a free exchange of thoughts, constructive criticism, and not formal but genuine leadership. At the same time, however, it is necessary to conclusively overcome the ossified formal hierarchy and insincerity and obsequiousness, which are intolerable in the party.

What we need are new people and new ideas. It is necessary that the predominant principle be that of choice between constructive programs, intentions, and action plans geared to the solution of the problems which confront the party organizations, the work force, and the regions.

It is on the basis of such approaches that we should conduct the report and election campaign in the party organizations and the election of delegates to the 28th Ukrainian CP Congress and 28th CPSU Congress. The party rules which are currently in force afford sufficient opportunities for this, and it is only necessary to realize their principles fully. And the party masses at large and we ourselves will name truly worthy, active, and authoritative people taking the cause and the progress of perestroika keenly to heart.

The democratization of party life raises to a higher level the role of the party member and makes him personally involved in and responsible for all that occurs both in his organization and in the party as a whole. We must strengthen party discipline in every possible way and enhance the responsibility of each communist for the cohesion of the party ranks, for the implementation of party policy, and for the fulfillment of party decisions in his assigned area. This is the fundamental line, and we will not retreat from it.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee is receiving letters whose authors ask: do the CPSU Rules and Program and party discipline and ethics exist for some party members? People have good reason to be incensed. There are still, unfortunately, repeated instances of party members having forgotten, as it were, that their main party duty is selfless labor, without which there cannot be perestroika itself and an improvement in people's life, and some are even joining destructive extremist groupings and acting against the party line. Our position in this respect is unequivocal: Whoever does not uphold the party cause and engages in double-dealing is placing himself outside of the party.

The more pronounced quitting of the CPSU has become a new phenomenon for us in party life. Some 6,200 persons handed in their party cards and candidate cards in 9 months of the current year. This constitutes less than 0.2 percent of the quantitative composition of the Ukrainian Communist Party. The situation should not be dramatized, it seems. The less so in that those quitting

include careerists, time-servers, and simply politically immature people. The self-cleansing of the party is a natural and necessary process. But there are also those who did not find in our organization opportunities for self-expression and saw no desire here to do anything specific and useful. And we cannot fail to worry about the fate of each of these people. For when one looks into such facts, it is not that infrequently that it transpires that no one has even candidly had a word with the individual: So you are going, well, go ahead then.

In addition, the reasons for quitting the party are sometimes laid down, so to speak, at the time of admittance to it. Superficiality and insufficient study of the new intake and formalism at various stages of the hearing of admittance applications—this is what has opened the way to the party of incidental, unprepared people. At the same time, however, nor is the appropriate attention being paid everywhere to the training of fresh party forces from the ranks of the vigorous champions of perestroika who have already given notice of their high political assertiveness, feel for what is new, and concern for public interests.

In 9 months of this year 42,800 persons were admitted as CPSU candidates in the republic. These are people who joined the party at a difficult time and who were not intimidated by the frenzied attacks on the party and the attempts of some forces to counterpose it to the state and the people, to shove it aside from political leadership, and destroy it morally. Some time will pass, and people of our new intake will take pride in the fact that the time of entry into the ranks of the CPSU stamped on their party cards is 1989 or 1990.

Together with this the question of the continued democratization of admittance to the party has become urgent. Specifically, with the consent of our plenum it might be possible to propose to the CPSU Central Committee the extension to one or two oblast party organizations of our republic of the experiment on granting the primary party organizations the right of final decision on questions concerning the admittance of candidates and the departure or expulsion of candidates of the CPSU.

Comrades!

The particular role in implementation of the party line which belongs to the primary party organizations is understandable. Only via them is it possible, in V.I. Lenin's words, to effect "unity below, unity in practical work, in the struggle, under mutual supervision."

The reports and elections in the party groups and shop and primary party organizations, which testify convincingly that pronounced changes have occurred recently in people's mood, afford substantial material for analysis, reflection, and conclusions in this connection. The latter wish to work, and work hard, in order to achieve practical results. And it would be impermissible not to take advantage of this change in the interests of perestroika.

In order to perform its vanguard role today each party organization must on a broad democratic basis formulate its own approach in decisions on specific socially significant matters, organize people, and see the work through to a conclusion, to a real result. Without this all our statements about the vanguard role of the party organizations will remain declarations. These will not win trust and authority among people.

Democratization envisages the development of initiative and independence in the activity of each party organization and party committee. It is essential to be rid as quickly as possible of the habit of waiting on any pretext for instructions "from higher up". The situation today is changing rapidly, and it is necessary to operate boldly. It is necessary in each specific instance to proceed from life's realities, overcome stereotypes, of whatever kind—old or new—adopt substantiated decisions and be responsible for them.

We must in the interests of the cause, in the interests of perestroika cease shifting the blame for shortcomings onto someone else. There are enough of them, unfortunately, in each component of the republic party organization. But separate mention has to be made of the truly great work of the city and rayon party committees. It is their officials, going daily among the people, who have been forced to take on themselves the fire of criticism for the shortages and shortcomings, for the lack of organization, and the infringements of the law; in a word, for virtually everything, for which the gorkoms [city party committees] and raykoms [rayon party committees] are far from always directly to blame.

Nor can we agree with the instances of criticism being addressed merely "upstairs," when one's own omissions and miscalculations are circumvented.

Each of us deals with his own area and bears full responsibility for it. But we are all together engaged in one common cause, and mutual understanding and coordinated action are needed here.

I wish to emphasize that we are well aware that there is now also a considerable increase in the responsibility of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and its Politburo and Secretariat for the formulation and implementation of the correct political line under the republic's conditions. Ultimately we proceed from the fact that the Central Committee must be an intellectual political center open to constructive suggestions from whomever they proceed, a center reacting sensitively to the changes in all spheres of social life, comprehending them and formulating analytical, profoundly substantiated concepts both for the long term and for the successful accomplishment of current tasks.

The growing assertiveness of the masses may be led only provided our plans and programs imbibe the entire creative potential of the people and the energy of renewal.

I would like to dwell particularly on a question which has today assumed fundamental significance. While advocating an expansion of the boundaries of the real independence of the republic party organizations, we must decisively strengthen internationalist principles and show convincingly with all explanatory work that the communists' delineation along national lines would lead to an uncoupling of their efforts and a considerable weakening of the party's consolidating role in society.

The Central Committee September Plenum deemed unacceptable the idea of federalism in the structure of the CPSU. I am sure that our plenum will support this position.

Comrades!

An urgent task of the party organizations is the more decisive mastery of political methods of work. This a complex and multilevel problem connected, primarily, with a change in the very functions of the party and soviet authorities.

I would like to emphasize merely one aspect here. We need to study more comprehensively and in greater depth and take account in our work of public opinion and the people's mood and forecast them, and not bring up the rear, as they say.

Some people are convinced that the restructuring in party work is associated primarily with the work force. This is so, but we need to go out into the streets and onto the squares also. We need to stimulate the communists and teach them to debate and counterpose to our opponents the facts and proof. After all, it is obvious that a political struggle is underway. And a very serious one. Some people are no longer ashamed to employ dishonest methods, demagoguery, and obvious distortions in respect of the party and party workers. We, on the other hand, are sometimes afraid to appeal to people simply for common sense.

Granted the critical attitude toward the pace and scale of the transformations, we have reason to say that the perestroika period has brought profound changes to society. Not to see this means disregarding the people's labor.

Now, on the threshold of the elections of people's deputies of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic [Ukrainian SSR] and the local soviets, the most important thing for the party as a political organization is, as V.I. Lenin pointed out, "...the arrangement of state power." And for this reason, all that is associated with the elections should be at the center of the party organizations' attention.

The draft laws on changes and additions to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and on the elections of people's deputies have been discussed extensively in the republic. The working groups formed by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium received over 230,000 comments on these bills. They also received seven alternative

draft election laws. This testifies that there has been a natural democratic process in the republic, as required by the restructuring of public life.

Of course, the fate of this article or the other of the drafts will be decided by a session of the republic Supreme Soviet. But, proceeding from the proposals of the party committees, the communists, and many working people of the republic, the opinion of our plenum on certain fundamentally important provisions of the bills should be expressed also.

The Central Committee Politburo has concluded that proceeding from the experience gained at the all-union level, it would be inexpedient to have a congress of people's deputies in the structure of the highest organs of state power of the republic. The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet should be elected by the whole electorate.

As far as the elections of people's deputies from public organizations are concerned, this article of the draft came in for the greatest criticism. Considering this, upholding it would hardly be expedient, the less so in that the public organizations themselves have not defended it particularly. Although, candidly, we are worried about the representation in a future Supreme Soviet of such categories of the population as veterans, women and, the youth.

Mention also needs to be made of the proposal concerning direct elections of the Supreme Soviet chairman or so-called "president" of the republic. In our view, they are unacceptable. If we speak of the introduction of the office of "president," this means altogether a departure from collective forms of administration, which is ultimately contrary to the very concept of perestroika geared to the broadest democratization of public life. Concerning the direct election of the Supreme Soviet chairman in circumvention of the Supreme Soviet itself, this in itself invests relations between the chairman and the Soviet with a particular character. One way or another, the direct election whether of the chairman or "president" is a beaten path toward the inordinate concentration of power in the hands of one person, which, proceeding from our historical experience, cannot be allowed.

I believe that the participants in the plenum will express their opinions on this and other issues.

We need to prepare for the elections very seriously. Every communist must recognize that it is ultimately a question of whose hands hold the reins of power. After all, forces which are even openly hostile toward our system no longer conceal their claims to it. Their clamorous demagoguery is fed more often than not by personal ambition. These people do not have, as a rule, anything constructive to their name. Can the prattle about a return to capitalism, the Ukraine's separation from the Soviet Union, and such things be taken seriously.

Unfortunately, verbal speculation on the real problems of perestroika and the shortages and difficulties are finding a response in a certain part of the population in places.

All this needs to be countered by an open, honest, and consistent position on all issues, the most serious included, and one's own precise and clear political line. Each party organization must draw up a specific election action program and organize extensive explanatory and agitation work around it.

We proceed from the fact that the party organizations and committees will submit their proposals in respect also of the election platform of the republic party organization, which will be studied at the next Ukrainian CP Central Committee plenum.

Comrades!

It stands to reason that the democratic changes in the party should be manifested also in their relations with the public organizations. The task today is via the communists working therein to pursue the scrupulous party line geared to an increase in responsibility in the public organizations and the development of their initiative and independence on the questions for whose solution they were, strictly speaking, formed. As far as the independent associations, including "Rukh," are concerned, our scrupulous position on this question is well known. It is that we will cooperate with all forces adhering to the principles of socialism, perestroika, and the friendship of the USSR peoples. At the same time, on the other hand, we will continue to resolutely expose those who do not accept the socialist choice, attempt to discredit the party, and propagandize separatism and national exclusiveness. This applies particularly to the so-called Ukrainian Helsinki Union, Ukrainian People's Democratic League, and other such groupings which are on a different track to us, under whoever's "roof" they may be concealing themselves.

We fully support the conclusion of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the fact that the time has come to speak clearly and in the telling language of the law about the conditions under which nationalist, chauvinist, and other extremist organizations can and should be banned and dissolved. The impunity of lawbreakers prompts them to new provocations. The republic's law enforcement authorities should have their say here also.

One thing, comrades, is clear: In the preconference period the republic's party committees and organizations will have to operate in an exceptionally difficult atmosphere. But let us remain true to our party's tradition—the greater the difficulties and the more complex the tasks, the closer should be our cohesion and the higher our responsibility for all that needs to be done in the name of the people.

Strengthening the Sovereignty of the Republic in the Soviet Federation and Actively Restructuring the Spiritual Sphere

Comrades!

A most urgent and acute problem of interethnic relations discussed at the CPSU Central Committee September Plenum was undoubtedly that of the improvement of the soviet federation. A cardinal, pivotal question here is the

harmonization and coordination of the interests of the USSR and the union republics. For its practical solution it is necessary to establish the optimum correlation between the rights of the union republics and the USSR. The CPSU platform adopted by the Central Committee plenum provides for a radical broadening of the rights of the republic organs of power and administration. This signifies the maximum suffusion of the republics' sovereignty with real content. They will themselves now be responsible for economic and cultural development and the all-around satisfaction of diverse requirements.

In this connection it is essential that we accelerate the elaboration of proposals concerning forms of representation in organs of the USSR and the enactment of all-union laws and decisions concerning the republic. Of course, the first say here belongs to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, the republic Council of Ministers, and the research establishments.

The right to raise the question of the abrogation of a union law going beyond the writ of the union and to protest and suspend decrees and instructions of the union government on one's own territory if they violate a union republic's constitutional rights is crucial for the republics.

Consequently, we must concern ourselves with the creation of a legal mechanism of defense of the republic's interests and thereby enhance the authority of its laws.

We believe it necessary to emphasize that hitherto the republic's legislative creativity has not been distinguished by sufficient enterprise.

An organic indication of a republic's genuine sovereignty is its territorial supremacy. We share the viewpoint that not only can a republic's territory not be changed, as recorded in the current USSR Constitution, nor can it be used without its consent, as the republic has formerly proposed. Such a practice would contribute to an improvement in the management of the republic's economy and a strengthening of its economic sovereignty and enable it to use natural resources, deploy the productive forces, and solve social, environmental, cultural, and other problems more efficiently and rationally.

The problem of an improvement in the institution of citizenship, which is an inalienable attribute of statehood and sovereignty, is clearly ripe also. It is essential to approach anew the very procedure of the granting of citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR. It is now quite formal. We need, of course, a law on republic citizenship which reflects both its legal and moral aspects. The elaboration of this law should be speeded up. It is necessary to proceed here from the fact that each citizen of the republic is simultaneously a citizen of the USSR and that any privileges for some and a limitation of the rights of other Soviet citizens on ethnic, religious, language, and other grounds are impermissible in principle.

Much has to be done in the republic for the creation of an efficient democratic mechanism of the control of national

processes. This is of particular significance for the Ukraine, in which citizens of almost 90 nationalities live.

What kind of practical issues arise here? They amount in general to satisfaction as fully as possible of the socio-cultural requirements of the representatives of any nationality.

An important political factor is their assured representation both in republic and local organs of state power and administration. It is essential that the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the appropriate oblispolkoms [oblast executive committees], losing no time, formulate specific proposals pertaining to the formation of republic national citizens' councils, national administrative-territorial formations, and interethnic commissions in the local soviets of people's deputies, and in their ispolkoms [executive committees], the appropriate subdivisions. Determination of the range of their powers should, in our opinion, fall within the jurisdiction of the local soviets themselves.

The new union and republic laws on a guarantee of the rights of citizens of the USSR living outside of their state and territorial formations or without such on the territory of the Soviet Union will undoubtedly contribute to the practical realization of this.

It is necessary for a politically consummate solution of these questions to study in depth the economic, social, and spiritual situation in which each national group finds itself. The existing problems, on the other hand, need to be tackled without delay.

The most urgent and serious of them is for us today the restoration of justice in respect of the Crimean Tatars. The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the republic government need together with the Crimea Oblispolkom to accelerate the preparation of the corresponding proposals—program, it may be said—pertaining to this question which might take comprehensively into consideration the actual situation which has taken shape in the Crimea.

Practice demands that the judicial-legal protection of the national honor and dignity of the Soviet individual be strengthened considerably in republic legislation. The legal arsenal ought to incorporate obligatory compensation for moral and material damage caused by national insult.

Of course, laws and legal rules do not operate automatically. Their realization will depend to a large extent on the work of the law enforcement authorities. They, primarily the Ukrainian SSR Procuracy (Comrade P.G. Osipenko) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Comrade I.D. Gladush) and also the Ministry of Justice (Comrade V.I. Zaychuk), should apply Soviet laws more actively against persons and groups infringing citizens' national equality, resorting to extremist actions, provoking interethnic clashes, fomenting interethnic discord, and terrorizing and intimidating people.

It has to be said that the republic's law enforcement authorities frequently operate indecisively and frequently become flustered in a complex situation.

We need to view the Ukraine's international relations through the prism of the extension of the independence and broadening of the sovereignty of the republic also. Specifically, it is a question of the suffusion with real content of the republic's right to enter into relations with foreign states and conclude treaties and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

As you can see, comrades, the broadening of the rights of the republic and its sovereignty encompasses a wide range of issues. Serious analysis and balanced decisions are needed here.

Comrades!

Despite all the deformations and distortions, Lenin's nationality policy has provided for the spiritual growth of people of all nationalities. This applies to the people of the Ukraine also. We have reason to evaluate what has been done at its worth and we emphatically reject the nihilistic attempts to paint the past solely in dark colors. However, nor can we fail to see the acute unsolved problems, many of which have built up in the spiritual life of the republic, as of the whole country.

The CPSU Central Committee plenum formulated a precise and consistent action program in the sphere of national-cultural building. Its realization will make it possible to have done with the painful issues.

We may today put among the most important of them the language problem. Step by step and by the joint efforts of the party and soviet authorities and state and public organizations the blunders perpetrated here earlier are being removed. The sphere of the active use of Ukrainian is gradually expanding. Conditions for the development of Russian and the languages of the other nationalities living in the republic are improving also.

Nonetheless, it has to be acknowledged that the Ukrainian CP Central Committee decrees on these questions are not being fulfilled quickly enough in a number of regions. We cannot agree with this attitude toward this important matter.

Nor must excesses and compulsion be permitted here. It is necessary to evaluate the situation realistically, take account of the available forces, and, what is most important, work and make persistent progress. There is extensive scope here for the activity of all party and soviet authorities, artistic unions and cultural establishments, and people working in public education, and also for the constructive work of the T.G. Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society.

A Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet session will shortly examine a draft Ukrainian SSR language law. It provides for according official language status to Ukrainian. We believe that this step is justified.

In our opinion, it is very important that the draft provide for the legal equality of Ukrainian and Russian and the languages of the other nationalities whose representatives live in the republic. This is a safeguard against all excesses in the solution of language problems.

We would hope that the deputies take a constructive view of the proposals and observations pertaining to this draft.

Our position is such: It is necessary in implementing nationality and language policy to adhere unswervingly to the right of free choice of language of tuition. This is an important political issue. We consider violation of this principle impermissible.

The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Public Education should concern itself with the opening in each corresponding region of educational and training institutions and individual classes and groups in which Ukrainian, Russian, and other national languages are the languages of tuition. This will be also the practical creation of the conditions for realization of parents' right of choice of language of tuition for their children, which corresponds to the requirements of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR constitutions and humanitarian, international standards.

We need to continue to improve the study of Russian, which in our country has become the medium of interethnic communication—statewide, essentially.

It should be emphasized that the republic's entire spiritual life is gradually being enriched under the influence of the restructuring processes. Nonetheless, the sluggishness, formalism, and indifference of government officials from the field of culture and opportunism in the position of certain figures of the arts are taking their toll.

I would like, specifically, to call the attention of the party committee of the Ukrainian Writers Union and its leaders to the current state of Ukrainian literature. One has the impression that questions of its development are gradually receding in the union's activity somewhere into the background. At the same time, however, against the backdrop of the masses' increased national self-awareness their interest in new full-blooded works of literature is clearly not being satisfied.

The processes of a revival of the Ukrainian theater and national cinema are occurring contradictorily. The commercialization of cinema art and the desire of certain producers to gain an easy success with the audience by way of the shooting of films per the models of Western mass culture are increasing the danger of a lowering of the standards of the national cinema.

There has been much debate recently in connection with questions of the slow development of national culture. But proper creative results are not yet in sight. The artistic unions, the Ministry of Culture, and other state establishments should, most likely, now by joint efforts be imparting considerably greater dynamism to the processes of the development of national literature and art.

The Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers should stimulate the elaboration of a concept and program of the integral development of Ukrainian national culture and the cultures of the nationalities living in the Ukraine.

An important place in our work should be occupied by questions of the growth of the people's intellectual potential and a revival of the fame of university education and, generally, the best educational, scientific, and cultural traditions.

Problems of satisfaction of the social and cultural requirements of the national groups living in the Ukraine should be distinguished. The party committees' attention to them has increased markedly recently. The experience of the creation of national-cultural societies of Poles, Hungarians, Jews, Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians, Germans, and Turkic-speaking peoples merits attention, in particular. They have already done many good things and are helping people establish their national dignity. And we, as the CPSU platform proposes, must increase our efforts in this field and help the societies in their activity.

It is necessary to develop relations with the fraternal republics and pay more attention to fellow countrymen living outside of the Ukraine.

The activity of the republic's "Druzhba" cultural and educational center, whose social and cultural actions have received positive comment, is contributing to the mutual enrichment of the cultures of the fraternal peoples. It would be expedient for the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers to study the question of a strengthening of the center's physical plant and accord it the status of a state establishment.

Generally, man's spiritual growth remains our important party cause. For this reason attention to the development of the literary and artistic process and the work and life of the republic's artistic intelligentsia should be a subject of the party committees' daily concern.

The republic's television, radio, newspapers, and journals should increase their contribution to the cause of harmonization of interethnic relations. They are called on to establish the ideals of the friendship and fraternity of the Soviet peoples and emphatically rebuff nationalism and chauvinism and all that introduces dissension and enmity to our great family. The editorial collectives which have distinguished these problems as a separate field have done right, in our view.

It is necessary to give profound thought to questions of an improvement in the structure of the press in order that it most fully correspond to the needs of perestroika and the requirements of people of all nationalities.

Book publishing demands more palpable positive changes. There are many difficulties here. They are connected mainly with the absence of a sufficient quantity of paper, the unprofitability of a substantial portion of the publications, and the weakness of the printing

facilities and also of personnel support for the publication of books and journals in the national languages. The Ukrainian SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and Book Trade (Comrade Yu.P. Dyachenko) should tackle these questions more vigorously and find both the resources and the executives. The opportunities exist. Participants in the plenum, particularly, have had a chance to see this for themselves, having familiarized themselves with the exhibition in the foyer.

Practical work on the implementation of nationality policy is impossible, of course, without an in-depth scientific comprehension of the processes occurring in the field of inter-ethnic relations. At the same time, on the other hand, the republic's social scientists frequently prefer simply to comment and analyze inadequately the phenomena and events of social life and do not always opportunely discover current contradictions and propose ways of solving them.

The coordinating role of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences (Comrade I.I. Lukinov) in the development of research is manifestly inadequate. Resources allocated for the study of problems of interethnic relations are scattered around various institutes. The creation of a center for the study of inter-ethnic problems is dragging on. Sociological research is being conducted unsatisfactorily.

The development of the theory and study and collation of the practice of interethnic relations require new approaches. Special new courses could be introduced in the VUZ's [higher educational institutions] and theory of interethnic relations departments created in the leading universities. But there is a lack of initiative from below here, as they say.

A fundamental renewal of the system of international and patriotic education, particularly of the youth, is required. The solution of this problem will depend primarily on the teacher-training personnel and teachers. The young people should know the history of the peoples of our multinational socialist family.

It is important to impart modern forms and suffuse with new content propaganda of the advantages of the federative arrangement of the Soviet state. Unfortunately, this work has long been of a particularly for-show nature.

The party organizations are called upon to concern themselves constantly with an increase in the effectiveness of various forms of ideological activity and the training and retraining of personnel. Ideology activists are called upon to persistently master the art of purposive, militant work under the conditions of democracy, glasnost, and pluralism of opinions and the ability to give demagogues and political adventurers a profoundly cogent reply. The party committees must constantly analyze the political situation and promptly formulate means for countering political extremism and nationalist

manifestations. This applies primarily to the Lvov, Ternopol, Donetsk, and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblasts and the city of Kiev.

Our plenum should speak with all candor about the orgy of manifestly nationalist elements in Lvov, which has yet to be duly rebuffed by the party organizations and soviet and law enforcement authorities. Events are taking a dangerous turn. Wide-ranging nationalist propaganda has been initiated. Strong psychological pressure is being exerted on the masses.

It has to be seen that attempts are being made in the nationalist intoxication to whitewash the antipopular activity of the Central Rada and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists- Ukrainian Insurgent Army and portray the Ukrainian people's complex past in a distorted form. The notorious "Zluki Act" of the Petlyura Directory and the Western Ukraine People's Republic in 1919 is being presented as the reunification of the Ukrainian nation. But it is common knowledge that the aspiration of people on both banks of the Zbruch to unification was actually realized only in September 1939. This event has become a part of our life forever. For the first time the Ukrainian nation was united within the bounds of socialist statehood as an equal component of the Soviet federation. The way was opened to the working people of Western Ukraine to liberation from social and national oppression.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee resolution in connection with the 50th anniversary of the reunification contains fundamental, objective party evaluations. And we should be guided by them in all work in connection with celebration of the anniversary.

At the same time, however, comrades, I would like to emphasize that the ideology and practice of nationalism are not obtaining the support of the working class, the peasantry, and the judicious part of the intelligentsia. The working people are demanding a high-minded political appraisal of the manifestations of bourgeois nationalism. They rightly believe that this would improve interethnic relations. And this appraisal is unambiguous. Nationalism in any form is incompatible with the people's interests and leads to national discord and its most dangerous manifestations, up to and including bloody confrontation. Such a disaster is still remembered by many people.

A few words about national symbols. Some independent formations have recently been attempting by power methods to foist the yellow and blue flag and trident on the Ukrainian people as national symbols. The Central Committee is receiving numerous letters from people demanding an emphatic end to these attempts since they are aimed at fanning interethnic friction and are a desecration of the memory of those killed and tortured at the hands of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists.

I believe it is necessary in our republic legislation to precisely determine the procedure of the use of state and national symbols and with unfailing regard for public opinion.

The party platform poses anew the question of the role of religion in public life. Society has become more tolerant of religion. Believers actively support the restructuring processes. We appreciate their contribution to the cause of the strengthening of peace and charitable activity.

The supporters of various religious beliefs live in the Ukraine: Orthodox, Catholics, Jews, and others. The believers themselves must decide what kind of church they need and to what religious school to belong. However, we cannot fail to note a stimulation of the actions of religious extremists. They are sowing religious intolerance, fanning national enmity, and provoking clashes between people of different religious beliefs. We cannot permit religion to become a cause of national passions and to impede people's friendship and fraternity.

Thus the solution of the multifaceted problems of the development of the spiritual sphere, the preservation of national traditions, and the enhancement of the culture of interethnic communication demand a new approach, new thinking, and daily specific work.

Accelerating the Accomplishment of Socioeconomic Tasks and Extending the Economic Reform

Comrades!

A most important area in the work on preparing for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 28th Ukrainian CP Congress should undoubtedly be the accomplishment of urgent socioeconomic tasks. A strengthening of the economy, an improvement on this basis of Soviet people's well-being, the solution of environmental problems—these are a substantial indication of the recovery of our society. They are also an essential prerequisite for an enhancement of the party's authority and its establishment as the real vanguard force of the people.

If we analyze the work on restructuring in this decisive sphere, mention should be made primarily of the structural changes in the economy in favor of satisfaction of man's social requirements. The proportion of the consumption fund in national income has increased. The preferential development of the production of consumer goods has been mapped out. Some R1.6 billion thereof over and above the plan were manufactured in 3 years of the 5-year plan. Some R4.5 billion more of state resources than envisaged were used for the construction of housing, schools, hospitals, and other social establishments in this period. The targets pertaining to most important qualitative indicators are being met: productivity, resource-saving, and so forth.

In the current 5-year plan average annual purchases of grain have increased 27 percent; sunflower, 20 percent; meat, 17 percent; and milk, 21 percent. The cereals' yield (excluding corn) rose more than one-third in 1989.

However, according to preliminary data of the Ukrainian SSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the

republic will not enter 1990 abreast of the 5-year plan targets for growth rate of national income and industrial and agricultural products.

The 5-year plan targets for power generation, coal production, and the manufacture of rolled ferrous metals, mineral fertilizer, and certain mechanical engineering and light industry products, farm products, and some other types of products are not being secured.

Unfortunately this year, when almost all collectives are working under the new management conditions, things in certain sectors have even deteriorated.

Objectively, all this is the result of the fact that the economic levers and incentives of the economic reform have not yet begun to work properly. In repeating this truth we have sometimes begun to gloss over the fact that the reform is being introduced, unfortunately, against the background of negative phenomena which could reduce to nothing the influence of the most consummate economic and financial mechanisms.

The point being that we are too often also encountering an absence of high responsibility, the inadequate professional training of personnel, an inability to work with people and find ways of developing work force initiative, and sometimes simply poor work and everyday lack of dispatch.

No reform can dispense with the most important prerequisite of the development of any society—persevering, painstaking, high-quality labor. This needs to be recalled once again, bearing in mind the extremely unsatisfactory results of our work this September. Specifically, only a 1-percent increase in the amount of industrial production in the month—this is a clear sign of stagnation. And in six oblasts (Volyna, Voroshilovgrad, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporozhye, and Nikolayev) the manufacture of industrial output in September not only did not increase, but even diminished appreciably.

People's exactingness and their unwillingness to put up any longer with the existing shortcomings have increased—all this constitutes our political and social reality. And it will not change and life will not turn back to past times, as some people might possibly wish.

For this reason our most important task today is putting an end to the effect of negative factors in the economy and sharply raising the level of management and responsibility and state, financial, production, and labor discipline. Everything necessary for this had been done, it might have seemed. Programs of the practical accomplishment of the 5-year and annual plans had been formulated. But when it is a question of their fulfillment and actual results, there is nothing special to boast of here. It is this which exasperates people most and creates social tension. Although many could be asked: are you content with yourselves and your work and its results?

Therefore let us once again together address the facts of our day-to-day life.

Let us take the food problem. There are programs on this question both in the republic and in the oblasts. But people are seeing no real results since there are altogether none anywhere, unfortunately.

A few figures. Compared with last year the production of meat in the republic from state resources declined by 13,100 tons; of animal oil, by 2,300 tons. The production of meat here declined in 15 oblasts, and of animal oil, in 13 oblasts.

What now? What needs to be done first of all?

The first and most important thing is immediately putting a stop to the losses and spoilage of the products in the field, at the warehouses, or in transportation. And the potential here is tremendous. According to figures of agrarian economists, more than R5 billion of agricultural products are lost annually.

But is it only today that we are learning about this? It has for several years been a question of the inadequacy of the physical plant for the processing and storage of products. A number of specific documents have been adopted on the retooling of enterprises of the manufacturing and food industry. Considerable resources have been allocated for all this both previously and in the current 5-year plan. Nonetheless, they have regularly not been assimilated. In addition, supplies of engineering equipment have diminished 16 percent compared with 1985. The defense enterprises switched to the manufacture of equipment for the food sectors are assimilating it extremely slowly.

And were some sizable resources or some special directives "from the top" necessary for the proper organization of the harvesting and procurement of the quite good harvest of vegetables, fruit, and melon crops cultivated this year?

It should become an inviolable rule for all executives, including those of the republic's Gosagroprom [State Agro-Industrial Committee], oblispolkom chairmen, and, yes, oblast party committee [obkom] secretaries also: If you have been unable to organize the work, tell the public candidly who is to blame for this and what is being done to improve matters. There is no other way today; people are demanding specific responsibility for a specific area.

The position of the Central Committee Politburo is that those who are working irresponsibly may no longer remain executives. This applies primarily to the communists holding leading office. I am sure the Central Committee plenum will support us.

Unless we now all together take the path of the exposure and holding accountable of people actually to blame for this shortcoming or the other, we will not progress. A few examples of literally recent days. Everyone certainly read in PRAVDA how a brand-new railcar was loaded with rubble and dispatched to a Kharkov plant. It stood waiting to be unloaded for more than 2 months. And you

know what kind of strain there is currently in rail transport. Were some people to blame here? I believe that we cannot have such people in our party. Yesterday Grigoriy Ivanovich Revenko described how they had recently "found" a container with school exercise books, which had, it turned out, been waiting to be unloaded for more than 3 months.

And practice provides us daily with as many such examples as we could wish. In addition, it has become fashionable to shift responsibility onto someone else—the center, which, you see, failed to give timely instructions—and onto others, while such outrages are being perpetrated close at hand. We must bring order and discipline to bear here. This will not in the least contradict the principles of democratization, incidentally.

To speak of a further increase in the amount of the production of agricultural products, the paths of this work have been determined with us. But the situation in the countryside is so complex today that we need to accelerate appreciably the measures pertaining to its social restructuring and perfection of production and economic relations. The "ultimatum" of the rural workers of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast's Pavlogradskiy Rayon, which was reported recently in PRAVDA, is understandable from these standpoints. Of course, we are not supporters of ultimatums, but everyone must draw the correct conclusions.

People are waiting impatiently for changes for the better to occur in the provision of the trade network with the necessary nonfood commodities. An analysis shows that repeated manifestations of group egotism and dependency are having a negative effect on consumer goods production. In their plans for the current year the associations and enterprises have provided for a volume of the production of goods R1.3 billion less than handed down by the state order, although one out of every 10 enterprises is failing to cope with the adopted plans.

The party committees and local soviet ispolkoms should examine immediately what can be done by the end of the year to compensate for the lag.

We do not as yet have a clear prospect for next year either. The state order has not been accommodated to the extent of R4.4 billion, including R3.2 billion of nonfood commodities. The most difficult situation is at enterprises of the Ministry of Light Industry in Donetsk, Lvov, Kharkov, and Odessa Oblasts.

The population of the republic today has cash in hand, the sum total of which is 1.3 times in excess of the annual amount of retail commodity turnover, and 6.4 times in excess of commodity stocks in trade. Unsatisfied demand for foodstuffs, clothing, footwear, and other commodities is put at no less than R14 billion.

The sole path here is to go to the work force and the primary party organizations, set about things all together, as they say, and take on the work oneself. Whoever wants does not complain but gets on with the

work. And one does not have to go far for experience. It is here in Kiev, in Lvov, in Kharkov. If this is not suitable, take something else, but everyone, without any exceptions and references to some "objective" factors, must produce as many consumer commodities as possible. It is this which must become the assessment of the efforts and yardstick of the maturity of the party committees and the depth of their political approach to a solution of life's most acute problems.

People are fed up with increasingly new shortages. Where do they come from?

Let us take, for example, the present speculation surrounding soap and detergents. Can such a phenomenon be considered a surprise? I believe not. After all, a similar situation had taken shape in respect of precisely these commodities back in 1981. The Council of Ministers intended at that time, in accordance with Central Committee instructions, increasing capacity for the production of household soap production by 9,100 tons, and of toilet soap, by 35,500 tons. But owing to the lack of responsibility of the executants and the lack of supervision of this matter on the part of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the assignment was thwarted. The production of household soap, on the contrary, in 1988 declined compared with the 1980 level by 14,000 tons, and of toilet soap, by 2,800 tons.

This year the republic government has been implementing certain measures in "firewagon style" to rectify the situation. But how long might this last? And are not meanwhile new shortages ripening somewhere? How are they to be avoided? An answer to these questions should be given by the Gosplan (Comrades V.P. Popov and D.Ya. Kozenyashev), the Gosagroprom (Comrades A.N. Tkachenko and N.F. Kulinich), the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Comrade A.K. Minchenko), and the Ministry of Trade (Comrade A.S. Statikov), for we will no longer put up with this situation.

Life demands a more assertive position from the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and our law enforcement authorities. Who, for example, is preventing them conducting an effective struggle against profiteering and the overbidding cooperatives? If legislative instruments are needed for this, consult with the people and the deputies and enact them. People will only support this.

Acting and acting assertively—this is what is an extreme necessity today! This applies in full to the republic Council of Ministers and the executives of republic departments and the oblispolkoms.

The state of affairs in capital construction is causing great concern. We have never had such letdowns as this year. It is primarily a question of the construction of accommodation and social facilities. In the 9 months the annual quota for the installation of state apartment houses was fulfilled only 53 percent. This was, besides, 500,000 square meters less than the past year. The plans for the introduction of schools, hospitals, clinics, and

children's establishments are in jeopardy. It is necessary in Kharkov and Donetsk oblasts, for example, to hand over in the fourth quarter approximately half the annual plan for apartment houses, all hospitals, almost two-thirds of the clinics and children's establishments, and many schools. Nothing can excuse this. References to a lack of resources here are without foundation. Some R1.2 billion of construction and installation work has been performed in both oblasts. The proportion of social facilities here constitutes less than one-third. So the cement, timber, metal, and other material resources would have been perfectly sufficient provided they had been funneled primarily into social construction. It would seem that the oblispolkoms and Comrades A.S. Maselskiy and Yu.K. Smirov personally have let this matter drift. It is also being dealt with unsatisfactorily by the obkoms (Comrades V.P. Mysnichenko and A.Ya. Vinnik). Nor is the situation much better in Odessa, Crimea, Dnepropetrovsk, and certain other oblasts.

One has the impression that the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Construction Board and Comrade Minister V.P. Salo personally have ceased to control the production process, at least in the sphere of social construction. The ministry is fulfilling the program of contract work, but in realization of the social part thereof constituting less than half the total amount (44 percent)—complete letdown!

We do not have the right to thwart fulfillment of the republic "Housing 2000" program. For this reason we need in practice to abruptly reorient the work of the ministry's production and managerial components toward the accomplishment of priority social tasks. This also applies to the oblispolkoms, whom people hold accountable in the first instance.

There are also many complaints on the part of the public about the unsatisfactory work of housing and municipal services, the low quality of housing repairs, and the slow changes for the better in medical services, the trade and consumer service sphere, and other fields directly connected with people's life.

Without now going into details on all these problems—they need to be discussed separately—it should be emphasized that concern for decisive change in these sectors should be an organic part of the pregress work of all party organizations of the republic without exception.

Comrades!

A prominent place in the solution of the existing economic and social problems is occupied by the republic's transition to economic independence and economic accountability. This is not a simple issue. After all, we need to create a qualitatively new mechanism of control at all levels of management which makes it possible to overcome the negative tendencies as quickly as possible and reorient the republic's economy toward maximum satisfaction of man's requirements. It is essential here to make full use of the possibilities of the country's single national economic complex created in the years of Soviet power.

The Central Committee Politburo considers it essential to emphasize that we reject any idea of autarky. There is no need to prove that this would entail disastrous consequences, would be an impediment in the way of progress, and would disrupt the organic interrepublic economic relations which have taken shape over decades. Their content and nature have frequently been distorted, it is true.

The Ukrainian SSR truly exports to the union republics more than it imports of coal, iron ore, rolled ferrous metals, cement, tractors, individual chemical products, metal-cutting machine tools, chemical equipment, freight cars, diesel locomotives, agricultural equipment, and certain types of rural products. But, after all, we receive from other republics what we lack or of what we have an insufficiency—oil and natural gas, nonferrous metals, lumber, synthetic rubber, mineral fertilizers, grain- and potato-harvesting combines, cotton, cloth, home appliances, and so forth.

Undoubtedly the republic, as a sovereign state which is part of the USSR on the basis of the principles of socialist federalism, must operate independently and work so as to not only maintain itself, so to speak, but also effect expanded reproduction for the good of all Soviet people.

We fully share the opinion that we must not under the pressure of current difficulties go astray in the formulation of fundamental economic decisions for the future. What we need are not abstract projects in economics and not clamorous slogans, but an economic concept which has been elaborated in detail. Unfortunately, very dubious ideas, which may be categorized merely as a kind of "economic romanticism" bordering on political recklessness, are currently being expressed on the part of the representatives of some amateur structures.

In examining problems of republic economic accountability, the industrial and soviet authorities should proceed from the fundamental proposition concerning the organic connection of the economic independence of the region with the enterprises' full economic accountability. It needs to be clearly recognized that genuine economic independence cannot be secured without the accomplishment of this cardinal task. Very little has as yet been done in this area, unfortunately.

Economic accountability presupposes, as is known, the self-repayment, profitability, and self-financing of each production and territorial unit and the entire economic complex. However, it is known that in the current year and in the draft for 1990 a republic budget deficit of R1.8 billion is envisaged. Yet many collectives, taking advantage of the right to determine plans independently, are adopting them in clearly understated amounts. For this reason the budget will experience a shortfall this year from industrial collective profits alone of almost R300 million. Here is "self-repayment" for you.

The question of a reduction in unprofitability remains serious. In the first 6 months 168 industrial enterprises

had losses of R20 million. However, a number of leaders of ministries and departments, primarily the Ministry of Transport (Comrade P.P. Volkov), the Ministry of Housing and Municipal Services (Comrade V.D. Ploshchenko), and the Gosagroprom (Comrade V.P. Sitnik), where there are more of these enterprises than elsewhere, are not even planning to eliminate unprofitability by the end of the 5-year plan.

Although the paths here are well known—the lease and the contract, which are being actively employed by the Lvov “Konveyer” Association, the Dnepropetrovsk Pipe-Rolling Plant imeni V.I. Lenin, and many enterprises of other sectors. [sentence as published] For this reason we need to orient the work force toward the introduction of this experience and a search for new forms and methods of work. These questions are changing increasingly from purely economic to social and political questions.

The draft general principles of the Ukrainian SSR's economic independence were published recently. They still need, of course, to be specified and completed with regard for the proposals and observations being received in the course of discussion thereof. This work should not be allowed to drag on, of course, but there should be no undue haste in such a complex and crucial business. It is necessary to weigh up each factor and each direction of development and foresee the possible social and economic consequences of the decisions. After all, fundamentally new economic principles of the organization of our life are being created.

Nonetheless, I would like to emphasize once again that the accomplishment of long-term tasks is organically connected with how we work today. In the 9 months the increase in industrial production constituted only 2.9 percent compared with 3.4 percent in the 6 months and 3.6 percent as planned for the year. The deterioration in the work of many enterprises and the slackening of contract discipline have led to an increase in the amount of the product supply shortfall. In the third quarter it increased by R800 million and is in excess of R1.3 billion.

It is no secret that the mass meetings and strikes have had a negative influence on the reduction in the amount and the efficiency of production. Great arrears in coal production have built up on account of this. Some 3.3 million tons thereof less than planned have been obtained in the last 3 months. This has had serious repercussions in the work of other sectors, ferrous metallurgy, primarily. The arrears here constitute almost 280,000 tons of finished rolled metal and 28,000 tons of steel pipes. There has been a large shortfall in the supply of metal to the mechanical engineers and construction organizations. In the summer, in September particularly, there was a considerable deterioration in the operation of railroad transport. Of course, the strikes mounted both in our republic and in other regions of the country were reflected negatively here also. In addition, from

1,000 to 1,500 cars, which, of course, are out of circulation, stand idle and unloaded daily on enterprise and organization and freight station access tracks. All this has led to much unshipped coal, iron ore, mineral fertilizer, and other commodities having built up now at the industrial enterprises. We need to immediately bring order to bear on the railroads, particularly at the border stations and also in Odessa, Kiev, and Donetsk.

I wish to emphasize once again that if decisive measures are not adopted, the annual plan will be thwarted. The state of affairs demands effective intervention on the part of the obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms. These matters must be studied far more and in greater depth by V.D. Gladush, deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers and member of the CPSU, who has been entrusted with personal responsibility for the work of the lead sectors.

Mention has to be made today also of the progress of work associated with the elimination of the environmental and social consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station [AES]. As is known, approximately R4 billion have been spent on this already. However, the radiation situation in a number of areas of the republic remains very complicated.

The union and republic authorities are receiving many letters and complaints from the inhabitants of the said areas reporting an increase in sickness, particularly among children, unsatisfactory provision with “clean” food products, and the slow solution of a number of social, everyday, and production questions. People's anxiety is entirely justified. Many problems connected with the Chernobyl disaster need to be tackled more energetically by everyone—the republic Supreme Soviet and government and the Central Committee.

The elaboration of a special republic comprehensive program on this matter is currently being completed in the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers. The Ukrainian CP Central Committee Politburo deems a priority task the need to speed up the resettlement of people from the most dangerous zones of Zhitomir and Kiev Oblasts, which should be completed by the end of next year. In accordance with the proposal of the government commission, a Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers' decree is being prepared which provides for the establishment of a number of supplementary benefits and an increase in the monetary payments and compensation to all evacuees and persons living in the affected localities.

It is necessary to notify people of all these measures and, what is most important, implement them as rapidly as possible. The Central Committee and the republic Council of Ministers will persistently seek the resources and opportunities for this and strictly monitor the actions of the pertinent authorities and their leaders.

I would like to say also that we will continue to defend the position of the impermissibility of the commissioning of the Crimea AES. We find incomprehensible

the attempts of certain union departments to find any justification, even with the aid of foreign specialists, for "saving" this facility in a seismic zone.

As a whole, considerably more scrupulousness needs to be displayed on environmental matters by the leaders of republic ministries, departments, oblispolkoms, enterprises, and organizations and the Nature Protection Committee. Nature conservation is not only a national, but an international problem of tremendous importance.

The principles of economic independence which are being spoken about today make it possible to tackle these questions more comprehensively and efficiently. However, we need to do everything through the enhancement of the role of the local soviets to tie together more rationally and fully the interests of the country, the republic, and the regions in the use of labor, natural, and other resources. It is this that should be the basis of economic independence.

Comrades!

Summing up all that has been said about the party organizations' tasks pertaining to fulfillment of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee September Plenum, it has to be emphasized that the period of preparation for the congress will be one primarily of profound comprehension of the experience of work under the new conditions, of the experience of perestroika.

There is less than a year to the congress. Little time, as we can see. It is therefore necessary to once again self-critically evaluate the fruitfulness of the fulfillment of our decisions and plans.

It would obviously be useful to conduct a kind of survey of practical work. To check how the instructions of plenums, the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat, and the Council of Ministers have been fulfilled. And at all levels. This will make it possible to specifically ascertain who is guilty of the breakdowns which have occurred and what should be done to rectify the situation and achieve specific substantial results in a renewal of all spheres of social life.

Such an approach will enable us to pick up the right tempo in work, reach the charted frontiers and justify the hopes which the people place in the party.

Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Official on Election Preparations

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[Interview with N.G. Khomenko, secretary, Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, by RATAU correspondent: "With the Widest Possible Participation by the Masses"]

[Text] On 4 March 1989 elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies, as well as deputies to the local soviets, will be held. This extremely important event in our

republic's sociopolitical life marks the second phase in the reforms of the political system. What kinds of fundamental innovations are contained in the new election laws? How are the preparations for the elections coming along? These and other questions were addressed by a RATAU correspondent to N.G. Khomenko, secretary of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

[N.G. Khomenko] Elections to the Ukrainian SSR's highest organ of state power and to this republic's local soviets of people's deputies, as well as the entire pre-election campaign, are now being carried out on a fundamentally new legal basis. The laws on changes and additions to the Ukrainian SSR Constitution concerning the elections of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies and deputies to the local soviets, as adopted at the 10th Session of the Supreme Soviet, have become the foundation upon which the mechanism of our republic's political system will be developed and improved, the principles of a socialist state of law implemented, and the genuine rebirth of the soviets as the people's fully empowered representative organs carried out.

The new election laws ensure the conduct of the elections and all pre-election measures on a truly democratic basis, with the widest possible participation of the population, openly and in the spirit of glasnost. These laws guarantee the complete sovereignty of every voter to exercise his own constitutional rights, to specify that deputy who, in the voter's opinion, will best represent and protect their interests.

At present our republic as a whole is witnessing wide-scale, painstaking, and well-grounded work whose results will enable us to form 25 oblast, 469 rayon, 434 city, 120 municipal-district, 820 settlement, and 8,995 village soviets of people's deputies—complete masters on their own territories.

In accordance with the new legislation, the quantitative composition of the deputies is being considerably reduced. The body of deputies at all levels throughout this republic will amount to approximately 308,000 elected officials, which is slightly more than 200,000 less than in the presently existing convocation. But such a "reduction" need not be conducive to harmful results. On the contrary, it creates the prerequisites for upgrading the businesslike qualities of the soviets' sessions; it will allow each official elected by the people to fully exercise his powers, function actively at the sessions and the meetings of the permanent commissions, as well as to carry out other duties pertinent to a deputy.

During the time which has elapsed since the publication on 1 November 1989 of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet's decree on scheduling elections a significant number of pre-election measures have been carried out; more and more working people have been involved in organizing the preparation and conduct of this extremely important political campaign. The first session of the Central Election Commission for the Election of Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies has been held. In contrast to

the previous elections, for each election okrug—and, in accordance with the Ukrainian SSR Constitution, there are 450 of them—not only the okrug centers and borders but also the number of voters have been specified.

More than 299,000 okrugs for electing deputies to the local soviets have been established on this republic's territory. Information about them has been brought to the voters' attention via the local press and other media. Elections of deputies to almost 500 settlement and village soviets will be held by multi-seat elections okrugs, i.e., voting will be conducted in accordance with an integrated election ballot.

At the sessions or meetings of the soviets' executive committees 10,863 territorial election commissions have been created in accordance with the principle of competitiveness. The formation of okrug-level election commissions is nearing completion. A great deal of work must likewise be carried out with regard to establishing election districts and district-level election commissions, as well as creating the necessary conditions for them to exercise the powers entrusted to them. It should be noted that it is precisely here, in the meetings for the purpose of nominating representatives to the election commissions, that the foundations of competitiveness and pluralism of opinions are being laid, that the best-prepared voters are being chosen, voters who will carry out the organization of the elections and monitor the implementation of the Law on Elections of Deputies to the local soviets.

The date 3 December 1989 will mark the beginning, and 3 January 1990—the end, of one of the most important stages of the election campaign: the nomination of candidates for the office of deputy. After this, the election commissions will begin to register them.

Nomination of candidates for the office of deputy, like all preceding measures, in accordance with the new legislation, will be carried out on the principles of a broad-based democracy, glasnost, and will be monitored by the public. The right to nominate their own candidates has been granted by law to all work collectives, public organizations, meetings of voters and their places of residence, collectives at educational institutions, and military service personnel at their military units. Moreover, labor collectives and collectives of educational institutions which have more than 200 employees have been accorded the right to independently nominate at their meetings (or conferences) their own candidates for the office of Ukrainian SSR people's deputies. Collectives which have a lesser number of employees can assemble together and at their combined meeting can nominate their own candidate. With the same number of participants meetings are to be held by collectives at vocational-technical, special-secondary, and higher educational institutions, as well as by voters at their places of residence. And another important principle has been reinforced: from every one labor collective and from every one meeting—there shall be one candidate for the office of Ukrainian SSR people's deputy.

Nomination of candidates for the office of deputy to a local soviet may be carried out at general meetings of work collectives, as well as at meetings at shops, farmsteads, sections, and other production-type subdivisions. The laws provide the procedure for nominating candidates for the office of deputy, whereas the procedure for voting—secret or open—shall be determined at the meetings themselves. But is is a mandatory requirement that the meeting participants be registered by name and that there be a name-by-name account of those who shall have participated in the voting. At the meetings conditions shall be created for the nomination of an unlimited number of candidates. Every participant in the meeting shall have the right to make suggestions concerning candidates for the office of deputy, suggestions concerning their removal from consideration, and to put forth his own name for discussion as a candidate for the office of deputy.

The process of registering candidates for the office of people's deputy has also been simplified. Now no other measures are provided for aside from meetings or sessions of the organs of a public organization for the purpose of nominating a candidate for the office of deputy. The okrug-level election commission must register a candidate upon the availability of the appropriately filled-out document and a statement that the person nominated gives his consent to run for the office of deputy.

As you know, during the discussion of the draft laws many voters came out against a possible interference by the election commissions in a candidate's program and in the contents of his pre-election struggle. They spoke about the need for a clear-cut constitutional protection of the honor and dignity of a candidate for the office of people's deputy. All these and other remarks and proposals along such lines have been fully taken into account. In particular, all that has been recognized is that a candidate's program ought not contain positions of an anti-legal nature. But if such instances do take place, then the examination of this matter shall be referred to the competence of the appropriate territorial commission with the court's conclusion made available. Provision has also been made concerning the responsibility of those persons who disseminate patently unjust information about a candidate for the office of people's deputy.

Voters favorably met the decision by the session of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet regarding the statute in the law to the effect that at least two candidacies must be presented for registration of candidates for the office of Ukrainian SSR people's deputy. That is to say, a genuine competition between candidates must be guaranteed.

The law has provided equal rights for each candidate of a particular election okrug in conducting a pre-election struggle, equal possibilities for campaigning, for appearing and speaking out on television and radio, as well as in the pages of newspapers and journals. Candidates for the office of deputy, upon their request must be granted by economic, public, and state organizations

with rooms, and suitable conditions must be created for conducting pre-election assemblies, meetings with voters, etc.

As regards meetings between candidates for the office of deputy and voters, which shall be extended to 3 March, it is important here that consideration be accorded to examining the instructions given, as well as the remarks and suggestions made.

From among the upcoming actions in the election campaign, we must single out the fact that by 16 February the voters' lists must be presented for general familiarization; and by this deadline the election commissions are to provide the people with election ballots.

The necessity for this innovation was brought about by the fact that election districts are now located in places where citizens are staying temporarily: sanatoriums and rest homes, long-distance trains. No provisions have been made for issuing certificates for voting if the voter will be outside the bounds of his permanent place of residence on Election Day. Instead of this, provision has been made for such a citizen to have the opportunity of voting 15 days or less prior to the elections. His ballot, sealed in an enveloped and dropped into the ballot box, will be taken into account when the votes are tallied on Election Day.

Our present, pre-election campaign also has many other important, new provisions aimed at ensuring democratic principles and the competitive nature of the elections for the office of people's deputy at all levels of soviets. The duty of the election commissions—ranging from the Central Commission for the Elections of the Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies to sectional commissions—is to ensure the organization, preparation, and conduct of the elections in complete accordance with the Ukrainian SSR Constitution and the election laws. These elections are supposed to form soviets which would become genuine masters on their territory; they will have the duty of elevating to a new level all the processes of perestroika in our republic, subordinating their own energy and creative activity to the benefit of human beings, their everyday interests and concerns.

Uzbek SSR CP Issues Pre-Election Party Platform
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[Uzbek SSR CP Pre-Election Party Platform: "Basic Directions of the Nationality, Socio-Economic, and Spiritual Development of the Uzbek SSR, and the Increase of the Prosperity of the Workers"]

[Text] **Basic Directions of the Nationality, Socio-Economic, and Spiritual Development of the Uzbek SSR, and the Increase of the Prosperity of the People. Platform of the Uzbek CP for the Election of People's Deputies of the Uzbek SSR and to the Local Soviets**

On 18 February 1990, the elections of people's deputies of the Uzbek SSR and to the local Soviets will take place. They signify the second stage of the political reform, and in many respects the further development of the republic, every oblast, city, and rayon, and the increase of the prosperity of the people will depend on their results.

The pre-election campaign is developing and will now be held in a difficult situation. The critical, decisive, and therefore the most difficult stage of restructuring has begun. Revolutionary transformations are entering the deepest strata of life and are affecting the fundamental interests of the workers.

Capital repair in our large all-union house does not come easily. Forces have appeared which, in aspiring to force their way to power, are speculating on the difficulties of the transition period and are trying to drive a wedge between the party and the people, to destroy the unity of our multinational state. They are deliberately forcing the situation and are undermining discipline and order. It is impossible to allow this. Only through joint labor can we improve the life of all and everyone.

In preparing for the elections, the Uzbek Communist Party considers it necessary to come out with a developed platform, to set before the workers its positions in regard to the main, principal questions of the national-state, socio-economic and spiritual development of the republic.

I.

The Uzbek Communist Party declares its unshakeable loyalty to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the cause of socialist construction, the principles of internationalism, and the friendship and fraternity of all nations and nationalities. It entirely supports the policy of the party aimed at the revolutionary restructuring and renewal of our society.

Expressing the fundamental interests of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, and the intelligentsia, the aspirations and expectations of the Uzbek people and the representatives of all the nations and nationalities living in the republic, the Uzbek Communist Party consistently advocates the strengthening of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of the sovereignty and economic independence of every republic within the framework of a single national-economic complex of the country.

The production and scientific-technical potential, the land, its wealth, the water, and other natural resources located in the territory of the republic are the property of the Uzbek SSR. It uses them independently first of all in the interests of its own people, as well as the peoples of the USSR.

The Uzbek Communist Party firmly defends the ideological and organizational unity of the party. Only the united party, armed with the scientific theory of

socialism and a developed platform of perestroika, uniting in its ranks the best representatives of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia, of all nations and nationalities, can unite all the forces for the struggle for the solution of the present problems, the revolutionary renewal of society.

The Uzbek Communist Party advocates the expansion of the rights and the independence of the local party organizations, which, on the basis of the Program and the Statute of the CPSU determine their political actions. Proceeding from the general party policy, they conduct their work with regard for nationality and regional peculiarities and needs.

In developing the restructuring, the Communist Party considers it necessary to restore the complete historical truth about the past and the present of the republic, not allowing either the slandering or the coloring of the truth.

The path of national and social liberation, the formation of socialist statehood, and the development of productive forces and culture traversed by the Uzbek people has not been simple and smooth.

In its course an industrial production base has been created, the sphere of land and water use has been expanded many times over, important steps have been taken in the matter of the development of culture, public education, science, and health care. Together with the entire country, Uzbekistan fully shared the burden of the Great Patriotic War, gave refuge to hundreds of thousands of refugees and orphans, shared land and shelter with the peoples unjustly exiled from their native places. In the republic a multinational composition of the population has historically developed, the unity of production and public activity, the relations of mutual respect and good neighbor relations have become established.

At the same time, the republic, as the entire country, has experienced the serious consequences of the distortions and deformations of the Leninist plan for the building of socialism and the violations of socialist legality.

In many respects, the state sovereignty of the republic remained formal, its independence in the solution of its most important problems was limited. The departmental approach of the central organs led to the lop-sided, basically raw material-oriented development of the economy, to significant distortions in the structure and distribution of productive forces, and to the lagging behind of the social sphere. The problems of ecology and the employment of the population became aggravated.

In terms of national income, per capita income, and the level of life support of the people, the republic lagged behind the average union indicators. The pursuit of gross output in cotton-growing did great damage to the vital interests of the entire population, especially of the peasants. It led to the single-crop system of the cotton plant, infringements of scientifically-based systems of agriculture, and the displacement of forage and food crops.

The negative influence of these factors is experienced by the entire population of the republic and the workers of all nationalities.

Quite recently the frequently indiscriminate, not always valid approaches to the so-called "cotton cases", serious errors in the selection and training of nationality cadres, in the assessment of historical and cultural values, and in the treatment of popular customs and traditions had a negative effect.

The Uzbek Communist Party full acknowledges its responsibility for allowed defects and distortions. Expanding the preparation for the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress, it is exacting and critical in analyzing its work and searches for ways of strengthening it. Above all, the task is set of intensifying restructuring in the party organizations and committees themselves, on the basis of the principles of democracy and glasnost, the increase of discipline and responsibility of cadres. Today only those officials have the right to lead who enjoy the confidence and respect of the people and live for the life and the interests of the people and every single individual. On this depends the success of perestroika and the authority of the party itself.

The fundamental party line consists in make the transition from the discussions and fault-finding of the past and empty promises to concrete practical deeds, the results of which must show up in every labor collective and every family. The political and socio-economic situation is now such that it is impossible to further rock the boat, in which all of us are sitting, but it is necessary to give it the correct course and the necessary acceleration. Only firm discipline, order, and responsibility will help us to solve the difficult problems which today are worrying people.

A special role in this belongs to the primary party organizations. The Communist Party will achieve an expansion of their independence and increase of responsibility. They must make themselves heard with a full voice in every labor collective. Their work must be authoritative and weighty in the solution of all production and social questions and in the promotion of cadres. Moreover, workers of all ranks must be subjected to increased exactingness in regard to personal modesty, the inadmissibility of illegal privileges and advantages.

Repudiating any exclusiveness or isolation, the Communist Party, all of its organs and organizations act in close cooperation with the Soviet and state organs, trade union, Komsomol and other public organizations. The party declares its willingness to conduct a dialogue with informal associations and movements, but on the condition that they stand on the platform of socialism and internationalism and strictly observe Soviet laws.

The party has never separated itself from the people. However, the deviations from Leninist norms of party life permitted in the past have to a certain extent weakened the relationship of the party committees to the masses. For this reason, the Communist Party considers

as its chief task the strengthening of the link with the workers, the stress on the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the labor forces of society.

To live with the people, to overcome all hardships with the people, to restructure life together, to solve all problems together, to build the present and the future of our society together—this is the political and moral obligation of the 660,000 communists of the republic before its entire population.

Accepting the entire responsibility for the past, the present, and the future of the republic, the Uzbek Communist Party builds its pre-election platform on the following basic directions.

II.

The chief duty of all party committees and organizations is the protection of the interests of the working people, the strengthening of the principles of social justice, and the solution of the questions connected with the satisfaction of the urgent needs of all strata of the population.

The Uzbek Communist Party will in every conceivable way support the initiative and enterprise of workers, kolkhoz workers, the intelligentsia, and all categories of workers, to achieve that every toiler does in fact become the master of production. To this end to promote the mastery of real khozraschet [cost accounting] in all its production links, the expansion of the rights and economic independence of the labor collectives, the expansion of leasing, the contract of peasant farms, and other effective forms of labor organization.

A task of enormous economic, social and political significance is to secure the full and efficient employment of the able-bodied population. In recent years, in spite of the measures being taken, the situation here has not only failed to improve but has even become aggravated. The growth of the able-bodied population is outpacing the introduction of additional jobs.

The Uzbek Communist Party believes that it is necessary to solve the problem of finding employment for the population through the accelerated development of the labor-intensive sectors, the increase of the shift system in the work of the enterprises now in operation, the intensive expansion of the sphere of service, the network of small and medium enterprises, branches, and shops in small towns and rural localities, the development of cooperatives and individual labor activity, the expansion of cottage industry, and other forms of labor organization. To create cooperative multi-profile industrial combines in every rayon center and to secure the restoration and development of folk trades and cottage handicrafts on a modern technical basis.

Not long ago the goal-oriented integrated program "Employment" was adopted and is already being implemented. Already in 1990, about 300,000 people, above all from among young people, will be provided with work and stable wages. And in the forthcoming five-year it is

envisaged to involve up to half a million people in public production and in studies. The training of a skilled working class and engineering-technical personnel from the young people of the native nationalities for modern labor-intensive and science-intensive manufactures will be conducted at accelerated rates.

The increase of per capita income, the improvement of the material situation, first of all of poor families and citizens, must become the subject of special concern of all party, Soviet, and economic organs of the republic. Today about 9 million people, or 45 percent of all inhabitants of Uzbekistan, have an average per capita income of up to 75 rubles a month, which does not guarantee the subsistence minimum. The Uzbek Communist Party considers it its duty to implement a program of social assistance to the poor strata of the population to raise their standard of living, to approximate it to average republic indicators. Among the projected measures is the construction of houses at the expense of enterprises and farms, the granting of credits at favorable conditions, and provision of building materials and fuel at reduced prices. It is intended to implement a broad system of benefits in the use of housing, municipal services, and pre-school and out-of-school institutions.

Already in 1990, an additional 142 million rubles at the expense of the republic and local budgets and enterprise funds are being directed to strengthen the social protection of the low-income part of the population. This assistance will steadily grow in proportion to the strengthening of the republic's economic independence and financial situation.

Any attempts to increase prices for consumer goods and services, the reduction of production and the erosion of cheap consumer goods, especially for children and the aged.

The goodness, decency and humaneness of a society are determined by its treatment of war and labor veterans, lonely aged citizens and invalids.

At the present time, 3.3 million people are enjoying the services of social security in the republic, and 1.6 billion rubles are directed toward these purposes. The minimum pension scales for more than 1 million people have been increased to 70 rubles a month. A new system is being created which extends services to pensioners at home.

And all the same, the cause of social security is in need of truly national assistance. The party organizations will in every conceivable manner support the humane initiative of the labor collectives of enterprises, organizations and farms in regard to additional pension payments, allowances for mothers with many children at the expense of their own funds, earned in the conditions of khozraschet.

The republic integrated program "Miloserdie" [Charity] is being developed. In the coming year, an additional 7 million rubles will be directed toward

increasing the minimum pension scales, which will make it possible to improve the material situation of 55,000 people. By 1995, it is envisaged to increase, by a factor of almost 2, the number of homes and boarding houses for invalids and the aged, and to increase by as much the network of social assistance departments. There will be a significant increase in the norms of expenditures for nourishment in the homes and boarding houses. Already in the coming year, the needs of the fighters and internationalists, invalids, and families of those who died in Afghanistan for housing and personal plots, sanatorium-resort travel authorizations, prosthetic-orthopedic appliances and specialized motor transport.

One of the special features of the republic is the large number of children of the families. The Uzbek Communist Party considers it its moral duty to protect motherhood and childhood, the creation of all the conditions for the healthy and harmonious development of every child.

Already in the coming year, more than an additional 100 million rubles are being allotted for the organization of free nourishment of students of the first to the fifth grades of general education schools and for the provision of assistance to pregnant women suffering from anemia. Kolkhozes are permitted to provide agricultural products for hospitals and kindergartens at the expense of state purchases.

Along with the accelerated construction of permanent pre-school institutions, it is planned to create, in 1990, kindergartens at home for 100,000 places.

Taking into account the increase of the post-natal leave, as well as the instruction of children in school from age 6, the inclusion by children's institutions by the end of the following five-year plan will exceed 50 percent by the end of the next five-year plan.

The Uzbek Communist Party plans to implement profound transformations of the social character of the village. We are greatly indebted to the peasant. The majority of rural settlements do not have water mains, a sewage system, and natural gas. In many villages there are no schools, pre-school and medical institutions, trade and consumer service facilities.

The solution of these and other urgent social problems in the village is the subject of the special concern of the Uzbek Communist Party. On its initiative, large measures for the provision of all rural inhabitants with land allotments and the increase of their dimensions have been developed and are being realized.

As a result, a number of vitally important social tasks are being solved interdependently: The solution of the Housing Program, the improvement of self-provision of families with food products, the supplementation of markets, and the increase of the employment of the population. And, what is especially important—the provision of social guarantees for the women living in the village. Having assumed the burden of concern for the family and the upbringing of the children, they perform

an enormous state task. However, until recently, a significant part of them was deprived of the right to a pension, assistance in case of illness, etc. Now, having concluded contracts for the delivery of surplus agricultural products, they will enjoy all social benefits.

The task consists in realizing quickly, without red tape, everything that has been outlined. The local Soviets, the kolkhozes, and the sovkhoses are obliged to provide extensive assistance to the rural toilers in loans for the establishment and expansion of subsidiary farming, and the provision of the rural farmsteads with pedigree cattle and poultry. The artificial restrictions on the number of cattle in private farms are being removed. The task is being set to solve the problem of supplying them with concentrated, coarse, and succulent fodder. Measures will be taken to equip the peasant farms with means of small-scale mechanization. The party committees and organizations will exercise strict control over questions of the unconditional observance of social justice in the apportionment of land allotments and the provision of people with loans and building materials for individual construction.

The measures adopted will be conducive to the further development of individual construction in the village. During the next year, plans call for the construction of 5.3 million square meters of housing in rural localities. This is 800,000 square meters, or almost 20 percent more, than in 1988. In the next five-year plan, approximately 35 million square meters of housing will be built in rural localities at the expense of all of the sources. Plans call for the accelerated development of water main, sewage and gas pipeline networks, the organization of rural medical outpatient centers or medical-obstetrical centers, and a sharp increase of the number of trade and consumer service enterprises. Special attention will be given to the supply of the population with high-quality water, first of all the population of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR and Khorezm Oblast, as well as Andizhan, Kashka-Darya, Bukhara and other oblasts. For this, additional funds are being made available, and the output of equipment is being organized in enterprises of the republic.

The future of Uzbekistan depends on the young people, on creating for it the necessary conditions for study, labor, everyday life, and rest. The Central Committee of the Communist Party considers the realization of the republic program for the training of cadres of the working class and engineering-technical personnel of the local nationality as one of its chief goals. It envisages the increase and renewal of the material-technical base of public education. Above all, the task is set to eliminate all 1,132 emergency schools or subject them to capital repairs. In the towns and settlements, this task will be solved in 1992, and in the rural localities—by 1993. The introduction of new schools will increase by a factor of 1.5 a year.

The network of vocational-technical schools primarily of industrial direction is being expanded. On the basis of

direct contracts with the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and Belorussia, several thousand workers from among the young people of the republic will be trained in them annually.

A reform of higher and secondary specialized education is being carried out. There will be an increase and improvement in the training of specialists in the fields of knowledge connected with scientific-technical progress. There will be an expansion of the interaction with the central VUZ's of the country, where more than 3,000 young men and women of the republic are sent every year. Cooperation will be further developed with the VUZ's of the Central Asian republics, in which about 1,500 of our students are studying. This makes it possible to obtain a higher education in the native language of the youth of the Tajik, Turkmen, Kazqakh, and Kirghiz nationalities that live in Uzbekistan.

There will be a significant expansion in the practice of the establishment of nominal stipends and the sending of talented young people for training and a probationary work in the best VUZ's of the country and abroad.

The problems of the students will be solved at accelerated rates. Starting next year, 78,000 students of higher and secondary educational institutions living in private apartments will receive a monthly partial compensation to pay for housing. Analogous measures will also be taken in regard to young specialists—workers in public education, health care, and social security. During the forthcoming five-year plan, the available housing in dormitories of VUZ's and tekhnikums will increase by 220,000 square meters.

Significant funds are being allotted for the equipment of laboratories and dormitories, there will be an expansion of the network of sports bases, and student clubs. Enterprises, organizations and farms are establishing direct links with educational institutions and are providing funds and equipment.

Great significance is being given to the creation of conditions for the formation and strengthening of young families. It is envisaged to repudiate the collection of taxes for childlessness, to expand the benefits in case of the birth of the first and second child, to increase the dimensions of one-time allowances, to assist newly-married couples in the immediate allotment of allotment of apartments and places in family dormitories, and to develop in every conceivable manner housing construction complexes for young people. To practice more extensively long-term credits and loans for young families for the setting up and acquisition of a farm, especially in places of new settlement.

One of the most important socio-economic problems is the fundamental improvement of the ecological situation. The situation here is extremely alarming. The republic's main sources of water and the air basins of many cities are polluted with harmful chemicals and effluents from production exceeding the permissible norm. The saline soil, oversaturated with pesticides, is

the chief source of the well-being of all inhabitants of the republic. The Priaral Region has turned into a zone of ecological catastrophe.

The Communist Party regards the adoption of urgent measures in regard to the improvement of the housing sphere as its duty before the present and future generations. An integrated ecological program will be put into effect, which encompasses all sectors of the economy. With the participation of the nature protection and sanitary services, deputies, and representatives of the public, it is planned to carry out the introduction of an ecological passport system of all enterprises, factories, shops, and sectors. To determine concrete measures for every one of them and to establish terms for ecological improvement. Decisive measures will be taken in case of the violation of the established conditions, up to the stoppage, closing and reprofiling of enterprises. The prohibition of the introduction of ecologically harmful manufactures is being declared. Measures will be taken immediately to guarantee ecological cleanliness in the cities of Tashkent, Chirchik, Almalyk, Fergana, Navoy, and other cities of the republic.

With the help of the entire country and in close cooperation with the other Central Asian republics, the Uzbek Communist Party is making every effort in the struggle to save the Aral Sea and the implementation of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers in regard to improvement of the ecological and sanitary situation in the Priaral Region. Special organs are being created for the coordination of this work on the union level. Significant funds are being sought for the only projected large-scale work, which according to preliminary data will come to 25 million rubles. The planning of investments and material-technical resources for these goals is singled out as a separate line item, and the Central Communist Party and the government of the republic will take this work under special control.

On the wider plane, the Communist Party is setting the goal of the radical improvement of the entire cause of preserving the health of people. A significant strengthening of the material-technical base of medical treatment and preventive institutions is being planned. Beginning in 1990, the volumes of capital construction in this sphere are being sharply increased. Special attention is being given to the development of specialized centers for the nursing of new-born children, the extension of assistance to pregnant women, and district [patronazhnaya] service for the protection of maternity and childhood. There will be a significant improvement in the supply of the population with medicine. The output of disposable syringes will be organized at the joint Sovplastital Enterprise.

In order to improve the training of physicians, an agreement has been reached concerning the allotment of out-of-competition places in the country's best medical institutions to the republic. Already this year, 1,800 young men and women were sent there. A goal-oriented

program for the improvement of the health protection of people is being developed, the universal clinical examination of the population is envisaged.

Health protection is inseparable from energetic measures for the physical training of the workers, especially the young people. The task has been set to build within the next 5 years 150 stadiums and 180 pools, to increase by many times the number of rental centers for sports and tourist equipment. The production of sports equipment and clothing will be expanded.

The efforts of the party, Soviet, and economic organs will be aimed at the acceleration of housing construction. The Uzbek Communist Party will consistently pursue the policy of the party aimed at providing every family with a separate apartment or house.

In 1990 it is planned to build 10.4 million square meters of housing, which is 2 million square meters, or 25 percent, more than in 1989. This will make it possible to turn around the situation that has developed, where the scales of the introduction of housing hardly covered the growth of the population. For the first time in recent years, a real improvement in the provision of housing to the workers will be attained: On a per capita basis, the general living space will increase by 0.6 square meters as compared to the five-year plan and reach 11.55 square meters.

A radical acceleration in housing construction will take place in the 13th Five-Year Plan. Plans call for the introduction of 67-68 million square meters of housing. This will make it possible to improve housing conditions of more than 6 million people, which is 1.5 times more than in the current five-year plan. In so doing, the provision of housing per person will be brought to 13 square meters. The volumes of housing construction being planned will make it possible already in 1994 to supply the next persons on the waiting list with apartments, who were on it at the beginning of 1989.

The task is set to apportion land allotments for individual building to hero mothers and war and labor invalids within a year after being put on the waiting list. And through state housing construction to provide the allotment of housing of this category of persons no later than within 3 years after registration.

A subject of special concern of the Communist Party, all party, Soviet, and economic organs is the improvement of the supply of the population with food products. The necessary conditions are being created for increasing the total number of cattle and raising their productivity on kolkhoz and sovkhoz farms, as well as in the private farmsteads of rural toilers. Through the increase in deliveries of livestock products from the all-union funds, the majority of oblasts have acquired the right to retain all the meat produced for their own use. So that now much depends on local initiative and managerial sharpness.

These and other possibilities will make it possible to not only to overcome the reduction in the per capita meat consumption level that existed in past years, but also to

attain some increase of it. If in 1985 the per capita consumption of meat came to 31 kilograms, and in subsequent years it even declined to 29-30, already in 1990 it is envisaged to bring the level of consumption up to 33 kilograms. The average per capita consumption of milk during the next year will increase by 27 kilograms and come to 205 kilograms. There will be a substantial improvement in the supply of the population with fruit and vegetable products.

The Uzbek Communist Party will attain the further strengthening of the improvements that have been outlined. In 1995, it is envisaged to bring the per capita consumption of meat up to 43-45 kilograms, of milk—to 235-250 kilograms.

The elimination of single-crop system of cotton creates the conditions for the intensive development of a fruit and vegetable complex in the republic. It is envisaged to increase the production and to fully satisfy the demand for vegetable and melon crops in 1990, and for fruit and grapes—within 5 years. There will be a two-fold expansion of the base for the preservation and processing of fruit and vegetable products, which will make it possible to lower their losses significantly.

In connection with conversion, enterprises of the defense and other sectors join in the solution of this problem. For the 13th Five-Year Plan, they will prepare 120 complete sets of equipment for canned food factories, which will operate directly in kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

One of the chief tasks of the years immediately ahead is to reliably secure the growing cash incomes of the workers with a broad assortment of consumer goods and paid services. If at the present time, on an average annual per capita basis, consumer goods valued at 517 rubles are produced, paid services worth 95 rubles are provided, and goods valued at 802 rubles are sold, the task is set to bring these indicators respectively up to 650, 140, and 950 rubles by the end of the next five-year plan. Thus the increase will be from 1.2-fold to 1.5-fold. Special attention will be given to the increase in the output of clothing, footwear, and other commodities for children. There will be a three-fold increase in the output of goods in enterprises of group "A". There will be a significant increase in the resources for the sale of ready-made garments, knitted goods, hosiery, footwear, televisions, washing machines, electric vacuum cleaners, refrigerators, and other non-food products.

The drastic reorientation of the republic's economy to the solution of the questions of the life-support of the population require significant resource reinforcement already next year. To this end, projections call for the allotment of 3.9 billion rubles for the development of the base of the social sphere, which is 1.3 billion, or 53 percent, more than the targets of the five-year plan for this year.

Such an approach will be secured and developed in every conceivable way in the subsequent years, in the period of the plenary powers of the new membership of the Uzbek SSR people's deputies and the local Soviets.

III.

The increase of the well-being of the population and the development of the social sphere depend on the efficient use of the production, scientific-technical, natural-economic potential of the republic, on the quality of our work.

In terms of the level of national income, the labor productivity of the Uzbek SSR at present lags significantly behind the average union indicators. What, in concrete terms, will have to be done to increase production efficiency?

The Uzbek Communist Party believes that the entire economic policy must be built on the following fundamental propositions:

- To radically change the structure of the national economy and its most important sector—agriculture. To attain the kind of situation so that basically all raw material resources are processed on the territory of the republic, which will create the necessary prerequisites for the increase of the national income and the per capita incomes of the population;
- to impart a social orientation to the entire economy, to turn its face to man, to the satisfaction of his growing demands. For the solution of the complex of social problems, in the new five-year plan to direct the overwhelming part of the national income being utilized into current and non-productive construction;
- To secure the break-through to the mastery of the achievements of modern scientific-technical progress, to make the transition to the mastery of labor and science-intensive manufacturing. To create and develop our own base for the output of technically complex machine building products, household equipment, television and radio apparatus;
- to take measures for the more rational distribution of productive forces in the territories. To restrict the further development of industry in Tashkent Oblast and in the city of Tashkent to the production of consumer goods. Simultaneously to accelerate the increase of the industrial potential of the Kara-Kalpak ASSR, Syr-Darya, Surkhan-Darya, Khorezm, and other oblasts;
- to give special attention to the development of light and textile industry as the direct technological continuation of the cotton-growing complex. To restore and impart new development to folk trades and handicrafts.

The radical transformations in agriculture are related to the stabilization of production and deliveries of cotton-fiber in a volume of 1.5 million tons, which will make it possible already in 1990 to release 300,000 hectares of land requiring irrigation from cotton production and to increase sharply the areas under fodder, fruit and vegetable, and other agricultural crops, and the production of livestock products. Simultaneously measures are being

implemented for the introduction of additional wages of cotton-growers, the fundamental solution of the question of increasing the purchase price for cotton and other agricultural products. Already in 1990, the price of 1 ton of raw cotton will come to 1,000 rubles compared to 800 rubles in 1988.

In the conditions of Uzbekistan, agriculture requiring irrigation is one of the chief sources which feeds the predominant part of the population. For this reason, every conceivable increase in the productivity of the land, its melioration improvement, and the economical and rational use of irrigation water is an integral part of the long-term development of the republic.

To this end, the consistent implementation of a complex of measures connected with the introduction of water-saving technology, advanced irrigation and sprinkling technology, and the introduction of new varieties of agricultural crops with low moisture capacity, is envisaged.

In connection with the growing shortage of water resources and the demographic situation, the search for additional sources and possibilities of water supply for the region through their replenishment from other territories acquires great significance.

The solution of all social and economic tasks is directly linked with the fundamental improvement of the state of affairs in the construction complex. The material-technical base of the construction organizations is being strengthened. During the five-year plan the production of cement, slate, and brick will increase by a factor of 1.5 to 1.7. The output of linoleum and facing tile will increase by a factor of 3 to 4. The production of local building materials on the farms will develop extensively. This will make it possible in the forthcoming five-year plan to satisfy the demand for material resources of both construction subdivisions and individual builders.

The dynamic and persistent development of the productive forces and the strengthening of the economic independence of Uzbekistan require the further expansion and intensification of relations with the other union republics, and the improvement of foreign economic activity. There will have to be a significant strengthening of the cooperation with the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The international relations of Uzbekistan will be expanded, for which a republic bank of the USSR Foreign Economic Bank is being created.

The Uzbek Communist Party proceeds from the fact that science to an ever greater degree is becoming a direct production force. The coordination of scientific research will be strengthened. The intellectual potential of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences, other scientific research and design organizations, and VUZ's will be concentrated on the solution of the main problems of socio-economic and political development of the republic, ecology, and the protection of the health of people. The practical training of our scientists in the most important scientific centers of the country and

abroad will be expanded. The material-technical base of science will be strengthened.

In the republic, as in the entire country, a radical reform of the management of the economy is being implemented. Its point of departure is the basic production link—the enterprise and the farm. We will have to increase their independence and responsibility and bring khozraschet principles to all intra-production subdivisions, to every job.

The Uzbek Communist Party will in every conceivable way promote the strengthening of the real sovereignty of the Soviets at the local level, the broad participation of the workers in the solution of all questions of the economic and social development of the territories. Measures will be implemented to expand the structure of the local farm and to strengthen the financial base of republic, oblast, city and rayon self-government. All enterprises, irrespective of their departmental subordination, must take part in the formation of the local budget.

The rights and plenary powers of the raykom as an important link of self-government at the place of residence of the population will be expanded. At the initiative of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, questions have been decided in regard to the apportionment of staff units and the wage fund for the raykoms, their independence is being significantly increased. Their material possibilities for extending assistance to poor families, pensioners, and solitary old people are being strengthened. Their role in preventing conflicts within families and between neighbors, in the prevention of crime, and the upbringing of young people in the spirit of respect for the traditions and customs of the people is growing. All the questions connected with the improvement of territories, the construction of new installations, the Soviets decide with the participation and the consent of the raykoms.

IV.

The Communist regards as the most important political task the harmonization of inter-nationality relations on the basis of the platform of the CPSU, the implementation of the kind of nationality policy that would secure the solution of the urgent problems of the development of Uzbekistan and all the nations and nationalities inhabiting it. The Communist Party will consistently pursue a policy aimed at the expansion of the rights and sovereignty of the republic in all spheres of socio-economic, political, and spiritual life, and attain the broad independence of the Uzbek SSR and the Karakalpak ASSR in the solution of the questions included in their jurisdiction.

Concrete measures are being taken in regard to the fullest satisfaction of national-cultural needs. The Uzbek Communist Party will firmly and steadily put into effect the Law on Giving the Uzbek Language the Status of State Language, which was adopted by the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet. A complex of measures in regard to the implementation of this law within the established terms is being realized by the Council of Ministers. Already

today the necessary conditions for the intensified study of the Uzbek language are being created everywhere. Simultaneously the broad mastery of the Russian language, as the language of inter-nationality intercourse, by the entire population, and the free development of all peoples which inhabit the republic is being secured.

Consistent work is being done in regard to the study and the objective assessment of the individual periods in the history and culture of Uzbekistan. Popular traditions, rites and customs, as, for example, the holding of the spring Navruz Holiday and others, are being revived. Additional funds are being allotted for the restoration of historical monuments in Samarkand, Bukhara, Khiva, Tashkent, Shakhrisabz, and other cultural centers. In the educational institutions, special courses for the study of the history, culture, and way of life of the peoples of Central Asia. The study of Arabic script is being organized on a voluntary basis. Along with this, all the conditions for accustoming the masses with the best specimen of world and home culture are being secured.

There will be an increase in the output of literature in the Uzbek language and the languages of the other nationalities of the republic, national cultural centers and societies will be created. The editions of newspapers in the Tajik, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tatar, and Korean languages, and the volume of radio broadcasts in the languages of the nationalities of the republic are being expanded.

The party organization will continue to rigorously pursue a policy aimed at securing the requisite all nationalities living in Uzbekistan in party, Soviet and state organs, and public organizations.

The rights of the republic in questions of the development of foreign economic, scientific, and cultural relations with foreign countries, and the creation of joint enterprises on a mutually advantageous basis will be considerably expanded. The fundamental position of the Uzbek Communist Party is that the successful national and social development of the republic is possible only within the structure of the Soviet Federation, in the fraternal family of Soviet peoples. The party organizations are called upon to strengthen our unity in every conceivable manner, to strengthen on a fundamentally new basis the patriotic and international education of all strata of the population especially of the rising generation.

The communists of Uzbekistan will not allow privileges of any kind for some people and the infringement of the rights of others on the basis of nationality. They will wage an uncompromising struggle against manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, against all who propagate separatism and national isolation, decisively rebuff attempts to sow international discord and to belittle our international achievements.

In the sphere of constant party attention is the work on the formation, among the young people, of the willingness to protect the creative labor of Soviet people, the defense of the socialist Homeland, and the strengthening of the unity of the army and the people.

The Uzbek Communist Party regards the increase of labor and public activeness, the political and spiritual culture of the masses, and their understanding of the goals of perestroika, as one of its central tasks. This requires new content and methods of ideological work on the basis of the principles of democratization and glasnost. Meetings of the party aktiv and deputies in the labor and educational collectives and at the place of residence of the population, as well as "direct lines" of communication of the workers with the leaders of all ranks and levels, are becoming a daily practice.

The dialogue of the party with the people is growing also with the help of the means of the mass media. Glasnost, criticism and self-criticism, and mutual relations between party committees and editorial boards based on respect, trust and responsibility must promote the constructive search for the solution of the existing problems.

The further development of the material base of the mass media will also be conducive to this. By 1995 it is proposed to encompass a maximum of the republic's territory with television broadcasting. The television studio in Termez, television centers in Andizhan and Samarkand, and radio houses in Urgench and Nukus will be commissioned. A branch of the Publishing House for Fiction imeni G. Gulyam will be opened in the city of Samarkand.

Cultural-educational work and the organization of leisure will have to be raised to a new level. In the next five-year plan it is planned to build new buildings of the Theater imeni Khamza, the Theater of Satire imeni A. Kakhkhar, and the Conservatory, to carry out the reconstruction of the Uzbek TYUZ [Theater of the Young Spectator], and the Concert Hall imeni Sverdlov. The concert-philharmonic hall in the city of Samarkand will accept new spectators, and the construction of the Theater imeni Gorki in Tashkent will be completed. Large sums will be allotted for the construction and improvement of clubs, libraries, and houses of culture.

The Uzbek Communist Party is doing everything necessary to unite and consolidate all the healthy forces of the creative intelligentsia, to restore the dialogue with it that was destroyed in the recent past, to secure a respectful relationship and the necessary conditions for the growth of activeness of all directions of the multifaceted Uzbek culture and art.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party realizes that the growth of the spiritual culture, civic activeness, and political self-consciousness of our people is unthinkable without the all-round and harmonious development of the very seats, the very centers of culture, without material and moral incentive, without the support of the intelligentsia, first of all, of the talented young people, which always was and will be the bearer of this culture in the masses.

A republic, such as Uzbekistan, with its ancient history and culture, which has the priceless legacy of Beruni, Al-Khorezm, Farabi, Ulugbek, Alsher Navoiy, Furkat,

Mukimi, and other great thinkers and national enlighteners of the past, today must create all the necessary conditions for the centuries-long riches and traditions to continue and develop logically.

Dissociating itself from the voluntarist actions in regard to religion permitted in the past, the republic party organization supports the guarantee of the freedom of conscience and the legal rights of the rights of believers, for cooperation with religious organizations. Since the beginning of the year, approximately 90 new religious buildings have been registered, 25 former religious buildings have been returned to the believers and will be restored—buildings which are monuments of architecture. Believers are being granted all the possibilities for participation in the socio-political and cultural life of the republic, peacemaking and charitable activity, the strengthening of humanism, respectfulness, and good-neighborliness in inter-nationality relations.

At the same time, the party—through the methods of propaganda and persuasion, will form a scientific-materialist world view among the workers and decisively condemn any attempts to speak from positions of religious intolerance and fanaticism.

The consolidation, unity, and cooperation of all forces coming out in support of restructuring and the renewal of all spheres of the life of the republic—such is the task which the Uzbek Communist Party is setting itself for the coming period and historical perspective.

In the view of the Uzbek Communist Party, one of the most important directions in the work of the party, Soviet, law enforcement organs, and the public of the republic is the realization of fundamental measures to strengthen legality and law and order. National property, the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens must be reliably protected from any criminal infringements, speculation, and abuse.

The Communist Party will take under its strict control the implementation of the republic state program of irreconcilable struggle against crime. It envisages a significant increase in material-technical equipment, the professional-cadre strengthening of the law enforcement organs, and the active involvement of labor collectives, state and economic organs, and public organizations in the maintenance of order.

The Uzbek Communist Party considers as completely inadmissible any manifestations of mass or group disorders on nationality, language or social grounds. Attempts to carry out such actions will be decisively stopped, and their organizers and participants will be called to account.

The Communist Party advocates the strict observance of socialist legality and the humanization of Soviet criminal law. Proceeding from the principles of social justice, the objective assessment and correction of some extremes permitted at the time in the review of the

so-called "cotton" cases, the Uzbek CP Central Committee considers it necessary to support the numerous appeals of the workers in regard to a review of the indicated cases with respect to persons who are today in places of confinement by order of the court. To this end, an Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium commission has been created, which should complete this work in the near future.

The Communist Party advocates the strengthening of production, labor and public discipline, and organization. Democracy is not anarchy and complete permissiveness. Only discipline, organization, and responsibility can guarantee the real improvement of the life of all and everyone.

* * *

The Uzbek Communist Party declares that all of the organizational and political work of the party committees and organizations will be aimed at seeing to it that active supporters of restructuring, the best representatives of all strata of society—workers, kolkhoz workers, the workers in intellectual labor, veterans and young

people, the sons and daughters of all nationalities living in the republic—are elected to deputy.

To this end, cooperation will be secured with the trade unions, the Komsomol and other public organizations, including informal ones. From the first days of the pre-election campaign, it is necessary to create reliable guarantees against violations of the principles of democracy, to secure the broad and open discussion of all candidacies being proposed, the free expression of the will of the people.

And at the same time—to oppose the selection to power of various sorts of political adventurers and demagogues who use the difficulties of restructuring for careerist and anti-perestroika goals.

The Communist Party expresses the firm conviction that the workers of Uzbekistan will manifest a high consciousness of civic duty and responsibility for the fate of the republic, that they will give their votes to real fighters for perestroika, for the improvement of people's lives. Having combined our forces, we will bring the republic to qualitatively new frontiers of national and social progress.

Estonian Intermovement Holds Press Conference
*90UN0615A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 16 Dec 89p 2*

[Transcript of press conference by V. Ivanov: "Any Unanimity Is a Myth": Notes from the Intermovement Press Conference of 14 December 1988"]

[Text] The words in the title are those of one of Intermovement's leaders, co-chairman of the Intermovement Coordinating Council's presidium Viktor Kiemets. They were uttered in his reply to journalists' question about whether there is complete and unqualified unanimity of views and positions in the Intermovement leadership. In developing his thought, the speaker emphasized that there can be no question of unanimity as that concept has been understood in years past. Not only that, but there is a diversity of opinion in the Intermovement Coordinating Council, where members have been known to shout themselves hoarse. This does not, however, imply divergences on fundamental questions. There could only be disagreement with respect to work methods, tactics.

However, if we were to remove ourselves from the concrete sentence spoken on a concrete point, it does express—or such was the impression from the press conference as a whole—a certain general description of the current situation.

We have no intention of assigning that description a purely negative value. Wouldn't it make more sense to consider whether or not today we need to achieve that kind of show unanimity? Perhaps the fact that we are all different and all understand the course of events differently serves to conceal a much greater potential for finding paths to an objective solution of crucial problems? To what today is usually called consensus and which has a no-less-useful synonym in the Russian language—accord? After all, accord does not necessarily have to be accompanied by hugs and kisses...

We are not about to forget that this press conference, held in the building of the Estonian Union of Journalists (EUJ) and at the initiative of the EUJ leadership, is for all practical purposes the first undertaking of its kind. Apart from V. Kiemets, Lyudmila Poleshchuk, Yuriy Rudyak, and Kim Shiryaev from Intermovement also participated.

Opening the press conference, V. Kiemets noted that until now all criticism of Intermovement in the pages of the republic press and over the air has been just so much "shadowboxing," wherein those doing the criticizing, not having gone to the trouble of acquainting themselves in detail with Intermovement's program documents, have ascribed to it "sins" and statements they themselves have invented. "Of course," said V. Kiemets, "this kind of boxing is easy to win, since one receives no 'blows' in return, but the win it brings is also illusory."

"For example," said the speaker, "there is a widespread opinion that Intermovement is against the study of the

Estonian language. The idea is utterly fantastic. Similar examples could be cited by the cartload." "Doubtless," Kiemets stressed, "the time has past when consolidation in the republic could have taken place painlessly. That consolidation is, nevertheless, essential—if only on some other level."

"All of you, surely, have heard the speech by people's deputy Yevgeniy Kogan on the first day of work of the second Congress of Soviets," said Kiemets. "Of course, it was a very expansive, very emotional speech, and Kogan probably laid it on a little thick. Nevertheless, the issue was stated unambiguously: Do we want bloodshed, do we want another Karabakh, or do we, at long last, want to try to understand each other for once?"

Taking advantage of the opportunity, the speaker offered apologies for those incidents that have occurred at the Intermovement info-club (the "Beacon"). Especially, at its last meeting on Wednesday, when the audience behaved quite rudely toward journalists Grant Gukasov and Dimitriy Klenskiy.

"The fact of the matter is," stressed one of the Intermovement leaders, "that when we put out notices about our info-evenings and invite all those interested to come listen, the group that gathers at the Beacon gets hard to handle. Very different people are being put together."

[Question] Do you consider your past position on boycotting elections to the local Soviets correct and will there be elections for alternative organs of power?

[Answer] There are still no final election results. When there are, we'll be able to see what the true breakdown of votes was and whether our concrete comments and our protests were seriously considered—that is when we will make our decision about alternative elections. In general, the boycott (you could also call it a protest against those kinds of elections) was forced. This election law, in our view, is undemocratic. It restricts the Russian-speaking population's ability to vote for representatives to local organs of power.

[Question] As far as we know, approximately 150,000 people failed to participate in the elections in the city of Tallinn. How do you explain the fact that, in the words of Deputy Kogan at the Congress, the nonparticipation in the elections of 160,000 non-Estonians was an outright lie?

[Answer] We refuse to answer the question, which is an insult to a people's deputy of the USSR.

[Question] Do you want another Karabakh? And if not, then to whom was Deputy Kogan addressing his question—"Do you want another Karabakh?"

[Answer] We are disturbed by the way events are developing. We will never agree to our children finding themselves here without a future. When you've heard us out you'll understand whether or not we, whether or not Russian-speaking mothers, want another Karabakh here.

Our children have been transformed into migrants' children. They do not have good, well-situated schools. Our children have no prospect of receiving a good education in the future. We don't have enough teachers. And no woman would ever wish for bloodshed or the death of her own children.

(Editor's note: In this respect a little commentary seems appropriate. If at the very outset of events in Estonia alarm about the possibility of a situation like that which developed in Nagorno-Karabakh was not justified, it was at any right understandable. It was logical to anticipate all possible variations, including a "black scenario." Today, when the entire course of events indicates that the situation will develop within a democratic framework—discussions of bloodshed and "another Karabakh" seem at the very least excessive and in no way facilitating of consolidation, but capable merely of igniting subsiding passions. Finally, it is not irrelevant to recall that in Karabakh everything actually began with direct conflicts between the two ethnic groups.)

[Question] With respect to poor schools for Russian-speaking children, I invite you to Rakvereskiy rayon. You and I will visit schools where non-Estonian children study—in Rakvere itself and in Tamsalu—and you will see for yourself whether the conditions in which they find themselves are worse than those for Estonian children....Is it really necessary to proclaim so categorically that non-Estonian children have been harmed in some way? In the Kuresaare schools Estonian children study in two or three shifts, while in the Russian-language schools they are still in one, and no one makes any accusations against the Russians as a consequence. Why do you do so against them?

[Answer] The issue was only the schools in the city of Tallinn, not how matters stand in other towns and rayons of Estonia.

[Question] What do you make of the fact that the Dvigatel factory, a large inhabited micro-rayon built on Lasnamyae, has not acted on socially relevant objectives (apart from one kindergarten) and as a result the Russian-language schools of the neighboring blocks are genuinely overcrowded?

[Answer] When Comrade Rayang was asked at the republic congress of women about when the problems of overcrowded Russian-language schools would be resolved, he answered: "When the migration of the Russian-language population ceases, this question will be resolved." I think (replied L. Poleshchuk. Ed.) that the fact that Tallinn's Russian-language schools are overcrowded is the fault not of Dvigatel alone but also of the city authorities and the city committee on education.

[Question] Doesn't it seem to you in this respect that it was more than illogical not only to reject a real chance to influence the solution of this concrete problem through the city council but also to boycott the elections for the Tallinn City Council?

[Answer] The question of schools is a separate question. We are working so that everyone will have equal rights and equal opportunities in the resolution of all problems (Estonian schools too have their share of problems). After the draft law on elections to local soviets was published we put out a statement that not only criticized individual articles but also made suggestions of its own. But not one newspaper published that notice.

By the way, as a positive phenomenon it should be noted that during the discussion of the draft law on elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic our comments and suggestions were still taken into account. In particular, the newspaper Soviet Estonia published them nearly in full; they were heard in a report at a session of the Supreme Soviet; and individual suggestions of ours proved so logical and justified that they were incorporated into that document.

For example, in the law on elections to local soviets there is no clear sense of who is considered the elite. So in the law on elections to the Supreme Soviet our comments were taken into account and a special section was introduced dealing with precisely this issue.

[Question] What is your opinion of the role of the Communist Party of Estonia and its Central Committee?

[Answer] The current membership of the Central Committee does not, in our view, represent a force capable of consolidating all movements in Estonia. We do not want to confuse the entire Communist Party with its Central Committee.

For all practical purposes, the whole subsequent conversation ceased to be a press conference and became a discussion of such concepts as the right of a nation (or peoples?) to self-determination, as well as the meaning of the very concepts "nation," "people," "right," and so on. It does not seem possible to convey the content of that discussion, for the conversation was, in essence, conducted in different languages—in the figurative rather than the literal sense. And it is impossible to say with any precision who was more at fault for initiating this "chain reaction of misunderstanding." While mouthing their readiness for constructive dialogue, each side in fact delivered a prolonged monologue, although various people spoke.

We will refrain from making negative comments on this. However, we will repeat one more time: this encounter was the first of its type. Probably, if they become a regular occurrence, we will all learn how not only to express our own viewpoint but also to hear out (and most important, seriously consider) the opponent's.

At the end of the meeting Yu. Rudyak read a statement the sense of which came down to the fact that Intermove-ment welcomes in principle the active lawmaking process going on in our republic today. "We feel," the speaker said, "that nonimplementation of republic laws is absurd, but more than eight months ago Intermove-ment submitted an application for registration and we

have yet to get any kind of response, although there is a republic law on the registration of voluntary associations of citizens according to which we composed our application."

Georgian National Democratic Party Holds Second Congress

*90US0323 Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
30 Nov 89 p 4*

[Article by M. Tsverava: "Second Congress of the Georgian NDP: The Policy is Still the Same"]

[Text] Social and political forces which must be reckoned with at the most diverse levels became an objective reality in Georgia long ago. Yet we still sometimes hear observations such as: "Informals? They are loud-mouths! All they want is to shout slogans at meetings".

It would have been good for those who continue to think this way to have attended the 2nd Congress of the Georgian National Democratic Party which was held in Tbilisi on 25 and 26 November. Preparation for the congress was serious and lengthy and was conducted at such a high level as to be the envy of any formal forum at the all-union level. If nothing else, the fact that representatives of the NDP's kindred democratic political organizations in Moscow, Leningrad, the Ukraine, the Baltic Republics and other regions of the country attended as honored guests indicates that the congress was more than a passing event. Representatives of many of the republics social organizations and well-known Georgian cultural figures took an active part in the work of the congress.

We often judge the work of one organization or another by its outward manifestations, by what is visible on the surface (meetings, acts of protest...) and, accordingly, our impression is also superficial. Unfortunately, the quasi-legal status of organizations which we still label as informal out of habit prevents us from looking at their work more thoroughly. Within their limits meanwhile, as graphically demonstrated by the congress, they are doing serious, purposeful work devoted to a normal democratic existence for Georgia in the future.

When we heard the speeches and discussions during the course of the congress, it occurred to us that nowadays our official circles, as we say, are resigned to the existence of social organizations and have agreed to accept their presence. This in itself is good, but now it is certainly time to move on to the next level—to cooperation, since the views of these very same national democrats, for instance toward economic, religious and social policy, undoubtedly are of interest and knowledge (or application) of them can bring genuine benefits...

True, we must make precisely the same appeal to these social and political organizations themselves since, today, this same Georgian National Democratic Party [NDP] has taken the firm position of boycotting any kind of cooperation with official circles like the Communist Party and the national and republic Supreme

Soviets. The NDP platform ratified at the congress reaffirmed the immutability of this position.

Generally we must say that the National Democratic Party is today one of those political organizations which is most consistent in its work. On 26 August, our newspaper published an interview with Georgiy Chanturiya, chairman of the NDP, which prompted widespread response. The views, policies and work platform of the party, which basically were discussed at the congress, are in keeping with the ideas expressed by G. Chanturiya in that interview. For that reason, we will not dwell at length on this today. We will say only that lively discussions revolved around the drafts of the program and party procedures, though they were conducted in full accordance with the laws of "parliamentary skirmishes"; something which our parliament itself cannot always boast about. The press conference after the opening of the congress was interesting, but this is not surprising since a press conference invites dialog and free discussion, and these are always interesting and topical.

Concerning the congress directly, we asked USSR Peoples' Deputy E. N. Shengelaya, who not only spent both days in the congress hall but who even spoke there, for his appraisal of how it went.

"In my deputy's platform", Eldar Nikolayevich said, "I wrote that I would try to promote in every way possible our creation of a multiparty system. One cannot imagine a genuine, true democracy without such a system. Having accepted the invitation to attend the NDP Congress, I was interested first and foremost in the question of whether, in the event that a multiparty system is approved, the National Democratic Party as it currently exists could claim a niche in the new political climate. I was extremely pleased with what I saw. Today we are starting practically from zero after all, but at the congress I saw young people, not even of my generation, who take their work very seriously and thoughtfully. It is very important that the National Democratic Party adopted moral, highly intellectual principles as the basis for all its work. This is all the more welcome nowadays when, unfortunately, politics is based more and more frequently on power. The informal spirit of comradeship which reigned over the congress and, judging by this, which reigns in the ranks of the NDP as a whole, commands respect.

"A very important quality which I noted during the congress was tolerance. While this is more rarely encountered today, the NDP is clearly prepared for any kind of dialog. Generally it is very difficult for me to speak at various conferences and meetings but here, at the congress, I wanted to speak. Indeed, apart from my genuine sympathies, I also spoke about those things in the NDP platform which do not appeal to me. The audience listened with obvious interest and there was no hint that only one point of view—the view of the National Democrats - had the right to exist.

"In general, I think that this party is already capable today of becoming an interesting political force. Like the

juice of the grape which has already passed the fermentation stage (a stage, by the way, in which many other organizations still remain) and has begun to form a good, fine wine, the NDP already has formed a clear-cut position—not one blindly resurrected from its ancestral party but an absolutely modern one.

“If I may, I have a question of a general nature. There are a number of very serious organizations in the republic,

yet, in our view, they have no dialog with the official circles about which we talk so much. What prevents this?

“Only one thing it seems to me: the absence of a legitimate framework for the existence of different parties and organizations. Today the government engages in dialog with public organizations and parties only when the situation with some kind of specific event becomes tense. That is to say, only when there is no other way out. The main reason is hidden in this approach.”

Group Discusses Large Scale Corruption

90US0355 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with writer Anatoliy Bezuglov, by Y. Nekrasov and A. Osinskiy: "Corruption"]

[Text] Corruption: What Professor Anatoliy Bezuglov, writer and doctor of jurisprudence, as well as MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA correspondents Yuriy Nekrasov and Arkadiy Osinskiy think about this problem.

[Nekrasov] Not too long ago, Anatoliy Alekseyevich, we attended your unusual premiere. Your novel "Black Widow" and the film based upon your scenario Souvenir for the Procurator were shown simultaneously to Muscovites in the Palace of Youth. Of course, it is not the purpose of today's discussion to give an artistic evaluation of these works...

[Bezuglov] Especially since the author is taking part in the discussion.

[Nekrasov] Nevertheless, I would like to dwell for a moment upon one aspect of the film. I have in mind one of the characters, the director of a large factory. He, shall we say, transmigrates from your novel "Procurator" to the screen, and not, it seems to me, without losing something in the process. In the novel this powerful manager, who was promoted from among the workers, becomes to a certain degree a victim of circumstances. Led by the well-known motto "all in the name of business" (or more precisely, the plan) he begins with small evasions of the law, for example his predilection for overtime money, and ends up in the same net of pure criminality in which dodgers are enmeshed, by distorting results achieved. In the film we have instead the head of a mafia in which the city Yuzhnomorsk is ensnared. He is the all-powerful director of a criminal concern. The image has been transformed and straightened out. It has become, so to speak, black and white.

[Bezuglov] Yes, it has been straightened out. And what is more, it has not become black and white, but rather simply black. And that is not unintentional on my part. The novel and film come several years apart. I don't have to say what kind of years they were. Each of us has had to significantly readjust our views and ideas about things. One would think that, considering the constant contact I have had with law-enforcement services as a lawyer, no new discoveries about the present state of things in the criminal world would be in store for me. And perhaps there were no new discoveries. But only now is one beginning to fully grasp the scale corruption has reached and what a real force organized crime has become. As Mayakovskiy said, poetry is not a mirror that reflects, but a lens that magnifies. This pertains to any kind of creative work. My artistic aim is to place a contemporary boss of the criminal world under a public magnifying glass. And that is how the factory director's transformation came about.

[Osinskiy] Anatoliy Alekseyevich, you have juxtaposed two terms—"corruption" and "organized crime." Is that mere coincidence, or...

[Bezuglov] It is precisely the "or." Organized crime of contemporary proportions is unthinkable without corruption, just as the corruption which is harming society requires certain organized efforts on the part of the forces that have an interest in society's corruption. Crime, particularly at the level we are seeing today, requires superb organization. And as I see it, its chief task is to expose the underlying mechanism or, if you like, the technology of criminal business—more precisely, to expose what we today call the underground economy.

[Osinskiy] Won't you be reproached for creating a kind of handbook for potential criminals?

[Bezuglov] I am already being reproached, and how! We barely had time to initiate the publication of a 30-volume work "The Soviet Detective" (and the USSR Goskompechat [State Press Committee of the USSR Council of Ministers] is backing us), when a message arrived signed by Yu. Bondarev, first vice-chairman of the board of the RSFSR Union of Writers. Here, specifically, is what disturbs Yuriy Vasil'evich: "Books like this achieve nothing but moral decay; they engender crime and act as refined instructions on how to commit new crimes."

Well, what can you say to that? I really never make anything up in my stories and novels. And as to the underlying mechanism of crime, I use scenarios from real criminal cases. And I do that with conviction. First of all, secrets which are brought into the open to a large degree lose their danger for society. For it is a bad idea to imitate that which is already known—and that goes for criminals too. Second, honestly, I simply cannot understand the origin of such an unflattering opinion of our readers. It is rather awkward to assume that all of them are solely concerned with how to better direct their criminal acts. Yes, we want to teach the reader, but something else: how to competently resist evil, how to recognize it, in whomever it is hidden.

[Nekrasov] We are assiduously thumping our chests because, they say, we have begun talking about organized crime at a late date. And clearly we're landing a few blows. But from time immemorial crime has been divided into spontaneous, so to speak emotional acts, and organized crime. Even a quarter of a century ago, when I worked in a rayon procurator's office and investigated crimes of goodness knows what scale, in every case of embezzlement, down to the tiniest levels of trade, I encountered a rather impressive "business" organization at work. If you sum up what has been said and written about organized crime recently, it seems that it has developed among us relatively recently.

[Bezuglov] Of course organized crime did not emerge here yesterday or even the day before yesterday. For all practical purposes, it has always existed in one or the

other form. But the extent and character of criminal activity have undergone substantial changes. Today this evil has acquired the dimensions of a calamity. And no small role in that is played by the fact that we are speaking about it in public, not just at official meetings. Precisely this openness creates for the person who not long ago was completely deprived of any reliable information the sense of not just calamity, but of ecumenical catastrophe. I have no intention of taking on the role of consoler. The situation is indeed very grave and requires urgent action. But as is known, panic is useless as a stimulator of action.

[Osinskiy] I am in full solidarity with you on that point. In my opinion several of our and your literary brothers-in-arms have overdone it to a certain degree in supercharging passions. Exciting the public's "righteous indignation" is perhaps not the most difficult task today, and it seems it is also not the most pressing. Our people's attitude towards crime is not at all defined. And what is lacking is concrete advice to the public on how to defend oneself in a dangerous situation or how to cooperate with law-enforcement bodies, which today of course cannot function without public support.

[Bezuglov] But this reproach pertains not only to us writers, but also to you journalists.

[Osinskiy] I am not objecting there. But still it is not the duty of the journalists to teach the public legal nuances. The pages of this very paper are always open to the employees of law-enforcement bodies. And we have good contacts with the courts, the procurator's office, and the police. But they are primarily on a union and city level. So what about the rayon level, the one on which people come into the closest contact with massive negative manifestations? Here our business cooperation is still not being viewed in perspective. Some workers of this core group have their own prejudice against the press, something akin to an allergy.

[Nekrasov] It seems we have strayed from the theme of our discussion.

[Osinskiy] I don't think so. Glasnost, keeping people informed, raising the level of legal knowledge, strengthening contacts with law-enforcement bodies, cooperation with them on the part of the population and press—these are all necessary conditions for opposing crime in general and in particular organized crime.

[Nekrasov] I agree. But we have not yet "drawn" even a sketchy portrait of contemporary organized crime. In the film "Souvenir for the Procurator" as well as in the book "Black Widow"—and not only there, also in the reports from many of today's court trials—something really new is being observed. A certain confusion of genres has taken place in the criminal world. In our time we knew that, for example, a professional thief would only resort to murder under the excessive influence of alcohol, or that a pick-pocket will hardly dare to burglarize an apartment. But an embezzler does his dirty business with the aid of manipulation in the bookkeeping records,

financial and other documents—and in public he behaves like a fully respectable citizen. Today those managing a racket and directing the murderer's hand are people who, so to speak, can't be tripped up—those who seldom have occasion to be directly linked to...Well, okay. In a word, those similar to "your" director, Anatoliy Alekseyevich.

[Bezuglov] That's exactly the problem. Many of those directly involved in crimes do not even know who the head of the operation is. I share the conviction of those who argue that large-scale vandalism by youths, say, in Kazan—is not at all a spontaneous phenomenon, that the thugs in Fergan were not moved by the thick political and moral climate alone, and that the appearance of Moscow racketeers like carrion-crows is not accidental. All of my experience and practice prevents me from thinking otherwise. It took only the emergence of the first shoots of the cooperative movement for the corrupt civil servants of that same Moscow to quickly realize the kinds of dividends they themselves could reap from it. Now in connection with this, a case is being investigated in which iniquitous millions are involved. Millions. In a word, the astronomic (in the opinion of a number of readers) sums which the gamblers in "Black Widow" stake are those I took from a real case.

And these millions are not only a means of satisfying the greediest appetites—they are powerful control levers in the criminal world and a reliable bridle for corrupt assistants. The painful admission must be made that representatives of this today have been found within law enforcement bodies as well. And the cleansing process which is going on there is a natural and indispensable precondition for success in the struggle against corruption.

[Nekrasov] But the process of cleaning up, or more precisely, clearing out, is also needed in our normative economy. Why, not long ago ridiculous instructions placed an enterprising manager on equal footing with an out-and-out maneuverer. The director tied up with them risked having every move he made regarded as criminal. Let us at least remember how spontaneous, direct ties among enterprises were condemned along with attempts to independently arrange above-plan production. A colleague from a branch newspaper told a story reminiscent of a bad joke. At a house-building factory a surplus of window blocks developed. The head of a neighboring construction bureau which urgently needed the materials heard about this. He said to the director: "sell them to me!" "I can't," said the director, "my freedom is dear to me. But do you see that hole in the fence? Go and steal the stuff. And later, when I need something, I'll steal it from you." And this is a dialogue between two law-abiding managers in the epoch of "advanced socialism."

[Bezuglov] Of course the fact that innovators and dodgers are placed on the same level has not at all eased the situation. Legislative reform is definitely needed. And first and foremost, of course, the omnipotence of

instructions which contradict laws must end. Incidentally, similar instructions which civil servants often adapt to their interests leave the way clear for them to commit various abuses.

All the same, our fundamental troubles spring not from the laws' imperfections, but from our flagrantly scornful attitude towards them. If we would scrupulously follow them, moreover on every societal level, then the big criminal bosses would feel much more uncomfortable. And there would be incomparably fewer of them.

[Osinskiy] At the same time, Anatoliy Alekseyevich, at the premiere with which we started here, in the auditorium—frankly speaking, one did not sense that those present were striving in every way and at all times to follow the letter of the law. On the contrary, the reaction of many of them showed that they felt that any means used against criminals were good. And the harsher, the better.

[Nekrasov] If that sentiment were only confined to that auditorium! Do you think that the mail we receive in our editorial office reflects a different climate?

[Osinskiy] And it's not only a matter of climate. Wherever there is a call for more letters on the struggle against crime, there are almost no constructive beginnings. Recently the fed-up call of "give us..." could be heard. In this case, "'give us' law and order." I can well understand the feelings of veterans and women—that section of the population understandably unable to make a significant personal contribution to the struggle against crime. But an analogous "give us" is also to be found in letters from men who are, so to speak, in the prime of life. And no one asks himself, "How can I help?" And really, how can they help in the struggle against the primary contemporary evil when millions are unprepared for it and inexperienced in legal questions?

[Bezuglov] You rightly observed that they are "unprepared." And with that you yourself gave an answer: it's time to prepare them. And that clearly means that before all else we need to reexamine (and reexamine critically) our entire practice of legal propaganda and education. Until now it has basically been of an abstract, educational nature. People were not taught how to make practical use of a law. That's on the one hand. On the other hand, the experience of cooperation between our law-enforcement bodies and the public has not withstood the tests of time. Isn't that why those very volunteer public order squads and even their most mobile section—the Komsomol operations detachments—have gradually migrated from the streets and other public places to the pages of reports and other accounts, and the comrades' courts either idle or carefully play into the hands of the administration?

It is not so much presumptuous to claim to be able to deliver a comprehensive prescription for a cure. But I would propose that the provisional committees on the struggle against crime should study the complex of problems connected with the population's legal culture,

with its juridical protection, and with the activities of public workers' units. They should study these problems precisely in the context of their immediate tasks. And of course as soon as they address the state of neglect in which an area—and indeed the entire struggle against crime finds itself today—then in addition to practical workers, experts in jurisprudence, sociologists, pedagogues, medical experts, and many other specialists should also be brought in to revise the corresponding measures. For we are dealing with a social phenomenon which cannot be overcome with the help of only legal means or administrative measures, let alone ardent appeals.

More Autonomy for Local Courts Favored

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[Article by Yuriy Feofanov: "Our Courts Are Local Courts..."]

[Text] An investigator, who had worked in Central Asia for a long time, told me how he had dismissed the case of a "dangerous criminal"—the person had tried to buy a public official, to give him a bribe.

"I became familiar with the materials. The chiefs of administrations, party workers, militia officials. Some were giving, others were taking. Thousands, tens of thousands of rubles. It was all like using carbon copy. And suddenly, an 83-year-old peasant from a remote village 'tried to bribe the chief of the passport desk' for 10 rubles. This 10 rubles bewildered me. I began to clear things up. The old man himself was arrested, by the way, but was later released. So, how did it turn out? He came for some kind of certificate. They issued it without any delays. He bowed and thanked them, as if they had done him a great favor, and on the way out he left a folded 10-ruble note in a scrap of newspaper. They arrested him on the spot. The old man could not at all comprehend what he had done wrong. He said one thing: 'You have to give the chief a gift, that has always been the custom.'"

"A 10-ruble note," I said, "is small change, understandably. But what if it were a 100-ruble note?"

"It would have been worse," the investigator replied. "But, you see, he had it firmly established in his mind that he had to show his appreciation to the boss. Before he would have offered a leg of lamb, for example, to a village constable, a doctor, or a clerk. He sincerely did not understand what they were accusing him of doing."

As it was later learned, the people working at this passport office were by no means unselfish. The same as in many others. And not only in the "offices": in the ministries, party committees, and ispolkoms. All of this is too well known. And trials are under way or being prepared against the bribe takers—both those who took and gave bribes. If we analyze the sources of the phenomenon and the reasons for the scope of the crimes and

why they went on so long without being punished, we automatically come to the old peasant with his 10-ruble note.

At the trial for the case of Churbanov, the defendants and the witnesses (bribe takers) more than once said the same thing the old man said: "It is our custom," "It has been that way since olden times," "It is Eastern hospitality." I am convinced that they talked about the "ethnic peculiarities of bribery" not only as an excuse—they are sufficiently reasonable people to hope to justify it by this—but they also said it to explain. But the evil increases a hundredfold precisely because criminals have imposed modern-day preying on other on wonderful ethnic traditions—to feed and give a gift to a guest. They have distorted and dirtied the brightest thing.

But they will say to me: Why is this being written? What kind of conclusions can be drawn from all this? Is there some hidden thought: To understand means to forgive? No, I do not mean that at all. I will go farther: If high-ranking bribe takers would have been tried, conforming to local customs and peculiarities, the sentences could have been even harsher. If only because the judges could have taken into account the vile playing on the wonderful ethnic traditions as aggravating circumstances. Having acquitted the old peasant, although he also committed a crime, independent judges would have rendered honor and dignity to the degenerate, as such people have been called recently, who has totally stained his people.

In short, if a "local court" would have tried him... Do we have one, a "local court?" Do we have a Tajik, Lithuanian, Georgian court? Do we need one? Is it possible to have one? If we had one, would it not run contrary to the idea of uniform understanding of the law? Contrary to Lenin's ideas? "Our courts are local courts," are Lenin's words.

I have familiarized myself with criminal cases from various union republics that have reached the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court. It cannot be said that these cases are of such a nature or so complicated that they could not be finished in a sovereign republic. They are the usual routine, sometimes ridiculously insignificant cases.

...Abdurakhman Sharapov, senior representative of the Department for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation [OBKhSS] of the Soviet Rayon Department of Internal Affairs [ROVD] of the city of Ashkhabad, was sentenced to 1 year of corrective labor and withholding of 10 percent of his salary. He refused to initiate criminal proceedings against a vegetable stall salesperson who shortchanged a customer 9 kopecks.

...Olga Belyanskaya, a brigade leader at the Borovlyana hog complex in Minsk Oblast, was given exactly the same sentence by the rayon court. She was charged with stealing scrap metal that was scattered about and belonging to no one. It was worth 126 rubles 30 kopecks.

She took this scrap metal by verbal permission of the sovkhos director. She was acquitted only on the protest of the USSR Procurator General (!) by decision of the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court (!!) for the lack of material evidence.

...The Narva city court sentenced Andreyev, a trade union member, to 6 months corrective labor for spitting in the face of Illarionov, chairman of the trade union committee of a fishing fleet base, at a committee meeting. The Supreme Court of Estonia left the sentence in force; the procurator general lodged a protest and insisted on a dismissal of the case.

...In 1984 there was a gas-line explosion in Baku—58 people died, 13 were injured, and damage amounted to nearly 350,000 rubles. Sergey Gaykazyan, chief engineer of the Bakgaz PGU, was brought to trial, charged with negligence. The Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Court acquitted Gaykazyan. The procurator lodged a protest. The Presidium of the Supreme Court denied it: the chief engineer could not have prevented the accident; its causes were the condition of the system, not Gaykazyan's negligence. The Procuracy insisted on the charges until the Plenum of the Supreme Court once and for all denied the protest.

Let us note: In all cases, the procurators acted in precise accordance with the law, but in the first three cases were more humane toward the defendants than the courts were.

But that is not the issue. Perhaps in Ashkhabad, Minsk, Tallinn, and Baku it is clearer how to characterize an act than in Moscow? Shortchanging someone is ridiculous, I agree. But the local court proceeded from the fact that the top representative did not put a stop to the shortchanging of the customer. In convicting brigade leader Belyanskaya, the people's court of Minsk Rayon obviously proceeded from some circumstances better known to him. If we even assume that in all cases the local courts erred..., the supreme republic judicial authorities confirmed their decisions. Why should the Union intervene in these cases? Especially when the Republic Supreme Court acquitted the engineer, despite the deaths of 58 people? Is such guardianship justified? After all, this deprives the courts of independence and wounds their prestige.

Obviously, if we examine each of the above four cases, the procurator general or the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, who lodged the protests, could very convincingly justify their intervention. But it is a matter of principles in this case: In what instances is such intervention necessary, and not simply possible.

Here there arises the problem of relations between "the center and the localities" in the area of legislation and judicial practice. As we know, the procuracy exercises the highest supervision of rule of law and uniform application of the law throughout the country; without this supervision there would be "Kaluga law and Kazan law," which Lenin pointed out in his famous letter "On

'Dual' Subordination and Law." He demanded that the procuracy be beyond local influences and subordination and be structured according to a strictly vertical principle. This idea was embodied in the statutes on procuracy supervision, and today in the Law on USSR Procuracy.

But let us go back to that same letter by Lenin. In it, emphasizing the need for uniform application of the laws, he wrote that our courts are local courts and that the judicial authority is "obligated, on the one hand, to observe absolutely the uniform laws established for the entire federation and, on the other hand, when determining the extent of punishment is obligated to take into consideration all the local circumstances, in doing so having the right to say that the law was unquestionably violated in such-and-such a case, but that such-and-such circumstances closely known to the local people and learned in the local court force the court to deem it necessary to reduce the punishment with respect to such-and-such individuals or even to acquit such-and-such individuals." (Author's emphasis—Yu.F.)

I talked with Professor A.Ya. Svetlov, doctor of juridical sciences from the State and Law Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, about the causes of this, not only the historical causes but also those resulting from the practice of present-day law.

"Without a doubt," Aleksandr Yakovlevich said, "union-wide norms are necessary. The question is—to what limits. Let us superficially go over the criminal code. Liability for theft of socialist property, rape, over-reporting, boot-legging, buying up and feeding bread to livestock, receiving bribes, and so forth has been established by the Union law, and the norms simply added to the republic codes. But on what grounds? This runs contrary to the Constitution. It is not at all the result of the principle of uniform understanding of the law. It is a usurpation of the prerogatives of the republics by the center."

But, I objected, does this really violate sovereignty? You see, the basic principles are still adopted by the Union, and you agree with this. The professor explained his thought.

"The basic principles of legislation should establish uniform 'base' norms on which the criminal codes of the republics will be based. Therefore, only those norms which regulate the uniform application of the most important aspects of criminal liability are acceptable. They include, for example, a listing of punishments, the procedure for serving a sentence, dismissal of criminal liability, criminal liability of minors, and a number of others. Or such a norm of material law such as capital punishment."

How simple and bold it all is and....difficult to carry out. In any event, we have not been able to embody in judicial practice this highest dialectics of justice: The law is uniform and inflexible in establishing guilt, and the court administering the law sees before itself a real,

"local" person. The bureaucratic-command system has crushed and trampled this traditional Russian court of jurors, a "court of conscience."

There were many reasons for this. A self-dependent and independent court was incompatible with Stalin's regime. True, Vyshinskiy placed the court's "sense of justice" above the law, but pursued a quite different, by no means legal goal in doing so—to cast off those weak shackles which, if only formally, imposed on arbitrary rule. But that is another subject, a long time ago now, and it is hardly returning there. Talking about the present-day influence of law on the local court is much more relevant.

Our court, unlike in England, for example, does not create law; its activities fall under the law. But is this principle, then, reconcilable with the self-dependence and independence of the local court? Yes, formally, if only because the Union by the idea passes only the fundamentals of legislation—criminal, civil, labor, and domestic. The codes—legal documents by which, strictly speaking, they are judged—are the prerogative of the union republics. They should take into consideration, above all, local and ethnic peculiarities. But they are all much the same for us.

"There is still a question of trends," the professor continued. "The fundamentals adopted by the Union swell by infringing on the prerogatives of the republics. Look, the basic principles of criminal legislation of the USSR and the union republics in 1924 consisted of an introduction and 39 articles; the ones in effect today, adopted in 1958, consist of 53 articles, and the draft of the new fundamentals already contains 76 articles. We also need to add the following circumstance to this: Up until recently, the union lawmaker did not listen to the opinions of the republics. We learned about many decrees only from the newspaper."

In short, in the professor's opinion, "feedback" between the center and the republics in the area of legislation, if we talk about from the bottom upward, is fairly weak. In all likelihood, the situation with lawmaking will change, but as far as judicial practice is concerned, it has a very solid moment of inertia.

Now a court with jurors has been legalized. If it is approved, the local courts will acquire a certain independence. However, I think hypertrophied "local influence," in other words the desire to command "one's own court," is increasing. This must be taken into account. It is not yet known which republics will institute the court of jurors. I think a struggle may yet unfold here. It is important, however, that it was not good intentions but the law that consolidated this form of justice along with the traditional form.

Everything has become more complicated. Here there is nowhere to go from the dialectics that laws are inflexible, justice humane.

Functions, Roles of Committee on Crime Discussed

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[Interview with A. Yakovlev, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, USSR people's deputy, by I. Kozlovskiy: "On Crime—A United Front"]

[Text] Every segment of our society is troubled by the alarming increase in crime in the country. For this very reason the USSR Supreme Soviet found it necessary to pass a decree strengthening law and order in the country and it established the Provisional Committee on Fighting Crime in the USSR. A correspondent from PARTINAYA ZHIZN asked A. Yakovlev, member of the Provisional Committee on Fighting Crime, doctor of juridical sciences, and professor, to answer questions posed by the journal's readership.

[Correspondent] What functions are entrusted to the Provisional Committee on Fighting Crime in the USSR?

[Yakovlev] The committee permits law enforcement agencies, under the vigilant control of Soviet power, to coordinate activities with the goal of designing a strategy for fighting crime and to compile statistics on the eradication of criminal offenses using a dependable source of information in their work. The latest reports on the crime situation in the country are very alarming. Over 10 months of this year the organs of internal affairs and the procurator's office registered more than 1.9 million crimes—34.1 percent more than for a similar period last year. What has caused this increase? Only a substantive analysis of the conditions causing crime in a number of regions of the country can give us an answer to this question. In addition to studying these conditions, our committee is charged with securing the efficient interaction, and in individual cases the movement into "hot spots," of the appropriate law enforcement resources. Provisional committees must not in any fashion extend their influence over judicial organs as these are subordinate only to the Law.

The creation of such entities is based on at least three factors: A real and objective increase in crime, and the need to provide extensive information to the populations of various regions on criminal offenses and their consequences, which, incidentally, makes a very strong impression on society's awareness of law and order. The third factor follows from the combination of these first two—today's need to learn strict law and order specifically under conditions of democracy. I wish to stress this, by the way, because "strict order" can also exist in instances where it runs counter to democracy.

Of course to wage a decisive battle against crime one might go to the extreme of declaring a state of emergency in the country. In this instance, let us assume, the goal is achieved: Crime decreases, but at the same time the normal life of society is violated. It is not necessary to use such an extreme method to achieve strict law and

order. Today we must strive to provide room for the development of positive social processes in society without relaxing—on the contrary, while intensifying—the struggle against those who would oppose this development.

Few people are aware of the paradoxical fact that in those countries of so-called "Western democracy" there are just as many laws, just as tough, they are applied very rigorously, and the "curve" of crime nonetheless continues to grow.

Today the country is in a peculiar situation: We are strengthening law and order under conditions of a developing democracy, not at the expense of its curtailment but so that freedom is guaranteed and protected by means of an increasing liability for the abuse of that freedom. It is a very different thing when there is no freedom. Let us say that there is no freedom of speech. That means that there is no real opportunity to abuse it, or the opportunity is extremely limited. We must have democracy and at the same time resolute law and order. And on the way to its consolidation there can be all sorts of complications and digressions.

So how have we fought crime in the past? In fits and starts. If you read the documents from the past 5, 10, and 25 years you can see that much attention was devoted to fighting crime, but there was no system to it. It was done in "spurts." Aware of an increase in crime, society recoiled as it were and passed various types of "get-tough" resolutions, and the "curve" of those convicted for offenses rose sharply. Then later society forgot about it and passed on to new business, and everything was repeated from the beginning. The trouble was that in the course of the campaigns all sorts of attempts were made to intensify the fight against crime, even to the point of infringing on democratic guarantees so that the innocent were often punished. And this did happen, unfortunately. It is intolerable that people should be arrested indiscriminately and convicted without being guilty while the real criminals escape justice. We do not need that sort of pseudostruggle. "To each according to his desserts"—this is the indisputable truth of the Law. We are guided by it.

The people's courts must be the decision-making element in the process of the fight against crime. But we have the right to require the investigative organs and the militia to take effective measure against those who break Socialist law. If a criminal threatens the life of a Soviet citizen, then in specific situations he must be rendered harmless on the spot.

To continue, we must require that the people's courts treat the investigation of the case with the greatest objectivity and responsibility, not permitting "adjustments" of the indictment and sanction for the alleged crime. I would like to remind the judicial organs of an indisputable truth: Anything that has not been proved does not exist. In other words, in the interest of

observing Socialist law we should not forgo either the foundations of law and order or the democratic achievements of society.

[Correspondent] What issues do the first actions of the Provisional Committee address? How does it intend to defend the rights and legitimate interests of the workers?

[Yakovlev] The first sessions of the Provisional Committee have already unearthed a large number of issues that should be resolved immediately. Here is one of them. We must heighten the activities first of all of the "first echelon" summoned to defend the rights of Soviet citizens—the militia and the organs of internal affairs. To that end additional funds are being allotted for equipment. It must not be forgotten that the militia and organs of internal affairs must carry out their tasks in complex, at times extreme situations using new forms and methods of work under conditions of society's increasing democratization. Take for example the increasingly frequent instances of situations of conflict when workers conduct sanctioned and unsanctioned meetings and demonstrations. How should we react to them?

Of course if you forbid all demonstrations, you will not have the accompanying violations of social order on the streets and squares. However, it is impossible to use that method because that would be nothing more than an infringement of democracy. At the same time, if you do not defend the demonstration from extremists and from those who are trying to turn the mass public appearances of workers into pogroms, then that means you are attacking democracy itself. So the need arises to protect the legitimate rights of the citizens from those who intend to provoke conflicts and all sorts of provocations. In this instance the following principle is observed: If you are demonstrating peacefully, I will protect you so that no hooligan will throw a rock at you. And if there are extremists among your participants, the utmost measures will be used to cut short their outrages. Provisional committees have been created in all the union and autonomous republics, krais, and oblasts, and it is exactly on the efficient resolution of issues arising from nonstandard situations that they are now focusing their attention.

And now about their activities. Despite the fact that the provisional committees at the local level have only been formed recently, they have already begun to make a definite contribution to the organizational work of the law and order agencies, which are now functioning more decisively in their fight with crime.

I will focus on two of the basic trends of their work. First is the effective resolution of present-day problems. Well-organized information on the state of matters at the local level will permit the provisional committees to maneuver resources and to coordinate their efforts in response to circumstances. Second is the creation of a real opportunity to develop long-term programs to reduce and restrain the crime that is taking deep root. That type cannot be eradicated with a sudden attack across 1-2 months. For example, not everyone is familiar

with the term "zone that is particularly affected by crime." Essentially these are socially neglected regions, city suburbs, where people inhabit barracks left over from the 1930's. They are a "microclimate," and the efforts of the militia to improve circumstances are clearly insufficient. As a result there is a need to enlist government and economic workers with the object of creating normal conditions of life for the people there.

In turn the organs of public education are committed to care about the leisure time of the youth and not to permit dropping out and staying back from one year to the next. The contribution of the cultural and public health workers to the improvement of life of the population may be even more appreciable. One hardly needs to prove that in a healthy social atmosphere there is less chance for the younger generation to grow up morally afflicted. It is quite another matter when the youth are raised in an unfavorable environment that is affected by alcoholism, unemployment, homelessness, and parasitism. The long-term programs which are being created in the country by the provisional committees on fighting crime are intended to resolve exactly these problems. It seems to me that this course of action is fully justified.

One of the tasks before the committees is to coordinate the actions of law enforcement institutions for fighting crime. However, the sphere of the committees' influence is far broader. They also provide for interaction between law enforcement agencies and the public concerning the observance of law and order. At one of the sessions of our committee we listened with interest to the experience of the workers of Gorkiy Oblast, who created workers' detachments to aid the militia. Their example merits the greatest interest and dissemination to the other regions of the country. And this is important: Who if not the soviet organs should be concerned with carrying out law enforcement measures at the local level?

[Correspondent] Could you tell us in more detail how public initiative should be developed? What directions should it take?

[Yakovlev] We should support the aspirations of society to play a direct role in the fight against crime. Such work should, in my opinion, be distinguished by substance and purposefulness. We need to say, "Let us all begin together." When we act we must remember that the efforts of individual "professionals" are not sufficient to cope with crime. At the same time, we cannot delegate those functions which properly belong to those "professionals" who have the right to arrest citizens suspected of committing a crime and to make use of a weapon where necessary. We must keep in mind that the worker of the militia is an official who bears heightened responsibility for his actions before the Law. And we must never give to society those same rights which we give to the militiaman, a professional worker who has undergone special training.

I expect that many will ask what society's role is, then. I respond that there is an enormous sphere of our life, the social sphere, which offers an immense field of action for

society. Any of society's representatives may be charged with visiting a family to find out what conditions a "difficult" youth lives in. Any member of society has the right to request law enforcement agencies to take administrative action against alcoholic parents for neglect and to petition in exceptional cases that they be deprived of their parental rights. And what about those families with many children who find themselves under the "poverty line"? Certainly society can have its say here and turn for help to the local law enforcement agencies, who will find a way of resolving the problem and care for the children.

Or another instance. State property is systematically misappropriated at enterprises. Who will effectively obstruct the actions of these criminals? The answer is, of course, society working together with law enforcement agencies, which have the necessary experience in this respect. Society can also contribute to the fight against prostitution, trade in currency, and gambling near hotels, markets, and train stations, where these negative phenomenon are most often encountered.

This is where our society should exercise its law enforcement role. It will be most effective and significant where measures are taken to prevent and expose crime and to clean up the environment where it originates. I am convinced that it is far more important for representatives of society to go down into the cellars where the homeless and the poor huddle. Their place is in the workers' dormitories, with unfortunate families, in the schools, and at the factory. And this is fully warranted. What good does it do for a few members of society armed with clubs to go out on duty with militia detachments? I repeat: That is for "professionals" with the appropriate training.

I believe that the party organs are expected to make a quite significant contribution in the matter of involving society in the fight against crime. Their task is not to "give orders" and "supervise execution," but rather to play a personal role in spot-checks on the "breeding grounds of crime," where most criminal offenses have their beginning. How to obtain the effective interaction of law enforcement agencies with society—this is one of the main questions being studied by the provisional committees.

[Correspondent] What influence do interethnic conflicts have on the growth of crime?

[Yakovlev] The issue of overcoming interethnic conflicts has been defined in depth and comprehensively by the September (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum. For this reason I will not go into great deal on this problem.

Under the concept of "conflict" one may have in mind a simple disagreement, which can be resolved in the course of a meeting between the conflicting parties and a constructive discussion of the problems which have accumulated between them. However it could also include, for instance, a knife fight, in which case this is nothing other than a manifestation of extremism, a

criminal act. Unfortunately, such excesses have become more frequent recently. Soviet laws specify punishment for stirring up nationalist dissension, and the law enforcement agencies must secure their absolute observance. We must not be willing to allow many crimes on nationalist grounds to remain effectively unpunished because of gaps in the mechanism of justice.

[Correspondent] "Gaps" of justice were discussed at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Could you tell us in more detail what is expected to be done to create a comprehensive state-legal system? And what role does the Provisional Committee on Fighting Crime play in it?

[Yakovlev] Of course in the process of affirming the principles of a law-governed state, efforts to improve our legislation and to create an efficient mechanism of activity for law enforcement agencies gain more and more meaning. I would like to draw attention specifically to these issues. What should we start with, in my opinion? First, with the creation of a single investigative apparatus. Today preliminary investigations are carried out at various levels: in the procuracy and the organs of the MVD and KGB. But each of these subunits has its own specific, no less important tasks.

The organs of internal affairs execute all sorts of functions—from work in places of confinement to issuing passports for travel abroad, and from cartography to fire safety. But in addition they conduct investigations. Take the Committee for State Security and the procurator's office. Alongside all the primary obligations they have been entrusted with, they too carry out investigative work. So it seems to me that it would be expedient to create a united, independent agency subordinate only to the Law—an investigative committee under the USSR Council of Ministers which would take the appropriate functions upon itself.

I would also like to touch on the very important, timely issue of involving the counsel for the defense in the case at the stage of the preliminary investigation. In this event, those who have been charged with investigating a criminal case will examine its essence more carefully and seek stronger proofs before making an accusation. Both suggestions have a common goal—to protect a person's dignity and honor and defend his rights before the Law. As a people's deputy I see my task as incorporating both of these suggestions into law enforcement practice. Only then will we see strictly executed the requirement defined by the Congress of People's Deputies: We must have an objective investigation, a strong defense, and an independent court—this is the three-sided formula of Socialist justice.

Our institute is also participating very directly in the development of drafts of new statutes. In particular, a draft Law on the Consideration of Criminal Cases by an Expanded Board of People's Assessors was prepared and sent to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The draft of a document on the new judicial procedure was developed under the leadership of professor V.

Savitskiy. The document will be studied by the highest state organs before being published in the press for nationwide discussion. Other proposals for improving our legislation are also being prepared. Of course, a certain time will pass before these laws begin to affect the legal community. But the time has already come for three important elements—investigation, defense, and court—to restructure their activities as life demands. With this goal, work is already underway on a transitional draft law which can be introduced into the existing legislation without waiting for the adoption of those fundamental documents that have been developed but not yet finally ruled on. Such a document is supposed to be prepared and submitted for examination to the Committee for Legislation, Law, and Law Enforcement under the USSR Supreme Soviet.

In conclusion I would like to talk briefly about the long-term efforts of our Provisional Committee on Fighting Crime. First of all, its collective is now busy composing a normative document entitled "Model Regulations for Provisional Committees," which is awaited in various regions of the country. Work is begun on "A Comprehensive National Program for Fighting Crime in the USSR," which will reflect the problems of interaction between law enforcement agencies and society in the interest of observing Socialist law.

A perfectly concrete "address" is maintained in such topical analyses as "A Study of the Reasons and Conditions for Encroachment on Socialist Property in the Sphere of Trade, Public Catering, and Consumer Services" and "How People Who Have Been Released From Places of Confinement Work and Subsist." The issue is that 30 percent of the country's crimes are committed by people who have been in places of confinement, which is a cause for alarm. So here in general outlines are the issues which our committee is currently studying.

The times urgently demand a restructuring of all the work of the law enforcement agencies. The most important task of the party, soviet, and social organs is to render them constant help and support through actions, not words. I remind you that their authority in the masses is grounded on the principles of inviolable observation of Socialist law, high ideological conviction, moral purity and honesty, professional skill, political awareness, and selfless service to the Homeland and the people.

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Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Addressed on Crime Control

90UN0642A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 6 Dec 89 p 2

[Speech given at BSSR Supreme Soviet 13th Session, 11th Convocation, 5 Dec 89, by I.F. Yakushev, chairman, Commission on Legislative Proposals, deputy to BSSR Supreme Soviet: "On Urgent Measures To Strengthen Discipline and Public Order in Our Republic"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Deputies!

The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium have recently begun to receive many appeals, resolutions, and decisions from labor collectives and public organizations, as well as letters from individual citizens. These items convey serious concern and alarm in connection with the the significant upswing of crime in our republic, the unfavorable state of affairs with regard to public order, and the decrease of discipline. The public demands that the Soviet of People's Deputies and the law-enforcement organs take urgent, decisive, and effective measures to bring about the necessary public order, as well as to protect the legal rights and interests of Soviet people.

Proceeding on this basis, the Committee on Legislative Proposals at its own meeting thoroughly analyzed the situation which has evolved, and it considers that these negative processes in our life have become extremely acute and have justifiably evoked concern and anxiety among the public.

Indeed, whatever type of crime we take and compare with what was previously the case, the statistics turn out to be depressing. An upsurge of crime is observed everywhere, and it is becoming bolder, fiercer, and more organized.

This republic is witnessing, especially in recent times, widespread instances of a patent disregard for the law, scorn for the commonly accepted norms of behavior, and the rules of socialist communal life.

During the first 10 months of 1989 crime on the territory of the Belorussian SSR, as compared to the same period last year, rose by 38 percent on the whole, by 55.7 percent for serious crimes, and by 37 percent for murder. Theft of state and public property increased by a factor of about 1.7, and theft of personal property rose by a factor of more than 1.7. Burglaries and robberies increased by 77 and 92 percent respectively, while armed robbery doubled. Crimes committed by juveniles or with their participation went up by 34 percent.

The situation with regard to observing law and order in public places has become more complicated. More than twice as many crimes were committed on streets, squares, and parks than was the case last year.

Crime in the cities has grown twice as fast; here the rate of increase is 150 percent.

The situation has become particularly alarming in such cities as Minsk, Orsha, Baranovich, Bobruysk, Zhlobin, and polotsk, as well as in oblast centers.

Every 24 hours in this republic 164 crimes are registered, including 1 murder, 6-7 burglaries and robberies, 70 thefts of state, public, and personal property belonging to citizens, and 6 thefts of transport means.

Cases of insubordination on the part of policemen and other representatives of authority have become more frequent. This year more than 2,500 such instances have been reported.

The measures being taken to strengthen labor discipline have proved to have little effect; they have not yielded the necessary results. Losses of working time have increased at this republic's industrial enterprises and construction projects. During the first half of 1989 they amounted to 330,000 man-days (during the same period of 1988 the corresponding figure was 241,000 man-days). Losses of working time due to unauthorized absences have increased by 18 percent.

As a result of slackening the fight against crime, mercenary crimes have increased by 150 percent as compared to 1988. The total of unearned income amounted to almost 8 million rubles.

An extremely negative influence on the state of discipline and public order continues to be exerted by the increasing number of violations of the laws against the use of alcoholic beverages.

Judge for yourselves: during the first 10 months of this year more than 340,000 citizens have been involved in violations of the laws against the use of alcoholic beverages and home-brewing. More than 116,000 persons have been arrested for driving on this republic's roads in an inebriated condition. And how many persons will perish? Crime has jumped by one-third because of drunkenness.

Matters are unfavorable with regard to solving crimes. This year almost 13,000 crimes have remained unsolved, including 1370 serious crimes.

There has been a diminution in the sharpness of the reaction on the part of the law-enforcement organs and the labor collectives to the illegal behavior of malicious drunkards, parasites, and drug addicts.

Recently there have been many irresponsible calls for strikes as a means of exerting pressure on the organs of state power and administration in order to devise a short-term profit at the expense of worsening the position of working people in other sectors of the national economy and the republic's position as a whole.

Certain extreme-minded elements, by taking advantage of the broad-based development of democracy and glasnost, profiting on the objective difficulties of the present stage of perestroika, playing on the ethnic feelings of the Belorussian people, and assuming the monopolistic right to speak in its name, are attempting thereby to heat up the situation in this republic and to undermine faith in the socialist prospects for developing the society.

They are inciting people to violate law and order, they are conducting unsanctioned assemblies, meetings, and processions during which public order is violated, crude attacks on the party are permitted, the functioning of transportation and municipal services are interfered

with, and the interests of citizens are infringed upon, which destabilizes the economic and political situation.

All of this undermines the faith of our republic's population in the capacity of the organs of state power and administration to ensure reliable legal protection of the individual and the proper law and order in this republic.

Taking into account the developing situation with regard to crime in this republic and utilizing the right of legislative initiative which has been granted to us, the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet's Commission on Legislative Proposals hereby presents for your consideration a draft decree entitled "On Urgent Measures To Strengthen Discipline and Public Order in Our Republic." The adoption of effective measures for strengthening law and order, as well as instituting order at production facilities and in public places is expected by labor collectives, the public, and all our people.

The draft decree proposes that the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, local Soviets of People's Deputies, ministries and departments, labor collectives, and public organizations adopt immediate and effective measures to strengthen law, order, and discipline, based on a comprehensive approach, working out a system of organizational, legal, economic, educational, preventive, and other measures, regarding them as an extremely important task.

The draft presented herewith proposes that the republic's government and the local Soviets of People's Deputies examine and supplement the material and technical equipment of the internal-affairs organs and courts up to the necessary level. We must give broad support to the initiative of the labor collectives and local Soviets of People's Deputies for setting up a republic-level fund to fight crime. The Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers must solve the problem of opening a special account in order to collect funds for this purpose and approve a statute concerning the procedure for disbursing such funds. At present monetary funds and equipment amounting to 1,200,000 rubles have already been transferred to the accounts of the police organs. The draft also outlines other important measures whose implementation would allow us to raise the level of all work with regard to strengthening law and order, legality, and discipline. It would also activate the participation of workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and all this republic's working people in this important cause.

The Commission on Legislative Proposals requests the deputies of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet to support our proposal. Thank you for your attention!

Belorussian SSR Official on Improving Criminal Justice System

90UN0600A Minsk *SELSKAYA GAZETA* in Russian
6 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by L. Grankovskiy, prosecutor, investigative board of the Belorussian SSR Prosecutor's Office, justice

counsel, Minsk: "Cheap Justice is Expensive. Should We Economize on Law Enforcement Bodies?"]

[Text] Never before have the desk and safe in my office been so full of criminal cases and victims' complaints. Prosecutors have enough work, and I do not think they are threatened by the prospect of becoming jobless. On the contrary, crime is growing at such tempestuous rates recently, that this growth is beginning to threaten the existence of society itself. The number of employees in law enforcement agencies in this regard is not only not increasing, but constantly decreasing in connection with the low salary. The most skilled prosecuting and investigative workers are leaving to work in cooperatives and enterprises, where the salary is significantly higher, yet the work is somewhat calmer.

Due to the heavy workload, inquiry and investigative employees are in no condition to expose all the crimes being committed in time. Everyone knows that nothing panders to criminals, so much as a feeling of impunity. For illustration, it suffices to disclose several commonplace cases of theft, now lying on my desk.

Going home in the evening, S.A. Knyazeva, head of the industrial goods store in the settlement of Bobr, Krupskiy Rayon, Minsk Oblast, shut the door with three locks and turned on the alarm for the building watchman. Nevertheless, in the morning the store had been opened. One lock, handle sawed off, lay right there, and the others were in the trash bin. As it was determined, A.V. Dankevich, ROVD [Rayon Internal Affairs Department] investigator, instituted a criminal case that day for the theft of goods worth more than 2,000 rubles. However, he did not succeed in finding and restraining the criminal on the basis of the fresh evidence.

The crime was exposed only a month and a half later, when a certain V.V. Lyamytskikh was arrested in Leningrad, having lived in one of the villages of Krupskiy Rayon until committing the crime. It was discovered that he had robbed this store together with his thrice-convicted friend, I.I. Skarupo. Indeed, Lyamytskikh himself had no little experience in this area, having similarly "cleaned out" several other rural stores in Minsk and Vitebsk oblasts, including the one in Krupskiy Rayon. Criminal proceedings had been instituted against him twice before this.

The mothers of the burglars who are now considering their lives in places not so remote have full grounds for being bitter toward the luckless local detectives. Such was V.P. Borodach, senior officer of the Krupskiy ROVD Criminal Investigation Department, who had obviously performed his official duties formally. The point is that probation had been established with regard to V.V. Lyamytskikh in his previous release from prison. The senior officer considered it too onerous for himself to implement it in conformity with the law, and halted the probation after half a year: the man has been reformed, they said.

Krupskiy ROVD investigator A.V. Dankevich also failed to display much official zeal in investigating the case. I will not mention any professional details, but not all of the possible investigative actions were performed in a timely manner on his part and the criminals remained unknown, thus enabling Lyamytskikh to commit other crimes and to hide in Leningrad. In short, it turns out that it is not hard to steal in Krupki. No great ingenuity is required. Indeed, is this really so in Krupki alone?

In the village of Tishovka, Mogilevskiy Rayon, a previously twice-convicted stevedore, one of the local residents, broke down the door of a store and carried vodka and other goods away from it on a bicycle all night long. Of course, he got his later, but the Mogilevskiy ROVD investigator who looked into this case, N.V. Sychikov, in violation of the requirements of criminal and procedural legislation, did not even attempt to clarify the reasons and conditions that contributed to committing the crime, "did not notice," that the store was not guarded at night and had not been equipped with fire and security alarms, and did not make the corresponding recommendation to the rayon consumers' union leadership. In short, an ordinary thief could come in and act without any interference whatsoever.

The list of such thefts, burglaries, robberies, and other crimes could continue for a fairly long time. Many of them would not have happened, if the criminals had been exposed and arrested in time.

What is preventing this? Again, let me repeat: the workload of the investigators, many of whom have 30 or more cases, is excessive. Indeed, even Sherlock Holmes would be physically in no condition to immediately and qualitatively investigate them all.

Attempts have been made to improve the work of the country's investigative apparatus. Investigative subdivisions were formed for precisely this purpose in 1963 in the system of internal affairs agencies. A large share of crimes were transferred from the prosecutor's office to these subdivisions for investigation. However, time has shown that such subdivisions are not justifying the hopes placed on them, and in many cases have begun to work worse than they did 20-25 years ago, due to cadre turnover. Concealment of crimes, the illegal institution of criminal proceedings against citizens, and the creation of apparent prosperity at work have appeared. Today, playing safe has been added to this. Even persons who have committed serious crimes are not always arrested and sentenced to imprisonment by the courts. The people's courts, in order to lessen their responsibility, return many cases for additional investigation with unfulfillable instructions. As a consequence, such cases are closed by the investigators. Thus, it turns out that crime is growing, but the number of people sentenced to imprisonment has decreased by half.

It seems, reasons for the low level of preliminary investigative work by the internal affairs bodies could be

found in the lack of interest on the part of the investigators in the results of their work. One is unwillingly forced to note that young, inexperienced investigators are working throughout many investigative apparatuses of the internal affairs agencies. A question arises: where have the professionals with long terms of service gone? It turns out, they have been discharged or transferred to other departments. In fact, of all the MVD employees, the investigator is under special moral and physical pressure. His work is under the constant, strict supervision of the prosecutor and the court, who rigidly evaluate his every action. With any number of cases open, he must conclude each of them within a 1- or 2-month period from the moment of institution. The salary of all internal affairs employees is basically identical, and the differences are largely symbolic. There are also many contradictions in the existing legislation, which cause official friction in connection with the fact that the investigators are virtually completely subordinate to the chiefs of the internal affairs departments, although, according to criminal and procedural law, the investigators themselves are obliged to give the chiefs instructions on criminal cases.

It seems that the investigative apparatus should be unified and should be directly under the auspices of the prosecutor's office. The more so, since only the prosecutor can sanction an arrest, and only he or his deputy is granted the right to approve a guilty verdict or to send a case to court.

Today, investigators from the prosecutor's office look into the most serious and dangerous crimes. However, strange though this may be, their material situation is even slightly worse than that of investigators in the internal affairs agencies. Their salaries are lower, vacations are shorter, and the retirement age is 60 years, to which few of the investigators from the rayon prosecutor's office work. (Their colleagues from the MVD retire 10 years earlier). Yet, after all, the most experienced specialists ought to be hired to investigate such difficult cases.

Right now, appeals abound to rouse the "whole world" against crime, to advance a "broad front." Of course, society is a great force, but even the whole world cannot replace a professional apparatus. No one will do its work for it. It would be a great mistake if, relying on social activeness, the state delayed solving the problems that trouble our law enforcement system.

Since it is a question of additional financing, the first question is: where will the money come from under the current plan status of the state budget? Let me answer: we will find it ourselves. Even part of that which we return to the state treasury would meet our needs entirely. The more so, since the staff size of our service is extremely insignificant. For instance, there are fewer than 10,000 investigators in the Prosecutor's Office in the country.

A practice exists in a number of countries: one-half and, at times, an even larger share of fines for concealing income remain with the organization which discovered

the violation, i.e., with the tax inspectorate, the police, etc. I do not understand why we could not implement such a procedure to encourage the workers of our investigative agencies. We have the cheapest justice in the world. Perhaps that is why it costs society so much.

Public Fund Created to Assist Brest Area MVD

90UN0531B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in
Russian 25 Nov 89 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Voluntary Fund Established"]

[Text] The technical equipment of the militia still leaves much to be desired. In order to put things right, a voluntary charitable fund, called "Law and Order," was recently established in Leninskiy Rayon of the city of Brest.

The rayon committees of the party and the Komsomol, the rayispolkom and the procuracy were founders of the fund.

Assets received from working collectives and private individuals for special bank account No 700502 will be directed toward strengthening the material base of the Leninskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department—which, one must think, would serve to strengthen the struggle with violaters of law and order.

Estonia Drafts Anti-Crime Plan

90UN0543A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 8 Dec 89 pp 3-4

["Draft Concept for Maintaining Law and Order in Estonia (A Concept for the Fight Against Crime and Other Violations of the Law, and also To Insure the Safety of Citizens in the Estonian SSR under the Conditions of Cost Accounting)"]

[Text] This draft Concept for Maintaining Law and Order in Estonia was approved at the 4 December 1989 session of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers Presidium and it was decided to publish the draft of the document for public debate. In this connection we ask that comments, proposals, and opinions on the draft be sent before 10 January 1990 to the republic commission working on the concept. The address is 200100, Tallinn, Lossi plats, 1a.

I. General Provisions

The purpose of the Concept for Maintaining Law and Order in Estonia (KOPE) is to devise a general scheme for the tasks, principles, conditions, and structure of law enforcement activity that will become the basis for the free, safe, and legal activity and existence of individual citizens and of organizations and state organs in the Estonian SSR.

The provisions contained in KOPE stem from the Summary Concept of self-managing Estonia [IME].

The long-term task for KOPE is to help in the creation of independent statehood in Estonia and a law-governed state.

KOPE proceeds from the premise of the sovereignty of the Estonian SSR, in accordance with which the republic independently resolves all matters pertaining to law enforcement activity, including approval of the scheme, structure, and procedure for the activity of law enforcement agencies.

The social base for law and order in the Estonian SSR is stable economic development of society, constancy of social values, and the free and steady development of the social structure and culture, and the human community, which in turn should be guaranteed by the organs of power and management.

The basis for law enforcement activity in the Estonian SSR is the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Estonian SSR and the renewed, integrated system of enforceable enactments based on it, and also the provisions of international treaties and declarations on the rights of the individual and the citizen that make up part of the Estonian SSR's legal system.

The activity of law enforcement agencies in the Estonian SSR is determined by the purposeful legal policy whose basis is this Concept.

The structure of law enforcement agencies is built in accordance with the principles of the legal and administrative reform.

The fight against crime and for the safety of citizens is guaranteed as follows:

- by state law enforcement agencies, namely, the courts, procuracy, Ministry of Internal Affairs (including the police), the state security service, courts of arbitration, and forensic facilities;
- the law society, and also the Society for the Maintenance of Public Order, and Society of Firemen, and other public organizations;
- the services that provide security for institutions, enterprises, and organizations;
- the law-and-order cooperatives (security services), and also law enforcement activity by individual citizens.

In their activity the courts are independent and are subject only to the law. The procuracy and the state security service are subordinate to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. The police are subordinate and accountable to the republic government and the organs of local self-management.

Participation by the public in the fight against violations of the law is regarded as an inseparable part of the state program.

Law enforcement activity in the Estonian SSR is based on the principle of separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities and the generally recognized principles of democracy and glasnost; state law enforcement activity should be as close as possible to the individual, and is a means whereby the individual and his interests are safeguarded.

The state is responsible to individuals for carrying out the obligations that it has assumed, and individuals are responsible to the state.

Personal property and the property of cooperatives and other public organizations, and also state property, must be safeguarded equally.

The purpose of law enforcement activity is to create law and order in which the highest value is the individual, and in which all persons in the Estonian SSR regardless of their sex, education, nationality, social status, world outlook, and so forth feel themselves equally protected.

The principles in the building and the activity of law enforcement agencies is orientation on the individual, humanism, and legality. The priority task is to help the individual and safeguard him, and if necessary and on legal bases, also to cut short violations of the law, unmask the guilty, and punish them.

Law enforcement activity will be aimed at reducing state intervention and repressions, with their gradual replacement by independent mechanisms to regulate disputes (conciliation and so forth).

Organs of state power and management should guarantee the intelligibility of enforceable enactments that regulate the rights and obligations of all citizens, and also the activity of officials, and provide explanations and commentaries on legal standards. To this end a professional system of legal information is being set up and an independent publishing house for legal literature is being formed.

The objective nature and undeviating legality of law enforcement activity assumes the independence of the courts and employees of the procuracy and police from political movements and grouping.

II. Conditions of the Reform in Law Enforcement

Effective up-to-date law enforcement activity assumes the following:

- renewal of legislation;
- the creation of a center to train and re-train personnel in law enforcement agencies, aimed at improving the Estonian legal system and standards (the Estonian Institute of Law Enforcement);
- expanding permanent training for jurists with higher education and by improving their special training;
- eliminating or significantly reducing bureaucratic structures not directly or really associated with law

enforcement activity; bringing the law enforcement agencies closer to the public;

- significant increases in the wages of workers in law enforcement agencies and bringing wages into line with skills, improvements in their working conditions, and providing law enforcement agencies with the material-technical facilities (premises, communications facilities, office mechanization, transport, criminal and special equipment and so forth) to insure that they material operate efficiently;
- the creation of an operational data system based on computers and a computer network;
- the creation of an up-to-date legal data bank, independent of the department, accessible to all officials, the scientific community, and particular individuals needing such access; registration of legal information and review and clarification of procedure for exchanging that information with the other all-union republics and foreign countries;
- the creation of an up-to-date extradepartmental scientific law enforcement center (analysis center) to observe constantly the status of law enforcement and law enforcement activity, and also to work on the following proposals:
- combining pretrial investigations into a unified system;
- combining the forensic establishments into an extradepartmental system;
- transferring a number of the functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that are not appropriate (medical sobering-up facilities, the activity of the labor-treatment facilities and correctional facilities, registration and technical inspection of motor vehicles, and so forth) to the organs of local self-management, the justice, public health, and social security;
- fundamental reorganization of the activity of the system of correctional institutions, proceeding from common humane principles;
- publishing newspapers and journals on legal subjects for the broad public.

III. The Functions and Structure of Law Enforcement Agencies

The Courts

The legal system of the Estonian SSR is being transformed as follows:

- organs of local self-management form conciliation courts that operate on the territorial principle. The conciliation courts deal with administrative and other less important matters that under the law fall within their competence.

The existing comrades' courts and the system of administrative commissions are being abolished.

The basic element of the legal system will be the circuit or city court, which as the court of original jurisdiction hears criminal cases as defined by law, and also civil, labor, domestic and land disputes.

The circuit or city court as the court of original jurisdiction hears cases of special production under the law, and also appeals from individual citizens against officials and the activity of state organs in cases involving infringement of the rights of citizens afforded by law.

One new element of the legal system will be the okrug court, which as a court of original jurisdiction hears cases that under the law fall within its competence.

In instances as determined by law the okrug court may function as a court for the administration of oaths. The Estonian SSR Supreme Court is being made an appellate court that hears appeals against decisions or orders handed down by courts of original jurisdiction, and also appeals against the entry into force of decisions and order handed down by any court in the Estonian SSR.

The Estonian SSR Supreme Court provides clarification for standard interpretation of laws by all the courts.

The legal reform does the following:

- guarantees the right of all citizens and legal entities to the protection of the courts, and also the right to appeal the activity of officials, organs of state management and other organs that infringe on their legal rights;
- guarantees the right of all citizens to appeal the decisions or orders of circuit, city, or okrug courts in cases in which such decisions or orders directly affect them;
- realizes the constitutional principle according to which a citizen may be found guilty of the commission of a crime only by a court (presumption of innocence).

The Procuracy

The Procuracy of the Estonian SSR, empowered by the highest legislative body of the republic, exercises supervision over the accurate and uniform observance of laws on republic territory.

The procuracy system consists of the republic procuracy and circuit and city procuracies, which have the apparatus needed to discharge the functions assigned to them.

Discharge of the functions assigned to the procuracy is achieved as follows: by the unity of the procuracy system, and by the independence of the procuracies from local and departmental influences through the subordination of the procuracies only to some higher procuracy and the accountability of the republic procuracy only to the highest organ of power in the republic, and by the

legal standards regulating the responsibility of the procuracies and excluding interference in their activities in the exercise of procuracy supervision.

The spheres of activity by the procuracy include supervision over protection of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens, observance of laws regulating nature conservation, the economic sphere, the activity of ministries and state services and inspection services, executive organs at the local level, and the organs conducting preliminary investigations and inquiries, the activity of officials and citizens, review by the courts of administrative, criminal, and civil cases, and compliance with court decisions.

The activity of the procuracy is regulated by legislation covering the procuracy supervision, which should guarantee the obligatory nature of demands made of the procuracy for all matters under their supervision and the possibility of intervening in a criminal case for the purpose of the fight against crime, using methods as provided for by law.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs

The Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is the republic organ of state control, accountable to the Estonian SSR government and cooperating with other law enforcement agencies and appropriate ministries of the USSR and the other all-union republics, and also with Interpol.

The activity of the Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is aimed at guaranteeing the maintenance of public order, fighting crime, and guaranteeing traffic safety.

The Police Administration, which exercises leadership of the state police, coordinates the activity of the municipal police, and insures their cooperation, is formed as part of the Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The criminal and transport police and the investigation subdivisions and special investigations bureau for dealing with organized crime make up part of the state police.

The state police make up part of the system of the Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and carry on their activities throughout all the territory of the Estonian SSR.

The state police are funded from the state budget.

The municipal police are formed by the organs of local self-management and are part of that system, and they carry out their functions on the territory of the corresponding administrative unit (volost, settlement, city, or uyezd).

The municipal police include constables, workers in the highway police, workers in the police force that maintains public order (militiamen), experts in police equipment, and inspectors in duty, passport, and information services, and also specialized establishments that carry out other police functions.

The municipal police are maintained by the budget of local self-management.

The main tasks of the police pertain to insuring the maintenance of public order, safeguarding the legitimate interests and property of citizens, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, preventing crime and other socially dangerous actions, detecting crime, and participating in providing social and legal assistance to the public and meting out punishments that fall within the competence of the police.

Safeguarding the rights of workers in the police during the discharge of their service obligations, and also social guarantees of their activity, are guaranteed by the Estonian SSR Law on the Police.

Appropriate independent state services and inspection services operating on the basis of provisions approved by the Estonian SSR government and accountable directly to the Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (fire and rescue services, civil defense, the service charged with carrying out decisions of the courts, the service charged with safeguarding state secrets (in the press), the watchman service, the state fire inspection service, the state automobile inspection service, and so forth) pertain to the sphere controlled by the Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The Ministry of Justice

The Estonian SSR Ministry of Justice does the following:

- draws up, on instructions from the highest organs of state power and management in the Estonian SSR, or at its own initiative, draft laws and draft legal enactments of the Estonian SSR government, and on instructions from the Estonian SSR government provides expert assessment of draft enforceable enactments;
- systematizes and codifies the legislation of the Estonian SSR, and also publishes collections of enforceable enactments, and acts jointly with the scientific establishments in working on and introducing the "ESTLEX" information system;
- directs legal work in the national economy on a methodological basis; draws up and offers recommendations on improving legal work in the republic; organizes advanced training for lawyers serving the republic's economy; together with the scholars provides skilled legal assistance for economic organs and the central institutions of the republic in the matter of introducing new management forms, and guides legal propaganda in the republic, and also organizes general legal education within the framework of realization of the IME program;
- takes steps to develop the material base for the courts and notaries' offices, and also improve working conditions for their employees and enhance the prestige of this work; draw up proposals to bring proper order to

the activity of the courts and notaries' offices and exercise control over the organization of their work;

- organizes professional training and subsequent re-training for personnel in the justice establishments of the ministry;
- at the proposal of the services that issue civic certificates of registration in the Estonian SSR falling within the sphere managed by the Estonian SSR Ministry of Justice, devises and implements measures to improve the activity of the organs that issue civic certificates of registration.

State Security

The Estonian SSR state security service insures the state security of the Estonian SSR by means of intelligence work, counterintelligence work, guarding state borders, and conducting preliminary investigations, and also administrative and scientific and technical activity.

The following tasks pertain to the state security service:

- preventing and cutting short intelligence-gathering and subversive activity directed against the republic, and dealing with crimes aimed at the violent overthrow or change of constitutional order, and also particularly dangerous crimes against the economic system;
- safeguarding state borders, the continental shelf, and the economic zone; protecting objects of state importance and major sociopolitical measures, and also political and state figures;
- safeguarding state, commercial, and service secrets;
- providing special communications for the organs of state power and management;
- dealing with particularly dangerous and large-scale groups in organized crime, which through their activities are doing great political, economic, or moral harm to the republic.

Courts of Arbitration

The Estonian SSR State Board of Arbitration is being transformed into the Estonian SSR Court of Arbitration, which hears all economic disputes between legal entities. Economic disputes previously handled by other organs, including disputes between kolkhozes and interkolkhoz and state-kolkhoz enterprises and their disputes with state, cooperative, and other public enterprises, which were previously heard by the courts, are now additionally being transferred to the jurisdiction of the state court of arbitration, and also disputes between enterprises in a single system that were previously dealt with by ministries, state committees, and departments, and also disputes involving sums less than R100 dealt with by the higher organs of the debtors.

The state court of arbitration is an independent republic body.

Economic disputes between enterprises are also resolved in the Estonian SSR in the chamber of trade and commerce court of arbitration now being set up, and in other courts of arbitration.

Public Organizations and Independent Citizens' Organizations

The various public organizations and independent citizens' organizations may participate in the prevention of violations of the law, the fight against crime, and the protection of citizens, in cooperation with the law enforcement agencies.

In order to provide citizens and organizations with skilled legal assistance and safeguard the rights and freedoms of citizens, and also to help in guaranteeing legality in the judicature, a society of lawyers of Estonia is being set up.

The society of lawyers of Estonia operates on the basis of law.

Activity by private lawyers (the bureau of lawyers) is permitted.

Citizens may band together in citizens' militias (or groups).

Militias (or groups) may be set up on production, territorial, or other principles.

Enterprises, establishments, and organizations may use funding from one or more enterprises to set up their own paid security services for the purpose of maintaining public order and the inviolability of state property and the property of cooperatives and other public organizations, and of citizens, and also to protect the public.

Members of militias (or groups), and also of security services at enterprises, establishments, and organizations, may band together in order to carry out their tasks and safeguard their legitimate interests and rights in the independent public organization the alliance for the maintenance of order in Estonia.

The rights of members of the alliance for the maintenance of order in Estonia are protected by law.

Volunteer fire departments set up on the basis of enterprises, establishments, and organizations for the purpose of safeguarding the personal property of citizens and state property, and also production emergency rescue work, and uyezd and city fire departments formed from them, may join the alliance of firefighters of Estonia.

The rights of members of the alliance of firefighters of Estonia are protected by law.

Volunteer fire departments and societies cooperate with the professional fire departments and the medical, water-rescue and other rescue services and militias (or groups), and the police.

For the purposes of protecting citizens and enterprises, establishments, and organizations, and to provide watch services and other law enforcement needs, permission is granted for the activity of militia cooperatives (security services) and of individuals (private detectives) on the basis of licenses issued by organs of self-management in accordance with procedure as laid down by law.

Other State Measures to Guarantee Public Safety

In order to guarantee public safety the state does the following:

- develops a warning system for apartment houses, apartments and places where material values are stored, and also a system of telephone communications;
- organizes the production and installation of safes, archive strong boxes, and improved antitheft devices and locks;
- strengthens the security of houses, apartments, warehouses and production premises and other buildings in use and provides support for change in the technical specifications of newly planned buildings for the purpose of improving the safety of the public and of property;
- organizes a service to assist victims for the purpose of providing legal, psychological, medical and other aid, and makes provision for compensation from the state for damages caused to victims as the result of crime;
- creates an effective social assistance service whose tasks include providing help for orphaned children (children in children's homes) by providing foster homes, and so forth, social rehabilitation for persons released from places of detention, and vagrants and other persons of no fixed address, by creating a system of regional priorities and the organization of their work; and the organization of treatment for alcoholics and drug addicts and their social adaptation, and so forth;
- creates a system of training for citizens in the skills of self-defense and protection of property, operating on state and public bases;
- considers it appropriate and encourages the participation of the public in crime prevention in cooperation with law enforcement agencies.

Stages in the Realization of the Concept

Stage I. 1990-1991:

- drawing up laws and other enforceable enactments to regulate the law enforcement activity of state agencies and public organizations in the Estonian SSR (laws on the judicial system, the police, the legal profession, the alliance for public order, and other laws);

—increasing the wages of workers in law enforcement agencies and improving material-technical support for them;

—carrying out a reform of the courts;

—reorganizing the Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs into a republic ministry and transferring its management to the Tallinn Militia School;

—decentralizing the law enforcement agencies and setting up a municipal militia;

—transferring medical sobering-up rooms in internal affairs offices operating under city and rayon executive committees, and sobering-up stations, to appropriate public health and local self-management facilities;

—setting up militias (groups) to maintain public order, and an alliance for public order in Estonia;

—reorganizing the bulletin NYUKOGUDE YYGUS (SOVETSKOYE PRAVO) as a journal.

Stage II. 1992-1995:

—setting up aid services for victims and social aid services; establishing priorities for the social rehabilitation of persons released from places of detention, vagrants, and so forth;

—combining pretrial investigations into a single system;

—combining forensic facilities into a single extradepartmental system;

—setting up an independent publishing house for legal literature;

—setting up a scientific center (analysis center) for law enforcement;

—creating a legal data bank;

—transferring the Estonian SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs services that handle compliance with the sentences of the courts, and establishments subordinate to it, to the Estonian SSR Ministry of Justice (places of detention) and the Estonian SSR Ministry of Health (treatment and disease-prevention facilities), with simultaneous radical changes in the system and the activity of those facilities.

Stage III. After 1995:

—setting up an Estonian Institute of Law Enforcement;

—improving the services providing help for victims (compensation for material damages by victims as the result of crime, and so forth).

Ukrainian MVD Chief on Measures Against Racketeering

90UN0531A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
11 Nov 89 p3

[Interview with Ukrainian SSR MVD Minister I.D. Gladush by RATAU Correspondent A. Litvinov: "A Barrier to the Dishonest Ruble"; date and place not given]

[Text] Embezzlement, speculation, theft and racketeering—these terms have begun to appear more and more in the newspapers and in conversation. The crime wave has become a serious social problem, which demands extreme measures. Ukrainian SSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Gen-Lt Ivan Dmitrievich Gladush, describes to RATAU Correspondent A. Litvinov the measures republic law-enforcement authorities are undertaking in the struggle with these negative phenomena.

[Correspondent] Ivan Dmitrievich, let us begin our conversation with statistics.

[Gladush] In that case I would like to say right off that they are rather alarming. In spite of the measures taken, we have not yet succeeded in putting a stop to encroachments on public property, for a variety of reasons. These include shortcomings in the work of our sub-units, and BKhSS [Struggle with Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation] in particular; poor control and accounting on the part of the administration and the public; and the indulgent attitude of one's associates toward one who lays hands on socialist property.

For the republic's national economy as a whole, according to data from Ukrainian SSR Goskomstat, owing to shortages, waste, theft and spoilage of material-commodity values disclosed last year, losses amount to nearly 76 million rubles. "Leaders" in this are agricultural production, state and cooperative trade, domestic services, light industry, housing and municipal services agencies, and marketing and supply organizations. They also provide the majority of the criminally-punishable law violations: theft and bribery.

The level of pilferage committed by officials and materially-responsible persons by means of misuse of their official position has grown: particularly, by taking advantage of outdated norms for writing off raw materials and imperfections in technology, they gradually accumulate and then appropriate the indeterminable surpluses. And that is just what V.S. Neupokoyeva, warehouse chief in the office of material-technical supply at the Voroshilovgrad Baked Goods Production Association, and A.T. Kortkikh, an engineer in the production department of that same office, did. During the period from 1985 through 1988, they illegally wrote off 1,200 liters of alcohol, 34 tons of yeast, 500 liters of cognac, 1,000 liters of wine and other types of raw materials. The total shortfall amounted to more than 200,000 rubles.

The basic mission of BKhSS today is precisely this, to expose serious and often camouflaged crime in the economic sphere. And it is getting harder and harder to do every year. Let's face it, the criminals in this area are experienced people. They set up a base of witnesses ahead of time and gather counter-arguments; that is, they prepare their alibis, and at the same time take advantage of the many loopholes in our laws. Therefore, we must strive to stop such crimes at an early stage, when they are still getting organized. The moreso, since the provisional committees for the struggle with crime, formed by decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet, have summoned all law-enforcement organs to more decisive action.

[Correspondent] But after all, it's not just lack of control on the part of certain administrators that facilitates theft. Certain ones no doubt are not lacking recompense for the "services" they render to the criminals.

[Gladush] You're right. Today there is nothing worse than bribery. It is demoralizing both the management system, and khozraschet. And it is hard to combat. Today we have essentially lost our system of evidence. The bribe-giver, before he "bestows gratitude" on someone, turns around ten times and seeks or creates a situation when there would not be anyone else around; that is, he gives his bribes surreptitiously. And it is hard to catch someone red-handed at that moment. And the courts are reluctant to bring bribery cases to trial. Moreover (and this is yet another paradox in our legal system), if the accused admits that he has committed such a crime, the court will sentence him to the maximum prison term. But after all, a person who admits his guilt hopes for a lighter sentence.

[Correspondent] It is well-known that pilferage is directly associated with speculation. What is the situation today?

[Gladush] Analysis shows that the number of persons in the republic convicted of speculation is increasing every year. In only eight months, militia officials have exposed nearly 5,500 such crimes, which is 6.5 percent greater than for the same period last year.

An especially significant increase in speculation has taken place in Khmel'nitskiy, Ternopol, Kharkov, Voroshilovgrad, Odessa and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblasts. It has struck the oblast centers, the major industrial and port cities, and the resort zones, and it is expanding rapidly in the rural areas. More than 10,000 persons are arrested by the militia every year for petty speculation. Money and valuables confiscated from them amounts to more than two million rubles.

There is yet another problem: buying up of foreign currency, precious metals and jewels. There are instances in which persons have discovered treasure, appropriated it and subsequently committed illegal currency deals, selling the gold coins or other articles made from precious metals, which they found. For example, this year N.S. Boddubets and N.S. Kiyakha, workers of the Gorokhov PMK [Mobile Mechanized Column], were

arrested while trying to sell tsarist coins they had discovered while doing excavation work, and appropriated for themselves. Counterfeit money is also being produced. We have set up a special unit to combat this evil. But experienced cadres are needed. And although we have advanced courses for training the necessary specialists in Kharkov, that is not enough. And what's more, the material base is still, unfortunately, rather poor.

The majority of the populace is speaking out against just such cooperative speculators. But it is difficult to bring these operators to justice. Judge for yourself: Article 154 of the Ukrainian SSR Criminal Code defines that the subject of speculation can be only a private person. Dishonest people have taken advantage of this loophole. For example, joining together in a cooperative, certain passers-by are buying up various goods and reselling them at inflated prices, right under our noses. That is, they are legally engaging in speculation. But they do not fall under the purview of the given article.

[Correspondent] And what is the solution?

[Gladush] We don't think it is necessary to close down all such cooperatives. First of all, in our view it is necessary to establish a progressive tax; and secondly, to increase the criminal liability for their illegal actions.

The executive committees of local Soviets of People's Deputies must be more attentive when resolving questions of establishment of cooperatives. Unfortunately, they are still acting hastily, and they do not look deeply and thoroughly into the activities of the cooperatives. As a result they are being penetrated by previously-convicted persons, who according to the Law on Cooperatives in the USSR, cannot occupy supervisory and materially-responsible positions. For example, the Leninskiy Rayispolkom in the city of Dnepropetrovsk registered the Sogdiana Cooperative for preparing the national dishes of Uzbekistan. It was headed by V.A. Rusanov, who had not worked anywhere since 1986, and was previously convicted a number of times. He was registered in Kherson Oblast, but did not live there. But here he was given a loan in the amount of 100,000 rubles. He put up the money against a letter credit and disappeared. It was necessary to search for him. He was arrested far from Dnepropetrovsk, where he managed to spend 50,000. An investigation is presently under way.

I must point out that the number of such violations of the law is on the increase. Whereas last year 148 criminal

cases were opened against such cooperatives, in the first nine months of this year, there are already more than 400.

We must also give some thought to forbidding cooperative associations to buy up various goods wholesale. It is understandable that for a seller of fabrics it is easier to measure off 400 meters right away than to sell it a few meters at a time. His wages would still be the same. But besides his wages he quite often receives additional recompense. Right now nails, wood-screws, bolts and hinge-hasps have disappeared from the stores. Why? After all, we have not decreased their manufacture. Then where have they gone? They've gone over "to the left."

Yet another form of organized speculation has turned up. Therefore, after authorizing the activity of cooperatives, the state should have also given thought to the sources of supplying them with the necessary materials. Then there would not be such cases as the one of B.Ye. Fogel, dispatcher at the Gerkules Wholesale Trade Cooperative in Nikopol. He bought up nearly six tons of sausage in local agricultural trade at six rubles a kilogram, but in the documents he entered that he had bought them for eight. He then shipped the sausage to Vologda Oblast and sold it to the trade organizations there for nine rubles a kilogram. Here you have a theft of more than 11,000 rubles and a profit amounting to almost 6,000 rubles.

In Kiev, Kirovograd, Odessa, Kherson and Chernigov oblasts, cooperators are buying up large amounts of grain on kolkhozes and sovkhozes and are selling it at inflated prices outside the republic. This year over 10,000 tons of grain were exported in this manner.

Success in combating unearned incomes depends to a decisive degree on maintaining order in administrative activity and in improving the economic mechanism. The Internal Affairs organs are faced with still greater tasks.

But no matter how intensive the actions of militia officials become, the problems cannot be solved through their efforts alone. There must be a radical turnabout in public opinion toward total hostility to unearned wealth. We are already accustomed to heaping shame on thieving operators and all sorts of scroungers when they are caught. But how often do we close our eyes, when people take plywood and Dutch tile from a building project in plain sight, or when they trade in spare parts stolen from a store? What would prevent us all to switch from contemplative indignation and passiveness to active and total hostility to even the slightest encroachment on the people's goods.

UkSSR TV Official on Interethnic Channel

90UN0334A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Nov 89
2nd Edition p 3

[Article by I. Mashchenko, chief director of Ukrainian Television Programming, Kiev: "What Will You Be Like?"]

[Text] Surprising but true—in our country which comprises more than a hundred peoples and nations, general state television has somehow not reached the point of establishing interethnic television programming. And this when both all-union television channels were like twin brothers...in their featurelessness!

True, the union republics attempted to compensate in some measure for this deficiency by creating their own regional ethnic programs. And the call sign of Ukrainian Television (UT) was heard for the first time in 1964. Today we have another 14 oblast television stations operating in addition to the republic station. And a third of UT's own broadcasting (730 hours per year) consists of the joint screen production of local committees. This enables us to significantly enrich the republic screen with a variety of news items from all regions and consolidates the creative efforts of television broadcasters.

Our colleagues from Belorussia, Georgia, and Uzbekistan have made interesting finds in establishing their regional republic programs. But although all these programs fulfill an extremely important role, the service they provide to the republic population is exceptionally local in nature. There is almost a total lack of direct, creative contacts between them, no joint stock; few television centers in the capitals are linked by cable or radio relay for effecting program exchange.

And now in the realm of all-union color television we see the first glimmer of hope—a decision made by the board of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting on forming an Interethnic Contact Channel (KMO) based on the second all-union program of Central Television.

Employees at the Main Administration for Local Television and Radio Broadcasting of the USSR committee are on the brink of implementing the concept. Just last summer they conducted energetic and conscientious visits to all the major television centers in the country, discussed matters with creative personnel and television programmers, and scrutinized all the "firm" local broadcasts. Then all the instructional letters and recommendations appeared—on what Moscow wanted to see from each republic on KMO. There was even talk of discussing in detail the concept of a new television channel on union level. But then, as we see once again, the wavering set in and everything proceeded down that well-trodden path: The circular has been issued—kindly follow the instructions.

In the meantime, such an important social undertaking as the opening of an essentially new television program

not only affects professional television personnel, but touches on the interests of millions of viewers as well. It therefore requires thorough interpretive treatment, especially in the current stage of development of Soviet society. A plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was convened dedicated to interethnic relations in the country, a topic which has acquired critical significance, as we know. KMO could and should do a great deal to foster unity among our peoples.

However, as the erection of a house begins with the careful development of its architectural design, so the introduction of a television channel must be preceded by establishment of its overall concept. Unfortunately, careful development of a KMO design has not yet come about. For over half a year now, television stations of many local committees have been feeling their way along, trying to make the second all-union program pleasing with their own broadcasts, but television personnel in the outlying studios still have not acquired the necessary clarity of purpose—they still do not know how or where to proceed.

Here I recall our own experience in setting up Ukrainian television broadcasting. Somewhat more than two decades ago, we also were deciding in bits and pieces, as they say—everybody put in his two cents. But gradually we erected a unified structure, whose basis consisted of titles and series common to the main republic television staffs and oblast studios. The Main Board of Directors for republic television broadcasting is assuming the role of coordinator of the creative effort. It is accumulating ideas and proposals, directing a search for new means of broadcasting. Discussion of the main trends in republic television broadcasting takes place at Ukrainian television councils. The advantages of such a system, in operation already a quarter of a century, are seen not only in the fact that it brings initiative and search into the process, but also in that each participant in the creative process knows the overall plan. This is extremely important under conditions of "multiple-machine" production, when broadcasts of one orientation are prepared by various collectives.

When we consider that, even in view of the coming transition to intensified economic accountability on the regional level, the basic underlying principle of economic development in the USSR can comprise as before only a single, country-wide, national-economic complex, we are faced with the task of finding our own forms of effecting its screen adaptation, different from what the Central Television Main Editorial Staff for Propaganda is doing on the first program. And here a unifying role can be played by regular television links between the union republics and major economic regions. But such a labor-intensive (and expensive as well) business should not simply be farmed out to two concerned local studios. We cannot do without assistance from the center here, without its coordinating role, for almost every communication link runs through Moscow or is operationally subordinate to the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting service. And—there is no

use in hiding the fact—today at times it is far simpler to effect a television link with a foreign power way across the ocean than to establish screen dialogue between the capitals of two neighboring union republics.

We have a great need for operational information concerning one another's lives. It is felt that the programming of "Novosti" could be set up somewhat differently on Central Television's second program. Specifically, all the air time of one or two of its segments could be handed over daily to union republic studios, and the remaining segments could be filled up to a greater extent with video material from all parts of the country.

Or we could take the "birthdays" of our union republics, which are presently just pages on the calendar. Let us say that we might devote a great portion of the broadcast time 1 January to Belorussian KMO. On 25 December Ukrainian television might invite viewers all across the country to the "name-day" celebration of their republic. And the same with respect to the other regions. And on 30 December, carrying on this distinctive television tradition, we could together celebrate our common Socialist Fatherland from the Carpathians to Sakhalin.

Of course, these are just certain features in the potential creative appearance of the Interethnic Contact Channel. But the KMO needs a true patron-creator. It is not yet planned with any accuracy in various documents of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. A special section of the Main Administration for Local Television and Radio Broadcasting has partially assigned certain coordinating functions. But clearly this is not enough.

What is the way out? I see it in the creation of a separate program management board for the KMO. Both the first and second programs of Central Television and Interethnic Contact Channel must have their own special television character, and their reciprocal relations must be based on principles of creative competition. It is probable that, only under conditions of independence and concentrating in the same hands directorship of the entire process and organization of the extensive KMO television management—which can come to involve about a hundred regional studios of the country—will it be possible to achieve the desired results.

But there are many problems facing KMO, creative as well as organizational in nature. Here is one, for example, not at all a secondary matter—the problem of what language will be used to broadcast over the Interethnic Contact Channel. Naturally, when broadcasts dealing with local life—whether with regard to the Ukraine or the Central Asian republics—were prepared for Central Television by television crews sent out from Moscow, the language used in all cases was one and the same—Russian. It is a strange thing to think how much easier it was for us to hear over Central Television the original Italian in that "Octopus" serial, or the Spanish

in the Brazilian melodrama "The Slave-Girl Izaura," than to hear original Ukrainian, Georgian, Uzbek, or the languages of other peoples. This means it is the task of KMO to allow the country to feel the entire constellation of ethnic cultures and languages in their primogeniture. At the same time, we cannot get by without that great intermediary—the Russian language. But we must find the properly tactful form of its use.

The time has probably come for conducting a representative, all-union, scientific and practical conference on the problems of multi-program television broadcasting under today's conditions. We recall the first (and only, unfortunately) such conference, conducted in 1966, when in fact single-channel television reigned in our country, and the giant "Ostankino" had yet to be born. Perhaps it is no accident that electronic journalism theorists foresaw all kinds of Soviet television programming—special-reporting, youth and peasant-oriented programs, sports programming... But they could not even predict a place for an Interethnic Contact Channel. What a shame...

Not long ago I read in the British magazine *ECONOMIST* that one of the features of a developed state is the presence of at least 10 television programming choices. Is this realistic for our country? Presently our limit is 5 channels in Moscow, 4 in a number of the union republic capitals. But this is not because there is insufficient source material for setting up truly multi-program broadcasting. It is simply that the number of ground-based means available for sending television signals (from TV tower to television antenna) is incapable, on the average, of delivering to the viewer more than 3 or 4 programs. But if we turn our gaze to the skies, to space?

We have in mind the prospect of introducing direct television broadcasting through the principle of "space relay—home television set." After all, on the balconies of our nearest neighbors—Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians (not to mention people in the United States and the West European countries)—you can see antenna "saucers" which receive television signals directly from space. Of course, sooner or later this "cup" will pass to us as well. But if so, will our national republics be able to find a place in space orbit for their television channels? We feel that a 12-hour daily program of Ukrainian television could be of definite interest to a significant circle of viewers in the Far East, in Kazakhstan, and other areas—and not just for the millions of people who have left the Ukraine and now reside permanently in other regions. Representatives of all peoples in our country have also built their homes on Ukrainian land, and it would always be a festive occasion for them to see and hear their native tongue spoken on their home TV screen, to see their paternal kray.

But—this is fantasy of the future. Today the people who work in television in our country must build the Interethnic Contact Channel. What kind of channel will you be, our new child of the TV screen?

Literary Paper Examines Types of Socialism

90UN0153A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* in Russian No 43, 24 Oct 89 p 10

[Article by Vladimir Yegorov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Socialism of the People or 'Socialism for the People'"]

[Text] If You Do Not Bend It, It Will Not Straighten Out

Today, one way or another, the question of what socialism is comes to the forefront in numerous discussions. The range of expressed opinions (in the press and behind the scenes, and in local disputes and in the highest tribunals) is extremely broad.

There is nothing surprising in the emergence of a variety of polar and paradoxical views. This is an inseparable accompanying element of free development. But just as naturally, it is also necessary to analyze and to discuss judgments and concepts, but not to implant just one. There should be no place in democratic development for a monopolistic abuse of the social conscience.

In critical historical epochs, special tensions and contradictions always arise that are nourished by life itself. There are no revolutionary processes without this. It is bad when extreme radicalism prevails. Lenin, as is known, spoke about the petty bourgeoisie that was "enraged" over the horrors of capitalism. It seems that here as well the man in the street, horrified by the tragedies of history and "enraged" by what was not received (but promised) under the life of communist prosperity, has also rushed into extremes. He either appeals "not to forgo principles" and turn back, or he rejects the structure that has been established in our country and whatever socialism there is, or he wants perestroika to reduce its dizzy speeds, or he yearns for the next quick "leap forward."

Where does all of this come from? There are many reasons. I think, however, that the main reason lies in the vagueness of current concepts about socialism and the ways and methods for constructing it.

In understanding socialism as two branches of the same tree, whose name is human civilization, and asking the question about what direction humanity is taking, it is at the same time also important to formulate the principal problems clearly. For example, what did mankind create that was a higher ideal than the eternal ideals of good, equality, freedom, and justice? I am convinced—nothing. What are socialist ideals, if not a striving for the priority of the working person in society, and, moreover, so that all could live in equal measure in accordance with these eternal truths, and have economic, political, and legal opportunities. The answer may be trivial, but mankind has not come up with anything better. Depending on the attitude toward these questions, apparently now popular discussions also have to be held about convergence, about differences and similarities

between capitalism and socialism, about economic and social priorities, and about the primacy of human values, etc.

Many complications, and at times ambiguities in addressing the problems of socialist ideals, pass on into history. They are concentrated around the features of Russia as the world's first state that took the path of translating these ideals into a language of practice around the specifics and "complexity" of our history. And there is no escaping this. Moreover, it is not necessary to escape. The lessons of history are not only the burden of tragedies, and victory and defeat, but they are also our riches. Riches that do not always have value, but which always have experience.

These riches include the experience of realizing a principally new idea that has not lost its urgency to this day: Lenin's answer to critics when he said that there are no laws in history proceeding from which it is necessary first to achieve a certain level of culture and civilization, and only then to build a new society. Departing from revolutionary romanticism, not having the opportunity to rely on a revolution in countries in the West, and overcoming the utopian idea about ways to build socialism, Lenin sought a way out of the real situation in a specific society. He insisted on the need to ensure the socialist nature of a society that is political at first, after assuming authority, and only on this basis to try to achieve economic, social, and cultural gains that were won by others; that is, by preceding civilizations—by capitalism. It is sometimes asserted in literature that such a step was taken for the first time in the world. And that it seems to have been done not according to "laws" concocted in reading rooms, but, as the saying goes, "according to life..." But in the interview of I. Klyamkin and A. Migranyan in *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA* of 16 August it is demonstrated well how the political structure of bourgeois democracy for decades fostered both the market economy and democracy itself. So we were only repeating the same experience in our own way, and this was not a departure from the laws of history, but adherence to them.

To what extent socialism realized this law is another matter. It is not possible, and it is theoretically incorrect to compare, without reservations, highly experienced capitalism with socialism, which did not really even develop according to its own laws and is barely freeing itself from obviously superficial and schematized models, etc. However, such a comparison is useful to political opponents of socialism. For us the main thing is to understand: The illusions of a swift and direct movement of civilization on socialist rails could not have been finally rejected by human thought without the Soviet and international experience in their realization. Socialist ideals are too high and attractive, and the age-old aspirations of mankind for their implementation were too strong to be satisfied with an abstract-theoretical understanding: It is impossible and destructive to try to put ideals into practice that were not prepared by decades and decades of work. Alas, we had to come to this

understanding first and foremost through our difficult and tragic experience. And, of course, the question comes up here about the price of enlightenment. But this is a special problem, part of a more general problem—about the price of progress.

It seems that we are now really beginning to understand that ideals can be realized not by way of ignoring or artificial discarding of the laws of history, but just the opposite—only by considering, knowing, and utilizing them. However, the haste and hysteria which dominate many of our contemporaries in the treatment of ancient and yesterday's history is evidence that, as before, we are not managed by the laws of history, economics, and culture, but by slogans and the norms of revolutionary struggle. Among them are such as these: "Engage the enemy in battle, and there it will become apparent," and, no matter what happens, take power, engage in actions as deep as possible in order to seize a bridgehead just in the event of a forced withdrawal, destroy the old in general and a specific enemy in as fast and decisive a way as possible, etc. Perestroika, which was started as a revolutionary change of relations and structures of socialism with a number of movements, formations, and workers, started to turn to appeals and work for a revolutionary "breaking" of "the very foundations" of the nature of socialism. And from the right, and from the left. Extremes are extremes, and there should really be no panic at their appearance. However, it is permissible to fight with them, only by revealing their positions and calling things by their names. In straightening out the crooked line of socialist social development, it is not possible once again to test it for durability by bending methods. In order not to deform it another time. Moreover, the question is not about future abstract ideas, but about the fate of millions.

Illusions as a Way to National Tragedy

In asking questions about just what socialism is, we begin to depart from the construction of speculative concepts and incomplete models. And this is the real Marxist approach, because, according to Marx, any formation is not a completed condition, but a movement.

At the same time, the renewal of the ways of socialistic reorganizations and perestroika does not move in a simple way. Perhaps the main complexity lies in the fact that the acceleration of socioeconomic development turned out to be a more complicated task than was anticipated. But it was not objective to oppose socialism in the area of economics from extrahistorical positions and from extraformational experience common to all humanity.

The question about the market comes to the forefront one way or another in the course of discussions about ways and methods of economic reform nowadays. And this is understandable—here, in this problem, old and new approaches to economics come together. Socialism in its utopian version rejected commodity-monetary

relationships and the laws of the market; that is, that which, for example, O.T. Bogomolov, in our view, properly and accurately called "one of mankind's most ingenious inventions, polished and perfected for centuries from the time of feudalism and even slave-owning. To this day, life has not created a real alternative to these relationships" (KOMMUNIST, No 11, 1989). And, if this is so, then the question is not whether a market is needed or not needed. The question is about its utilization in socialism and in socialistic mechanisms of distribution. And, undoubtedly, by taking the past and present into account.

It was not long ago, speaking about the utilization of commodity-monetary relations under our conditions, that economists and politicians "ran up against" weighty ideological and sociopolitical arguments (they no longer put these forth today, apparently fearing to be reputed as "not being up to date"). And I would like to support the appeals I hear more persistently: Let us now under conditions of glasnost argue, think, and adopt, but let us also tell the people the whole truth. Do we want to reject, while struggling with wage leveling, the idea of social justice. No. "Vulgar-communist" distribution is not necessary. But is increasing social inequality and an intensifying property stratification needed? Also, no. Today, however, the judgment is becoming popular: It is better to live differently, but well, than for all to live alike and poorly. The phrase is said loudly. But it is not clear why, having made mistakes, ignoring, for example, the laws of economics, it is necessary for us, without fail, to assimilate them to the detriment of social justice? And apparently the time has come to analyze in the scientific plan what social justice is and what the practical ways are for achieving it. To get an understanding and bring it to the consciousness of the masses so the politicians and millions of people would have an understanding of these problems.

Socialism, in order to have a right to existence, must master the higher achievements of human civilization in the area of economics, and the utilization of achievements in science, technology, and production. And simultaneously socialism is obliged to preserve its social and spiritual priorities. Otherwise, where is the socialism? To consolidate what is available and to realize the potential priorities of socialism—this is the problem. To find "the extent of uniting private interest,...its verification and control by the state, and the extent of its subordination to the general interests..." means to implement that which, according to Lenin, "previously constituted, and which unfortunately today still continues to constitute, a 'stumbling block' for many, many socialists." Indeed, it is really difficult to explain to the people why, let us say, we lagged so seriously behind the most developed capitalist countries in efficiency of production and standard of living. But it is not permitted to dash from one side to the other. It is no worse for today's socialists, shying away from the "stumbling block" of the old socialists, to stand in deep thought before an illusion. And if someone is disenchanted with the ideas of

socialism, let him say so outright and not hide behind the "fig leaf" of traditional idle talk. This will be more honorable. Without this, politics is transformed into intrigue.

Previously it was said that everything was bad "with them." These notions prevailed in society. Today, there are forces that lay claim to a dominant influence who want, it seems, to assert a directly opposite opinion—everything "there" is good. But is it necessary to assert the illusion in the mass consciousness: We will switch, they say, to a free market, but even better, simply to capitalism, and immediately everything will be better in our country, and we will heal everything, just like "they?"

But, first, a naive question: Which one of us will be a capitalist, and who will be the hired worker? Let us answer this first. We will convince the people, the people will understand us, and we will go farther. Or, finally, it will be necessary to "show all the cards" of the agroindustrial complex of that America, and not play in arguments of being either "for" or "against" the farming class, and only then call for a "liquidation" of the kolkhozes [collective farm], sovkhozes [state farm], etc. What is needed is a real variety of forms of economic management, rivalry, and competition among them, and not another new uniformity. Which, as specialists know, does not exist anywhere, including not in one capitalist country. And talking, for example, about the purchase of enterprises, the issuance of stocks, it is still more appropriate at the beginning to work out the social, economic, and legal regulating mechanisms. To show who among us will be able to buy stock and how much. Otherwise we will have another misunderstanding and counteraction as happened with cooperatives. The very idea of cooperatives has become discredited in the eyes of the people. The idea itself is remarkable, workable, and promising. In a word, if we will not be frank, if we do not immediately come up with a mechanism for the social protection of the interests of the workers, then we ourselves will evoke, through our "sluggishness" and half-measures, the dissatisfaction of the people even with the best, most interesting, and fruitful ideas.

The problem, as it presents itself, "rests" on the following. Not only publicists, but professional economists as well, have done a lot of work on the creation of myths about the possibility of obtaining quick, painless, and immediate benefits, acting in Leninist fashion, according to the logic of the implementation of NEP [New Economic Policy]. It is amazing, but hiding behind Lenin and taking into account only the outward similarity, the "form," we forget about the essence of NEP—to proceed from life. It is necessary, finally, to reject the notion that the masses, the nation, and people are somehow impersonal. That which can be manipulated and which can be experimented on endlessly. The forms of economic management of life that are habitual and rooted in the people must dictate policy, and not schemes. It is not possible to forget about the national tragedy when peasant life was

shaped and reshaped without taking into account centuries of a way of life and traditions. And the farm owner was ruined and new social relations were not instituted. And artel principles were written off either on account of their bourgeois underpinnings or on account of the infamous Russian patriarchy.

Our average American-European modernist interpretation of utopia has led to a crisis, and the Japanese in an extra-national, in essence, capitalism, brought so much from national-historical originality that the entire world is amazed. And we along with it. To what can this be attributed? Well, to the fact that the originality of historical development is not a whim, but a fact dictated by laws of history. It turned out that millions of lives were ruined through the neglect of experience accumulated by generations, experience which became part of the people. What now? Simply to acknowledge that a mistake was made and, again, in a new, more likely in the old way, to overcome the fate of today's millions and their traditions? What has not worked should be discarded. Harmful habits must not be fostered. But social and economic reorganizations must be conducted proceeding from available human material and not from "visionary" or "overseas" material, and workers who are brought to our land only on paper. Workers are formed over generations. And in the years of socialist history, he developed into a different kind from what he was on the eve of NEP. It seems, nonetheless, that some from among the "new revolutionaries" again decided to give more thought to the logicity of theoretical constructions, and not to human destinies.

What is this, another manifestation of "protectionism"? To the contrary—it is an appeal: Not to slight the economy and public opinion with ordinary monillusions, but actually to support the politico-economic policy for a creative perestroyka, for a variety of forms of property, and methods of economic management under socialism. And not to implant one or another form to please dominant concepts, but to support all—let them compete. Life itself shows what and who is more viable. And for whom is this appeal intended? Of course, both for those who determine policy and for those who develop its versions and who form public opinion. There is no better, if you please, more socialistic method of action than to tell the people the truth and to entrust them not only to test the path that was started at the top, but to select the path themselves. Let the people who are, according to the basic postulate of Marxism, the creator of history, actually select the concepts, forms, and methods for creating an effective economic, just, and socially viable system. The complicated scientific and practical task resides precisely in the creation of an appropriate mechanism for this. Creative methods are needed for its resolution, and not "shaking up" methods.

Quite a few have appeared among us who want to criticize Leninism and to examine alternatives to it. But somehow the conviction has not crystallized that both Marx and Lenin were against anticipating all details of development for the future. It seems that Lenin did not

have a completed concept of socialism, not only because he did not succeed in creating one, but also because he did not intend to "record all cases of future development." Real movement toward socialism and real socialist practice were more important to him. In our view, it was precisely this that was undeservedly forgotten. The problem itself was not developed much theoretically: How to understand the creative and searching nature of socialism. And this is a question not only of the quality of theory, but it is also a question of political practice.

The searching nature of socialism presupposes models and variants not only in the international and historical plan. It was exactly this that was forgotten. Under Stalin, the Leninist ideas of socialist competition were applied in a primitive way. Its principles (glasnost, comparability of results, and the possibility of repeating an experience) were reduced to application in the competition between two machine tool operators, shops, or similar plants. Lenin had in mind competition of associations, regions, soviets, enterprises, and communities in the search for ways, means, and methods of socialist construction. A search on the basis of diversity. And this is the only way to remove illusions decisively and to get down to practical socialist work.

"The Locomotive of Socialism"

The possibilities for such a—searching—development of socialism have really not been verified by history yet. The monopoly in thinking, which created an equivalent state and political machine, led to a monopoly in the practice of socio-economic development. It is possible to create conditions for a different movement in society only on the basis of democracy.

This is what is particularly alarming: Attempts to insert in the social consciousness the idea of the need for authoritative methods to achieve a gradual transition to a market economy and genuine democracy somehow very quickly began to be accepted normally (see the same Klyamkin and Migranyan interview). Categorical disagreements with such assertions have already been expressed in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, and I would like to subscribe to them.

First one should not confuse democracy with the amorphous condition engendered by state paralysis when the "system" looks abstractly at attempts to dismantle it and disrupt it from within and at the violation of legality, law and order, etc. There are no such democratic systems. And there cannot be as long as the state exists. Nor do they exist in the West. Is this really serious—by creating myths about bourgeois democracy and about ways to form it, to attempt to incline society either to a deliberate undemocratic condition or to anarchy? Every democratic state defends its own system of values, and "its own democracy."

Second, if history is supposed to teach us something, then it is not only the danger of leapfrogging stages that other countries and peoples have gone through, of which

Klyamkin and Migranyan are trying to convince us. It also teaches that experience should not be copied, but that both one's own and foreign experience should be taken into account. Besides, the concept of "foreign" is relative. Since we are part of human civilization, then we are simply obliged to use other experience, augmenting it with our own social, economic, spiritual, and national-historical originality. Are there any grounds for saying that an effort was made to do this? No. Under Stalin, these efforts were suppressed, and society moved into a trivial totalitarian state system. Not to a socialism that was well thought out. Or, for example, problems of social property. Here we followed the topsy-turvy approach to property under capitalism in its extreme aspect, monopoly reduced to an absurdity. But monopoly is not the same as socialism. It can be said that if our economy is working poorly for reasons of failure to utilize mankind's experience, then the state-political system did not allow socialism to develop freely and creatively because of the overly literal use of the phenomenon (experience) whose name is state monopoly.

In one of his speeches, A.P. Butenko justifiably focused the question on the fact that "private property is the material foundation of individual freedom and the basis of democracy in a bourgeois society. It is private property that belongs to the individual which renders him relatively independent of" the powerful of this world.... "Socialism is called on to eliminate private property, and together with this the objective basis for personal freedom and democracy that functions in a bourgeois society. Therefore, after eliminating private property as the basis of individual freedom and after consolidating the indivisible supremacy of socialist property, the attempt to preserve the principles and norms of the democracy of a bourgeois society, after filling them with new, socialist content, turned out to be utopia..." (PRAVDA, "What Should Socialism Be Like?," 8 August 1989)

But private property under conditions of bourgeois development leads neither to socialism nor to social and political equality. Despite all the democracy and pluralism of bourgeois democracies, the monopoly of political power, information, and propaganda has not been eliminated. The limits of bourgeois democracy are not in the degree of openness of discussion, which yesterday was still at the center of opposition of systems, but in monopoly. Moreover, capitalism has already shown its ability to erect monopoly in the political and spiritual spheres of totalitarian absolutism, including outright dictates. Thus, a literal transfer of the attributes of bourgeois democracy to socialist soil is unfruitful, not only because of the different economic foundation of democracy, but also for other essential reasons underlying this type of democracy.

Other original ways of developing democracy are necessary to socialism, not in the name of "uniqueness," but substance. This is a very complex and difficult question. Let us dwell at least on several of its aspects.

Such a danger as the possibility of replacing the monopoly of ministries and departments (old bureaucratic structures) with new monopoly structures—committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet—which has already been noted in the press, should be emphasized. There also, concepts can predominate not because they are better, but because the forces of the “pushers” are stronger. Talking about this, A.Ya. Degtyarev and D.I. Piskunov (IZVESTIYA, 7 August 1989) propose mechanisms for considering alternative and independent expert opinion, etc. As the saying goes, the ideas that have been put forth work.

Undoubtedly, under conditions of glasnost, the democracy of elections and openness of work of Soviet organs at all levels, the danger of monopolization of one position, and the lack of control and incompetence in making decisions are reduced significantly. But, with our bitter experience of the past, we really can no longer allow even the slightest loophole for any group, departmental, or local egoism. Everything cannot be anticipated. However, loopholes have to be plugged wherever they appear. Even hypothetically.

Monopoly is all-pervasive, both horizontally and vertically. It is even stranger when against a background of the fight with hypertrophied centralization and group egoism, there appear, let us say, such ideas as: A USSR People's Deputy should have the legal and economic opportunity to unite the deputy corps on the spot and be able to lead them in his own way. People frightened by bureaucracy and departmental dictates, it seems, receive such innovations with enthusiasm. Or, for example, the possibility of sponsor support of deputy activity on somebody's part. The slightest doubt here is rebuffed with anger and offense—how can you not trust the probity of deputies, after all they can be recalled, etc. It is unethical to doubt probity *a priori*. That is so. But here the question is about politics, and politics has its own laws, so that it is better to reserve emotions for another situation.

As for the just noted dangers then, apparently, the following has to be considered. We need a solid, wide-ranging independence for our local organs. Any deputy is answerable only before the law and accountable only to his constituents. There is no deputy hierarchy, and subordination is not permissible. The subordination of lower organs to higher organs is natural, but this is another matter. Here the axiom of state control is administration. But we need independent places, and their creative and original work. This is needed in a fundamental way. Without this there will be no searching development that is not bridled by the usual illusions.

It is impossible to allow problems concerning even the slightest dependence of deputies on whatever financial source, other than the budget. There are no grounds for not trusting the deputies. But to set one's hopes on personal qualities in politics is naive. No matter who it

is. The opportunity for lobbying tendencies is obvious, if you look into the sponsorship ties of the deputies

The democratic search for socialism is made up of such “personal” questions today. The fundamentals of the search in the development of socialist democracy look into the problem of economic and social roots and into the social basis of the political institutions of society. And it is here, if you will, that the most complicated questions for the theory of socialism are concentrated. Without their resolution, it will be impossible to avoid the danger of two extremes. On the one hand, there is a possibility of impeding the emancipation of social creativity and the initiative of the masses, and, on the other hand, there is a possibility of losing the threads of public administration and destabilizing the country.

Of course, it is not possible to reduce the matter to a simplified concept, and, it is said, that the truth is there where there is a “golden mean.” But it has long been known that not all “gold” is at the “mean”, and that not everything that is at the “mean” is “gold.” Another thing is no less clear—the truth is not in the lines but between them. Where—and here lies the problem. Where is that conventional “mean” in economics, in politics, and in ideology?.. But even for those who understand these questions, society is not secure against “buffeting” until a law-governed democratic state is established, and until it is created, the Constitution and legislation in force will not be observed. It is not possible to build a law-governed state by overstepping the laws; that is, violating them. No matter what kind they are.

In the final analysis, the mechanisms of bourgeois democracy, on which many are setting their hopes, being tremendous achievements of civilization, cannot be used “one on one” under socialism, by no means because they are bourgeois. It is a matter of their separateness, stability under some conditions, and inadequacies under other conditions. The conditions of its development under socialism are the great democracy and glasnost of its mechanisms for the control of the entire society. Not a competitive priority with respect to capitalism, but the conditions of existence of socialism. Because here not only the superstructure, but also the economic relations and structures can function effectively and improve themselves only on the foundation of a broad, genuine, and all-embracing democracy. It can be said, using a figurative analogy of Marx, that if the revolution is the “locomotive of history,” then democracy is the “locomotive of socialism.” Unquestionably, this “locomotive” should not be identified either with the invention of the “bicycle,” or with the design of a good but obsolete “steam locomotive.”

Socialism and democracy are inseparable not in a propaganda sense. We have already gone through this. In essence, socialism is unthinkable outside democracy. For it contains too many chances for deformations, because of the immeasurably great significance of the subjective factors of development. All monopolization here harbors the threat of corrosion and the recurrent unilateral

turnaround of the entire society. This, as the saying goes, is a small matter—whose monopoly is it and a monopoly of what. A monopoly of a group or a trend. The monopoly of today's authority, or monopoly in the formation of public opinion; that is, the monopoly of tomorrow's authority. But any monopoly leads to extremes, and it engenders impatience with another opinion. And hysterical actions, when monopoly threatens something.

Of course, the article touches on only a part of the questions. There are many more of them, but the essence of the problem lies in the following: Do we believe in the creative and constructive potential of the people or not? Do we plan once more to build socialism "for the people," or shall we transform the people from an object to a subject of social reorganization? Will we "set" the country on a track that has been traveled by others, or will we once more act not from life, but from "conceptions?" And perhaps, finally, complying with the laws of historical development, we will try to find a way for a sixth part of the planet that is selected in the practice of social creativity by the people themselves who populate this land? With their distinctive history, with their original traditions, with their ideas about justice, well-being, order, and about good and evil. And not in the name of formal "nontriviality," but in the name of common sense. In everything—in economics, in politics, and in culture.

Decree on Crimes of Lithuanian Communists

90UN0643F Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
27 Dec 89 p 3

[Declaration of the 20th Lithuanian CP Congress: "On Errors and Crimes Committed in the Past by Communists of Lithuania"]

[Text] The communists of Lithuania, gathered for the extraordinary 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party, are critically evaluating the party's record—from inception to present day. The past history of the Lithuanian Communist Party has been dramatic and severe; its record is contradictory and instructive. Today, as we see a rebirth of the nation, the democratization of society, and the establishment of a law-governed state, communists are openly acknowledging that over the 70 or more years of the party's existence and functioning, there have occurred political miscalculations, over-reactions, and errors on the part of the leadership of the party and ordinary communists. The

Communist Party has not escaped false ideals and values, theoretical dogma, or the influence of ideas alien to the inhabitants of Lithuania, to all the people, and to an independent Lithuanian state.

The Lithuanian Communist Party inherited a heavy burden of political and moral responsibility from the days of Stalinism. The essence of the policy of the Stalinist totalitarian regime consisted of breaking down the Lithuanian republic through annexation and occupation of the land, destruction of the traditional way of life, abolition of religion and the ethnic culture of the people, mass deportations and annihilation of Lithuanian residents, persecution of the church and religious beliefs, the undermining of the foundations of ethnic minorities. Unfortunately, the executive agent of this policy was the Lithuanian Communist Party itself, an integral part of the CPSU (All-Union Communist Party [Bolsheviks], later the CPSU). It is a bitter pill to swallow, however incontrovertible it may be, that within the Stalinist administrative apparatus of violence, among the responsible officials within repressive organs who arrived from other republics, were communists from our region, working blindly to implement the Stalinist policy of genocide and committing crimes against the people, crimes against humanity.

Today we understand that, in certain instances, objective conditions predetermined the essence and direction of policy pursued by the Lithuanian Communist Party, the conduct of the party leadership and of its individual members. During the bleak, tense, pre-war and war years, the post-war period, and the years of Stalinist rebirth, the Lithuanian Communist Party, like all the people, was deprived of freedom of choice and opportunities for independent activity.

The truthful and objective history of the Lithuanian Communist Party has yet to be written. However, we cannot ignore the bitter lessons of history. In critically examining the party's past, communists of Lithuania condemn the errors of its policies and the activities which have had severe consequences for the Lithuanian people and state. Communists categorically dissociate themselves from party members who have committed crimes against the people and humanity, regardless of the circumstances and personal motives involved.

The Lithuanian Communist Party has chosen a path leading to the rebirth of an independent democratic Lithuanian state and is rallying inhabitants of the republic to reach this vitally important goal, to realize the noble and humane aspirations of the party's program.

Bogomolov Cites Concern Over Moscow Development, Self-Financing

904A0081A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Nov 89 p 2

[Interview with Academician Oleg Timofeyevich Bogomolov, USSR People's Deputy and director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Economics of the World Socialist System Institute, by MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent M. Makhlin: "Cost Accounting? But What Will the City Dweller Receive?"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Our interlocutor is Academician O. T. Bogomolov, USSR People's Deputy and director of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Economics of the World Socialist System Institute.

[Correspondent] Let us begin, Oleg Timofeyevich, with this. You are a Muscovite. As a Muscovite, what in Moscow dissatisfies you?

[Bogomolov] I would say, not only dissatisfies, but also frightens and plunges me into a state of very great concern. Moscow is growing, but not because this is being dictated by the interests of the people who live here. The very organization of the economic and political affairs in the country leads to the excessive concentration of the populace in the cities and to an unwarranted urbanization, which is capable ultimately of "smothering" these same cities.

The tendency toward urbanization is being observed throughout the entire world, but it has become something ugly in our country. I am talking about the supply system, the establishment of special privileges for large populated areas, the existing passport system, the inefficient distribution of productive forces and culture. As a result, our Moscow is becoming a focal point of people who, it may be said, are destroying their own locality, the cultural layers of which, in my opinion, have already suffered substantially.

It would be wrong to seek a way out of the situation, as they say, locally, within the limits of the city boundary. The problems are more profound. And it is necessary to reflect not just on local decisions, but also on union-wide decisions. I will explain this idea.

In his own time, Engels spoke about the fact that the triumph of new social relations should lead to a uniform settling of people across the territory and to the uniform distribution of productive forces. Unfortunately, this uniformity is not being achieved in our country; rather, conversely, we are becoming witnesses to an extraordinary territorial disproportionateness, which is placing us in an incomparable position with the Western states. Look how the uniformity in the distribution of the population in the United States of America is increasing—a mass of small towns, good transportation arteries and a significantly more equitable distribution of culture and science across the territory of the entire country.

And in Europe? If you take the FRG, then right in the outlying areas, dozens of universities are encountered, from among which it would be difficult to isolate the most important and advanced. On the other hand, this country, relatively compact in size, of course, cannot be compared with the Soviet Union and here there has been a different historical settling process. But, all the same, we see how the disproportionateness is increasing in our country, while there there is a policy of dispersal. And the people are benefiting from this and I am not talking really about any military or similar aspects.

This is why, first of all, the gigantic concentration of people in one place, the enormous influx of non-Muscovites, the erosion of the traditional culture in the city and the transformation of Moscow into a courtyard do not suit me as a Muscovite. Indeed, they are coming from all corners of the country to the capital, basically on shopping trips. The neighboring territory—within a radius of 200 kilometers—in general, is oriented toward Moscow's stores.

[Correspondent] Half of the goods turnover in Moscow is occurring due to the people from other cities.

[Bogomolov] In my view, such a social distortion is the result of the Stalinist system of state control and economics. It is from this that both the gigantic drop in morality and the uncontrollability of the city economy take their beginning.

Over the course of a long period of time, we lived under the demagogic slogan: "We will transform Moscow into a model communist city!" A mockery of common sense and the conscience of the people. They should have thought about how to protect the health of the city and how to solve the many urgent problems, or at least the housing problems. To no avail...

In contrast to many capitals or the largest industrial centers of the world, in Moscow, there is an absolute lack of individual construction of houses around the city and in the individual sections. Are these concrete boxes really the ideal of architectural creativity and domestic comfort?

Take London, take New York. In London, you will find dozens of cottages with splendid little yards, which create for a person a comfortable living environment. New York is surrounded by hundreds of small towns in which the townspeople live, while they go to work using the splendid highways or electric railway. Is it far? Perhaps, but New Yorkers prefer to live in their own individual houses with all the comforts and with a front yard—outside the city. How should the problems of a more uniform settling of people be solved? I believe that, under current conditions, these problems are solvable, although such a level of public services as there is in Moscow cannot be quickly provided in other regions of the country. But, indeed, even there, there is a whole series of advantages which people could set up among

their own values. I am talking about the possibility of living in a good environment and healthy climatic conditions.

[Correspondent] Let us suppose that an alternative to living in the capital was established for people. But then the question arises—how is Moscow, with its multisectorial industry and colossal city economy, to survive without additional workers? Now the influx has supposedly been stopped and this, understandably, speaks of social and technological progress, but my readers are asking: how warranted is the existence in the capital city of such colossuses as ZIL [the Motor Vehicle Plant imeni I. A. Likhachev] and of such enterprises as Serp i molot [Hammer and Sickle], which produces metal for the entire country and receives “semi-finished rolled products” from other cities? Are there analogs in other capitals?

[Bogomolov] Capitals vary greatly, indeed. There are capitals which are purely administrative centers—this includes the American capital, Washington. This is the administrative and political capital, while the real economic capital is New York, which has focused on large industry and the business world. London, perhaps, is both the one and the other: both the political capital and an industrial center.

So that there are different models. This is not the point. There should be a policy for the development of the city. Indeed, it can grow to such dimensions until it turns into a megapolis, drawing into itself all the small cities and, alternately, residential districts and industrial zones. Or it can gradually stop its own growth and subsequently improve its own quality. It seems to me that it is time for Moscow to choose the second version.

The influx of people from outside should be natural and regulated by both economic and social laws. In any case, not generated by artificial factors of a special privileged position.

With regards to natural limiters, they can and should be present. For example, the cost of housing. If housing is free and is distributed, as the common saying goes, “from above,” with the blessing of the authorities, but the authorities cannot find people in the city and they recruit them from other regions, promising the new arrivals housing, then they settle in and later they fetch their relatives—this is purely a sociopolitical factor in the growth of the city. Where are the native Muscovites supposed to go?

I was born in Moscow, in the very center of the city, a 3-minute walk from the Kremlin. But I cannot count on this little homeland in getting an apartment. And when they gave me a room in a communal apartment, I moved myself to Yugo-Zapad. Since then I have been a resident of Yugo-Zapad, although my mother died in that same “communal apartment” in the city center.

And who is living now on Moscow's central streets? There is the new privileged stratum, which came from

other cities. Muscovites, my electorate, complain that they have been evicted from the center of the city to individual apartments in five-storied buildings on the outskirts of Moscow. Time has passed and already these recently outlying regions are becoming very frequently privileged regions. The five-storied buildings are being torn down and, in their place, better-built houses are being erected and—did you guess it?—again, it was not the native Muscovites who were being settled there, but rather, someone else. The Muscovites are moving beyond the Beltway. This is a social injustice.

But, let us return to the theme of our discussion. I believe that there are enormous work force reserves within Moscow. The structure of the city can and should be changed not by closing needed state enterprises, but by the gradual transformation of this structure.

In such a city as Moscow, there should be greater development of the services rendered to the entire national economy. These are the services for management, for the working out of scientific problems and the like. But, if we take industry, then, indeed, there are sectors which are necessary to each city—light industry and the food industry.

Unfortunately, here we have gigantic distortions. In addition, the services sphere is also underdeveloped on the whole across the country. Yet, indeed, it can create a lot of new jobs for those who will be discharged from various units of the management apparatus and industry. So that it is necessary to create adequately attractive conditions in the services sphere. The people here, according to strict state evaluations, cannot, most likely, exist honestly and have been compelled to resort to tricks to maintain their standard of living. We see this quite frequently in the example of trade. In my opinion, the entire organization of trade is directed in our country at having its workers, whether they want to or not, strive to extract so-called unearned income.

With regards to industry, here we need to think about how to streamline it. What good does it do to have a modern plant, built by a foreign company no less, for which we need two or three times as many workers as in the West, with the same turnover. Here we must not blame the mirror, but rather, seriously analyze where and in which sections efficiency is disappearing.

[Correspondent] Let us take the example of the Ford plants. Here there is a complete city, such as we have at Naberezhnyye Chelny around KamAZ [the Kama Motor Vehicle Plant] and other new industrial centers. And in Moscow, there is a motor vehicle giant, and not just one. And the Muscovites are disturbed about the advisability of further development of ZIL and AZLK [the Motor Vehicle Plant imeni the Leninist Komsomol]. Would it not be simpler to establish, in new sites outside Moscow, plants which would compete with the veterans of our homeland's motor vehicle industry?

[Bogomolov] In this instance, I would refrain from extreme evaluations. Indeed, it is easier, simpler and

more advantageous sometimes to augment the available industry's capabilities than to establish something new. But, finally, take certain American cities—such as Chicago or Detroit. These are focal points for enormous plants and, along with them, business centers with a university and the development of culture and so on. They coexist splendidly.

[Correspondent] Regional cost accounting, for which Moscow is preparing, raises ever more acutely the problem of payment for the resources of the city environment. What is your attitude toward this?

[Bogomolov] It must be taken into account that, throughout the entire world, the cost of the land is taken into consideration. And the cost varies greatly depending, for example, on where the plot is located—in the center of the city or on the outskirts, in a region which is more or less ecologically favorable, and so on. The limitedness of the city's territory—this is especially felt in Japan, where a patch of land has an unbelievably high price, which affects rent and the cost of hotels—makes it necessary to engage in multistory construction.

Recently, I was in the United States of America and certain things, I will tell you frankly, surprised me. Thus, the cost of housing in a small city not far from New York, in fact, in another state even, in Princeton, is significantly higher than in New York itself. What kind of place is Princeton? It has a university and small enterprises, which are developing high technology. The comparatively high cost of living is explained by the fact that there is a possibility of obtaining work, there is culture—a university, a mass of opportunities for those who are working in promising fields of knowledge, plus the very locality, which is favorable to a healthy life. As you see, the cost of housing, even there, is determined by various factors. And the people, depending on how they improve their own material position, can change this housing, finally attaining the version which suits them.

[Correspondent] So it has turned out that there are in Moscow both industrial rayons and bedroom rayons, where people go only to spend the night.

[Bogomolov] You and I are in one such bedroom rayon right now—Sevastopolskiy.

[Correspondent] The rayons are now becoming a basic unit of the territorial cost accounting. Just how are these bedroom rayons supposed to make ends meet, if they can not count on the profits of industrial enterprises?

[Bogomolov] I think that, under current conditions, they cannot provide for themselves. In Sevastopolskiy Rayon, where I live and work, there are several hundred thousand people in new houses or in houses built at the end of the '50's. There is almost no industry. There are a number of research institutes, which do not earn money, and there is commerce, which has been poorly developed. So that the rayon is in no condition to provide for itself.

But residential rayons, devoid of industry, exist in all countries. And, in my opinion, a regional system of cost accounting should not be identified with self-financing, leaving room for subsidies.

Cost accounting presupposes that the assets, which a given territory possesses, are at the disposal of the local organs of power. That is, the local organs have some kind of income of their own and distribute it efficiently in such a manner that there is never a need to appeal for subsidies. Thus, they can not be on total cost accounting, that is to say, on self-financing.

But then, there are other permissible variations: when one territory or another has too great an income from industrial or economic activities and this income greatly exceeds local needs, then the assets are moved into the state budget. Such redistribution exists everywhere. And all this needs to be taken into consideration during the determination of the territorial boundaries of the rayons.

[Correspondent] Perhaps the existence of bedroom rayons in the large cities is justified if the ecology is taken into account? However, an attempt is being observed to make industrial and bedroom rayons.

[Bogomolov] I agree with you. And I propose not only keeping the bedroom rayons, but also creating conditions so that people would live, if they wanted, in the suburban Moscow area, in the cottage rayons, where there should generally be no kind of industry whatsoever. People there can have a personal plot, their own house, a car and a public transportation stop for maintaining contact with the city center.

In brief, there are different variations. There may be a purely residential, bedroom rayon, but even it is not capable of getting by without commerce. If the tax system were set up according to the principle of the imposition of indirect taxes on individual products sold in a given rayon, then self-financing would be ensured quite practicably. For example, a tax of 2, 3, 5 or 10 percent, for the benefit of local municipalities, could be imposed on everything sold in all the commercial shops in a given rayon. And then the needed amount would be there for maintaining order and supporting local self-financing. We do not have such a system of taxes added to the cost of goods. We have enormous taxes, but they are set long before the goods reach a given rayon.

Here is a living example. Friends invited me once to go from New York to the neighboring state of New Jersey. Why? Because there the prices for all goods are lower than in New York. New York is an enormous city, with large expenses for the infrastructure, and the taxes there are higher. In the neighboring state, the very same item sells at a cheaper price. Now, if we would introduce such a system...

[Correspondent] But is there also a difference in New York's regions themselves?

[Bogomolov] No. Within the city, everything is the same. There is already a kind of redistribution between the regions there. It may be that the taxes are already coordinated with entrepreneurial activities.

The tax in the price makes it possible, of course, to support the local organs of power. And can really reach such a level that the subsidies of city or central organs will be reduced to a minimum. In this instance, the local authorities have an interest in commerce which functions well, so that the residents do not travel to other regions to shop and do not leave their own incomes there.

[Correspondent] What do you think about the idea? There are 33 rayons in Moscow. Some operate better, some worse. Some have created conditions for industrial work, some are concerned about the development of the cooperatives movement and some are more involved with individuals. To put it briefly, a rayon derives a considerable sum. It is reasonable to assume that the rayon soviet of people's deputies, at its own session, in determining priorities, notes: we have now, they say, a very bad situation with regards to the maintenance of order, so let us hire for the internal affairs administration an additional 100 people for difficult patrol and post duties. As for some of the other needs—health care and the like—they can wait, we will worry about them next year. We have, for example, a lower illness rate than in other rayons. Or, conversely, it is necessary to allot resources for medicine and "to rein in" the militia budget, if there is order in the streets.

Then there occurs a stratification, which corresponds to the principles of social justice, between the standard of living of this rayon and the city and between the rayons. And this would draw the tax-paying voters closer to the administrative organ. The populace would be compelled to be engaged actively in maintaining order and health.

[Bogomolov] It seems to me that, in general, the idea of regional cost accounting and the economic self-reliance of the individual rayons cannot be separated from self-management. It is necessary to strengthen self-management at the local rayon level and to bring the economic base under this self-management. Thus, the idea is not simply to engage in a discussion about the fact that order needs to be maintained, cleanliness observed and the ecology preserved, but rather, that there be genuine levers of influence on the solution of these questions. And their own budget, if there are sources of income, and if there is a fixed, let us assume, sum of revenue from superior organs, while all the rest depends on skill and efficiency in the use of local resources. Of course, differentiation between rayons is inevitable. And each one will decide what it needs to do: either reinforce health care and build sports structures or a new polyclinic or establish a series of commercial shops. What is required here are initiative, independent action and self-reliance. It is more complicated with monetary assets.

There is no hard currency, but there should be flexible, intelligent decisions. Unfortunately, in recent times, our government has committed a very large number of big mistakes, having parted with the existing hard currency laws. The notorious "Berezka" [Birch Tree] stores served as a stimulus for our inflated staffs of employees of the embassies and trade delegations abroad, nevertheless, not to spend their personal assets abroad, but rather, they have endeavored to bring them into the Soviet Union. We have been deprived of all this. We have been deprived, by my calculations, of a quarter of a billion dollars annually. Of this amount, it is likely that no less than 100 million went to Moscow. The reason being that there was a network of these stores.

What is to be done now: does the city need this hard currency? I believe that Moscow could earn it if the city had specific foreign trade authority.

Simply exchanging rubles for hard currency is possible in principle, but the state does not have this hard currency today. A more practical path would be if our Moscow enterprises obtained access to the foreign market and a portion of the tax payments were made in hard currency. Then it would appear in the city budget.

Trade Union Role in Student Life Discussed

90UN0326A Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Nov 89 pp 1, 3

[Article by N. Kishkin, V. Natykin: "Knowing How To Conduct a Dialogue"]

[Text] Representatives of student youth assembled for the first time following a 20-year break at an all-union student forum to talk about accumulated problems and how to solve them more rapidly and thoroughly.

The students received M.S. Gorbachev's speech with great interest. As a snap study conducted by the forum's sociological service showed, 80 percent of its participants put a very high value on the mere fact of the speech of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the vast majority shared the political positions which he expressed. This is the opinion of N. Golovina, a student at the Sibay Pedagogical School from Bashkiria: "Mikhail Sergeyevich addressed us as equals. One sensed in his words tremendous confidence in the students and the hope that we would support perestroika. I personally was sold by the fact that our leader answered candidly and sincerely the most pointed questions."

"The Country's Future Is Your Future," this placard, pinned up in the distinctively decorated hall of the Palace of Youth, defined very accurately, perhaps, the mood in which the students came to their forum. Before it commenced and in the breaks we chatted with many delegates and were convinced that the students do not separate their fate from that of the country and that of perestroika.

But the first day of the forum instilled alarm also: What if the youthful ardor should overstep the bounds and overwhelm practical efficiency, without which no problems are solved. One further figure from the sociological study: 51 percent of the delegates polled declared that they had come with their own proposals and would fight for them to the end, even if they were in a minority of one. Would not the forum turn into a gathering of people who would not listen to one another and who, consequently, would be unable to find mutually acceptable solutions? The evening sitting of the first day convinced us that there were certain grounds for such misgivings. Having spent 2.5 hours on this, the delegates were unable even to form the forum's working bodies. Sober voices calling for an end to the speechifying and a speedier switch to business, for whose sake they had come to Moscow, were drowned out in the endless disputes on contrived procedural issues.

Only on the second day were the procedural questions concluded, and Sergey Vlasenko, member of the preparatory committee and student at Lvov University, was given the floor. He formulated the main problems which were to be studied at the forum. They included an improvement in the students' social position, a broadening of their rights in the administration of educational institutions, an improvement in the teaching of the social sciences, an upgrading of inter-ethnic relations among students and a rise in the level of training of specialists.

G.A. Yagodin, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Public Education, who addressed the forum, emphasized that the nature of learning had now changed. S&T progress demanded that students acquire a solid basis which subsequently enables a person to constantly upgrade his professional qualifications. We need to seek talent and afford it scope for development. And the need to solve acute social problems is connected with this. Currently the student is dependent on accommodation and inadequate financial provision and frequently spends his powers and nervous energy not in study but on ridding himself of this dependency. He should be given society's credit, which he will return when he becomes a specialist.

The position of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] in the development of the student movement was presented to the participants in the forum by V.I. Mironenko, first secretary of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee. In his opinion, the question should be posed even more broadly: concerning a fundamental restructuring of the entire communist youth movement top to bottom. The Komsomol insists on the legal protection of the VUZ's [higher educational institutions] against the incompetent interference of the local authorities, on declaration of VUZ grounds as a self-managing administrative zone imbued with a spirit of freedom and democracy and a search for new paths of the interaction of the students and lecturers and proposes the creation of

a student sociological service and the USSR's inclusion in a European program of education integration.

V.M. Mishin, secretary of the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], spoke on behalf of a founder of the forum—the Soviet trade unions.

"All the illnesses of society of which we are today endeavoring to rid ourselves have infected in full measure the VUZ organism also.

"The need for the speediest solution of priority student problems was formulated at state level on the threshold of the forum on the initiative of the unions and the Komsomol. These are primarily the creation in the VUZ's and technical schools of social assistance funds for students in dire need, the abolition of income tax on all types of grants, interest-free credit to student families and the introduction of regional coefficients to grants wherever this is stipulated for people working in public education. It is necessary to seek to have the 13th Five-Year Plan determine the amount of the grant at a level not lower than the minimum wage with the introduction of an annual anti-inflation supplement. The unions consistently advocate the priority allocation of appropriations for reinforcing the physical plant of the higher school and developing its social infrastructure.

"It is now very important for the unions to restore the students' trust in full. The AUCCTU Sixth Plenum, which advocated the abandonment of functions foisted upon them which are not within their province, opposition in principle to the administrative and economic authorities and equal-partner relations with the government, was pivotal in the formulation of the unions' new strategy.

"At the proposal of the AUCCTU the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted a number of fundamental decisions whose realization will be positively reflected primarily in the living standard of the needy strata of the population and, of course, the students and trainee youth as a whole.

"Life is not easy for the student currently. He is oppressed by everyday disorders and a shortage of necessities. But the student no longer wishes and no longer can put up with the demeaning lack of rights and social lack of protection flouting civil and even human dignity.

"The legislation in force currently makes a sharp differentiation in the rights of the working people and the students, noticeably short-changing the latter. There is today essentially no effective mechanism regulating the legal foundations of the relations of the VUZ administration and the student collectives. For the first time in the history of the Soviet trade unions the AUCCTU supported proposals concerning the conclusion of collective contracts between student trade union committees and the VUZ administration incorporating mutual commitments and mutual responsibility in questions of an improvement in the student youth's study, work, social and recreational conditions. This practice has been put

to the test this year even in a number of VUZ's. Unfortunately, it is meeting virtually everywhere with either misunderstanding or even outright resistance on the part of the administrative components.

"I would like to state with all certainty," the AUCCTU secretary emphasized, "that the unions will not retreat from their decisions and will implement the policy of a strengthening of the social protection of the student.

"This will require a broadening of the rights of the student trade union committee. You obviously know that the AUCCTU has submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet the draft law 'Rights of the USSR Trade Unions'. It contains our demands—to have the right to stop managerial decisions infringing the interests of the working people and the students, the right to strike and assurances of protection of the union official and activist. It is proposed extending to the student trade union committee all the rights of the workforce trade union committee. In addition, we intend formulating in the law on trade union rights a special article on the student trade union.

"Of course, we realize that the interests of the students should be fully and clearly reflected in the majority of legislative instruments which are being turned out in the Supreme Soviet currently, whether it be on taxation and local self-management, laws on the press and referenda and so forth. The consolidation of people's deputies from the CPSU, the unions and the Komsomol and deputies representing the educational complex in a kind of 'parliamentary student support bloc,' which would set as its goal the achievement of a new legal status of the students in a law-based socialist state befitting our times, would contribute to this.

"An understanding of the decisive turnabout toward the needs of the students and the formation of a strong self-governing student trade union movement is now being established increasingly firmly in the AUCCTU and the unions. The AUCCTU Presidium Student Affairs Commission was formed recently. A representative of student youth was for the first time in the history of the unions elected to the AUCCTU Presidium.

"There are at the present time 2.6 million students in the ranks of 14 sectoral unions. This is justified: Industrial union committees render their VUZ's appreciable assistance. Nonetheless, unification of the student trade union movement is an objective requirement. This would multiply its forces and make it possible to understand better and pose and solve on a large scale socioeconomic problems of the student body. Proceeding from this, the AUCCTU supported the proposal of student activists concerning the creation of an all-union association of VUZ student trade union organizations. On 11 November the constituent conference of this association united 67 trade union organizations of universities and institutes, which, without forfeiting the financial and organizational support of their sectoral

unions, have acquired real opportunities for the coordination of their activity and the consideration and expression of specific student problems.

"The AUCCTU and a number of sectoral unions—founders of the new all-union public organization—will render the association all-around support.

"In transferring today the question of what the unions may do for the students from the rhetorical to the practical plane we must be clearly aware that giving the students something means taking something from somewhere. The student trade union bodies are allocated considerable subsidies today even. But you must understand that this is becoming increasingly difficult with every passing day. All trade union committees have today learned to count their money and defend the rights precisely of their own members. An increasingly small proportion of union dues is being put at the disposal of the higher authorities, and there are increasingly few opportunities for maneuvering budget resources.

"Hopes should not henceforward be put in subsidies.

"The creation of financially autonomous student enterprises and centers connected, as far as possible, with their future special field, whose activity and profits would be funneled into an improvement in the students' social amenities, is seen as the way to solve the student trade union organization's financial problems.

"The financially autonomous activity of the trade union committee of students of the Kiev Civil Aviation Engineers Institute brings in almost half a million rubles in income. This money goes to help student families, 'Afghantsy' soldiers, the creation of evening and Sunday kindergarten and an improvement in everyday conditions in the hostels.

"Financially autonomous activity may noticeably help the students at such a difficult time for the state. But it is important for the state to support it also. The USSR Supreme Soviet is currently studying a taxation law. I propose on behalf of the forum that the legislators be asked to abolish all types of taxes on the financially autonomous activity of the student public organizations and outfits. This would be a real help to the VUZ's and the students right now.

"Permit me to remind you that the great Russian physician and teacher N.I. Pirogov once spoke of student youth as being the barometer of society. Such an evaluation thereof prompts the idea of the formation in the country of a system of consideration of student public opinion. After all, it is not only the future but also the present intellectual potential of our society. And if it remains unclaimed, intellectual, spiritual impoverishment, which cannot be compensated by any Happy and Witty Clubs [reference to a recent TV program] and discotheques, will inevitably set in.

"I am convinced that for stimulation of the students' real participation in the renewal of all spheres of society's

activity they need a permanent tribune, and not episodic congresses and forums. A tribune for the fruitful constructive dialogue of party and students, state and students, and unions and students. A student parliament of the country, an all-union student coordinating council or committee, whose powers would include not only discussion of serious student problems but also the formulation of possible alternatives and the blocking of individual directives running counter to the students' interests, could, for example, be the place for such a dialogue.

"Many leaders are today speaking about dependent sentiments among the students. All is laid on, they say, and they are still unhappy. But only short-sighted people could fail to see the reasons for this phenomenon. They are to be found in the students' alienation from participation in the administration of VUZ life. The student will always feel himself to be a temporary resident and will not become an integral part of the hostel unless he changes from being a passive object of administration into the subject of self-managing activity. The unions," V.M. Mishin said in conclusion, "will continue to actively support the idea of full-fledged student self-management. For ultimately it is the VUZ's which exist for the students, and not the students for the VUZ's."

Discussion of problems troubling the students began yesterday in the latter half of the day in the forum's discussion centers.

Export of Armenian Workforce Seen as Advantage During Reconstruction

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30 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by G. Tosunyan, chief, Administration for Territorial Intersectoral Scientific and Production Cooperation, Mosgorispolkom Main Administration for Science and Technology: "Working Hands from Armenia: An Item for Export"]

[Text] The extremely acute problem of providing housing and job placement for 700,000 of my fellow-Armenians—who have suffered from the earthquake or who are refugees—undoubtedly must be solved primarily by means of accelerated construction in the disaster zone, as well as in other regions of the republic, and, above all, by the manpower of the local population.

Despite all efforts, substantial aid from the center, the union republics, and foreign countries, both new construction and the renovation of the previous social infrastructure have been proceeding much too slowly. In addition, there are the consequences of a prolonged blockade of Armenia's transportation arteries. Now there is no longer any doubt that the onset of winter will turn out to be a new disaster for thousands upon thousands of people without a roof over their heads, without work, and without prospects for the next few years.

Half-measures and promises at all levels these days have already lost their former "therapeutic" traits. They cause

merely irritation and annoyance. And for this reason many disillusioned persons feel compelled to leave Mother Armenia in search of shelter with relatives living abroad. Even those whom nobody is waiting for abroad are leaving or attempting to leave. Moreover, the existing conditions for leaving, despite all their procedural obstacles (until the eventual implementation of the appropriate law) not only do not hinder the migrational flow from Armenia but even facilitate its increase.

Without entering into a discussion here of the moral aspect of the "iron curtain," let me draw the readers' attention to the economic feasibility of opening this curtain slightly, above all, for those persons who, because of circumstances and natural causes, have turned out to be deprived of the elementary conditions of existence.

These days Armenia is obviously and simply incapable of caring for all those persons who have suffered, taking into account the country's serious economic condition. Furthermore, let's be extremely frank, up to now we have not succeeded in making effective use of the aid being received.

However, it seems to me that our republic has a moral and constitutional right to permit those persons who have suffered from the earthquake, as well as the refugees, to go abroad and earn money, while retaining the status of citizenship in the USSR as a whole and the Armenian SSR in particular. They should also be granted the opportunity to utilize the money earned thereby for building their own housing in the Motherland. There is undoubtedly a genuine danger that some of those who have left will not return. At first glance, this could be interpreted as contradicting the interests of the nation and not harmonizing with the policy of joining together and uniting the Armenian people. However, experience attests to the following: every person who wishes to leave the country, it must be agreed, will sooner or later find a way to carry out his intention. The task of a civilized state is not to hold its own citizens by force, but rather to create conditions facilitating the strengthening of love for the Motherland.

By granting the right to leave Armenia with a subsequent return over the course of 3 to 5 years, we would succeed in partially solving a number of extremely acute problems: a) some of the able-bodied but, because of the extraordinary circumstances, unemployed population would obtain the opportunity to find work abroad. Naturally, they would need a certain amount of help from the Armenian diaspora and its charitable funds; b) there would be a significant reduction in the migrational flow from Armenia, inasmuch as, before leaving for good, people would prefer to carefully evaluate the living conditions "over there," without burning all their bridges behind them; c) meanwhile, the republic would be effectively solving its own problems by obtaining the opportunity of allocating more funds to Armenia's remaining "per capita suffering population"; d) a certain portion of the money earned "over there" would come

back to Armenia in one form or another; e) it is impossible not to take into account the political significance of such a step along the path to the final opening of the "Stalinist curtain." Let our republic furnish an example; f) such a bold step would lessen the social tension in Armenia and reduce the psychological stress among our much-suffering people; g) finally, such a solution would be completely in harmony with the idea of establishing a special economic zone in Armenia and would speed up its implementation.

For the skeptic's information: there are close analogies in both worldwide and domestic practice. In particular, the many years of experience in exporting working hands from Yugoslavia and Turkey, the laws on leaving one's country which were recently passed with a well-known, favorable response in Bulgaria and the GDR, as well as the "ecological refugees" from Chernobyl.... If such a possibility for working abroad can be accepted in principle, then it makes sense to effectively work out a legal mechanism for this solution, which is vitally necessary for Armenia. As a lawyer (my second field of specialization), I am prepared to offer my services free of charge.

Commentary by I.Yu. Semenov, chairman of the Armenian SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Issues

If we set aside G. Tosunyan's understanding of the reasons Armenians are leaving for permanent places of residence abroad, the effectiveness of utilizing aid which has arrived and continues to arrive for the disaster area, and certain other opinions which are, to a large extent, subjective and do not reflect the actual state of affairs, his proposal, on the whole, is interesting. Indeed, the export of working hands from Turkey has helped, to a certain degree, in obtaining "hard" currency and in solving a number of other problems. And his proposal would have been given serious study had it not been for the December 1988 earthquake in Armenia, which devastated many cities and villages, killed thousands of human beings, and left hundreds of thousands without roofs over their heads. Today 30,000 persons are needed just for work on construction sites in the regions which suffered. Many enterprises and organizations in Yerevan, Kamo, Leninakan, Kirovakan, and Stepanavan are prepared to accept and find jobs for 20,000-25,000 workers, office employees, engineers, and technicians. So this republic's "able-bodied" population have places where they could apply their efforts, experience, and know-how, if they only had the desire to do so.

There is also another aspect which not neglect either. The entire USSR and many of the world's other states have aided and are aiding Armenia. But we, according to G. Tosunyan, should send some of our workforce abroad as an item for export at this time. Even now people in those regions of the USSR to which our so-called "job-hoppers" have gone in search of "easy money" even after the earthquake cannot understand why it is that, at a time when their fathers, husbands, sons, and daughters

are helping the Armenian people in its trouble, Armenia's "sons" are coming to their regions in order to earn money.

In addition to everything else, this republic's transportation in the near future into a free-enterprise zone (and I believe that this will occur) will allow people, without leaving for America, to earn "hard" currency for Armenia by turning out products which will yield to nobody in the world with regard to quality.

Today our sacred duty is to employ our labor on our own native soil to assist the Armenian people to restore the devastated cities and villages from ruins, as well as to give shelter to those who have suffered. There is a great deal of work for those who really seek it, enough for everyone. So let's restore our own region, and then we can decide later whether or not we need to export working hands.

Belorussia Opens Diagnostic Center With Imported Computer Equipment

90US0327 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 29 Nov 89 p 2

[Article by A. Lemeshenok: "Event: First In The Republic"]

[Text] The opening of a diagnostic center can without exaggeration be considered an outstanding event in the development of republic health care. Some \$5.5 million in foreign-currency rubles was spent on the most modern equipment.

"The diagnostic center in Minsk is only the first," said chief physician Anatoliy Vasilyevich Tolkachev. "Under the well-known program for developing health care up to 1995, such medical institutions are to appear in all oblast centers. I know that the one in Mogilev is now being readied for use. Right now they are moving in the equipment and training the medical personnel. But our center will remain the largest, serving not just Minsk residents but also residents of other regions of the republic."

I have had an opportunity to visit various clinics not only in our country but in foreign countries as well, and I can attest to the fact that what I saw here is impressive. It is delightful that our people too will finally have the chance to receive the most skillful care.

As we know, the most difficult and important part of treating and preventing various illness is reliable diagnosis. Henceforth medical specialists at neighborhood polyclinics will have a very valuable help in their work. They will be able to send those under their care to the center for examination, and hence to avoid many doubts and mistakes.

"Six diagnostic and one consultation department are already in operation," Anatoliy Vasilyevich continued. "They are the departments for radiation and functional

diagnosis and for ultrasound diagnosis of abdominal cavity organs, the endoscopic department, and several laboratories. Patients who so desire can see leading specialists for consultation."

Equipment from the United States, Japan, the FRG, and Sweden has been installed in the rooms and laboratories. The most advanced Soviet-made equipment is also present. It too meets all necessary requirements.

Deputy Chief Physician Vasilii Ivanovich Sykalo gave me a demonstration of several instruments and devices. Take, for example, the Spektrum biochemical analysis unit. Dr. Valter Myuller of the FRG, a physician widely known throughout Europe, supervised its installation and trained our specialists. Test-tubes containing the material to be analyzed are inserted into the Spektrum unit and a read-out of the results with all the necessary data appears on the computer screen almost immediately. True, it's in English. But the girls from that and other laboratories learned that foreign language in special courses beforehand and now work with no particular problems.

The most complex piece of equipment is a computer tomograph. There are several of them here. They are indispensable in neurosurgery and in detecting all sorts of tumors. David Bekop, a representative of the General Electric firm, helped install the tomograph and trained the medical personnel.

However, it must already be said that despite all this impressive equipment, problems have also arisen at the first diagnostic center. Essentially, the trouble is that this equipment requires special chemical reagents (reactants), as a rule. And as we know, each firm uses different types. The manufacturing process is usually a tightly guarded secret. Take thermal paper, for example. For now the center has a certain amount of these reagents on hand. But what about later, when the center, which is designed to accommodate 1,000 visits per day, starts working at full capacity?

Even in the most advanced piece of equipment, certain parts naturally wear out. Buying them will require more foreign currency. And that currency is very hard to come by. Consequently, the center's directors are considering various options. For example, there is the possibility of concluding contracts with enterprises that have foreign currency, under which the center would provide health care and examination services to their employees on an extra-plan basis. It would be a mutually beneficial arrangement. But would the labor collective councils always be equal to the occasion in such instances? Wouldn't they be tempted to buy some sort of imported goods instead of helping the doctors? Everything must be carefully weighed in this regard and the most far-sighted decisions taken.

The diagnostic center also plans to offer paid services—provided this doesn't interfere with their primary work, needless to say.

I spoke with many specialists at the center. They are, for the most part, young people who are energetic and talented—the center didn't take on just anyone who wanted to work at it. For despite the notorious personnel shortage, the newly created institution's directors tried to bring on staff not just anyone who came along, but people who share their outlook, who have a high sense of responsibility, and who can cherish and be proud to work in such a unique institution. This is a very hopeful sign.

In conclusion, we should add that the editors of SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA intend to tell readers about the center's operation, tasks, and problems as often as possible.

Federation of Women Writers Formed

[Speech by Larisa Vasilyeva: "Women, Life, and Literature: Introductory Speech at the Constituent Conference of the Federation of Women Writers Under the Jurisdiction of the USSR Union of Writers"]

[Text] This meeting of women writers is the first in the history of Soviet literature. Nor does it have any analogy in the 19th century. Nor has such a number of women writers ever gathered together previously in other countries.

The result of our meeting could turn out to be the beginning of a process of renewing life on certain age-old but virtually forgotten principles. Its success depends on how prepared we are to recognize ourselves as being on the cutting edge of human history.

Do we sense that we are a mistake of the cosmos? Are we expecting the end of the world? Shall we hide our heads in the sand? Or would it, perhaps, be better to search out our own, age-old error? We have not been able to make a fairy-tale into a fact. No matter what page of the history books we turn, there are mistakes upon mistakes in revolutions, wars, the economy, and culture. And nowadays the children, while condemning their fathers for their recent intolerance and arbitrary use of force, are themselves demonstrating the very same intolerance with the signs of business conditions and for a return to the recent signs.

Today a number of scientists are of the opinion that human beings naturally contain genes of destruction along with genes of creation. If we read the history of humanity with careful attention, there seems to be no doubt concerning such a concept.

Yes, for thousands of years the dominant, powerful, splendid, and courageous masculine world has amazed Earth with its creative and destructive experiments, while in its mighty shade the human race continues to have its instinct for preserving life—the feminine principle. It is specifically the interests of the feminine principle which have not been taken into consideration by the public formations of our civilization. This is not a matter of equal rights which have liberated women to a

large extent, nor about equal rights which have enslaved women to a large extent. It is not a matter of the burdens of Soviet everyday life which leave us no time to think about ourselves. Nor is it about the oddities of women in the Western countries, who have better food and clothing than do our women but who are, for some reason, dissatisfied with their status as women and are fighting for equal rights, something which we already have plenty of. And it is not about the theory that if women were given wider access to the levers of power, things would be run right. We have seen quite a few women at these levers, in high posts as well as low ones—ranging from minister to janitor. They are all comrades in work, compelled to suppress their own femininity to please the bureaucratic, masculine scheme of things. What it is a matter of is humankind's main, age-old error—a discordance of principles.

It is not equality with men that we wish—that is impossible if only because, so far at least, no man has succeeded in giving birth to a child—but rather the affirmation of our own principle as equal in the world. Not power over man's world but harmony with it. Not predominance but mutually helpful activities.

By not taking into consideration the feminine principle in public life and by not asking women's opinions on the most important issues in the life of the entire society, the masculine, ruling world is making a mistake; it should replace its mass effort to be like men with its own natural destiny.

What have we attempted to do on the whole? Have we averted even one bloodletting? What did we do to prevent there being victims of the Revolution, Civil War, and the events of the 1930's? Where were the women when the world swung between the Twentieth Century's Scylla and Charybdis—between the USSR and Germany? Where were they when the electric-power stations were "combing" the great Russian Volga with their deadly "combs?" And where were they when AES's [nuclear-power stations] began to spring up like mushrooms? We did not try to object. And just recently the entire women's world did not come out in opposition to the war in Afghanistan.

Nowadays there are clashes here and there over what kinds of blood are flowing through various people's veins. How are women—whether of mixed or unmixed blood—acting these days, when they are again losing their children in various exchanges of fire?

What experiences have we women undergone as a whole? The cold and hunger of destruction and wars. Crowded housing and lines. We have tried carrying the wounded out of fire. We have tried being widows. And we have tried being orphaned mothers.

But what we have not tried is to assert as a law of life our own women's right to jointly decide the course of events these days.

But why should we women writers begin to raise this unraisable cart-load with an affirmation of the feminine principle in a world where it has not been affirmed over the centuries? Precisely because we have in our writers' hands a mighty, though poorly used, weapon. "There is nothing more powerful than the word," the Ancient Greeks said. And two thousand years ago humanity heard the following from the Gospels: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God."

And so the time has come for us to weigh our own words—to look at ourselves as women writers, and to ask ourselves: What has been my role in past ages, what is it today, and what can it become tomorrow?

Within the literary process writers and critics have also concerned themselves with the question of what divides literature. At times they have divided it into "isms," and then they began to divide it into "war," "production," "rural," and "urban" literature. They have also divided it into right-wing and left-wing literature. They have utilized criteria of production and world view. But for some reason it is impossible for them to try not to divide it up but rather to consider a natural criterion.

Women constitute more than half of humankind. As you know, art is a reflection of life. When we take a look at the art created over the length of our entire civilization, it becomes clearly evident that its process also reflects the suppression of the feminine principle: even in creative art women have not expressed themselves as powerfully as men.

It has become accepted to think that women are incapable of scaling the heights for reasons of psychology and physiology. But who has proved this?

Each of us has her own experience of surviving in art. But why not combine this and share it among ourselves and with women writers of other countries? They have similar problems within the masculine world. And there behind the walls of art and literature is the extremely rich, complex, impoverished, and half-ruined, feminine world, waiting to escape from its muteness through our words.

We do not wish women's dominance in literature. Not alienation from the literary process, but our own place and designation in this process. Not filling our books and the mass media with women's topics, but the affirmation of the feminine principles of peace, goodness, kindness, and tolerance.

And so the goals of our association are as follows:

1. Affirmation of the feminine principle in society and literature.
2. With the help of women, a change of the climate in society.

3. Self-determination of the feminine principle within the literary process.

4. Establishment and strengthening of relations among women writers.

An association of women scientists has already been founded. So too have been a club of woman journalists and an association entitled *Tvorchestvo* [Creativity], which unites creative women of various professions. A woman writers' association has emerged in Petrozavodsk, and there is a women writers' club entitled *Femina* in Irkutsk. Nor must we leave out of consideration production-type women's councils. They are likewise in need of an influx of forces and support of the creative feminine principle.

In all probability, all our precipitously emerging women's associations will soon be in need of a unified center, something like a women's parliament. With its own opinion, one which will not always coincide with that of the "stronger half." The women's voice must resound independently. Remember the proverb: "What woman wants is what God wants!"

How will the association be strengthened so as to have a viable form? How will ties be implemented between women writers and the women's world beyond the border of the literary process? We must give careful thought to all this. It seems feasible to us that we elect a woman representative from each republic, oblast, and large city. All of them together would constitute the association's council, capable of developing and implementing ideas of a general nature.

What will be the periodicity of the meetings? This will have to be decided in accordance with the possibilities of the association within the framework of the USSR Union of Writers.

Our association's council is forming several groups capable of developing programs whereby women writers can participate in work of the mass media, in establishing new journals, anthologies, and so forth. Issues of interaction between the women writers of various regions as well as the basic problems of society must be at the center of our association's attention.

One of the main problems is that of sharing our culture. And another, no less important problem is that of power. Power and woman are incompatible concepts. It is precisely for this reason that there should be no place within our association for boss-type syndromes, supervisory symptoms, or pointing fingers. What we need are tolerance and loyalty. Therefore, the council must think about all the leadership roles carefully and tactfully. The principles of conduct must sound a distinctly clear note of intellectuality in all matters.

It seems feasible to us to suggest an association of creative women in the localities and clubs everywhere—in republics, oblasts, cities, and villages.

But just how are we to define a creative woman? Should it be limited to women writers, artists, actresses, and journalists? Is not being a physician a creative profession? Does not a woman schoolteacher also create in her work? And are not women lawyers, physicists, and builders also creative? It seems to us that the local clubs can include women in various professions. How the clubs will function and what they will concern themselves with are matters wherein there should be complete freedom of action. By basing our work on the principle of affirming the feminine principle, they will be able to find a large field of activity for the mind, feelings, ethnic characteristics, and talent. Such "women's *zemstvos*" can be of use for the society. And of quite considerable use. Through meetings and discussions, acts of culture and art, as well as religion. There would seem to be good prospects for forming clubs in connection with a publishing house, journal, newspaper, television, or radio format.

The link between each club and our association will be constructed not on the principles of subordination or of one department under another, but on the principles of mutual assistance and mutual understanding.

Who will take upon themselves the role of the creators and founders? In every case it will be the enthusiasts. It will not necessarily be women writers—there are not too many of them. Just so long as we are spared the notorious women's quarrels. And there will be none if we keep the idea of power out of the clubs. The climate and the atmosphere—these comprise our power.

As to our central press, the organizational committee has already undertaken a whole series of steps to publish a new type of journal. And we hope to be able to speak about it in specific, realistic terms quite soon. The society needs and must have literary-artistic and moral-ethical journals. Without them our activity would undoubtedly be made more difficult. We need channels of communication on television and radio. It is not only we women writers who have need of them—that would not amount to much—but also all the many millions of women in the society. In these publications and broadcasts our subjects must be the neglected and lost problems of all humanity in which the HUMAN BEING should emerge in the harmony of the twin principles mentioned above.

It is said that our association intends to confront the masculine world. Nonsense! We will still need to learn how to listen carefully to men's opinions, to understand them, and neither reject nor accept them without question. We must catch their point of view with keen sensitivity and verify it against our own.

No matter what may happen within our society: whether we remain an inviolable union of republics or divide up into various countries, the idea of developing the feminine principle can no longer be erased from people's minds. It has been named. And herein is a sign of the times.

Let me intentionally repeat myself: the possibility of this new undertaking's success lies within ourselves—upon how much from this moment on we will be able to rise above prejudices—our own and those of men—above our jealousies, which never have and never will yield any positive results.

I recently heard that Cosmonaut Valeriy Polyakov, who spent many months in space, said the following: "From out there the Earth looks small. Without borders or barriers. An integrated, commonly shared entity. And all our quarrels, wars, and fights seem like such a fuss, such foolish nonsense." Let's heed this man's voice, and let's help our men to analyze our serious, destiny-laden, everyday problems: not to spill new blood, but to put our commonly shared house in order. Let's aid the memory of our fathers to issue forth from the Last Judgement of History with confidence that past mistakes will not be repeated.

Let's help our children to find ground under their feet and faith in the eternal ideals of hope and love.

Let's help ourselves to find a life full of value and to give the world our sympathy and consolation, our wise, loving kindness, and tender, albeit weak force.

Orthodox Official on Uniate Conflict

90UN0606A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian* No 1, 3 Jan 90 p 2

[Untitled interview with Kirill, Archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, chairman of the Department of External Church Relations, Moscow Patriarchy]

[Text] [Question] 1990 is your first year of work as the minister of foreign affairs for the Russian Orthodox Church. You were also elected a member of the Holy Synod. You often speak of the need for restructuring in the Church. Do you have a specific program?

[Kirill] Last year's events attest that this year will not be easy, for either the country, or the Church. Our Church should do a great deal in order not to be late, as it has sometimes been late in the past. Today, the question of people's trust in the episcopate is being decided. There is a program: it is a program for renovating intra-church life, adopted at the Local Council in 1988 and, mainly, at the Higher Clergy Council in 1989. Unfortunately, the broad public is virtually uninformed about it. I know there is a viewpoint that our hierarchy is not striving much toward restructuring within the Church. This is not so.

Over 70 years, many of our church structures were destroyed, in particular, the life of the parish. The Church is all the believing people, and should help liberate the tremendous spiritual, cultural, and moral potential, so necessary for our society today.

The Church should really open itself. It is impossible to do this, occasionally participating first in some kind of fund, then in some kind of measure.

Organization of a system of religious instruction, of the free education of children, youth, and adults is needed. The church should also participate in secular general educational programs.

The people need the Church. Thus, a ceremonial requiem was given on 24 December at the Smolensk Cathedral, in memory of a decade since the start of the war in Afghanistan, on the initiative of a regional Smolensk group of Afghans. Eighty-six people from Smolensk Oblast died in Afghanistan, 17 of them from Smolensk itself. Almost everyone who served in Afghanistan and remained among the living, their relatives, and the relatives of the deceased attended the service. After the requiem, we met with representatives of the Afghans and they spoke of their readiness to cooperate with the Church in matters of the upbringing of youth.

So it is that my hopes are tied to the spiritual renovation of the Church and of society. And my worries... Of course, they are about what is happening in the West Ukraine. Religious feelings are very strong feelings, and always in the course of history there has been a temptation to use them for inspiration, to stimulate a certain political activeness on the part of the people. Almost all religious wars were essentially such. As to that which is occurring in the West Ukraine: it is not a clash between Orthodox and Catholic, it is a political conflict, or rather, a conflict with an ethnic underpinning, in which confessional ideas and religious feelings are used to kindle the struggle.

There is only one solution: stop the violence. Violence cannot be a way to solve problems. It only casts everything into chaos. Violence is dangerous, because it always gives rise to answering violence. It is necessary to give people an opportunity to calmly, in a benevolent atmosphere, solve each specific problem in every church, in every community. However, it will be possible to reach an agreement only if the political stir is halted, and the authorities are obliged to help with this.

'Church and Perestroika' Conference Held

90UN0631A Moscow *LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian* No 50, 15 Dec 89 p 7

[Report by L. Popov: "Perestroika and the Church"]

[Text] A conference of the movement "Church and perestroika" took place in Moscow, including all Russian Christian denominations, clergy, and laymen. Representatives of the Patriarchate, Council of Religious

Affairs, academic institutes and many public organizations participated in the conference.

The conference went on for two days on the premises of the house of the cinematographers. From the speeches of the participants, who came from all corners of our native land, a dramatic picture arose of the state of the church in the Soviet Union. Many facts were brought out which attested to coarse meddling by local authorities in the internal life of the church, such as the designation of elders presented by a governmental institution, and selection and confirmation of vestries by the same institution.

Matters pertaining to the publication of church literature are extremely unfortunate, especially since there is a great awakening of interest in religion and church history in the country. One of the clergymen who spoke, Father Aleksandr Borisov announced that last summer he had to baptize 70-80 persons daily and that in some locations 200-300 get baptized. One third of them are adults, and practically none have ever held the Bible in their hands. The following figure was arrived at: In Moscow every month 20,000 adults get baptized. It was noted that this is a result of the abolition of the registration of baptisms. Those accepting baptism need not fear subsequent persecution. A well-known journalist, clergyman Mark Smirnov, gave examples of biased reporting of events of church life by the press.

Participants in the conference recommended changes in the legislation of 1929 on religious cults to exclude from criminal codes articles aimed against free religious activity (142 and 227 of the criminal code of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic) and to rehabilitate all those previously convicted for religious activity. Also to restore the old, pre-revolutionary name: "Orthodox...of Russia" instead of today's "Russian Orthodox Church." This ethnic designation never corresponded to the truth or to church practice.

As a result of the discussions a resolution was worked out. A desire for similar conferences regularly was expressed.

Orthodox Recount Uniate Aggression

90UN0619A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA in Russian No 49, 8 Dec 89 p 21

[Letter by the clergy, church workers and Orthodox believers of the Lvov Eparchy to the leaders of the Orthodox Churches and to the Russian Orthodox Episcopate: "To Prevent Fratricide"]

[Text] The people of our country are living through a very difficult period. It is defined not only by political and economic problems. We can not be indifferent to the fact that religious hatred, too, has begun to appear among our countrymen, leading to interethnic strife. One example of this is the problem being created by the so-called Ukrainian Catholic Church. Almost four centuries ago it forcibly imposed itself onto lands where the Orthodox religion

had been the indigenous creed time out of mind. But the problem is not confessional differences but the fact that the Uniates attack the Orthodox religion. This is evidenced by recent events in the Lvov and Drobych Eparchy described in the appeal by the clergy, church workers and Orthodox believers of the Lvov Eparchy to the heads of the Orthodox Churches and to the Russian Orthodox Episcopate. We reprint it here, followed by the editorial note describing events in Lvov, from MOSKOVSKIY TSERKOVNYY VESTNIK No 16.

We appeal to you with a bitter request on behalf of Orthodox Galicians from the Lvov and Drobych Eparchy and its 1,270 parishes.

The New Year's bell had no sooner announced the start of the first day of the second millennium of the Holy Russia that the Uniates, who are destroying the brotherly unity of Christian churches, decided to deal a blow to the Russian Orthodox Church, trying to split the soul of our believers and plunge them into spiritual, ethnic and religious strife.

Starting with the disorders in the courtyard of the St. Yuriy Cathedral in January, Uniate propagandists, with the help of Radio Liberty, publicly denounce our Russian Orthodox Church which in the persons of its pastors and hierarchs honorably withstood all the unimaginable trials and tribulations of history and did not allow our God-loving people to lose its soul, baptizing and wedding people and calling upon them to stand in the spiritual beauty of our Baptist, the Faithful Prince Vladimir.

Those who are trying to revive the Uniate Church, as well as their protectors who in those harsh days for our Holy Orthodox Church adapted to the spirit of the times for their own purposes and laughed at the clergy and believers, call the Russian Orthodox Church "the Church of Russian tsars", "Stalin's Church", "the Satan's Church" and "the schismatic Church", trying to alienate our Orthodox people from their long-suffering mother, the Orthodox Church, to split our conscience and to plunge us into a fraternal carnage.

Uniate leaders attract people alien to religion in spirit and religious fanatics, and call on them to attack and chase away Orthodox believers and their leader. On holidays, they burst into Orthodox temples shouting and whistling loudly and disrupting services in our temples.

On July 30, in the town of Yavorov, these so-called Christians burst into our Orthodox temple before the start of the service and destroyed vestments and other church paraphernalia.

The Uniates went so far as to declare themselves a Ukrainian Catholic Church in order to make our Ukrainian people think that the only true Ukrainians are Catholics. The rest are "enemies of the Ukrainian people." In this case, the question is who were Ukrainian Zaporozhye cossacks, whose duty it was to protect the Holy Orthodox faith from incursions by the infidels?

What to do with the Orthodox Taras Shevchenko, who decisively condemned the Uniate Church? Finally, what is one to make of Gogol's Taras Bulba, a patriot who executed his own son for betraying his Orthodox people? Today, the Uniates defile the memory of our Orthodox ancestors by holding sacrilegious rites on their graves. The Orthodox prince Daniil Galitskiy is next.

On August 2, when the metropolitan announced services in our Orthodox temple in the village of Mshan, Gorodskoy Rayon, the Uniates pasted fliers all over Lvov claiming that our leader was going to seize their church and called upon their followers to resist. Their plan was simple: they knew that it was our Orthodox temple but decided to foment disorder. Photographs would appear abroad, with explanations that this was how Galicians turned back an Orthodox cleric, "a Russifier of the Ukrainian people."

Having become convinced that under democratization they could attack the Orthodox Galicians with impunity, the Uniates at their rallies have begun to call rabidly for the seizure of the St. Yuriy Cathedral, which prior to the establishment of the Brest Uniate Church had been an Orthodox monastery. They think that once the cathedral falls, our believers would be cowed into turning the remaining Orthodox churches over to the Uniates.

Our clergymen are constantly getting death and arson threats over the telephone and unknown persons terrorize our clerics and believers in temples.

Even the son of the Polish king Sigizmund III young prince Vladislav wrote about Uniate terrorist acts against Orthodox faithful: "I know the history of the Uniate Church very well. It was introduced by force, without the consent of the Russian people." Today, violence is being perpetrated once again. The faith of our God-loving people is being defiled once again for the purpose of unleashing hatred and a fratricidal slaughter.

The newly beatified Blessed Reverend Paisiy Velichkovskiy had been forced to leave his native banks of the Dnepr as the Uniate Church was being imposed by sword in the Trans-Dnepr Ukraine. He vowed "never to live in lands where the Anti-Christ Uniates are triumphant." At the time of this new test we have the spiritual need to beg of you to redouble your holy prayers to the

Universal Lord that the Holiest Lord, with His omnipotent hand help us withstand and not succumb to the mortal sin of fratricide, finding salvation instead in the holy spirit of reconciliation, and exult in the love of the Lord who loves us. Help us with your holy prayers and your brotherly love in this trial.

With Fraternal Love in Christ, etc.

On October 29, extremist members of the Ukrainian Catholic Church burst into the Church of Transfiguration in the city of Lvov during religious services, expelled believers by force and seized the Orthodox temple. Services are being conducted in the temple according to the Greco-Catholic canon. Sermons contain insults to the Orthodox Church and its clergy and exhortations to seize other Orthodox temples in Lvov.

After the seizure of the Church of Transfiguration, Filaret, the patriarchal exarch of the Ukraine and the metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, came to Lvov. At the meeting with representative of the city's intellectuals, the Ukrainian exarch replied to the proposal to leave the seized temple to the Greco-Catholics, to avoid fanning passions in the city, that to give up the Church of Transfiguration would mean in this situation to condone illegal acts. The issue of the Greco-Catholic Church should be decided by church officials and not by those who are trying to earn themselves a dubious political capital. This issue would be raised at the meeting between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Holy See.

It was no accident that the extremists chose the Church of Transfiguration. Until his villainous assassination in 1948, the dean of that temple was Father Gavriil Kostelnik, a noted figure in the Orthodox Church and the spirit and the brain of the movement among Greco-Catholics (Uniates) to return to the fold of the Orthodox Church which had begun in the 18th century. Those who foment religious hatred want to erase the memory of that martyr of the Orthodox Church and the glorious son of the Ukrainian people.

The rayon soviet ispolkom condemned that act. Dozens of protests from Orthodox believers poured into the rayon procurator office. Unfortunately, the efforts of municipal authorities to resolve the conflict have been fruitless. Lawlessness goes on. The Lvov Orthodox community has appealed to the courts.

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